- PTAB · Dec 27, 2022 · IPR2022-01147 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious over the asserted reference combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“at least a bachelor of science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related discipline, with at least two years of relevant experience in a field related to acoustics, speech recognition, speech detection, or signal processing.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education or industry experience may compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above.” Id. Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. To determine whether to institute, we also apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim Construction We need only construe terms that are in controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“The closest that Petitioner comes to addressing the recited VAD with Weinstein is by stating that “[a] POSITA would have understood that ‘there is no coupling of the desired signal into the reference sensor, i.e., when the actual coupling system H21 is zero,’ occurs when the desired signal, e.g., speech, is absent.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 92). Notably, the only support for this conclusion is the Kenny Declaration, which simply repeats this statement verbatim without any citation to the evidence of record. Compare id., with Ex. 1003 ¶ 92. We agree with Patent Owner that the “conclusion is wholly unsupported by evidence.” PO Resp. 12. And “[e]xpert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). But, even assuming Petitioner’s conclusion is correct and crediting Dr. Kenny’s testimony, the Petition does not explain sufficiently how a VAD signal in the Hietanen-Burnett combination is related to the period in which speech is alleged to be absent in Weinstein. See Pet. 25.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,019,091 - Apple Inc. v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 16, 2022 · IPR2022-01084 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 14–42 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)); see id. at 7, 9. The Interim Procedure also explains that such a stipulation (a Sotera stipulation) “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB.” Id. at 7. In this proceeding, Petitioner “stipulates that, unless the Board denies or later vacates institution,” Petitioner “will not seek resolution in the litigation of invalidity based on the specific grounds asserted in” the Petition. Pet. 98–99. Petitioner asserts that its “stipulation prevents overlap because it requires the grounds addressed in each forum to be mutually exclusive, thereby obviating the possibility of inconsistent results.” Prelim. Reply 4.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“purposes of institution that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reasons to combine Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings in the way Petitioner proposes. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–125, 145–147, 163–164. As Dr. Kenny explains, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have (1) “applied Visser’s cross filter w12 to Avendano’s second signal x2 to further increase speech content in the first virtual microphone Cf” and (2) “applied Visser’s cross filter w21 to Avendano’s first signal x1 to further decrease speech content in the second virtual microphone Cb.” Id. ¶¶ 120, 145, 164. As Dr. Kenny also explains, these modifications would have improved Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhanc[ing] the separation between speech and noise.” Id. ¶¶ 119, 163. Any “need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining” references. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. At this stage of the proceeding, we are persuaded that improving Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system” suffices as a reason for combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164. The “desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is universal . . . .” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Because Dr. Kenny explains that combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings would have improved Avendano’s system by “further enhanc[ing] the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhanc[ing] the separation between speech and noise,” we disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner provides “no reason” why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have configured “the modified Avendano system in the specific way” Petitioner proposes. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119, 163; Prelim. Resp. 10. Patent Owner’s assertion that Avendano differs from Visser because (1) Avendano subtracts the signals supplied by delay nodes 402 and 404 and (2) Visser sums the signals supplied by cross filters w12 and w21 disregards the principle that “[c]ombining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” See In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973); Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Obviousness does not depend on “whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). That Avendano already accounts for “changing acoustic signals” with a “Weiner filter and filter smoothing module,” as Patent Owner asserts, does not undermine modifying Avendano’s system to incorporate Visser’s cross filters w12 and w21 to “further enhance the separation of speech in Avendano’s system,” i.e., “further enhance the separation between speech and noise.” See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164; Prelim. Resp. 12. Visser’s cross filters w12 and w21 would have improved Avendano’s system regardless whether the cross filters adapted during operation. