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  • PTAB · Nov 18, 2020 · PGR2019-00048 · APJ David Cotta · PGR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish a reasonable expectation that doses above 300 mg/day of mifepristone could be safely co-administered with a strong CYP3A inhibitor.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The definition of a POSA that best incorporates both experience with drug-drug interaction and experience treating patients is Petitioner’s proposed multidisciplinary team. Patent Owner does not object to defining the POSA as part of a multidisciplinary team, so long as that team includes a person with experience treating Cushing’s syndrome, which, as discussed above, is appropriate. Tr. 38. Accordingly, we define the POSA as: a multidisciplinary team that includes researchers and clinicians in the field and is able to draw upon not only the individual skills of each team member, but also the specialized skills of others to solve a given problem. The 6 Claim 5 and its dependents are directed to “[a] method of treating symptoms associated with elevated cortisol levels.” Cushing’s syndrome is “caused by excess levels of cortisol.” Ex. 1001, 1:31–33. Accordingly, claim 5 relates to Cushing’s syndrome even if it does not specifically recite that the patient has Cushing’s syndrome. All of the other claims expressly recite Cushing’s syndrome. researchers and clinicians would have an M.D., a Pharm. D., and/or a Ph.D. in pharmacology or a related discipline. The clinician would have at least four years of experience treating patients with Cushing’s syndrome using mifepristone and/or CYP3A inhibitors. The researcher would have at least four years of experience studying drug-drug interactions involving CYP3A inhibitors.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

      “Further, if we were to consider Petitioner’s new argument, we would find that the claims do require safety, as entirely consistent with what both parties unmistakably understood, as evidenced by their patentability arguments throughout the proceeding (until Petitioner’s new argument in its Reply). In this regard, we note that the preambles in the independent claims at issue, i.e., in claims 1, 5, and 10, are necessarily limiting and we consider the scope of the challenged claims as a whole, including preambles, in our patentability analysis. The preamble in claim 1, for example, recites a “method of treating Cushing’s syndrome in a patient who is taking an original once-daily dose of 1200 mg or 900 mg per day of mifepristone.” Ex. 1001, 68:2–16. Claims 5 and 10 contain similar language relating to a patient taking an “original once-daily dose” of 1200 mg or 900 mg per day of mifepristone, although claim 5 is directed to a “method of treating symptoms associated with elevated cortisol levels,” and claim 10 is directed” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “In addition, when considering the recited methods of treatment (or controlling hyperglycemia) in a patient in the context of the specification, we interpret the recited methods to require administration of drugs in a manner that is safe for a patient. The summary section in the specification of the ’214 patent, for example, states that: concomitant administration of a CYP3A inhibitor such as ketoconazole and a GRM such as mifepristone is believed to be safe for the subject, and to provide the therapeutic benefits of both drugs to the subject, and may allow the reduction in the amount of a GRM, or of a CYP3A inhibitor, administered to the subject; such reduction may reduce the risk of toxic effects of the CYP3A inhibitor concomitantly administered with the GRM. Ex. 1001, 3:50–58 (emphasis added); see id. at 4:4–21. That disclosure, along with many other statements in the specification, clarify that safety and efficiency are important aspects of the recited methods, especially in relation to toxic effects that might preclude treatment in patients. See also id. at 13:1–3 (stating “Applicant discloses herein methods for the safe concomitant administration of both a glucocorticoid receptor modulator (GRM) and steroidogenesis inhibitor to a subject.”), 13:10–23 (same).” slip op. at 20

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “Our regulations require the Petition to identify “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” and “[h]ow the construed claim is unpatentable.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3),(4). A reply is not an opportunity to start anew, to fill in gaps or to remedy omissions in a petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1357 (2018) (explaining that “petitioner’s contentions [in a petition] ... define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to conclusion.”); see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 73 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf. We therefore decline to consider Petitioner’s belatedly presented new argument in its Reply that the claims do not require safety. See Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider portions of a reply declaration “rais[ing] a new obviousness argument for [a claim] limitation that could have been made in the petition” but was not); Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369–70 (concluding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider reply brief arguments advocating a “new theory” of unpatentability under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). Even if we were to consider Petitioner’s new argument regarding claim construction, we would not find it persuasive because Petitioner’s obviousness rationale incorporates an expectation of safety. Irrespective of whether the claims require safety, Petitioner cannot carry its burden to establish that the claimed methods would have been obviousness without establishing that – as posited in the Petition – the POSA would have expected co-administration to be safe.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 10,195,214 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 10,195,214
  • PTAB · Jan 11, 2018 · IPR2016-00084 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3 and 8–10 were not proven unpatentable because the proposed obviousness analysis did not show that the choices leading to everolimus were finite, small, or easily traversed.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “The facts of the case at hand provide a stark contrast. As we have found above, while the prior art recognized rapamycin as a promising immunosuppressant, it was only one among many possible lead compounds. Furthermore, the prior art shows that chemists were pursuing a number of avenues to increase solubility, including making derivatives but also other approaches such as formulation techniques or prodrugs. And most tellingly, in contrast to Bristol-Myers Squibb where the experts agreed on the type and location of the potential substituents, here the experts diverge significantly. As discussed above, we credit the testimony of Novartis’ experts over Par’s, and find that the options of substituent and substituent position would not have been as narrow as those proposed by Par. In sum, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made would have been faced with a large number of decision points along the lead compound analysis proposed by Par. The number of potential compounds encompassed by this decision tree is unclear, but would be far larger than the three compounds Dr. Jorgensen discusses. Only by making the “right” choice at each step would the skilled artisan arrive at everolimus, the compound of claim 10 and the basis of Par’s obviousness challenge. In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that the options faced would have been—in the words of the Federal Circuit—finite, small, or easily traversed. We, therefore, cannot conclude that the compound of claim 10, and by extension, the compounds of claims 1–3, would have been obvious to one of skill in the art as of October 1992.” slip op. at 35

