- Fujitsu Network Communications, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 29, 2015 · IPR2015-00727 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Capella’s rehearing request, leaving in place its decision granting Fujitsu’s motion to submit supplemental information.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“2. Discussion When rehearing a decision on a motion, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(b). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision from which rehearing is sought should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Here, Capella contends the following in its Request for Rehearing:” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner
“it made in its Opposition to Fujitsu’s Motion. In our Decision, we were cognizant that paragraph 166 of Dr. Ford’s Declaration (Ex. 1037) was not identical to paragraph 166 of Dr. Drabik’s Declaration (Ex. 1016). In viewing the differences, however, we concluded that the changes were not substantive in nature, and instead simply encompassed expression of content that previously had been incorporated by reference. That Capella may disagree with our conclusion in that respect, does not show that we misapprehended or overlooked any matter in so reaching that conclusion. Moreover, although Capella generally contends that the expression of the material in paragraph 166 of Dr. Ford’s Declaration presents a new “rationale” applied to the combination of Bouevitch and Sparks that is an “attempt to remedy a deficiency in Dr. Drabik’s original declaration,” Cappela does not explain what the new rationale is or what deficiency allegedly now has been remedied. See Req. Reh’g 3–4.” slip op. at 3
None - Fujitsu Network Communications, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Dec 29, 2015 · IPR2015-00726 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Capella’s request for rehearing of its decision allowing Fujitsu to submit supplemental information.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(b). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision from which rehearing is sought should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Here, Capella contends the following in its Request for Rehearing:” slip op. at 2
- Additional discoveryOther
“for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(b). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision from which rehearing is sought should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Here, Capella contends the following in its Request for Rehearing:” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner
“for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(b). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision from which rehearing is sought should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Here, Capella contends the following in its Request for Rehearing: First, the Board’s decision granting Fujitsu’s motion to submit supplemental information is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Board misapprehended or overlooked that substantive content was added to Dr. Ford’s declaration. Third, the Board’s continued reliance on Dr. Drabik’s declaration, where cross-examination is impossible, violates the rules of discovery, the rules of evidence, and curtails due process.” slip op. at 2
None - American Express Company / American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. v. Signature Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 28, 2015 · CBM2015-00153 · APJ Michael P Tierney · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–16 because those originally issued claims had been cancelled or amended during reexamination; it did not reach the merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We are persuaded that the particular facts of this proceeding counsel against institution. Our decision whether to institute a covered business method patent review must be based on the claims of the ’402 patent as it exists today. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Petitioner challenged original claims 1–16, which Patent Owner has either cancelled or amended during ex parte reexamination. See Ex. 3001. Original claims 1–16, as challenged by Petitioner, no longer exist, and any decision as to the patentability of original claims 1–16 we might reach in this proceeding would be moot and purely advisory. We do not see how the efficient administration of the Office, or the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding, would be secured by instituting a covered business method patent review in this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). In denying institution, we do not reach the merits of the unpatentability arguments in the Petition, and express no opinion on those arguments at this time. Furthermore, based on the current record, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner is not prejudiced as they may elect to file a new Petition directed to the amended claims.3” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,423,402 - Fca US LLC v. Jacobs Vehicle Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 18, 2015 · IPR2015-01337 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because FCA did not show a reasonable likelihood that Bowman anticipates claim 1 or that the asserted grounds render any challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“gallery.” Pet. 14. Patent Owner states that it disagrees, and instead proposes a meaning of “more than one solenoid valve connected to permit fluid flow into and out of the hydraulic circuit.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Patent Owner does not explain how its proposed construction differs substantively from Petitioner’s proposed construction. We determine no express construction is necessary for purposes of this Decision. 