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 119–120, 145, 163–164. We are persuaded that Visser’s disclosure about filters adapting during operation and learning to separate speech “according to the specific acoustic environment,” such that the system can accurately separate speech “even in a changing acoustic environment,” provides an independent reason for combining Visser’s teachings with Avendano’s teachings. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104, 111–112, 147; Ex. 1006, 7:1–5, 9:8–12, 16:8–19, 16:62–17:4, code (57). (j)” slip op. at 55
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have at least a bachelor of science in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, mechanical engineering, or a related discipline, with at least two years of relevant experience in a field related to acoustics, speech recognition, speech detection, or signal processing.” Pet. 6–7. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional education or industry experience may compensate for a deficit in the other.” Id. at 7. Dr. Kenny’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–23. For purposes of the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (quoting Pet. 6–7). Based on the current record and for purposes of analysis, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan as consistent with the ’213 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,321,213 - PTAB · Dec 14, 2022 · IPR2022-01009 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 29 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Littleworth-Linder-Middlebrook obviousness challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Patent Owner has not persuaded us that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution of trial. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“when there is an early trial date in related litigation as part of assessing all relevant circumstances, including the merits, to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv Order”); NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 19–20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential). The Board evaluates six factors when making this assessment. See Fintiv Order, at 5–6. Further, “the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner proposes constructions for two terms, “pitch” and “oblique perspective view.” 1. “Pitch” Petitioner argues that the term “pitch” should be construed to mean either “pitch” or “slope.” Pet. 8. Petitioner asserts that, during prosecution, the applicant stated that “prior versions of the claims ‘use[d] the word “pitch” while other places use the word “slope” and that ‘[t]hese words have the same meaning in the context of these claims, however to avoid confusion, the term “slope” [was] removed and replaced with the word “pitch” throughout to maintain consistency.’” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002, 76– 77). Petitioner further argues that its construction is “supported by the ’961 patent itself which treats the terms interchangeably.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 1:52–67, 3:11–19, 4:19–30, 6:5–17, claims 1, 10, 16, 21–22, 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed construction of “pitch” in its Preliminary Response. See Prelim. Resp. Based on the present record, we agree with Petitioner that “pitch” should be construed to encompass “pitch” and “slope.”” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“At the institution stage, the relevant issue is whether the record includes “evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, Paper 29 at 13. As Hulu explains, the reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Id. Hulu additionally observes that, after institution, certain limited opportunities are available for a petitioner to present new evidence in support of its position, including in a motion to file supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123. Hulu at 14–16. Based on the present record, we find that there is a reasonable likelihood that Littleworth was publicly accessible before the critical date of the ’961 patent. Petitioner introduces the testimony of Ms. Munford that “I have reviewed Exhibit NEARMAP-1005, “Three-Dimensional Mapping and As-Built Computer Modelling by Analytical Photogrammetry” by R.M Littleworth, D.M. Stirling and J.H. Chandler as published in International Archives of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing: ISPRS 17th Congress, Washington, D.C., 1992, Volume B5.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 6. This statement suggests that Ms. Munford reviewed information indicating that Exhibit NEARMAP-1005 was published in the International Archives of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing: ISPRS 17th Congress, Washington, D.C., 1992, Volume B5, and is sufficient for purposes of institution. As for Patent Owner’s argument that the 008 field does not show the date when Littleworth was cataloged by the Rochester Institute of Technology library, Petitioner introduces testimony from Ms. Munford that “the 008 field of the MARC record is reserved for denoting the date of creation of the library record itself.