- PTAB · Oct 1, 2015 · IPR2014-00714 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
The Board canceled claims 11, 74, and 81 and denied substitute claims 154–156 because they broadened claim scope, lacked written-description support, and were not shown patentable over Mostov.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“A petition for inter partes review must identify “all real parties in interest.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide provides guidance regarding factors to consider in determining whether a party is a real party in interest. 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759–60 (Aug. 14, 2012). Considerations may include whether a non-party “funds and directs and controls” an IPR petition or proceeding. Id. at 48,760. Additional relevant factors include: the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. Generally, a party does not become a “real party-in-interest” merely through association with another party in an unrelated endeavor. Id. A party also is not considered a real party in interest in an inter partes review solely because it is a joint defendant with a petitioner in a patent infringement suit or is part of a joint defense group with a petitioner in the suit. Id. Whether a party who is not a named participant in a given proceeding is a “real party-in-interest” to that proceeding “is a highly fact-dependent question.” Id. at 48,759. There is no “bright line test.” Id. Courts invoke the term “real party-in-interest” to describe relationships and considerations sufficient to justify applying conventional principles of estoppel and preclusion. Id. Here, even assuming this contention is timely, Patent Owner has failed to provide any evidence, besides the mere fact that the other parties are co-defendants in a lawsuit or alleged infringers, to support the contention that Petitioner has failed to name all of the real parties in interest. That one fact, without any further proof of control or involvement by these parties in this proceeding, is insufficient to establish that Petitioner has failed to name” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“ii. Petitioner’s Expert Patent Owner asks that we “dismiss [Petitioner’s] Expert Declaration and disqualify [Petitioner’s Declarant] for making and using a false writing.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s Declarant falsely claimed that certain patent applications were patents by listing them under the heading “Patents” in his Resume. Id. at 8–9. A Patent Owner Response is not the proper vehicle to seek to exclude testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c). Moreover, even if it were the proper vehicle, we are not persuaded that the alleged “falsehood” that Patent Owner identified—listing patent applications, which are clearly identified as such, under a heading titled “Patents”—is, in any way, misleading. Thus, we decline Patent Owner’s request that we dismiss Dr. Vishwanath’s testimony.3 C. Motion to Amend As discussed above, in the Motion to Amend, Patent Owner requests” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“i. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Neither party puts forward a succinct definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s declarant, however, has put forward a detailed discussion of various references dated before April 20064 (the date Patent Owner now alleges is the priority date) related to subject matter of the ’990 patent. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20–74, 94–99. We have reviewed that discussion and the references cited in those paragraphs. We have found it accurately reflects the teachings of the references. Moreover, we agree with Petitioner’s declarant that the references are analogous to the claimed invention, and, as such, represent the level of skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that the Board did not err in concluding that the level of ordinary skill was best determined by the references of record); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91(CCPA 1978) (“[T]he PTO usually must evaluate . . . the level of ordinary skill solely on the cold words of the literature.”); see 4 We accept this date as the priority date only for the sake of argument. also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”’).” slip op. at 13
- ScopeMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“We agree with Petitioner and find, based on the Patent Owner’s own arguments, that these terms improperly broaden the scope of the claims. As Patent Owner explains, the added language is broad enough to include the removed items, and is intended to reflect the entire genus of “monitoring equipment” and “communications devices” that “are capable of communication and capable of receiving signals.” Mot. to Amend 4, 5. Thus, the claim has been broadened to not only include the listed species that have been removed, but anything falling within the claimed genus. Accordingly, we find that this amendment impermissibly broadens the claim. As for the second change in the claim language, we find that Patent Owner has failed to show why removal of the entire passage “wherein, the communication device receives a signal via any of one or more products listed in any of the plurality of product grouping categories,” would not impermissibly broaden the scope of claim 154. The deletion of this limitation necessarily broadens the claim in that limitation’s aspect. See In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“For example, a reissue claim that deletes a limitation or element from the patent claims is broader in that limitation’s aspect.”). Given that Patent Owner has entirely deleted this limitation and Patent Owner bears the burden of showing entitlement to the amendment, it was incumbent on Patent Owner to explain why removing this entire passage from claim 154 would not broaden the scope of the claim. See In re Bennett, 766 F.2d 524, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“[A] claim is broadened if it is broader in any respect than the original claim, even though it may be narrowed in other respects.”).” slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipation - PTAB · Oct 28, 2014 · IPR2013-00266 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision
