• Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Eyesmatch Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00297 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not establish the claimed distance-based variation in the rate of image-processing steps.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Putting aside the controversy over alleged impropriety and sandbagging in connection with the District Court’s Order, which we address infra in connection with Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike, we find the District Court’s “mirror-mimicking” construction to be well-reasoned and supported by the record, and we therefore adopt that construction and its reasoning. As the District Court points out, both the “double the distance” and “same size” aspects of its construction are expressly discussed in the ’109 patent. See Ex. 2008, 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–27, Figs. 5A, 5B). So, too, is “flipping” or reversing of the image disclosed. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:46–51, 15:41–47). Petitioner does not dispute that the ’109 patent discloses these aspects of “mirror-mimicking,” or even that the District Court’s claim construction is incorrect. Instead, Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe ‘mirror mimicking’ [beyond plain meaning] since the prior art expressly discloses mimicking a mirror.” Pet. Reply 6. Further. Petitioner characterizes the claim construction order as “a report and recommendation” by a magistrate judge that “the district court judge has not evaluated or adopted.” Id. at 6 n.2.9 We address infra whether the prior art “expressly” discloses “mirror- mimicking” as construed by the District Court. We, however, disagree with Petitioner that we should not construe this term. Given the controversy over whether Petitioner has argued for a different construction in the District Court, we cannot agree that an explicit construction of “mirror-mimicking” is an unnecessary step toward resolving this controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803. We therefore adopt the District Court’s construction for “mirror-” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill would have combined these references “to reduce distortion and provide a realistic mirror image.” Pet. 14–17; Haram Decl. ¶¶ 110–117. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that by specifically disclosing “flipping” the image, Rosenberg is discouraging or teaching away from performing other transformations to achieve its objective of “replicat[ing] the performance of a standard household mirror.” See PO Resp. 32–33 (Patent Owner asserting lack of motivation to combine the references). A reference may be said to “teach away” “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Galderma Lab'ys, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed. Id. Further, when conducting an obviousness analysis, the Board must consider a prior art reference “not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). We are not convinced that the references before us “teach away” from performing the other transformations.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

  Patent outcomesUS 8,982,109 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,109
• Google LLC / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Eyesmatch Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00856 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations did not teach or suggest varying the rate of the claimed image-processing steps according to user distance.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner states that it “applies Petitioners’ proposed level of skill for purposes of this Response.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Forsyth Decl. ¶¶ 62– 63). For this Decision, we adopt the formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and applied by Patent Owner as consistent with the prior art before us in this proceeding.7” slip op. at 13