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 4. Ms. Munford further testifies that because the date of creation “typically occurs during the process of preparing materials for public access, it is my experience that an item’s MARC record indicates the date of an item’s public availability.” Id. Additionally, Ms. Munford states that because the 008 field “is the only date reflecting the inclusion of said materials within the library’s collection, it is my experience that an item’s 008 field accurately indicates the date of an item’s public availability.” Id. ¶ 5. Patent Owner does not introduce any expert testimony to the contrary, but rather relies on attorney argument about the nature of the 008 and 040 fields of a MARC record. Prelim. Resp. 38– 42. Based on the present record, we determine that the testimony of Ms. Munford provides sufficient evidence for purposes of institution that the 008 field of the MARC record for Littleworth indicates the date that Littleworth was cataloged and made publicly available.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,670,961 - Code200, Uab / Teso LT, Uab et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 12, 2022 · IPR2022-01109 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied joinder and denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Practice Guide instructs us that a party seeking to maintain multiple challenges to the same patent claims carries a heavy burden of establishing that multiple petitions are necessary. Petitioner contends that Patent Owner has not carried that burden. Joinder Opp. 1. We agree. Petitioner has not explained why the 1492 IPR is an insufficient challenge. It is true that the 135 IPR involves Plamondon, another reference. But Petitioner has not explained how Plamondon differs from Crowds, Border, or MorphMix, or why granting joinder with the 135 IPR would be in the interest of justice, given Petitioner’s involvement managing the1492 IPR challenging substantially the same claims. In the words of our Trial Practice Guide, Petitioner fails to show “why the Board should exercise its discretion to institute additional petitions if it identifies one petition that satisfies petitioner’s burden under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” TPG 60. We see no evidence in the record suggesting that The Data Company is unqualified to manage the 135 IPR, or that Petitioner would add anything significant to that proceeding in its understudy role.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied
“III. DENIAL OF INTER PARTES REVIEW It is undisputed that Petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’319 patent more than one year prior to filing the Petition in this proceeding. See Joinder Mot. 2; Joinder Opp. 1. Accordingly, in view of the denial of the requested relief of joinder with the 135 IPR, institution of inter partes review as requested by Petitioner is barred by statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(b). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Because Petitioner is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from seeking inter partes review of the ’319 patent, we deny the Petition and do not institute review as to any of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“For the reasons described below, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Furthermore, we deny the Petition as time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). We do not reach Patent Owner’s additional contentions including those based on Fintiv or General Plastic.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Not reached
“For the reasons described below, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Furthermore, we deny the Petition as time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). We do not reach Patent Owner’s additional contentions including those based on Fintiv or General Plastic.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,257,319 - Code200, Uab / Teso LT, Uab et al. v. Bright Data Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 9, 2022 · IPR2022-01110 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims and grounds under § 314(a), and denied joinder because Petitioner could challenge the patent in the 1493 IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“seeking to maintain multiple challenges to the same patent claims carries a burden of establishing that multiple petitions are necessary. Petitioner’s main argument for inter partes review institution and joinder is that, “it will represent Petitioner’s first and only IPR directed to the ’510 patent that will have been instituted.” Mot. Reply 2. Although we recognize that at the time of Petitioner’s statement it was true, since the filing of the Petition, we have granted the petition in the 862 IPR, and joined Petitioner to the 1493 IPR, where Code 200 is now the sole petitioner and controls the proceedings. Petitioner, Code200, has not explained why Plamondon is more material to the validity of the ’510 patent than Crowds, Morphmix, or Border presented in the 1493 IPR, nor explained why Petitioner needs more than one instituted proceeding. See TPG 59 (explaining why more than one petition on different grounds could be required). In short, no explanation has been provided as to why the 1493 IPR is not a sufficient challenge.