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Par contends, supported by the testimony of Dr. Jorgensen, that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would generally have a Ph.D. in organic chemistry or medicinal chemistry or physical chemistry or a related field, or a Masters or Bachelor degree in chemistry or a related field and at least three years’ experience in drug discovery and design. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45). Novartis’ experts, with insubstantial exceptions, agree with Dr. Jorgensen’s recitation. Ex. 2092 ¶ 22 (Klibanov); Ex. 2093 ¶¶ 47–48 (Roush). We adopt the level of skill recited by the parties for purposes of our analysis herein.” slip op. at 13

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “Based on our review of the entirety of the record, we cannot conclude, as Par contends, that the C40 hydroxyl group would be the obvious, optimal, or preferred location for substitutions to rapamycin. Dr. Jorgensen’s testimony to that effect is premised on his assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have first narrowed the group of possible substitution positions to the C10, C28, or C40, because those are the hydroxyl groups of rapamycin. Ex. 1003 ¶ 142 (“person of ordinary skill in the art would have focused on hydroxyl groups on rapamycin as initial targets for modification.”). This statement, however, is based only on Dr. Jorgensen’s statement that the reactions of hydroxyl groups are “among the most fundamental and elementary reactions taught in beginning organic chemistry courses.” Id. Dr. Jorgensen provides no objective, documentary evidence that would indicate that starting with hydroxyl groups was an accepted rule followed by medicinal chemists in the field. To the contrary, Dr. Roush testifies that Dr. Jorgensen’s focus on rapamycin’s hydroxyl groups is inconsistent with the prior art as a whole, and provides multiple citations to the documentary evidence in the record supporting his testimony. Ex. 2093 ¶¶ 197, 206–216 (citing prior art modifications at the C9, C26, C27, C28, and C32 positions). For example, Ondeyka14 discloses demethylation of the methoxy group at rapamycin’s C29 position, while Caulfield15 discloses oxime substitutions at C32.16 We have weighed the testimony of Drs. Jorgensen and Roush on this point, and find Dr. Roush’s to be the more credible. While we agree with Par that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered rapamycin’s C40 position as a candidate for substitution, that site must be evaluated as one potential substitution site among many that were being modified in the field at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 24

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

      “obviousness challenge. In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that the options faced would have been—in the words of the Federal Circuit—finite, small, or easily traversed. We, therefore, cannot conclude that the compound of claim 10, and by extension, the compounds of claims 1–3, would have been obvious to one of skill in the art as of October 1992. With respect to the second ground of unpatentability, pertaining to the method of treatment claims 8 and 9, Par’s obviousness arguments are premised on the conclusion that everolimus would have been obvious. See Pet. 48–51 (“claims 8 and 9 would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in view of the art that makes the 40-O-2- hydroxyethyl-rapamycin derivative obvious”). As we conclude that everolimus has not been shown to be obvious, we reach the same conclusion as to the methods of claims 8 and 9. The addition of Hughes to the ground of unpatentability does not provide any of the teachings we found lacking from the art asserted in the first ground of unpatentability. As we have concluded that Par’s articulated lead compound analysis is insufficient to establish the obviousness of any of the challenged claims, we need not reach, and do not evaluate, the objective indicia of obviousness submitted by Novartis. PO Resp. 60–68.” slip op. at 36