The Board denied entry of substitute claims 20–26 as obvious, and granted cancellation of challenged claims 1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 17, 18, and 19.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1. the cleavable linker and the protecting group are cleavable under identical conditions Proposed substitute claim 20 recites, inter alia, “a base that is linked to a detectable label via a cleavable linker,” a “protecting group attached via the 3' oxygen atom” of the nucleotide, and a step of “removing the label and the protecting group of the nucleotide . . . under a single set of chemical cleavage conditions.” Mot. 2 (emphasis added). These limitations are similar to those present in original claim 1, which we construed in our Decision on Institution. Specifically, we construed removal of the label and the protecting group under a single set of conditions “to mean what its plain language indicates: removal of the label and the protecting group under a single set of conditions.” Dec. 6. Neither of the parties contested this construction subsequent to institution, and we discern no reason to modify our initial construction for the purposes of this decision. Proposed claim 20 also requires that the cleavable linker comprise a disulfide linkage, but does not specify the protecting group. Thus, “a single set of chemical cleavage conditions,” under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, limits the structure of the protecting group to one which can be cleaved under the same conditions as a disulfide linkage, but does not require a specific structure, such as a disulfide linkage.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“Illumina was essentially 100%. This is a significant and unexpected improvement over the disulfide cleavages of Ruby (~86%) and Herman (87%).” Ex. 2004 ¶ 84. There is no testimony, however, that the stated results were due to the claimed nucleotide rather than the reducing agent. While Dr. Romesberg refers to the “disulfide cleavage yield” as being unexpected, he does not testify that this yield was attributable to the claimed nucleotide configuration, rather than the reducing agent which performs the disulfide bond cleavage. Illumina has not distinguished the Vermaas results from the prior art by showing that the nucleotide is responsible for the disulfide yield, rather than it being a property of the disulfide bond and the yield being “the mere recognition” of the bond’s “latent properties,” which “does not render nonobvious an otherwise known invention.” Baxter, 952 F.2d at 392; In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Absent such evidence, Illumina has not shown that the claimed subject matter possesses “unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Galderma Labs., LP v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“After considering all the evidence as a whole, we conclude that Illumina has not met its burden in showing that the proposed substitute claims are patentable over the prior art considered in this Decision. The Motion to Amend is DENIED to the extent that it requests entry of substitute claims 20–26.” slip op. at 28
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,158,346 - PTAB · Jul 25, 2014 · IPR2013-00128 · APJ Richard M Lebovitz · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted cancellation of claims 1–8 but denied entry of substitute claims 9–12 because Illumina did not show they were patentable over the prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“[l]abeling moieties are favorably in communication with or coupled to nucleotides via a linker of sufficient length to ensure that the presence of said labeling moieties on said nucleotides will not interfere with the action of a polymerase enzyme on said nucleotides.” Ex. 2015, p. 32, ll. 10-13. Rabani specifically mentions disulfide linkages as useful when a cleavable linker is desired: Linkages comprising disulfide bonds within their length have been developed to provide for cleavability24; reagents comprising such linkages are commercially available25 and have been used to modify nucleotides26 in a manner which may be conveniently reversed by treatment with mild reducing agents such as dithiothreitol. Id. at p. 32, ll. 29-33. Footnotes 24 and 26 of the above quoted passage cite to Ruby, S.W. et al. (1990), Methods in Enzymology, 181:97, which is Exhibit 2016. Id. at 49. Footnote 25 references “for example, from Pierce Chemical Co., [ ] of Rockford, IL., U.S.A.” Id. Rabani, therefore, would have given a skilled worker reason to have used a cleavable linker with a disulfide bond to ensure that the labeling moieties on the nucleotides will not interfere with the action of a polymerase enzyme during the synthesis reaction. Church IBS cited Church as evidence of the obviousness of using a disulfide linker in a sequencing reaction. Paper 53, 2. Church provides another example of the use of a disulfide linker to attach a label to base of a nucleotide, further establishing its conventionality at the time of the invention. Ex. 1031, 17:10-18, 68:12-21. Church describes a working example in which a label was attached to a nucleotide base using a disulfide linker and then cleaving it off with DTT. Id. at 86:6-30. slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Unexpected resultsDecided for petitioner