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“In considering a balanced assessment of all relevant circumstances in this proceedings, we are not persuaded that institution of this case serves to promote the efficient administration of the inter partes review process. See TPG 56. Accordingly, in consideration of the circumstances of this case, we exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of review of inter partes review.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“Joinder may be authorized when warranted, but the decision to grant joinder is discretionary. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 3 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); TPG 76. Our Trial Practice Guide states that “when an otherwise time-barred petitioner requests same party and/or issue joinder, the Board may exercise its discretion to permit joinder, but will do so only where fairness requires it and to avoid undue prejudice to a party.” TPG. at 75–76 (citing Proppant Express Invs. v. Oren Techs., IPR2018-00914, Paper 38 at 3–4 (PTAB Mar. 13, 2019) (precedential)). Here, considering that Petitioner has the control and opportunity to challenge the ’510 patent in the 1493 IPR, as discussed above, we determine that there is no undue prejudice to Petitioner. Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. V. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that the Motion for Joinder is denied; and FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition is denied as to all challenged” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,484,510 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 5, 2022 · IPR2022-00865 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–26 and all petition grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Samsung Petitioners have stipulated that, unless the Board denies or later vacates institution of this petition, Samsung will not seek resolution of invalidity in the Samsung Litigation based on the specific grounds asserted in this petition, or on any other ground that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in an IPR. Pet. 73 (citing Ex. 1079); see Reply 2. This type of stipulation is often called a Sotera-type stipulation. See Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (Institution Decision) (precedential). In light of that Sotera-type stipulation, insofar as at least the Samsung case is concerned, we “will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation.” Interim Procedure 3; see also id. at 7–8.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioners have established a reasonable likelihood that they would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Therefore, in the context of the ’543 patent, and consistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms, a headset is not a handset. Turning to Petitioners’ challenges to dependent claims 8–10, 12, and 13, and independent claim 26, Petitioners’ bare reliance on the cellular phone disclosed in Yang, without any further elaboration, would appear to be insufficient, because the cellular phone disclosed in Yang is a handset, not a headset, as shown, for example, in Figures 1A, 1B, and 1C of Yang reproduced below. Yang describes devices 100a and 100b of Figures 1A and 1B as a “cellular phone” that is “similar to conventional cellular phones,” and then states that the device of Figure 1C “may be” a “handset,” a “personal digital assistant (PDA),” or a “video phone.” Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 20, 22, 24. Yang further refers to implementations “in various types of device such as cellular telephones, personal digital assistance (PDAs), tape recorders, telephones, and so on.” Id. ¶ 91. However, none of the figures or descriptions in Yang suggest the use of a headset as a communications device. For Ground 1, Petitioners do not argue that one of ordinary skill would have known to use a headset in addition to the devices explicitly disclosed in Yang — rather, Petitioners flatly argue that the handsets of Yang are in fact headsets. Therefore, at this stage, we are not prepared to determine that the” slip op. at 36
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“provided sufficiently articulated reasoning with rational underpinnings for the proffered combined teachings of Yang and Burnett. Petitioners have presented ample evidence, including declarant testimony, supporting the combination of Yang and Burnett. Pet. 22–27; Kyriakakis Decl. ¶¶ 87–92. Patent Owner’s attorney arguments are unpersuasive. Prelim. Resp. 5–8. We agree with Petitioners that the substitution of the Burnett GEMS sensor signals for the microphone inputs of Yang would have been a straightforward modification that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to make and would have had a reasonable expectation of successful implementation. We note that the ’543 patent itself indicates that the VAD can process received signals to output a simple “one-bit signal . . . with a zero value representing that no speech has occurred . . . and a unity value indicating that speech has occurred.” Ex. 1001, 4:52–57. Similarly, Yang discloses that the signaling of speech versus non-speech is a simple inversion of a signal. Ex. 1006 ¶ 32. Likewise, Burnett teaches that the GEMS sensor can tell a speech processor when the person is or is not speaking. Ex. 1007, 177. These teachings are consistent with Petitioners’ declarant’s testimony that using Burnett’s