    Patent outcomesUS 5,665,772 not shown unpatentable
    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 5,665,772
  • PTAB · Nov 28, 2017 · IPR2016-01096 · APJ Lora M Green · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 and 17–23 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not prove the claimed viscosity was necessarily present in either obviousness combination.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “In that regard, we note that Petitioner must “meet a high standard in order to rely on inherency to establish the existence of a claim limitation in the prior art in an obviousness analysis—the limitation at issue necessarily must be present, or the natural result of the combination of elements explicitly disclosed by the prior art.” PAR Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d at 1195‒ 96.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “In the Institution Decision, we determined that none of the terms in the challenged claims require express construction at that time. Dec. Inst. 6 (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that only claim terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy)); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner offers explicit constructions of several claim terms (Pet. 19‒22), as did Patent Owner in its Preliminary Response (Prelim. Resp. 9‒12). In its full Response, Patent Owner states that there is no need to expressly construe any of the claim terms. PO Resp. 13‒14. On the present record, we agree with Patent Owner and determine that none of the claim terms require explicit construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelOther

      “We conclude that, for practical purposes, there is little difference between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions of the ordinary artisan. Thus, our analysis would be the same under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition. In addition, the level of ordinary skill in the art in this case is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

      “Patent Owner argues also that objective indicia of non-obviousness, such as unexpected results and commercial success support the patentability of the challenged claims. PO Resp. 59‒61. As we conclude that the preponderance of evidence of record does not support Petitioner’s obviousness challenge, we need not address Patent Owner’s evidence of secondary indicia.” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 6,667,061 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,667,061
  • PTAB · Jul 28, 2017 · IPR2016-00558 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 2, 3, and 10–12 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish a reasonable expectation of success, and unexpected results supported patentability.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and the burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must establish the facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). Below, we explain why Petitioner has failed to meet its burden with respect to the challenged claims.” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “As discussed above, Grobelny teaches that the inclusion of a solubilizing group to a protease inhibitor compound having low water solubility for the purposes of improving water solubility and bioavailability of those compounds. Ex. 1022, 74:1116. In this regard, Grobelny provides general guidance for using a solubilizing agent phosphate ester salt to solve the solubility problem of amprenavir. However, the success of discovering fosamprenavir was not discovering a compound with improved solubility. Rather, the success was finding a compound that had the requisite bioavailability to treat HIV and minimize the development of drug-resistance mutations in patients.6 The evidence of record does not support a finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in developing fosamprenavir, a protease inhibitor prodrug having the same or improved bioavailability as its parent drug.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

      “b. Unexpected Results We further conclude that Patent Owner has demonstrated evidence of unexpected results regarding fosamprenavir’s improved resistance profile, pharmacokinetics, and side effect profile, which weighs in favor of patentability.” slip op. at 22

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedNot reached

      “PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude Ex. 1093. Paper 27, 1–6. Because we do not rely on Ex. 1093 to reach the final decision, we dismiss the Patent Owner’s motion to exclude as moot. IV.” slip op. at 26

    Patent outcomesUS 6,436,989 not shown unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,436,989
  • PTAB · Mar 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00258 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1–3, 16, and 17 not shown unpatentable under § 103 because Jin was not prior art.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference not prior artDecided for patent owner

      “are unpatentable, which includes the burden of establishing that any reference upon which it relies constitutes prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); see Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the challenger “bore the burden of persuasion . . . on all issues relating to the status of [the asserted reference] as prior art”). However, because Petitioner offered Jin into evidence, which qualifies on its face as prior art under §102(e), Patent Owner bears the burden of producing evidence supporting a date of invention prior to the critical date of Jin. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As discussed below, Patent Owner elected to antedate, and thereby remove, Jin as prior art by showing that the inventor actually reduced the claimed invention to practice prior to Jin’s 102(e) priority date(s). As a result, the burden of production returned to Petitioner to demonstrate that the invention set forth in the challenged claims was not actually reduced to practice as of the date alleged. Id. at 1380. In order to establish an inventor’s actual reduction to practice, Patent Owner must show: (1) construction of an embodiment meeting all limitations of the challenged claims; (2) that the invention would work for its intended purpose, and (3) sufficient evidence to corroborate the inventor’s testimony. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “Sufficiency of corroboration is determined by using a ‘rule of reason’ analysis, under which all pertinent evidence is examined when determining the credibility of an inventor's testimony.” Id. at 1170 (citation omitted). “[I]t is not[, however,] necessary to produce an actual over-the-shoulder observer. Rather, sufficient circumstantial evidence of an independent nature can satisfy the corroboration requirement. Furthermore, an actual reduction to practice does not require corroboration for every factual issue contested by the parties.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “[E]ach corroboration case must be decided on its own facts with a view to deciding whether the evidence as a whole is persuasive.” Id. at 1331 (citation omitted),” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “provided sufficient evidence to show that it reduced to practice an embodiment encompassing all elements of the challenged claims prior to the critical date of Jin, and Petitioner does not convince us otherwise. Accordingly, we find that Jin is not § 102(e) prior art, as Petitioner contends. Because Petitioner’s ground for challenging the ’556 Patent as obvious depends on Jin, we conclude that Petitioner has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable. F.” slip op. at 24