“Secondly, the cleavage agents are different. The cleavage agent used in Ruby is DTT (Ex. 2016, 10, “Elution buffer” A and B) and in Herman, the cleavage agent is described as “a reducing agent such as DTT” (Ex. 2017, col. 7, ll. 47-48) with DTT being used in its example (id. at col. 10, ll. 47-54, col. 11, ll. 11-22; col. 12, ll. 3-8). Mr. Vermaas describes an experiment that utilized another cleavage agent, 2 mM tris- (hydroxymethyl)phosphine. Ex. 2028 ¶ 10. Illumina did not offer an explanation as to why the phosphine compound was used instead of DTT as used by both Ruby and Herman. Indeed, Church used DTT in a DNA sequencing reaction, similar to the sequencing carried out in the Vermaas experiments, providing an additional reason to have used DTT in Dr. Varmaas’s comparison to the prior art. Ex. 1031, Fig. 5; 68, ll. 12-13; 86, ll. 20-23. There is no testimony that the stated results were due to the claimed nucleotide rather than the reducing agent. Dr. Romesberg testified: “Therefore, the disulfide cleavage yield achieved by Illumina was essentially 100%. This is a significant and unexpected improvement over the disulfide cleavages of Ruby (~86%) and Herman (87%).” Ex. 2009 ¶ 74. Dr. Romesberg refers to the “disulfide cleavage yield” as being unexpected, but he did not testify that this yield was attributable to the claimed nucleotide configuration, rather than the reducing agent which performs the disulfide bond cleavage. Illumina has not distinguished the Vermaas results from the prior art by showing that the nucleotide is responsible for the disulfide yield, rather than it being a property of the disulfide bond and the yield being “the mere recognition” of the bond’s “latent properties,” which “does not render nonobvious an otherwise known invention.” Baxter, 952 F.2d at 392; In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Absent such evidence, Illumina has not shown that the claimed subject matter possesses “unexpected results relative to the prior art.” Galderma Labs., LP v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir, 2013).” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“Patent Owner bears the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the relief requested in the Motion to Amend. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Patent Owner, therefore, bears the burden of showing the patentability of the amended claims. Patent Owner must show that the conditions for novelty and non- obviousness are met for the prior art available to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed, not just the prior art cited in the Petition. See Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., Case IPR 2012-00027, slip op. at 7 (PTAB June 11, 2013) (Paper 26). Also, a motion to amend “must include a claim listing, show the changes clearly, and set forth: (1) The support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(b)(1).” slip op. at 6
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“characterizations of Figure 6 from Ex. 1031, and all arguments based on it be excluded as evidence from this inter partes review. Illumina argues that the Figure should be excluded “because it includes poor quality black and white reproductions of images that do not accurately reflect the original underlying data.” Paper 70, 1. We agreed with Illumina that the figure of Church is of poor quality and gave it no weight. We, therefore, did not rely on Figure 6 of Church in reaching our decision. Accordingly, Illumina’s motion is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 29
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,057,026 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2014 · IPR2014-00084 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding following settlement, without issuing a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A decision by the Board to institute a trial was entered on April 1, 2014. Paper 12. This matter, however, is in the preliminary stages. The parties have not identified any other related matters. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to enter judgment1 and terminate the trial without rendering a final written decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“to a settlement. On June 20, 2014, we authorized the parties to file a joint request to terminate and to file the settlement agreement as business confidential information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c). Paper 15. On June 20, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate, as well as a joint motion requesting that the joint settlement agreement be treated as business confidential information and sealed. Papers 16 and 17; see also 35 U.S.C. § 317; 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. With their motion to terminate and seal, the parties also filed a copy of a written settlement agreement. Ex. 1018.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,361,235 - PTAB · May 20, 2014 · IPR2013-00124 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted cancellation of claims 1-26 and allowed substitute claims 27-44, but denied substitute claim 45 as unpatentable over Behan.