GEMS with Yang’s VAD would not have fundamentally changed how Yang’s VAD operates. In addition, we credit Petitioners’ declarant’s reliance on the statement in Yang suggesting the use of other types of signal detectors, as suggesting alternatives to using microphone inputs for speech detection. Patent Owner’s arguments that Yang’s VAD does not use a sensor independent of the microphones, and that Burnett does not disclose how to generate signals for a denoising system, are unpersuasive challenges to the references individually, whereas the relevant issue is whether the combination of references, taken as a whole, would have suggested the patentee’s invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,467,543 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Equo IP LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 28, 2022 · IPR2021-00943 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5–9, 11, 12, 16–20, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over the 300 reference, the 321 reference, and Ericsson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedOther
“Generally, Patent Owner’s arguments and Dr. Cooklev’s corresponding testimony do not give sufficient weight to the 300 reference. See id. at 49–52. Rather, they are heavily focused on what the 321 reference alone expressly teaches or suggests. See id.; Cooklev Decl. ¶¶ 140–148, 180–181. Because Petitioner relies on the 300 reference together with the 321 reference in its obviousness rationale, we disagree with these arguments (PO Resp. 49–52), and we give little weight to Dr. Cooklev’s corresponding testimony on this issue (Cooklev Decl. ¶¶ 140–148, 180– 181). c) Experts versus a POSITA Patent Owner notes that “both parties agree that the members of the 3GPP Working Groups were experts in the field—with more expertise and understanding than a POSITA.” PO Resp. 49 (emphasis added). Dr. Cooklev testified, “I disagree that a POSITA—who under all accounts would have less expertise than the members of the 3GPP Working Groups—would recognize a problem and believe that the solution was obvious when the Working Group members themselves struggled with the same issue.” Cooklev Decl. ¶ 194, cited in PO Resp. 49. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s obviousness analysis relies on the skill level of an expert, not a POSITA. PO Resp. 56. Patent Owner, though, provides insufficient evidence to support the assertion that the Working Group members struggled with this issue. See id. at 49. To the contrary, the background knowledge, reflected in the 300 reference, demonstrates that, in the RAP, the UE must receive a RAR before it transmits Message 3. See, Pet. 33–34 (citing Min Decl. ¶ 102; Ex. 1002, as “correction” (category F), instead of an “addition of feature” (category B) or a “functional modification of feature” (category C). Ex. 1011, 1. The “reason for change” in Qualcomm’s change request also lacks any indication of a struggle: According to the original intention, it is clarified that the transmission of the RACH Msg3 performed only in response to an uplink grant in the Random Access Response. The current specification also allows transmission of Msg3 in response to UL grant on PDCCH.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“PO Resp. 44–45. Patent Owner claims that its definition is better than Petitioner’s because (1) it is not “based on a rigid formula that does not credit significant industry or research experience, which may substitute for formal academic work” and (2) it references additional degrees and coursework. Id. at 45. Patent Owner, though, does not explain how those differences affect the obviousness analysis in this case. See id. Instead, Patent Owner argues that, “even under Samsung’s proposal, the level of ordinary skill in the art does not comport with Samsung’s assertion of obviousness” because the members of the 3GGP working groups were experts, not persons having ordinary skill. PO Resp. 56. That is, Patent Owner’s argument does not depend on the specific differences between the proposed definitions. See id. Rather, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner implicitly applies a level of skill that exceeds the ones proposed by either party. See id. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument for the reasons discussed in Section II.C of this Decision. We see no differences between the parties’ proposed definitions that would affect our analysis. Considering the full record developed during trial, including our review of the ’120 patent and the types of problems and solutions described there and in the cited prior art, we apply Petitioner’s definition in this Decision. Pet. 12. But our conclusion would be the same under Patent Owner’s.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner asserts, The Board should construe these two related terms [in claims 1 and 12] such that this “transmitting” feature requires transmitting the Msg3 data only when the three claimed conditions are met: (1) the UL Grant is received on the specific message, (2) the specific message is the random access response message, and (3) there is data stored in a Msg3 buffer of the user equipment. Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 56–57). In Petitioner’s view, the plain language supports the “only when” construction because “the only time after the UL Grant is received on the specific message that the user equipment transmits Msg3 buffer data is only when the specific message is the random access response message and there is data stored in a Msg3 buffer of the user equipment.” Id. at 13. Patent Owner argues for a broader construction. PO Resp. 40; Sur- reply 1–7. In Patent Owner’s view, narrowing the claim by adding the word in other IPRs involving a related patent (U.S. Patent No. 7,881,236),7 the word “only” clarified when the system transmits Message 3 data, but this is not needed here because the claim recites four transmitting limitations that cover all possible scenarios. PO Resp. 40. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s narrow construction is “an effort to introduce a potential non-infringement position” in this IPR. Sur-reply 5. In Patent Owner’s view, “No word or phrase from the challenged claims requires construction for resolution of this IPR.” PO Resp. 36; Sur-reply 4. During the oral hearing, both parties agreed that we need not construe the claims to reach the unpatentability issues. See Tr. 43:14–17 (Patent Owner’s counsel); 64:18–22 (Petitioner’s counsel). We need not resolve the dispute because Petitioner has shown that the” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“properly considers the 300 reference together with the 321 reference because the 300 reference describes a process not clearly documented by the 321 reference. Pet. 6. In particular, the 321 reference, individually, does not clearly describe whether a UE transmits Message 3 when it receives an uplink grant on a message other than an RAR. See id. But together the references show that (1) the Message 3 transmission occurs only if the RAP is ongoing and the Message 3 buffer has a MAC PDU and (2) Message 3 transmission requires a prior UL Grant received in an RAR. See id. at 34–35; Min. Decl. ¶ 104. Specifically, the 321 reference states, “If the UE receives both a grant for its RA-RNTI and a grant for its C-RNTI, the UE may choose to continue with either the grant for its RA-RNTI or the grant for its C-RNTI.” Ex. 1003 § 5.4.1, quoted in Pet. 32. The 321 reference calls the RA-RNTI grant an UL Grant in an RAR and calls the C-RNTI grant the UL Grant in a PDCCH. See, e.g., id. §§ 3.1 (“UE shall monitor the PDCCH after the uplink message containing the C-RNTI MAC”), 4.5.2 (“RA-RNTI for Random Access Response on DL-SCH”), cited in Min Decl. ¶ 99. Dr. Min testifies that, in the 321 reference, the UE chooses either the UL Grant received in an RAR or the UL Grant received in a PDCCH. Min Decl. ¶ 95. But, according to Dr. Min, the 321 reference clearly indicates that UL Grant received in the RAR is the correct one to use during the RAP. Id. ¶ 96. Dr. Min explains that the 321 reference teaches that the UE processes the received UL Grant value after successfully receiving RARs, but the 321 reference is silent about looking for a grant in a PDCCH during the RAP. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 § 5.1.4; Ex. 1045, TS 36.213 v8.3.0, § 6.1). Dr. Min testifies that a UL Grant received in a PDCCH during a RAP “would be highly unreliable” and should be discarded. Id. ¶¶ 96–97. So the 321 reference alone provides strong evidence supporting Petitioner’s assertion that it would have been obvious to transmit Message 3 only when (1) Message 3 data was available to transmit and (2) the UE had received an UL Grant in an RAR. See Pet. 35. To the extent that the language of the 321 reference is ambiguous on” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,517,120 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,517,120 - Forescout Technologies, Inc. v. Fortinet, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 15, 2022 · IPR2021-00914 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13, 15–18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Patrick alone, Patrick and Roese, or Patrick and Gilde.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A. Level of Ordinary Skill Petitioner contends “a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . at the time of the ’314 patent’s effective filing date would typically be a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and at least three years of experience in networking operating systems and cybersecurity, or a person with a master’s degree in one of the foregoing and at least two years of experience in the aforementioned fields.” Pet. 4 (citing Cole Decl. ¶¶ 26–28). For our Institution Decision, we adopted this definition. Institution Dec. 7. Patent Owner states that it “does not object” to Petitoner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 22. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by credible expert testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). We therefore continue to apply Petitioner’s formulation for this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Notwithstanding the parties’ initial position that claim construction is not required, for our Institution Decision we followed the guidance provided by the ’314 patent specification on the meaning of certain terms appearing in the patent. Institution Dec. 8–9. Thus, we construed the following terms: 1. Administrator/Network Administrator – “Administrators delegate workload to Sponsors, view reports and audit trails.” Ex. 1001, 2:2–4. “A Network Administrator has the responsibility of delegating the network management workload.” Id. at 2:11–12. 2. Sponsors – “Sponsors administer control over endpoints requiring network resources.” Id. at 2:4–5. 