- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Eyesmatch Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00810 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1–6 and 10–12 over Rosenberg and Park, and claims 3, 4, 7–9, and 11–18 over Rosenberg, Park, and Geisner.
RulingsFinal written decision- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Turning to the substantive issues, we find the District Court’s “mirror tracking mode” construction to be well-reasoned and supported by the record, and we therefore adopt that construction and its reasoning. As the District Court points out, both the “double the distance” and “same size” aspects of its construction are expressly discussed in the ’109 patent, which is incorporated in the ’110 patent. See Ex. 2008, 16 (citing Ex. 1021, 2:5–27, Figs. 5A, 5B), 40 (citing “same reasons set forth regarding the term ‘it appears to mimic a reflection of a mirror’” in support of construction of “mirror tracking mode”). So, too, is “flipping” or reversing of the image disclosed. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1021, 14:46–51, 15:41–47), 40.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“persuasively address limitation 1[f]’s “mirror tracking mode.” In particular, Petitioner does not address persuasively the requirement, as explained in Section II.B above, that mirror tracking mode involves processing camera-captured images in a way that “maintains roughly the same size regardless of the user movement.” At odds with this requirement, Petitioner founds its case on an assertion that “Haan teaches the claimed mirror tracking mode” because “if the viewer is within 35 cm of the camera, a tracking mode is entered, applying resizing transformation.” Pet. 44 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75–76, 80–82, 90–94, 97; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 205–210). The resizing transformation Petitioner references actually involves magnifying the user’s image by an amount that changes based on the user’s position relative to the camera, quite the opposite of maintaining image size regardless of the user movement. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75–76, Fig. 8. Thus, Petitioner’s initial position is unpersuasive. Petitioner’s shift to Haan’s “reflective mirror mode and conventional mirror period in the dual mode” is also unavailing. Reply 8. Consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments, Petitioner does not provide persuasive evidence that these operating states of Haan’s device involve any processing of camera-captured images. Sur-reply 13–14. To the contrary, Haan suggests that anytime its device provides an unmagnified image, it comes from a reflection off a physical reflective surface. See, e.g., Ex.1005 ¶ 76 (“This can be done for instance by using the device as a simple mirror, i.e. not displaying an image on the display device, but using the device in the reflective mode.”) (emphasis added), ¶ 92 (“a simple reflective mode, to act as a mirror”), ¶ 29 (“for a first range of positions, no image is displayed, whereby the reflective layer acts as a mirror, and for a second range of positions, the recorded image is displayed.”) (emphasis added). We also find unpersuasive Petitioner’s Reply arguments based on Haan’s disclosure of smoothly transitioning from “using the device as a simple mirror” (i.e., using a physical reflecting surface) to displaying a magnified image. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76, 80). To the extent this may establish a point around the transition at which Haan’s system displays an image with relatively little magnification, it does not establish that Haan teaches, suggests, or renders obvious holding the displayed size roughly constant, “regardless of the user movement.” Indeed, given Haan’s focus on helping the user see things more clearly with image magnification, Petitioner’s argument that it would have been obvious to hold the size of the image constant is not persuasive. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 4. Thus, on the whole, Petitioner’s shifting, scattered arguments do not persuasively address limitation 1[f]. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Haan and Francois. And Petitioner’s arguments and evidence addressing claims 2–6, 10–12, 16, and 17 do not cure the foregoing deficiencies in the challenge of claim 1. Pet. 46–52. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that any of claims 1–6, 10–12, 16, and 17 would have been obvious over Haan and Francois.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree. Petitioner demonstrates persuasively that a person of ordinary skill would have combined these references “to correct image distortions and provide a more realistic mirror image.” Pet. 52–55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 242–249. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that by specifically disclosing “flipping” the image, Rosenberg is discouraging or teaching away from performing other transformations to achieve its objective of “replicat[ing] the performance of a standard household mirror.” See PO Resp. 35, 38–39 (Patent Owner asserting lack of motivation to combine the references). A reference may be said to “teach away” “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” Galderma Lab'ys, L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2009)). “A reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.” Id. Further, when conducting an obviousness analysis, the Board must consider a prior art reference “not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.” Bradium Techs. LLC v. Iancu, 923 F.3d 1032, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). We are not convinced that the references before us “teach away” from performing the other transformations. In sum, we find for the reasons given that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that to a person of ordinary skill, Rosenberg alone or with Park teaches or suggests limitation 1[f].” slip op. at 44