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Motions i. Patent Owners Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 74) Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1400, 1049, and 1051, each of which relates to Petitioner’s obviousness case. As discussed above, Petitioner has failed to satisfy the threshold issue of demonstrating that Jin, the primary reference relied upon in its obviousness ground, is prior art to the ’556 Patent. Accordingly, we do not address the substance of Petitioner’s obviousness arguments and, thus, do not rely on the challenged exhibits in our analysis. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion as moot. ii. Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence (Paper 75) Petitioner moves to exclude Exhibit 2207 (“Webb Exhibit 4”) which is purportedly an unredacted version of the TKT report (Exhibit 2115). See Paper 81, 1. As we have no need to rely on the challenged exhibit or associated testimony in our analysis, Petitioner’s motion is denied as moot.” slip op. at 24

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied

      “iii. Petitioner’s Request for Expungement of Papers 71 and 72 In its Response to Patent Owner’s Motions for Observations Regarding Cross-Examination of Drs. Carbonell and Webb, Petitioner requests that we expunge, or accord no weight to, Patent Owner’s Motions for Observations because Patent Owner “made no effort to faithfully quote any testimony, and its ‘observations,’ which are often crammed with multiple citations, improperly narrate and mischaracterize the testimony cited, are rife with legal argument, and include references to unauthorized exhibits.” Paper 80, 1–3 (footnotes omitted); Paper 82, 1–3 (same). Although we are not convinced that Patent Owner “color[s] so far outside the lines” as Petitioner contends, we do not rely in our analysis on Patent Owner’s Motions for Observations. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request is denied as moot.” slip op. at 25

    Patent outcomesUS 9,051,556 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,051,556
  • PTAB · Mar 22, 2017 · IPR2016-01245 · APJ Francisco C Prats · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner failed to establish obviousness over the instituted combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedNew argument consideredMixed

      “As provided in 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition or patent owner response.” Thus, “a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence will not be considered and may be returned. The Board will not attempt to sort proper from improper portions of the reply.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012). One indication that a new issue has been raised in a reply is where a petitioner submits “new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case” of unpatentability of an original claim. Id.; see also Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Board did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to consider new contentions and evidence in reply advanced to supplement unpatentability rationale presented in petition).” slip op. at 5

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that the relevant art is medicinal chemistry. Pet 12. As to the level of ordinary skill in that art as of March 15, 1996 (the earliest possible priority date of the ’551 patent), Petitioner contends as follows: [A] POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have a Ph.D. in organic or medicinal chemistry and at least a few years of experience in medicinal chemistry, including in the development of potential drug candidates. Ex. 1002, ¶ 13 [Wang Decl.]. The POSA would also include a person having a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree (organic chemistry or medicinal chemistry) if such a person had more years of experience in medicinal chemistry and the development of potential drug candidates. Id. With experience in drug development, the POSA would have an appreciation of the diseases and ailments a particular drug candidate is intended to treat, but would not necessarily be a medical doctor or clinician. The POSA would know how to evaluate the physical and biological properties of chemical compounds and would be able to conduct, or otherwise have access to resources that could conduct, in vitro and in vivo evaluations of biological and toxicity properties of chemical compounds. Id. Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not controvert Petitioner’s characterization of the relevant art, or the level of ordinary skill in that art, nor does Patent Owner advance a specific assertion of its own as to the level of ordinary skill. See, generally, PO Resp. Accordingly, when evaluating the parties’ contentions regarding the scope and content of the prior art, and the differences between the prior art and the challenged claims, we take into consideration Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill. We also consider that the cited references provide evidence as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Patent Owner (PO Resp. 38) that, given Kohn 1991’s teaching that “stringent steric and electronic requirements exist for maximal anticonvulsant activity in this class of compounds” (Ex. 1012, 2447), the expected substantial change to the conformation of the overall molecule is significant evidence that an ordinary artisan would not have been motivated to replace the methoxyamino group of compound 3l, the most potent compound taught in Kohn 1991, with a methoxymethyl group. In sum, we acknowledge Dr. Wang’s testimony, discussed above, that due to a methoxyamino group’s potential synthetic and stability issues, and uncommonness in commercial pharmaceuticals, an ordinary artisan may have had a reason to replace such a group with a more common and acceptable moiety, such as a methoxymethyl group, in chemical compounds generally. Nonetheless, as also discussed above, the evidence advanced by Patent Owner shows that, as to the specific FAA compounds of Kohn 1991, an ordinary artisan would have understood that compound 3l’s methoxyamino moiety was considered a basic C(α)-amino substituent that conferred significant activity to the compound, and replacement of that moiety with other substituents would have led to a reduction in activity. As also discussed above, Kohn 1991 teaches that “stringent steric and electronic requirements exist for maximal anticonvulsant activity in this class of compounds” (Ex. 1012, 2447), whereas an ordinary artisan would have understood that substituting a methoxymethyl group for the methoxyamino group of Kohn 1991’s compound 3l would result in a compound with a significantly different conformation and biological activity. Thus, assessing Petitioner’s evidence of a more general motivation for substituting a methoxymethyl group for the methoxyamino group of compound 3l, against Patent Owner’s evidence specifically suggesting that an ordinary artisan would not have viewed the posited substitution as being desirable, we find that the weight of the evidence significantly favors Patent Owner’s position. Overall, the evidence before us indicates that an ordinary artisan lacked motivation, as well as a reasonable expectation of success, for making the specific substitution to Kohn 1991’s compound 3l, required to arrive at lacosamide. That is, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the prior art of record would have suggested making the specific modification to compound 3l required to yield lacosamide.” slip op. at 23

    • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

      “this issue, we agree with Patent Owner (PO Resp. 56–58) that lacosamide satisfied a long-felt but unmet need in that lacosamide has been found to be useful for treating refractory patients for which other antiepileptic drugs were ineffective. Patent Owner’s witness on this issue, Dr. Bazil,20 testifies as follows: For many of my patients, lacosamide is a very important option, and it certainly fills a need in those patients who require a drug with the unique combination of properties as lacosamide possesses. Thus, lacosamide exhibits its biggest advantages in refractory patients. I have had numerous patients who were able to successfully control their seizures with lacosamide, but who had failed to do so previously with other antiseizure drugs. As director of Columbia’s Epilepsy Center, I have also heard many success stories from other neurologists about patients whose seizures were not controlled by other AEDs but were controlled when they switched to lacosamide. Ex. 2038 ¶ 79 (Bazil Decl.).” slip op. at 36

    Patent outcomesUS RE38,551 not shown unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  • PTAB · Mar 22, 2017 · IPR2016-01101 · APJ Francisco C Prats · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable: the prior art did not motivate the specific modification for claims 1–9, and the challenge to claims 10–13 was insufficiently supported.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedNew argument consideredMixed

      “As provided in 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition or patent owner response.” Thus, “a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence will not be considered and may be returned. The Board will not attempt to sort proper from improper portions of the reply.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012). One indication that a new issue has been raised in a reply is where a petitioner submits “new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case” of unpatentability of an original claim. Id.; see also Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Board did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to consider new contentions and evidence in reply advanced to supplement unpatentability rationale presented in petition).” slip op. at 5

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

      “In any event, Petitioner fails to explain adequately why the declarations of Patent Owner’s President, Shaun Kirkpatrick (Ex. 2185), and Vice President and General Counsel of a licensee, Paul Petigrow (Ex. 2187), are insufficient to authenticate the letters. Although Petitioner contends that “[n]either declaration demonstrates personal knowledge of the facts necessary to establish the business-records exception” (Pet. Reply Opp. 1 (Paper 81)), Petitioner does not support that assertion with specific explanation, other than asserting that Mr. Petigrow has worked for the licensee for less than a year (see id.). Petitioner does not, however, address with any specificity the substance of any of Mr. Petigrow’s other assertions, nor does Petitioner explain why they should not be credited. As to hearsay, as Patent Owner contends (PO Opp. 5–6), under FRE 703, the proponent of an expert opinion may disclose otherwise inadmissible evidence underlying that opinion to a jury, if the court determines that the “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial effect.” In the present case, Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Roush relied on Exhibit 2125 (see Ex. 2036 ¶ 314 (Roush Decl.)), and another expert witness, Dr. Vellturo, relied on Exhibits 2141–2170 (see Ex. 2132 ¶¶ 41–42 (Vellturo Decl.)). As is evident from our discussion above, the probative value of reviewing the documents substantially assisted our evaluation of Patent Owner’s contentions regarding skepticism. In addition, any prejudicial effect on Petitioner is minimal because we ultimately did not find Patent Owner’s evidence of skepticism to be probative. Lastly, we are not persuaded that Patent Owner’s alleged failure to submit controverting correspondence warrants exclusion of Exhibits 2125 and 2141–2170 under either FRE 106 or the Board’s discovery rules. FRE 106, which appears to be more pertinent to a live trial, as opposed to an administrative proceeding such as this case, provides that “[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” Thus, rather than providing a basis for excluding evidence, FRE 106 is a vehicle for entry of additional evidence, allowing an adverse party to a proffered writing or statement (in this case Petitioner) the opportunity to require entry of any other part of the proffered writing/statement, or any” slip op. at 47