3. Profiles – “Profiles define the scope and limitations of a Sponsor's” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument and find that Petitioner demonstrates a motivation to combine the teachings of Patrick and Roese. Petitioner provides detailed testimony by Dr. Cole supporting the conclusion that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Patrick and Roese. Pet. Reply 20–22 (citing Cole Decl. ¶¶ 216–224). Dr. Cole testifies that “Patrick teaches that its system provides ‘flexible policies’ and ‘allow[s] for simple integration with third-party security products.’” Id. ¶ 216 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 41) (alteration in original). He testifies that “Roese describes an exemplary network security system” that is “able to enforce certain restrictions, on an initial and continual basis, based on locations of devices.” Id. ¶ 217 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 33) (internal quotation marks omitted). He concludes that “Roese is . . . an example of a ‘suitable entity which can be interacted with programmatically’ as identified in Patrick.” Id. ¶ 218 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 41) (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with Dr. Cole that “Patrick provides a specific motivation to combine, by emphasizing its use of ‘flexible policies’ and explaining its invention ‘allow[s] for simple integration with third-party security products.’” Id. ¶ 222 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 41). Dr. Cole testifies that a person of ordinary skill “would recognize that Roese’s system is one such third party security product, as suggested by Patrick, and also provides additional benefits relating to managing devices, as described in Roese.” Id. ¶ 223. Dr. Cole’s testimony also persuades us of the existence of a reasonable expectation of success in making the combination. Id. ¶ 218 (“A [person of ordinary skill] would therefore understand, consistent with Patrick’s express suggestion, that Patrick’s policy definitions and delegations of authority could be used together with Roese’s network security system to allow for policies specifically focused on managing devices.”). Patent Owner contends that “Petitioner . . . fails to demonstrate with respect to each of the disparate features of Roese relied upon, what the predictable results would be and how it would ‘provide a means to delegate and enforce policies relating to devices’ as alleged by Petitioner.” PO Resp. 42. We do not agree that Petitioner’s showing of motivation to combine, summarized supra, is insufficient. KSR instructs us that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” so the fact that it would take some creativity to carry out the combination does not defeat a finding of obviousness. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 421, see also ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The rationale of KSR does not support [the] theory that a person of ordinary skill can only perform combinations of a puzzle element A with a perfectly fitting puzzle element B.”). We find, for the reasons given, that Petitioner’s showing meets this standard and is sufficient. Petitioner, therefore, has demonstrated a motivation to combine Patrick with Roese with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 28
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition is insufficiently particular as to this or any other limitation. See PO Resp. 34– 35. For example, as discussed supra, Dr. Cole’s testimony supports Petitioner’s position that Patrick discloses transferring responsibility with specific references to Patrick. Cole Decl. ¶¶ 110–116. Dr. Cole explains how Patrick teaches delegating authorization from one subject to another. Id. ¶ 111. He relies on Figure 11 of Patrick to further illustrate his opinion. Id. ¶ 112. We do not agree that this testimony is insufficiently specific to show how Patrick meets this limitation or that Petitioner has failed to carry its burden. Moreover, other examples from Dr. Cole’s testimony are presented in the Petition at pages 20–21. There is no improper incorporation by reference to Dr. Cole’s testimony, as suggested by Patent Owner. PO Resp. 35. We therefore do not agree with Patent Owner (see id.) that “the Board should reject all grounds” due to lack of specificity in Petitioner’s case.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 8,458,314 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,458,314 - Google LLC v. Jawbone Innovations, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 14, 2022 · IPR2022-00889 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Google did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 29–44 obvious, principally because it did not adequately explain why an artisan would add a delay to Elko’s first microphone …