RulingsFinal written decision- ScopeMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“patent claims. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(ii).” slip op. at 9
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“partes review must set forth “[t]he support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundMixed
“In order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on structural similarity, the prior art must provide a reason to make the claimed compound, and there must also be “„adequate support in the prior art‟ for the 7 P.E.A. Teal et al., (Z)-11-Hexadecen-1-ol: A Behavioral Modifying Chemical Present in the Pheromone Gland of Female Heliothis Zea (Lepidoptera:Noctuidae), 116 CAN. ENTOMOLOGY 777-79 (1984). Ex. 2003. 8 Yih-Shen Hwang et al., Structure-Activity Relationship of Unsaturated Fatty Acids as Mosquito Ovipositional Repellents, 10 J. OF CHEM. ECOLOGY 145-51 (1984). Ex. 2004. change in structure.” Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729, 731-32 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that the test for obviousness of a compound based on structural similarity is in accordance with the legal principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), specifically, that it is important to identify “„a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does‟ in an obviousness determination.” Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1356-57 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Thus, “in cases involving new chemical compounds, it remains necessary to identify some reason that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound in a particular manner to establish prima facie obviousness of a new claimed compound.” Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1357.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundDecided for petitioner
“We acknowledge that McMahon and the Zhang Declaration are evidence that the ordinary artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation that, because a compound is known to repel mosquitoes, such as Aedes aegypti, the compound would also repel ticks, such as Amblyomma variegatum. Claim 45, however, encompasses the use of isolongifolanone when R1 is a hydrogen atom and R2 is an oxygen atom, which is the same compound specifically taught by Behan. See Pet. 7-8 (showing the structure of isolongifolanone, and discussing how it is encompassed by the chemical formula set forth in claim 1). As discussed above, Behan teaches the use of isolongifolanone to repel mosquitoes or cockroaches. Patent Owner provides no evidence that ticks and mites would not be present on the same objects or areas where mosquitoes and cockroaches are found, which are the insects addressed by Behan. Thus, by applying the isolongifolanone taught by Behan to an object or airspace for the purpose of repelling mosquitoes or cockroaches, one would also inherently repel ticks and mites. “It is a general rule that merely discovering and claiming a new benefit of an old process cannot render the process again patentable.” In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the realization of a new benefit of an old process does not render that process patentable); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating in the context of a claimed process that was drawn to the same use comprising the same steps of the prior art, “[n]ewly discovered results of known processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.”). We, therefore, conclude that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the patentability of proposed claim 45.” slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,579,016 - PTAB · Mar 18, 2014 · IPR2013-00626 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Superior did not show a reasonable likelihood that the cited references taught layers permanently affixed together.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Based on the current record, we are not persuaded that Superior is reasonably likely to show that Seo teaches a flexible inner layer and an exterior hard layer permanently affixed together. As Speck points out, Seo teaches that it is “impossible” to apply a different material to the surface of the body base of the phone case. Ex. 1002, 2:7-9. Neither Superior nor Dr. Kazmer addresses this teaching or explains how it can be consistent with the notion that Seo teaches permanently affixing Seo’s soft silicone layer to the hard resin layer. On the contrary, this teaching suggests that a soft silicone layer would not adhere or bond to a hard resin layer, and thus must be attached to the hard layer in the mechanical manner that Seo teaches. Moreover, we are not persuaded that Seo’s mechanical attachment method is “permanently affixed,” such that the hard and soft layers cannot be separated without damaging the layers or the rivets that connect the layers. Superior relies on Seo’s teaching that the layers are “integrally formed” or “integrally attached” to support this contention. Pet. 10. But there is insufficient evidence in the record to persuade us that “integrally” attached necessarily means “permanently” attached. Moreover, the combination of the softness and flexibility of Seo’s inner silicone layer with the “impossibility” of applying that layer to the surface of Seo’s hard outer layer leaves open the possibility that the layers may be separated without damaging the layers or the rivets that connect the layers. Thus, we are not persuaded on the present record that Superior is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that any of the challenged claims is anticipated by Seo, would have been obvious over Seo, or would have been obvious over Seo and Cozip.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“the written description define the term. In the absence of an express definition, it is reasonable to consult a general dictionary definition of the word for guidance in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim term as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the art. Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “Permanent” is commonly understood to mean “continuing or enduring without fundamental or marked change; stable.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 922 (11th ed. 2005). To “affix” means “to attach physically.” Id. at 21. Based on these definitions, the ordinary meaning of the phrase permanently affixed would be “attached physically such that the attachment continues or endures without fundamental or marked change.” Thus, a flexible inner layer and an exterior hard layer are permanently affixed when they cannot be separated without “fundamental[ly] or marked[ly] chang[ing]” – i.e., damaging – the layers or the bond between the layers. For purposes of this decision, therefore, permanently affixed, in the context of claim 1, requires that the flexible inner layer and the outer hard layer cannot be separated without damaging the layers or the bond between the layers.1” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Based on the current record, we are not persuaded that Superior is reasonably likely to show that Seo teaches a flexible inner layer and an exterior hard layer permanently affixed together. As Speck points out, Seo teaches that it is “impossible” to apply a different material to the surface of the body base of the phone case. Ex. 1002, 2:7-9. Neither Superior nor Dr. Kazmer addresses this teaching or explains how it can be consistent with the notion that Seo teaches permanently affixing Seo’s soft silicone layer to the hard resin layer. On the contrary, this teaching suggests that a soft silicone layer would not adhere or bond to a hard resin layer, and thus must be attached to the hard layer in the mechanical manner that Seo teaches. Moreover, we are not persuaded that Seo’s mechanical attachment method is “permanently affixed,” such that the hard and soft layers cannot be separated without damaging the layers or the rivets that connect the layers. Superior relies on Seo’s teaching that the layers are “integrally formed” or “integrally attached” to support this contention. Pet. 10. But there is insufficient evidence in the record to persuade us that “integrally” attached necessarily means “permanently” attached. Moreover, the combination of the softness and flexibility of Seo’s inner silicone layer with the “impossibility” of applying that layer to the surface of Seo’s hard outer layer leaves open the possibility that the layers may be separated without damaging the layers or the rivets that connect the layers. Thus, we are not persuaded on the present record that Superior is reasonably likely to prevail in showing that any of the challenged claims is anticipated by Seo, would have been obvious over Seo, or would have been obvious over Seo and Cozip.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“The above images depict perspective and front views of the Cozip case. Ex. 1003 at 8, 10. Superior asserts that Cozip discloses a case with “an exterior hard layer ha[ving] four corner joints with cut-away portions.” Pet. 28. Superior argues that “it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to fill the shell and corners of Cozip . . . with the flexible layer of Seo.” Id. at 33. Superior, therefore, is proposing that a person of ordinary skill would attach Seo’s soft silicone layer to Cozip’s polycarbonate case, with Cozip’s cut-away portions serving as the “dispensing portions” as taught by Seo. Superior reasons that it would be obvious to fill permanently the cut away portion of Cozip with the flexible inner layer 20 of Seo to attach tightly and integrally the inner layer 20 to Cozip’s outer layer as taught by Seo. Pet. 39 (citing Ex. 1002, 5:9-16). But Superior does not explain how attaching Seo’s inner silicone layer to Cozip’s case would result in “permanently affix[ing]” the two layers together, given that Seo teaches that it is “impossible to apply different material to the surface of the body case.” Ex. 1002, 2:7-9. Accordingly, as with the grounds based on Seo as the primary reference, we are not persuaded that Superior is reasonably likely to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would “permanently affix” Seo’s soft silicone layer to Cozip’s polycarbonate case. Therefore, we do not institute an inter partes review on any of the grounds based on Cozip as the primary reference.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,204,561 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2013 · IPR2013-00234 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the instituted proceeding under their settlement, without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A decision by the Board to institute a trial was entered on September 25, 2013. Paper 17. This matter, however, is in the preliminary stages. The parties have not identified any other related matters between them. Under these circumstances, the Board determines that it is appropriate to enter judgment2 and terminate the trial without rendering a final written decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“to a settlement. On November 15, 2013, the Board authorized the parties to file a joint request to terminate the proceeding and to file the settlement agreement as business confidential under 37 C.F.R. 42.74(c). Paper 32. On that same day, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate, Paper 30, and to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential, Paper 31.1 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. With their motion to terminate and to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential, the parties also filed a copy of a written settlement agreement. Paper 31 (Exhibit A).” slip op. at 2
None
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.