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “12. As to the level of ordinary skill in that art as of March 15, 1996 (the earliest possible priority date of the ’551 patent), Petitioner contends as follows: [A] POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have a Ph.D. in organic or medicinal chemistry and at least a few years of experience in medicinal chemistry, including in the development of potential drug candidates. Ex. 1002, ¶ 13 [Wang Decl.]. The POSA would also include a person having a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree (organic chemistry or medicinal chemistry) if such a person had more years of experience in medicinal chemistry and the development of potential drug candidates. Id. With experience in drug development, the POSA would have an appreciation of the diseases and ailments a particular drug candidate is intended to treat, but would not necessarily be a medical doctor or clinician. The POSA would know how to evaluate the physical and biological properties of chemical compounds and would be able to conduct, or otherwise have access to resources that could conduct, in vitro and in vivo evaluations of biological and toxicity properties of chemical compounds. Id. Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not controvert Petitioner’s characterization of the relevant art, or the level of ordinary skill in that art, nor does Patent Owner advance a specific assertion of its own as to the level of ordinary skill. See, generally, PO Resp. Accordingly, when evaluating the parties’ contentions regarding the scope and content of the prior art, and the differences between the prior art and the challenged claims, we take into consideration Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill. We also consider that the cited references provide evidence as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

      “As stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” We, nonetheless, acknowledge Dr. Wang’s education and experience (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 6–10, Appendix A), and note that Patent Owner does not dispute specifically the accuracy of Dr. Wang’s assertions in this regard. We thus acknowledge that, as a general principle in the art of medicinal chemistry, an ordinary artisan seeking to develop a commercial pharmaceutical compound ordinarily would have considered the substitution of a methoxyamino group with another more common and acceptable moiety, particularly because of any potential synthetic and stability issues associated with the methoxyamino group in the compound. Petitioner, however, does not identify a specific reason as to why that substitution would have been considered desirable for any of the prior art anticonvulsant compounds taught by Kohn 1991, let alone compound 3l identified as the lead compound.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS RE38,551 not shown unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  • PTAB · Mar 22, 2017 · IPR2016-00204 · APJ Francisco C Prats · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable: the Board found no sufficient motivation or reasonable expectation of success for the proposed compound modification, and the challenge to claims 10–13 was inadequately supported.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not controvert Petitioner’s characterization of the relevant art, or the level of ordinary skill in that art, nor does Patent Owner advance a specific assertion of its own as to the level of ordinary skill. See, generally, PO Resp. Accordingly, when evaluating the parties’ contentions regarding the scope and content of the prior art, and the differences between the prior art and the challenged claims, we take into consideration Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill. We also consider that the cited references provide evidence as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 12

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “As provided in 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition or patent owner response.” Thus, “a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence will not be considered and may be returned. The Board will not attempt to sort proper from improper portions of the reply.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012). One indication that a new issue has been raised in a reply is where a petitioner submits “new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case” of unpatentability of an original claim. Id.; see also Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Board did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to consider new contentions and evidence in reply advanced to supplement unpatentability rationale presented in petition).” slip op. at 5

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

      “In any event, Petitioner fails to explain adequately why the declarations of Patent Owner’s President, Shaun Kirkpatrick (Ex. 2185), and Vice President and General Counsel of a licensee, Paul Petigrow (Ex. 2187), are insufficient to authenticate the letters. Although Petitioner contends that “[n]either declaration demonstrates personal knowledge of the facts necessary to establish the business-records exception” (Pet. Reply Opp. 1 (Paper 81)), Petitioner does not support that assertion with specific explanation, other than asserting that Mr. Petigrow has worked for the licensee for less than a year (see id.). Petitioner does not, however, address with any specificity the substance of any of Mr. Petigrow’s other assertions, nor does Petitioner explain why they should not be credited. As to hearsay, as Patent Owner contends (PO Opp. 5–6), under FRE 703, the proponent of an expert opinion may disclose otherwise inadmissible evidence underlying that opinion to a jury, if the court determines that the “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial effect.” In the present case, Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Roush relied on Exhibit 2125 (see Ex. 2036 ¶ 314 (Roush Decl.)), and another expert witness, Dr. Vellturo, relied on Exhibits 2141–2170 (see Ex. 2132 ¶¶ 41–42 (Vellturo Decl.)). As is evident from our discussion above, the probative value of reviewing the documents substantially assisted our evaluation of Patent Owner’s contentions regarding skepticism. In addition, any prejudicial effect on Petitioner is minimal because we ultimately did not find Patent Owner’s evidence of skepticism to be probative. Lastly, we are not persuaded that Patent Owner’s alleged failure to submit controverting correspondence warrants exclusion of Exhibits 2125 and 2141–2170 under either FRE 106 or the Board’s discovery rules. FRE 106, which appears to be more pertinent to a live trial, as opposed to an administrative proceeding such as this case, provides that “[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” Thus, rather than providing a basis for excluding evidence, FRE 106 is a vehicle for entry of additional evidence, allowing an adverse party to a proffered writing or statement (in this case Petitioner) the opportunity to require entry of any other part of the proffered writing/statement, or any” slip op. at 47