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“microphone channel to the first microphone channel when implementing the dual-filter alternative suggested by Elko.14 Pet. 29–31. However, Petitioner fails to sufficiently explain why an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to implement that dual-filter alternative by relocating the delay to the first microphone channel. Although Petitioner states that its proposed modification “would account for sound propagation from different directions in the dual filter embodiment” (id. at 30–31), this is conclusory and insufficiently explained, particularly given Elko’s disclosure. Petitioner is correct that Elko suggests a dual-filter alternative. Ex. 1002, 11:15–20. Specifically, after describing the Figure 10 embodiment, Elko states that “[i]t might be desirable to filter both input channels to exclude signals that are out of the desired frequency band.” Id. at 11:15–16. Specifically, Elko suggests including “two adaptive filters like filter 1020 shown in FIG. 10, to adjust the two sensing microphones,” as well as a third microphone to serve as the reference. Id. at 11:16–20. But Petitioner fails to sufficiently explain why an ordinary artisan would have relocated delay 1022 when implementing this alternative. Petitioner’s refers to a need to “account for sound propagation from different directions” (Pet. 30–31), but Elko’s adaptive filter already does this. Elko specifically states that filter 1020 accounts for changes in the location of the desired source signal. See Ex. 1002, 11:21–24 (“[U]sing an adaptive filter also allows for the compensation of modal variation in the orientation of the array relative to the desired source.”);15 see also id. at 10:34–55 (noting that” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Finally, although Petitioner relies upon Dr. Vipperman’s declaration, the cited passages simply mirror the language in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 63–66, with Pet. 29–31. As a result, Dr. Vipperman’s testimony does not remedy the Petition’s deficiencies. 37 C.F.R § 42.65(a) (conclusory testimony is entitled to little or no weight); cf. TQ Delta, 942 F.3d at 1358 (“Conclusory expert testimony does not qualify as substantial evidence.”).” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposed definition generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’611 patent and the asserted prior art. 8 The current record does not include allegations or evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness. This definition is also supported by the testimony of Dr. Vipperman. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 23.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,326,611 - PTAB · Nov 2, 2022 · IPR2022-00735 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Patent Owner has not persuaded us that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution of trial. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“not yet set a date for the claim construction hearing, and the scheduling order indicates that it will not set a trial date until 14 days after its claim construction ruling.” Pet. 51 (citing Ex. 1013). Patent Owner does not dispute this. Prelim. Resp. 40. Therefore, the district court trial will likely occur after our final written decision in this proceeding, and factor 2 (timing of trial) weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. The litigation also is in a relatively early stage because, the parties appear to have just completed exchanging infringement and invalidity contentions and no claim construction hearing has occurred. Pet. 52–53; Prelim. Resp. 40–41. Therefore, factor 3 (investment in the district court litigation) also weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. Additionally, because this case is in a relatively early phase, the district court will have the ability to determine whether to stay the District Court Litigation in favor of this IPR (factor 1). Pet. 51–52. Further, because our final written decision will likely occur before trial in the District Court Litigation, the overlap in parties (factor 5) and any overlap in issues (factor 4) does not weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution.. Finally, we determine that the sixth Fintiv factor (other circumstances) is neutral. Accordingly, after considering all the factors, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“in this proceeding. Pet. 5. Patent Owner also does not include a section addressing claim construction. See Prelim. Resp. However, in the course of its argument, Patent Owner points to Dr. Forsyth’s statement that “[t]he ’518 patent describes that the oblique images ‘match the perspectives’ from which they ‘were captured,’” and that “[m]atching the perspectives ‘means that image pixels are not aligned on a rectangular grid [on the ground] but are aligned to the perspective that matches the perspective the camera has captured.’” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15) (emphasis omitted). At this stage, Patent Owner does not appear to dispute Dr. Forsyth’s statement. Id. at 19–22. For purposes of this decision, we adopt the understanding set forth by Dr. Forsyth, and interpret the language requiring that oblique images “match the perspectives from which” they “were captured” to mean that “image pixels are not aligned on a rectangular grid on the ground but are aligned to the perspective that matches the perspective the camera has captured.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 15 (brackets omitted). We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of the alleged invention would have had “at least a Bachelor’s Degree in an academic area emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience related to computerized image analysis and three-dimensional modeling.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 16). Petitioner further asserts that “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,593,518
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.