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Putting aside the controversy over alleged impropriety and sandbagging in connection with the District Court’s Order, which we address infra in connection with Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike, we find the District Court’s “mirror-mimicking” construction to be well-reasoned and supported by the record, and we therefore adopt that construction and its reasoning. As the District Court points out, both the “double the distance” and “same size” aspects of its construction are expressly discussed in the ’109 patent. See Ex. 2008, 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–27, Figs. 5A, 5B). So, too, is “flipping” or reversing of the image disclosed. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:46–51, 15:41–47). Petitioner does not dispute that the ’109 patent discloses these aspects of “mirror-mimicking,” or even that the District Court’s claim construction is incorrect. Instead, Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board need not construe ‘mirror mimicking’ [beyond plain meaning] since the prior art expressly discloses mimicking a mirror.” Pet. Reply 6. Further. Petitioner characterizes the claim construction order as “a report and recommendation” by a magistrate judge that “the district court judge has not evaluated or adopted.” Id. at 6 n.2.9 We address infra whether the prior art “expressly” discloses “mirror- mimicking” as construed by the District Court. We, however, disagree with Petitioner that we should not construe this term. Given the controversy over whether Petitioner has argued for a different construction in the District Court, we cannot agree that an explicit construction of “mirror-mimicking” is an unnecessary step toward resolving this controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803. We therefore adopt the District Court’s construction for “mirror-” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill would have combined these references “to reduce distortion and provide a realistic mirror image.” Pet. 14–17; Haram Decl. ¶¶ 110–117. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that by specifically disclosing “flipping” the image, Rosenberg is discouraging or teaching away from performing other transformations to achieve its objective of “replicat[ing] the performance of a standard household mirror.” See PO Resp. 32–33 (Patent Owner asserting lack of motivation to combine the references). A reference may be said to “teach away” “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Galderma Lab'ys, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed. Id. Further, when conducting an obviousness analysis, the Board must consider a prior art reference “not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). We are not convinced that the references before us “teach away” from performing the other transformations.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that step 1(h) is taught or suggested by the references cited by Petitioner or the testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Karam. We agree, instead, with Patent Owner’s argument that “a [person of ordinary skill] would regard the disclosures in Rosenberg relating to proximity detection to be in connection with turning on or off various display modes and not in connection with varying the rate of one or more steps that are performed to transform a series of captured images of a user.” PO Resp. 33 (citing Ex.1005, ¶¶ 25, 32, 56, 69, 114). This distinction was explored during the final hearing. Petitioner’s counsel confirmed that in Rosenberg’s mirror mode, the rate of performing the processing steps does not vary: [THE BOARD]: It’s true that when the -- when Rosenberg is acting in the mirror mode, it’s always at the same rate, correct? It’s always performing those three processing steps at the same rate? [COUNSEL]: Correct. Hearing Tr. 34:13–16. We conclude that Rosenberg fails to disclose or suggest step 1(h) for the reasons given by Patent Owner and summarized above. We agree with Patent Owner’s analysis that in Rosenberg, when the mirror is off the processing steps are not performed, and when the mirror is on, the steps are performed “at an invariant rate.” PO Sur-reply 18–19.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 8,982,109 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,109
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,129,825
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,202
• Bright Data Ltd. v. Oxylabs, UabNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2024 · IPR2023-00186 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Scoda did not disclose the claimed interception limitation and Hallak did not disclose execution of the removed script after removal.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the invention of the ’091 patent would have had master’s degree or higher in the field of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, or would have had a bachelor’s degree in the same fields and two or more years of experience in internet communications. Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 30–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. We adopt the level of ordinary skill as articulated by Petitioner because, based on the current record, this proposal appears to be consistent with the ’091 patent and the prior art of record and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Williams.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We find that the parties’ agreed upon construction is supported by the record before us and apply it in our patentability analysis below, requiring the embedded script to be removed before that script is executed. We determine that no other claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “during trial, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Scoda discloses intercepting a web page sent from a We agree with Patent Owner that portions of Scoda cited in the Petition do not disclose a web page, let alone one sent from a server and addressed to a client browser. See PO Resp. 17; Tr. 73:10–23. Scoda discloses that “[t]he core module 21 is executed by the web content proxy server 12 to determine where to provide the response with the executed JavaScript functionality in the exemplary environment 10, such as to a web browser on one of the client devices 14(1)–14(n).” Ex. 1016 ¶ 55. But this functionality does not refer to a web page from a server. Instead, this discussion is about a HTTP request that comes from a client device and may include one or more hidden JavaScript identifiers. See id. ¶¶ 50–55. The discussion about providing a response to a web browser on a client device refers to a response to the client device’s HTTP request, in the form of an error message, that is sent from the proxy server to client device. Id. ¶ 58. As Patent Owner points out, this is one of the two scenarios presented in Scoda, the other one being that HTTP request is sent to the server. Id.; PO Resp. 36; see also Ex. 2009 ¶ 70. We agree with Patent Owner and Dr. Almeroth that these communications between the client and proxy server or the proxy server and the content server do not disclose the “intercepting” limitation.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDenied

    “deficient, Petitioner attempts to change the focus of its argument. Pet. Reply 2–3. Petitioner instead relies on Figure 8 and related discussion as “Scoda’s disclosure of proxy server 12 processing a web page that was sent from a web server.” Id. Scoda, and Petitioner’s argument based on this disclosure is, therefore, an untimely new argument presented in the Reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369 (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’”) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 9,516,091 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Enfish · Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,516,091
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Almondnet, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 2, 2024 · IPR2022-01259 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 35–51 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not show that the claimed computers automatically authorize a distinct third-party second media property to allow ad display.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Having considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with Petitioner that the recited “system” of claim 35 does not necessarily exclude a “third-party second media property.” As Petitioner points out, claim 35 uses the open-ended transitional phrase “comprising,” such that the recited “system comprising one or more computers” may include components other than the recited “one or more computers.” See Pet. Reply 1 (citing CIAS, Inc. v. All. Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Moreover, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “programmed to implement a method of directing electronic advertisements” more naturally modifies “one or more computers,” rather than “system.” Id. at 3. Nonetheless, it is clear from the plain language of claim 35, as well as from the prosecution history of the related ’745 patent, that the third-party second media property must be distinct from such “one or more computers.” Petitioner’s repeated use of the abbreviation “TPSMP” obscures the fact that claim 35 does not simply recite a “second media property” but instead specifically recites a “third-party second media property.” Ex. 1001, 16:18–19 (emphasis added). Highlighting the significance of the modifier “third-party,” as Patent Owner points out, is the fact that that modifier was added to “second media property” in the phrase “automatically electronically authorizing, with at least one of the computers, a third party second media property to allow display, to the electronic visitor when later visiting the second media property, of an advertisement” in an Examiner’s amendment during prosecution of the ’822 patent’s grandparent ’286 application to avoid certain prior art, and the prosecution record of the ’286 application reflects that this amendment was made to make it clear that the recited “authorizing is being done of an unrelated site.” Ex. 2005, 58; see PO Resp. 10–11. More particularly, as Patent Owner points out, the applicant stated in the cited examiner interview report that “the claim structure already made [it] clear” that “the authorizing is being done of an unrelated site . . . because the phrase ‘authorizing’ a site does not seem to cover a site deciding something on its own,” but that the amendment to specify a “third party second media property” made that requirement “explicit.” Ex. 2005, 58; see PO Resp. 7–8 (quoting the same).” slip op. at 23

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “We adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, minus the phrases “at least” modifying the education and “or more” modifying the number of years of experience. As we explained in our Institution Decision, although Petitioner’s articulation otherwise appears consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the asserted prior art, inclusion of such qualifiers render the articulation vague by being open-ended thus encompassing the level of education and experience of an expert, someone with more than ordinary skill in the art. See Dec. 12. Thus, in summary, we find that one with ordinary skill in the art at the pertinent time period would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or the equivalent, and two years of experience with designing, programming, configuration, and/or analysis/research with Internet or similar network-related processes including, for example, user/entity profile management and/or web-based targeted content delivery, or a related field, where more education could supplement practical experience and vice versa.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Having considered the parties’ respective contentions in light of the evidence of record, we conclude that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 35 is unpatentable over the combination of Perry, Wilson, and Bronson. In particular, we are not persuaded that the cited prior art teaches or suggests “a system comprising one or more computers programmed to implement a method . . . comprising: . . . automatically electronically authorizing a third-party second media property to allow display . . . of an advertisement correlated with the profile-attribute information received about the visitor.” Although Figure 1 of Perry depicts a “system” that includes computers programmed to implement a method of distributing advertisements to users over the Internet, we are not persuaded that any component in that system implements a method that includes “automatically electronically authorizing a third-party second media property” to display such advertisements. As Patent Owner points out, Petitioner identifies “Internet publisher computer systems 131 and 132” and “advertising service company computer system 140 comprising one or more CPUs 141” as the recited “one or more computers.” Pet. 7; PO Resp. 11. Although there is no dispute that Publisher Systems 131 and 132 and ASC 140 are computers, we find that neither satisfies the remaining limitations of claim 35, particularly because neither “automatically electronically authoriz[es] a third-party second media property” to display advertisements. As we explain in our claim construction discussion above, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the recited “system” necessarily must exclude the “third-party second media server.” See supra § III.C. Nonetheless, the third-party second media server still must be separate and distinct from the “one or more computers programmed to implement [the recited] method,” lest the modifier “third-party” be rendered meaningless.” slip op. at 54