2. “normal mode”and “transient mode” Patent Owner also proposes constructions for both “normal mode” and “transient mode.” Prelim. Resp. 12–13. We determine no express construction is necessary for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review of claims 1, 3, 5–7, 13–22, 31, 35–50, and 53–56 of U.S. Patent No. 8,776,738 B2 (“the ’738 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, Jacobs Vehicle Systems, Inc., filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude the information presented does not show there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted as to the ’738 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Of particular concern is the limitation requiring “a plurality of solenoid valves in hydraulic communication with the hydraulic circuit.” There is no dispute that the claim requires more than one solenoid valve connected to a single hydraulic circuit. Petitioner identifies hydraulic passage 102 of Bowman as corresponding to the claimed “hydraulic circuit.” Pet. 15. Petitioner, however, fails to explain how passage 102 of Bowman (or any other passage) is connected to a plurality of solenoid valves, as further required by claim 1. A petition must identify how the construed claim is unpatenable, as well as the relevance of the evidence to the challenge raised. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (b). Although Petitioner provides a string citation in its claim chart to various statements in Bowman purportedly corresponding to the claimed “plurality of solenoid valves in hydraulic communication with the hydraulic circuit,” Petitioner offers no explanation relating the citations to the claimed language, and none is readily apparent. See Pet. 19–20. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Although figure 4 of Bowman shows a plurality of cartridge-type hydraulically actuated valve control systems mounted serially, Bowman expressly states that each cartridge module is “a complete unit in and of itself.” Petitioner has not shown that Bowman discloses “a plurality of solenoid valves in hydraulic communication with the hydraulic circuit,” as required by claim 1.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Although Petitioner does not direct us to any supporting expert testimony, we have also reviewed the Declaration of John J. Moskwa submitted along with the Petition, and find that it provides virtually no support for Petitioner’s contention that claim 1 is anticipated by Bowman beyond the statement that the declarant agrees “that the claim chart shows where every element of claim 1 of the ’738 Patent is disclosed in Bowman.” Ex. 1002, ¶ 28. We afford such conclusory testimony little weight.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,776,738 - LG Display Co., Ltd. / LG Electronics, Inc. v. Innovative Display Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 18, 2015 · IPR2014-01096 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 15 and 27 are unpatentable as obvious over Pristash and over Kobayashi in view of Pristash.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“persuaded us that applying the Phillips standard would affect our determination of this case. In fact, throughout this proceeding, Patent Owner has taken no position on claim construction. Prelim. Resp. 4; PO Resp. 6. The only claim term the Board construed in its Institution Decision is the term “deformities,” appearing in both challenged claims. Paper 11, 4. It was Petitioner who asserted that the ʼ370 patent “expressly defines” the term to mean “any change in the shape or geometry of the panel surface and/or coating or surface treatment that causes a portion of light to be emitted.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 4, ll. 36–40). Patent Owner did not oppose that construction. Hearing Tr. 45:20–25. In fact, Patent Owner pointed out that the construction of “deformities” proffered by Petitioner was agreed to and adopted by the district court. PO Resp. 7; Hearing Tr. 47:7–15. Patent Owner’s counsel agreed at the oral hearing that the expiration of the ʼ370 patent has no impact on that construction. Id. at 47:1– 18. Nor does Patent Owner seek any other particular constructions in light of the ʼ370 patent’s expiration. Id. at 46:9–19. In short, Patent Owner points to nothing that would change if the Phillips standard were applied. In light of the foregoing, we see no reason to modify our previous construction of “deformities” based either on the expiration of the ʼ370 patent or positions of the parties as developed during the trial, and adopt that construction for this Final Written Decision. Nor do we see the need to make any further constructions of the claims for the purposes of this decision that would be affected by the expiration of the ʼ370 patent or the Phillips standard.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“2. Analysis Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious to combine Pristash’s transition region with Kobayashi. Pet. 47. Petitioner asserts that this combination would have been obvious because “transition devices were known at the time for mixing and spreading light from the light source to the light guide.” Id. The Escuti Declaration (¶¶ 230–33) provides additional support for this contention.