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “Having considered the rationale and supporting evidence advanced by Petitioner alongside Patent Owner’s arguments and supporting evidence, Patent Owner persuades us that Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the prior art of record would have suggested making the specific modification to compound 3l required to yield lacosamide. Petitioner relies on the uncorroborated testimony of its expert, Dr. Wang, as support for its contention that compound 3l’s methoxyamino group is an uncommon moiety among commercial pharmaceuticals that presents potential synthetic and stability issues, and also for its contention that the posited substitute, a methoxymethyl group, is a more common and acceptable moiety for pharmaceutically active compounds. See Pet. 44–45; see also Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 106, 107 (Wang Decl.) (citing no documentary support). As stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” We, nonetheless, acknowledge Dr. Wang’s education and experience (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 6–10, Appendix A), and note that Patent Owner does not dispute specifically the accuracy of Dr. Wang’s assertions in this regard. We thus acknowledge that, as a general principle in the art of medicinal chemistry, an ordinary artisan seeking to develop a commercial pharmaceutical compound ordinarily would have considered the substitution of a methoxyamino group with another more common and acceptable moiety, particularly because of any potential synthetic and stability issues associated with the methoxyamino group in the compound. Petitioner, however, does not identify a specific reason as to why that substitution would have been considered desirable for any of the prior art anticonvulsant compounds taught by Kohn 1991, let alone compound 3l identified as the lead compound.” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS RE38,551 not shown unpatentable
    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  • PTAB · Mar 22, 2017 · IPR2016-01242 · APJ Francisco C Prats · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable: Petitioner failed to establish obviousness of claims 1–9 over Kohn 1991 and Silverman, or claims 10–13 over those references and the ’729 patent.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Based on the record developed in this proceeding, we conclude that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 of the ’551 patent are unpatentable for obviousness over Kohn 1991 and Silverman, nor has Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 10–13 of the ’551 patent are unpatentable for obviousness over Kohn 1991, Silverman, and the ’729 patent. slip op. at 4

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “As provided in 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a “reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition or patent owner response.” Thus, “a reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence will not be considered and may be returned. The Board will not attempt to sort proper from improper portions of the reply.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,767 (Aug. 14, 2012). One indication that a new issue has been raised in a reply is where a petitioner submits “new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case” of unpatentability of an original claim. Id.; see also Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Board did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to consider new contentions and evidence in reply advanced to supplement unpatentability rationale presented in petition).” slip op. at 5

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

      “Petitioner relies on the uncorroborated testimony of its expert, Dr. Wang, as support for its contention that compound 3l’s methoxyamino group is an uncommon moiety among commercial pharmaceuticals that presents potential synthetic and stability issues, and also for its contention that the posited substitute, a methoxymethyl group, is a more common and acceptable moiety for pharmaceutically active compounds. See Pet. 44–45; see also Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 106, 107 (Wang Decl.) (citing no documentary support). As stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a), “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” We, nonetheless, acknowledge Dr. Wang’s education and experience (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 6–10, Appendix A), and note that Patent Owner does not dispute specifically the accuracy of Dr. Wang’s assertions in this regard. We thus acknowledge that, as a general principle in the art of medicinal chemistry, an ordinary artisan seeking to develop a commercial pharmaceutical compound ordinarily would have considered the substitution of a methoxyamino group with another more common and acceptable moiety, particularly because of any potential synthetic and stability issues associated with the methoxyamino group in the compound. Petitioner, however, does not identify a specific reason as to why that substitution would have been considered desirable for any of the prior art anticonvulsant compounds taught by Kohn 1991, let alone compound 3l identified as the lead compound.” slip op. at 18

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that the relevant art is medicinal chemistry. Pet 12. As to the level of ordinary skill in that art as of March 15, 1996 (the earliest possible priority date of the ’551 patent), Petitioner contends as follows: [A] POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have a Ph.D. in organic or medicinal chemistry and at least a few years of experience in medicinal chemistry, including in the development of potential drug candidates. Ex. 1002, ¶ 13 [Wang Decl.]. The POSA would also include a person having a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree (organic chemistry or medicinal chemistry) if such a person had more years of experience in medicinal chemistry and the development of potential drug candidates. Id. With experience in drug development, the POSA would have an appreciation of the diseases and ailments a particular drug candidate is intended to treat, but would not necessarily be a medical doctor or clinician. The POSA would know how to evaluate the physical and biological properties of chemical compounds and would be able to conduct, or otherwise have access to resources that could conduct, in vitro and in vivo evaluations of biological and toxicity properties of chemical compounds. Id. Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not controvert Petitioner’s characterization of the relevant art, or the level of ordinary skill in that art, nor does Patent Owner advance a specific assertion of its own as to the level of ordinary skill. See, generally, PO Resp. Accordingly, when evaluating the parties’ contentions regarding the scope and content of the prior art, and the differences between the prior art and the challenged claims, we take into consideration Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of ordinary skill. We also consider that the cited references provide evidence as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