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Further, Patent Owner did not present Mr. Sherwood as an expert on patent law or claim drafting, and we decline to give substantial weight to his testimony on this issue that is ultimately a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (ruling that the interpretation of patent claims is a matter of law to be determined exclusively by the courts). Still further, Petitioner’s counsel conceded that the formatting of the claim is not dispositive. Tr. 14:14–18.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 8,200,822 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,200,822
• Nearmap US, Inc. v. Pictometry International Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00735 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 were not shown unpatentable because the Snavely-based combinations did not teach a “primary oblique image” as construed.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s construction of the term “primary oblique image” as “a displayed oblique image that can be considered ‘in front of’ the other displayed images.” This construction is supported by the ’518 patent Specification, which includes a listing of “Terminology” that contains the following definition for the term “primary oblique image”: Primary oblique image—a displayed oblique image that can be considered ‘in front of’ the other displayed images. The primary oblique image can also be a master image. Ex. 1001, 6:25:31–34.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on the full trial record, we find that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the proposed combination includes a “primary oblique image” as properly construed. As discussed above, we construe the term “primary oblique image” to require “a displayed oblique image that can be considered ‘in front of’ the other displayed images.” See supra § II.A.1(b). In its papers, Petitioner does not demonstrate that Snavely discloses a “primary oblique image” that can be considered “in front of” the other displayed images. To the contrary, we agree with and find credible Dr. Bajaj’s testimony that the “main view” of Snavely’s Figure 5, which Petitioner points to as the “primary oblique image,” is “behind the other displayed images in overlay panes,” such as the information pane, thumbnail pane, and map pane, and “therefore, necessarily cannot be considered ‘in front of’ the other displayed images.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 60; see Ex. 1004, Fig. 5; PO Resp. 26. Our conclusion is also supported by the fact that Snavely refers to the information, map, and thumbnail panes as “overlay panes.” Ex. 1004, 5 (“The components of this window are the main view, which fills the window, and three overlay panes: an information and search pane on the left, a thumbnail pane along the bottom, and a map pane in the upper-right corner.”). We agree with and find credible Dr. Bajaj’s testimony that Snavely’s description of these panes as “overlay” panes confirms that “the main view image is behind the images shown in the map pane, the information pane, and the thumbnail pane.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 61 (citing Ex. 1004, 5). Additional support is found in Dr. Forsyth’s deposition testimony, where he explained that one of ordinary skill would have understood “overlay panes” to be “on top of” a main display:” slip op. at 38

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “E. Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike and Motion to Exclude Patent Owner filed a Motion to Strike certain portions of the Third Munford Declaration (Exhibit 1020) and its Appendices, which Petitioner submitted to show that Snavely and Irani were publicly accessible before the critical date of the ’518 patent. Paper 30. Patent Owner also filed a Motion to Exclude certain Appendices of the Second Munford Declaration (Exhibit 1016) and Third Munford Declaration, which Petitioner also submitted to show public accessibility of Snavely and Irani. Paper 35. Because, as discussed above, we find that Petitioner has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims would have been obvious over Snavely, Balfour, Irani, and Yelton, we need not reach whether Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Snavely and Irani were publicly accessible before the critical date. We, therefore, deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike and Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 8,593,518 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,593,518
• Bank Of America, N.A. v. Nant Holdings IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2023 · IPR2021-01304 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 10, 12, 13, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to prove a rational reason to combine Ogasawara and Bolle or a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDenied

    “We credit Dr. Bajaj’s (Patent Owner’s expert) testimony that Bolle requires a stationary camera and spatially registered images for purposes of segmentation via Bolle’s Figure 3a and 3b embodiments, which we find to be well-aligned with Bolle’s disclosure and the complete record before us. See, e.g., Ex. 2007 ¶ 33. We find Dr. Bajaj’s testimony on this issue much more credible than Dr. Rodriguez’s (Petitioner’s expert) testimony to the contrary, which we find to be misaligned at best with Bolle’s explicit disclosures discussed above. See, e.g., Ex. 1050 ¶ 51 (Dr. Rodriguez testifying that Bolle’s Figure 4 shows a stationary camera, but Bolle allegedly is not limited to using a stationary camera; and that Bolle’s segmentation techniques do not require “exact alignment,” merely “approximate[]” alignment of images, without explaining how or why the skilled artisan would have interpreted Bolle in that way); Ex. 2008, 97:22– 99:6 (testifying on re-direct to the same); see also Skky, Inc. v. MindGeek, S.A.R.L., 859 F.3d 1014, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (the Board is “not required to credit [a party’s] expert evidence simply because [the party] offered it”); TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This court’s opinions have repeatedly recognized that conclusory expert testimony is inadequate to support an obviousness determination on substantial evidence review.”); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 42

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Considering the subject matter of the ’036 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s unopposed proposed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which also is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Rodriguez (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–47).” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “in the District Court Case entered a Markman order construing the Recognizes Limitation, among others. See Ex. 2006, 16–18, 21–22.4 Specifically, the court construed the Recognizes Limitation to mean “recognizes the target as a known target from the target database based on comparing parameters derived from the digital representation to recognition parameters associated with the known targets to find a match.” Ex. 2006, 21–22 (emphasis added). As explained in our Institution Decision (Dec. 17–19), we have reviewed the district court’s reasoning, as well as the ’036 patent and other evidence of record before us, and agree that for reasons given by the district court, the Recognizes Limitation should be given the same construction as determined by the district court. Neither 4 Unless otherwise specified, citations to exhibits use the page numbers assigned by the parties, not the original page numbers. party since has urged (or persuaded) us to revise this construction. Based on the complete record before us, we continue to construe the Recognizes Limitation to mean “recognizes the target as a known target from the target database based on comparing parameters derived from the digital representation to recognition parameters associated with the known targets to find a match.” See Dec. 17–19; Ex. 2006, 21–22. Both parties adopt this construction for purposes of their post-institution arguments in this case. See PO Resp. 18–19 (“Patent Owner and its expert apply this claim construction in their analysis in the remainder of this IPR, but do not necessarily agree it is correct.”); see generally Pet. Reply (arguing “matching” as per this construction); Pet. (same).” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “modifier. The definite article “the” can be used to modify something plural, e.g., “the digital representations.” Although in claim 1, “the” is used to modify a “digital representation,” that does not help the Patent Owner, because nothing in the claim excludes the involvement of additional digital representations while one “digital representation” is analyzed. Patent Owner points to nothing in claim 1 which restricts the analyzing to “only” one digital representation or “no more” than one digital representation, and we see none. Further, claim 1 uses the non-limiting phrase “comprising,” which creates a presumption that the claim is not limited to only those elements expressly recited in the claim. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We recognize that the only embodiment described in the specification of the ’036 patent analyzes only a single digital representation, but we are not required to construe the claim as limited to just that embodiment. Innova/Pre Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1121–22 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Such a construction is neither encouraged nor presumed. Id. Additionally, Patent Owner points to no expressions of disavowal either in the prosecution history or in the specification of the ’036 patent with regard to “a digital representation” in which the patent applicant disavows, with clarity, claim scope covering analysis of more than one digital representation. For the foregoing reasons, we disagree with Patent Owner, and we determine that analyzing “a digital representation” as recited in claim 1 does not preclude involvement of an additional digital representation or digital representations in the analysis.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,478,036 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,478,036
• Bank Of America, N.A. v. Nant Holdings IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 9, 2023 · IPR2021-01081 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 18, and 20 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a rational reason to combine the references and a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “imaging device (camera) to obtain two images for purposes of segmentation via Bolle’s Figure 3a and 3b embodiments, and that Ogasawara teaches using a mobile device to obtain a single image for purposes of pattern recognition. Bolle itself explicitly states that the object, background, and image input device “should be at the same position” when acquiring the first/dark image and second/light image, and that the two images must be spatially registered (explained above). Ex. 1006, 10:31–44; see id. at 9:48–51 (“By placing the object 131 on the surface 405, the distance 407 between camera 120 and object 131 remains fixed thus providing the means for repeatable imaging.”). We credit Dr. Bajaj’s (Patent Owner’s expert) testimony that Bolle requires a stationary camera and spatially registered images for purposes of segmentation via Bolle’s Figure 3a and 3b embodiments, which we find to be well-aligned with Bolle’s disclosure and the complete record before us. See, e.g., Ex. 2006 ¶ 38. We find Dr. Bajaj’s testimony on this issue much more credible than Dr. Rodriguez’s (Petitioner’s expert) testimony to the contrary, which we find to be misaligned at best with Bolle’s explicit disclosures discussed above. See, e.g., Ex. 1050 ¶ 66 (Dr. Rodriguez testifying that Bolle’s Figure 4 shows a stationary camera, but Bolle allegedly is not limited to using a stationary camera; and that Bolle’s segmentation techniques do not require “exact alignment,” merely “approximate[]” alignment of images, without explaining how or why the skilled artisan would have interpreted Bolle in that way); Ex. 2007, 97:22– 99:6 (testifying on re-direct to the same); see also Skky, Inc. v. MindGeek, S.A.R.L., 859 F.3d 1014, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (the Board is “not required to credit [a party’s] expert evidence simply because [the party] offered it”); TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This court’s opinions have repeatedly recognized that conclusory expert testimony is inadequate to support an obviousness determination on substantial evidence review.”); MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 780 F.3d 1159, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 41