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments attempting to distinguish Pristash. Instead, we are convinced by Petitioner’s arguments, citations to the Pristash disclosure, and the testimony of its expert, Dr. Escuti, that Pristash describes a panel that meets this limitation. Specifically, Pristash, taken as a whole, discloses in Figures 5 and 6 the combination of prismatic deformities with other deformity types (e.g., lenticular) on the same side of the light emitting panel as this claim requires. We are supported also in this conclusion by the testimony of Mr. Werner, who agreed that a lens is a different type of deformity than a prism. Werner Dep. 111:12–17. At oral argument, Patent Owner’s counsel asserted that Pristash does not meet this limitation because prismatic surface 48 in Figure 6 is not a “deformity” as the claims require, but is itself the surface of the panel. Hearing Tr. 49:7–10. We are not persuaded by this argument. There is no requirement in the claims that the deformities be on separate surfaces, only that they be on the same side of the panel. Moreover, the ʼ370 patent specifically refers to “prismatic surfaces, depressions or raised surfaces of various shapes” as examples of light extracting deformities. Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 57–60. We credit also Petitioner’s evidence, summarized supra (which Patent Owner does not challenge), that the other elements of claim 15 are found in Pristash. We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 15 would have been obvious over Pristash.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“D. Real Party-in-Interest Patent Owner contends that the Petition is insufficient for failure to name two real parties-in-interest: LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A. Inc. PO Resp. 15. The identical argument was raised in Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 18. We determined in our Institution Decision that Patent Owner failed to provide convincing evidence that LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A. Inc. are real parties in interest. Paper 11, 16–17. Patent Owner’s Response relies on the same arguments and evidence that we considered in our Institution Decision. For the reasons stated there, we determine that Patent Owner fails to prove that the Petition does not name the real parties-in-interest.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 7,537,370 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,537,370 - Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien AGInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 17, 2015 · IPR2015-01275 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any of claims 1–18 were unpatentable, chiefly because the cited art did not teach the uniform-distance limitation.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“distance between the jaw members along the length thereof,” a limitation required by all challenged claims. Both the Specification and the challenged claims of the ’284 patent require this distance when tissue is held between the jaw members. Indeed, the Specification discloses that the stop members are “positioned to control the gap distance between the opposing jaw members when the tissue is held therebetween.” Ex. 1001, 3:50–54; see also id. at Abstract (stating the same), 5:3–6 (stating the same). In addition, claim 15 recites “[a]n endoscopic bipolar forceps according to claim 12 wherein the jaw members and the non-conductive stop members are configured such that the distance between the jaw members when tissue is held therebetween is between about 0.002 inches and about 0.003 inches.” Id. at 15:21–16:3. Thus, we conclude that the challenged claims require “a 5 uniform distance between the jaw members” when tissue is held between the opposing jaw members.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Patent Owner asks us to deny the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), arguing that all but one references relied on in the Petition were considered during prosecution. Prelim. Resp. 9–12. The statute allows, but does not require, the Director to deny a petition if “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). We decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition under § 325(d).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under the statute, an inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response filed [thereto] shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail” in the unpatentability challenge. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (emphasis added). In the Petition, Petitioner does not rely on claim 2 of the ’284 patent to support, as the dissent insists, a uniform distance between the jaw members. To the contrary, when discussing claim 2, Petitioner submits that this claim limitation is (a) not supported by the disclosure of the ‘284 Patent and (b) at odds with the requirement of claim 1 (and PO’s arguments during prosecution) that “the non-conductive stop members [are] configured to maintain a uniform distance between the jaw members along the length thereof.” Providing stop members of different heights as required by this claim necessarily results in a non-uniform distance between jaw members. Pet. 26 (emphasis added). As a result, the information presented in the Petition does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail, based on claim 2 of the ’284 patent, that an “island of insulation” of unknown size and location, is sufficient to maintain a uniform distance between the jaw members. We decline to join the dissent in reforming the Petition and rely on an argument Petitioner specifically disclaimed.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Fox and Eggers ’142. Id. at 14–18. Petitioner also refers to the prior art for teaching each and every limitation of claims 1–11. Id. at 18–32. Assuming, without deciding, that Petitioner has provided sufficient rationale for combining the prior art, we nevertheless agree with Patent Owner that the combination does not teach “non-conductive stop members configured to maintain a uniform distance between the jaw members along the length thereof,” as all challenged claims require. See Prelim. Resp. 14–26.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,241,284 - Christie Digital Systems USA, Inc. v. Cascades Projection LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 16, 2015 · IPR2015-01342 · APJ Howard B Blankenship · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1, 17–19, 27, 28, 60, 61, 68, and 71–73 and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial” (37 C.F.R § 42.73(b)(2)). No claim remains to be adjudicated in this proceeding. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1, 17–19, 27, 28, 60, 61, 68, and 71–73 of the ’347 patent; and” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,688,347 - Hewlett-Packard Company v. Yyz LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 16, 2015 · CBM2015-00050 · APJ Richard E Rice · CBM · Adverse judgment