    Patent outcomesUS RE38,551 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  • PTAB · Mar 9, 2017 · IPR2015-01853 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–52 of the ’703, claims 1–3, 5–8, and 10–41 of the ’826, claims 1–8 of the ’685, and claims 1–40 of the ’437 were not shown unpatentable under § 103.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts constructions for the following claim terms, “less than 15 milligrams,” “release profile,” “matrix,” “improving walking,” and “initiating treatment.” Pet. 18–19. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner has failed to provide an explanation as to why the identified claim terms require construction and why the Board should depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms. Prelim. Resp. 17, n.4. In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Patent Owner and determined that it was unnecessary to construe explicitly the claim terms for purposes of the Institution Decision. See Dec. Instit. 6 (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We also determine here that we need not construe expressly any claim term in order to issue a Final Written Decision regarding the patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “1. Level of Skill Petitioner’s declarants, Drs. Pleasure and Polli, testify that a person of ordinary skill in connection with the ’703 patent would have had an M.D. or Ph.D. in neuroscience or a related field with an understanding of pharmacokinetics and at least some experience in providing drug therapy to MS patients. Ex. 1023 ¶ 16, Ex. 1044 ¶ 13. Additionally, Drs. Pleasure and Polli testify that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had access to a person having an advanced degree in pharmaceutics or pharmaceutical formulation, specifically oral sustained release formulations, or at least five years of experience in formulating sustained oral release drug products and may work as part of a multi-disciplinary team. Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 16–17; Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 13–14. Patent Owner does not dispute this recitation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2042 ¶ 68 n.5. We adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art identified by Drs. Pleasure and Polli as it is consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected by the prior art of record); In re GPAC Inc., 14 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 14

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

      “In order for claims of the ’703 patent to be entitled to benefit of the filing date of the Provisional, the Provisional must provide written description support for those claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 120. To satisfy the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, and provide support for the challenged claims of the ’703 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 120, the Provisional must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. See In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 261, 262 (CCPA 1976); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563– 64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The primary consideration in determining whether appropriate written description support exists “is factual and depends on the nature of the invention and the amount of knowledge imparted to those skilled in the art by the disclosure.” Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 27

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

      “We are persuaded by Dr. Hayes’ testimony as confirmed by testimony from Drs. Pleasure and Polli, and conclude that the Provisional supports the CavSS ranges in claims 14–15 and 35–36. Dr. Hayes offers credible 34 testimony concerning how one of skill in the art would interpret Table 7 of the Provisional, which depicts essentially the same data as Table 3 of Hayes. See Ex. 2041 ¶ 17. Dr. Hayes interpretation of the data in Table 7 is supported by testimony from Drs. Pleasure and Polli that about two thirds of the measured data fall within one standard deviation and approximately 95 percent of measured values are within two standard deviations from the mean. Id. at 20–22 (citing deposition testimony from Drs. Pleasure and Polli confirming such an understanding). We agree with Dr. Hayes that “[i]n light of the fact that a POSA would immediately recognize that Table 7 of the ’894 Provisional (Ex. 1007-00045) shows possession of measured data beyond even two standard deviations from its reported mean values, a more complete view of the information reported in Table 7 would consider data dispersed beyond two standard deviations from the mean” to encompass a CavSS range from 3.7–37.8 ng/ml. Ex. 2041 ¶ 23. We are not persuaded by Dr. Fairweather’s testimony that Table 7 supports a CavSS of only 15.1 ng/ml to 26.5 ng.ml. See Ex. 1066 ¶ 21. Dr. Fairweather was asked if he could identify where “range” is defined as plus or minus one standard deviation, and he replied that he could not identify where he found such a definition, Ex. 2176, 44:13–22, but Dr. Fairweather confirmed such a definition is not how he would define “range” in his usual practice, Id. at 92:20–93:21. See also id. at 108:5–11 (conceding there may not be any document that defines “range” as one 35 standard deviation from the mean). When asked whether he could justify the range that he provided for CavSS in his declaration, Dr. Fairweather stated that he could not. Id. at 104:25–105:2. He testified that he conceded the smallest range so as to avoid a discussion of what’s the proper definition for range. Id. at 104:16–20. Dr. Fairweather stated twice that he was not a person of skill in the art and would not be able to answer what assumptions such a person would make when reviewing Table 7 of the Provisional. Id. 136:16–23, 138:14–139:7. Finally, Dr. Fairweather also testified that he could not rule out whether the CavSS data for the 10 mg b.i.d. dose described in Table 7 of the Provisional had a range of at least 15 to 35 ng/ml. Id. at 90:9–92:19. In light of these statements, we do not credit Dr. Fairweather’s testimony.” slip op. at 34

    Patent outcomesUS 8,007,826 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,007,826
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