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Paragraph 37 of Exhibit 2006 that ‘a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that a wireless videophone available in the late-1990s would have significantly less processing power than any of the hardware discussed in Bolle.’ Ex. 2006, ¶ 37. Dr. Bajaj, however, provides no facts or data to support this bald assertion.” Mot. Excl. 5. We disagree that Dr. Bajaj has to show more. As an expert in the field, Dr. Bajaj can testify as to his opinion regarding the state of the art at a certain time period, without need of specific underlying material. The subject is not one for which Dr. Bajaj needs to run an experiment to observe the results. In the absence of supporting material, the testimony may be challenged as lacking sufficient credibility, but the testimony is not inadmissible. In any event, as discussed above, our decision assumes that Ogasawara’s videophone has processing circuitry just as powerful as Bolle’s computer. The testimony did not result in any detriment to Petitioner.” slip op. at 60

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Figure 3a embodiment, Petitioner offers no specific reason, let alone a rational one stated with particularity, for why the skilled artisan would have turned specifically to Bolle’s “image segmentation” teaching of comparing two spatially registered images of a scene, one with and the other without an object present, as depicted in Figure 3a. Instead, Petitioner takes Bolle’s teachings concerning Figure 3a out of context, and argues only generally that the skilled artisan allegedly would have been motivated to use Bolle’s “image segmentation” (generically) with Ogasawara to achieve the invention of claim 1. See, e.g., Pet. 21 (Petitioner arguing generally that combining Ogasawara and Bolle would have “achieve[d] a system that could more” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 7,881,529 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,881,529
• Bank Of America, N.A. v. Nant Holdings IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 9, 2023 · IPR2021-01332 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish motivation to combine Ogasawara and Bolle or a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of ordinary skill in the art] . . . would have had a range of knowledge roughly equivalent to the knowledge and/or training of a person holding the degree of Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or equivalent, and one to two years of experience working with image processing, image recognition, or a related field.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 53). In the Decision to Institute, we determined that Petitioner’s articulation is consistent with the prior art and patent specification and is supported by credible expert testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level “does not contend that an alternative level of ordinary skill in the art should be applied.” PO Resp. 18. Thus, we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. C.” slip op. at 11