The Board granted adverse judgment based on Patent Owner’s abandonment and cancelled claims 51, 52, and 55–57 of U.S. Patent No. 7,603,674 B2.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for such an adverse judgment include abandonment of the contest. We find that Patent Owner’s actions and admissions, as set forth in the Motion, constitute abandonment of these CBM Proceedings, and we determine based on such abandonment that Patent Owner has requested adverse judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) in both proceedings.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,603,674 - Hewlett-Packard Company v. Yyz LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Dec 16, 2015 · CBM2015-00049 · APJ Richard E Rice · CBM · Adverse judgment
The Board granted adverse judgment based on Patent Owner’s abandonment and ordered claims 22–23, 27–29 of the ’749 patent and claims 51–52, 55–57 of the ’674 patent cancelled.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for such an adverse judgment include abandonment of the contest. We find that Patent Owner’s actions and admissions, as set forth in the Motion, constitute abandonment of these CBM Proceedings, and we determine based on such abandonment that Patent Owner has requested adverse judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4) in both proceedings.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,062,749 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2012-00026 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 22, and 23 are unpatentable: claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 10 as obvious, and claims 22 and 23 as anticipated.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“permitted to consider the merits of Microsoft’s reasserted challenges on remand. First and foremost, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to the Board “for proceedings consistent with this opinion.” 789 F.3d at 1295. We do not interpret the Federal Circuit’s decision as requiring us to enter judgment for Proxyconn. Had this been the court’s intent, it could have done so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (authorizing appellate courts to “affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse” and remand). As the Federal Circuit recently stated regarding another remand to the Board: “The Board may control its own proceedings, consistent with its governing statutes, regulations, and practice. 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(a).” Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., Nos. 2015-1215, 2015-1226, 2015 WL 7148267, at *8 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2015). We also are not persuaded by Proxyconn’s argument that reconsidering the merits of the case in light of the Federal Circuit’s claim constructions results in unfairness or a “denial of due process.” PO Remand Br. 2. The guidance on claim construction provided by the Federal Circuit was based on claim constructions proposed by Proxyconn during the trial. See PO Resp. 11–16. For this reason, the suggestions that the claim constructions are “new,” or that Proxyconn was never permitted to address them, are unavailing. PO Remand Br. 2.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Finally, we note that persuasive evidence of a rationale to combine DRP and Mattis is found in the Long Declaration. IPR2013-00109, Ex. 1013, 10–16. Proxyconn does not challenge this evidence. We, therefore, conclude that, taking into account the Federal Circuit’s decision, Microsoft has demonstrated that claims 6, 7, and 9 of the ʼ717 patent would have been obvious over DRP and Mattis and are not patentable.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Unpatentable
“Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded that consistent with the Federal Circuit’s guidance, Mattis discloses a gateway and caching computer connected between “two other computers” as recited in claims 6, 7, and 9. Pet. Remand Br. 5 (identifying Mattis’ proxy server 30 and computer system 1100 as examples of the gateway, and citing IPR2013- 00109, Ex. 1004, Figs. 1–2, and 11, col. 1, l. 14–col. 2, l. 14, col. 9, l. 65– col. 10, l. 10, col. 27, l. 50–col. 28, l. 2, col. 37, ll. 26–31, and col. 37, ll. 42– 45). We are persuaded, therefore, that the Federal Circuit’s instruction that the gateway be separate from the “other” computers recited in the claims is met by the combination of Mattis and DRP.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We are not persuaded by this argument because it ignores the Pentium II implementation in Santos. We are, instead, persuaded that the use of a Pentium II computer to implement the decompressor as described in Santos meets Proxyconn’s construction of “receiver/computer,” and is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s guidance. For the reasons discussed supra, we determine that the decompressor machine in Santos’s Pentium II implementation is not an intermediary device.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 6,757,717 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,757,717
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.