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The district court construed the recognize limitation to mean “recognizing the at least one object in the scene as a target object based at least in part on the at least one characteristic of the video stream by comparing the at least one characteristic with characteristics of objects stored in a database to find a match.” Id. at 19. In adopting this construction, the district court remarked: “The Court agrees with Defendants that the ‘recognizing’ step requires querying a database.” Id. The district court rejected parts of Petitioner’s proposed construction there, finding no reason to change “recognizing” to “identifying,” and also finding no reason to change “based at least in part on the at least one characteristic” to “matching the at least one characteristic.” Ex. 2006, 17–19. With regard to the requirement of “finding a match,” the district court explained: “The intrinsic evidence consistently emphasizes that the system compares parameters in order to match a target object with an object in a database in order to ‘recognize’ the target.” Id. at 18; see also id. at 18–19. The district court also did not adopt Patent Owner’s plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner is correct that the antecedent basis in claim 1 for “the scene” is the earlier recited “a scene.” Patent Owner is incorrect, however, in characterizing “the” as a singular modifier. The definite article “the” can be used to modify something plural, e.g., “the scenes.” Although in claim 1, “the” is used to modify a “scene,” that does not help the Patent Owner, because nothing in the claim excludes the involvement of additional scenes while one “scene” is analyzed. Patent Owner points to nothing in claim 1 which restricts the analyzing to “only” one scene or “no more” than one scene, and we see none. Further, claim 1 uses the non-limiting phrase “comprising,” which creates a presumption that the claim is not limited to only those elements expressly recited in the claim. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We recognize that the only embodiment described in the specification of the ’004 patent analyzes only a single scene, but we are not required to construe the claim as limited to just that embodiment. Innova/Pre Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1121–22 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Such a construction is neither encouraged nor presumed. Id. Additionally, Patent Owner points to no expressions of disavowal either in the prosecution history or in the specification of the ’004 patent with regard to “a scene” in which the patent applicant disavows, with clarity, claim scope covering analysis of more than one scene. For the foregoing reasons, we disagree with Patent Owner, and we determine that analyzing “a scene” as recited in claim 1 does not preclude involvement of additional scene or scenes in the analysis.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “that Bolle’s camera and light source are stationary. The camera is stationary for a critical reason, that Bolle’s segmentation method requires spatial registration between two images taken by the camera. Ex. 1006, 10:31–34. Bolle explains: [T]he object 131, the background 312, and the image input device 120 should be at the same position in both step 510 and 520 to assure that the first and second images are in spatial registration. Suppose each pixel is numbered starting in the upper left corner of the image then proceeding across the first line then down to the second line in the manner of reading a book. Registration means that each numbered pixel in the first image corresponds to the same area of the scene (object(s) 131 and background 312) as the identically numbered pixel in the second image. Id. at 10:31–40 (emphases added). We credit Dr. Bajaj’s testimony that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Bolle contemplates that the image processing would be performed at the point of sale by a cashier, using a stationary device with a stationary camera, light source, and object platform.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 33. The testimony is supported by Figures 1 and 4 of Bolle. We credit that testimony over Dr. Rodriguez’s suggestion that Bolle discloses an embodiment which makes use of a mobile device for taking the images.” slip op. at 53

  Patent outcomesUS 9,324,004 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,324,004

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.