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“shows by a preponderance of the evidence that limitations 1[c] and 1[e] are taught or suggested by Rosenberg and Park, in combination. Pet. 58–64; PO Resp. 39–40; Reply 19–20; Sur-reply 19. Petitioner persuades us that limitations 1[c] and 1[e], would have been obvious over Rosenberg and Park, in combination. Pet. 58–64; Reply 19–20. Patent Owner’s counter arguments are unavailing for multiple reasons. Patent Owner’s arguments fail because they improperly attack Rosenberg’s teachings individually, rather than addressing Petitioner’s combination of the references. PO Resp. 39–40; Sur-reply 19. This is fatal to Patent Owner’s arguments. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Moreover, Petitioner presents persuasive arguments and evidence that the references, in combination, teach limitations 1[c] and 1[e], including persuasive evidence that the references’ tilting, resizing, and zooming meet the claim limitations’ “adaptive transformation mapping . . . to generate modified images that appear to be captured from a different point of view” that “corresponds to an image taken from a different angle and a different distance.” Pet. 58–64 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:26–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–67, 253–268; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 26–28, 50, 52, 61, 75 ; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 50–51, 59, Figs. 6A–6B, 7, 8, 14, 15; Ex. 1019, 16–20; Ex. 1021, 2:19–27, 17:19–24, 21:60, 23:65–24:9, 25:46–48, 30:4–11, Fig. 11); Reply 19–20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 253–268; Ex. 1021, 17:17–23; Ex. 2012, 63:13–22, 111:13–21). Regarding tilting, after noting the ’110 patent’s disclosure (incorporated from the ’109 patent) of performing tilt transformations (Pet. 10–11), Petitioner advances persuasive evidence that Park discloses such a tilting transformation, thereby teaching the claimed “different angle” (id. at 61–63). Regarding resizing and zooming, citing extensive discussion in the ’110 patent (incorporated from the ’109 patent) of resizing and/or zooming to address the effects of varying distance between an object and a camera, Petitioner and Dr. Karam explain that the prior art’s zooming and resizing meet the claimed “different distance.” Pet. 63 (Ex. 1001, 3:26–28; Ex. 1021, 17:19–23, 21:57–60, 23:65–24:9, 25:46–48, 30:4–11, Fig. 11); Ex. 1003 ¶ 265 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:26–28; Ex. 1021, 17:19–23, 21:57–60, 23:65–24:9, 25:46–48, 30:4–11, Fig. 11). In its counterarguments, Patent Owner suggests that zooming and resizing do not account for “occlusion effects,” but Patent Owner does not persuasively tie this argument to the ’110 patent, failing to cite any portion of the ’110 patent that evinces its invention addresses such effects. PO Resp. 23–25, 39–40.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 8,982,110 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,982,110 - Dropbox, Inc. v. Motion Offense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00287 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 9–12, 14–16, and 22–24 are unpatentable under § 103 over Riepling and Meisels, or Riepling, Manzano, and Meisels; claim 13 was disclaimed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. We apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“construction of “representation of the at least one file.” Petitioner is correct that a representation of a file is not the file itself, but (in keeping with the ordinary meaning of “representation”) is rather some sign or symbol that stands for the folder. Reply 2. This is confirmed by the explicit example of a representation of a folder in the ʼ906 application, illustrated in the portion of Figure 6B reproduced below (highlighted here for purposes of explanation). This portion of Figure 6B depicts representations of two files: “FamilyHistory.docx” and “XmasLetter-2012.pdf.” The ’906 application specifically states: [A] located data resources dialog UI element 630b . . . includes a presentation space 632b for presenting a user detectable representation of some or all of the data objects identified in the received data object identification response from . . . second node 504. Ex. 2004 ¶ 147 (emphasis added). The entries in the above figure are representations of the files, not the files themselves. The actual files are stored in the file system storage associated with the user’s node, and only retrieved if the user selects the “Access” or “Access All” elements. Id. ¶ 148. Patent Owner misconstrues the claim 22 language, “a first representation of the at least one file, in a location among one or more folders, that is stored at the at least one server” and “a second representation of the at least one file, in a location among one or more folders, that is stored at the first node.” Patent Owner infers from this language that the representation is itself a file that is “in a location among one or more folders” and is stored on a server or at a node. PO Resp. 17. Not so — the representation of a file, such as “FamilyHistory.docx” in the above figure, is not stored at a server or node, but rather is simply displayed on a screen. As the ’906 application states: A representation of a program entity may be stored and/or otherwise maintained in a presentation space. As used in this document, the term “presentation space” refers to a storage region allocated and/or otherwise provided for storing presentation information . . . . A screen of a display, for example, is a presentation space.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“because (i) Riepling and Meisels are from the same field of endeavor, directed to sharing files over a network; (ii) the combination would have yielded expected, predictable results, using known and routine computer programming principles, to modify Riepling’s system to generate an electronic message that includes a link pointing to an uploaded file; (iii) the combination would have been readily implemented given Meisels’ teachings of inserting, in an electronic message, a link to a shared location where a file is uploaded; and (iv) the combination was suggested because Meisels expressly disclosed a benefit of sending an email message with a link, to avoid multiple copies of a file from existing at multiple locations, and sending links to one file to multiple recipients and managing permissions on an individual recipient basis. Pet. 67–70 (citing Ex. 1107, Fig. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 19; Ex. 1108, Fig. 4, ¶¶ 1, 3, 41–45, 56; Mowry Decl. ¶¶ 194–198). In addition, for reasons similar to the motivation basis, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the combination. Id. at 70–71 (citing Mowry Decl. ¶¶ 199–200). Other than its arguments directed to ’520 claim requirement 9[l], discussed below in Section III.D.4.d), Patent Owner does not further address Petitioner’s arguments regarding the combination of Riepling and Meisels. As discussed in that section, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s expert’s testimony that one of ordinary skill would have applied the document link teachings of Meisels to modify Riepling. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Riepling and Meisels in the manner argued by Petitioner.” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that set content field 325 of Riepling teaches or suggests claim requirement 9[b]. As Petitioner’s expert explains, the fact that field 325 has an appearance identical to that of fields 321–324 in Figure 3, which fields are specifically stated to be “text field[s],” strongly suggests that field 325 is also a text field. Mowry Decl. ¶ 70; see also Reply 10–11. Patent Owner’s suggestion that field 325 could be a dropdown list or other type of field is contradicted by the fact that it does not show the typical dropdown arrow associated with a dropdown box, or other typical non-textbox appearance such as the checkbox appearance of field 320. Moreover, in the example of Figure 3, the “Set Content” entry is “audio,” which is a file description. Reply 10. The fact that “JPEG” is checked in field 320 is not inconsistent with the “audio” entry in field 325, given that, as Riepling explains, “it may be possible for audio files such as MP3 files to contain non-MP3 data, such as JPEG data embedded within the MP3 files.” Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 1107 ¶ 32; Mowry 2nd Decl. ¶ ¶ 101–104). Also, there is no reason why the Figure 5 response that gives the uploader the ability to provide additional description of the file being uploaded is inconsistent with the ability of the requester first describing what type of file is being requested via field 325 in Figure 3. Id. at 11–12. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded that the record supports Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim requirement 9[b].” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,611,520 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,611,520 - Dropbox, Inc. v. Motion Offense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00286 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 17–21 are unpatentable under § 103 over Houston and Garcia; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We conclude that there is no basis for Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “representation of the at least one folder.” Petitioner is correct that a representation of a folder is not the folder itself, but (in keeping with the ordinary meaning of “representation”) is rather some sign or symbol that stands for the folder. Reply 2. This is confirmed by the explicit example of a representation of a folder in the ’635 application, illustrated in the portion of Figure 6D reproduced below (highlighted here for purposes of explanation). This portion of Figure 6D depicts representations of several folders, including the highlighted “Music” folder. The ’635 application specifically states: A folder content pane UI element 648d in navigation window UI element 646d is presented including representations of one or more data objects[11] at a location, identified in a path UI element 650d. A pointer UI element 652d illustrates a drag and drop operation of a “Music” folder represented in contents pane UI element 648d, dropped on edit window UI element 602d. Ex. 2004 ¶ 123 (emphasis added). The word “Music” in the above figure is a representation of a folder, not the folder itself. The actual folder is an entity in a file system that stores files (in the case of a “Music” folder, presumably MP3 or WAV files, or the like).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s arguments are not pertinent to Petitioner’s proffered combination of Houston with Garcia as applied to the remaining challenged claims 17–21. As discussed further below, Petitioner relies on Garcia as supplementing Houston for details regarding the requirements of generating and sending an email with a link to a folder but without a file attachment, and for synchronizing folders and providing interfaces for display of shared folders. Pet. 26–27, 36–39, 57–60. For the challenged claims, Petitioner does not need to rely on the combination to modify Houston’s system such that, when an icon for a shared folder is created in Houston’s interface at an invited user’s client, the client does not store a file in the shared folder — 14 For this argument and others, Patent Owner cites for additional support portions of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/233,787. PO Resp. 18, 42, 46; Sur-Reply 9–12. This application is designated in Houston as a related application, and incorporated by reference therein. Ex. 1003, code (60), 1:6–10. We denied as untimely Patent Owner’s request to belatedly add this application to the record. Ex. 3002; Paper 39. Even accepting Patent Owner’s representations of the relied-on disclosures in that application, those disclosures are cumulative to Houston’s criticisms of systems that store documents remotely, and are irrelevant for the same reasons as discussed herein with respect to those Houston disclosures. that aspect of the Houston/Garcia combination is only relevant to claims 1–8, which have been disclaimed. Id. at 40–41; Ex. 2045.15 Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that Houston teaches away from combining with Garcia to delay storing a file when a folder is shared is not applicable to Petitioner’s challenges of claim 17–21, in light of our conclusion set forth above in Section III.C rejecting Patent Owner’s proposed construction of claim 17. The fact that the Houston system ensures the availability of synchronized local copies of files at each user’s local system and criticizes systems that store documents remotely, such as in Garcia, is irrelevant to those claims. On this record, there is nothing about that particular difference in the approaches of Houston and Garcia that would support a finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been discouraged from adopting Houston to take advantage of the teachings in Garcia regarding use of email and folder interfaces. In sum, Patent Owner focuses on a specific irrelevant detail of Houston regarding local storage of files, whereas Petitioner relies on other features of the combination of Houston and Garcia. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary” slip op. at 41
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“To give substantial weight to objective indicia of nonobviousness such as commercial success, a proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Nexus is a legally and factually sufficient connection between the objective evidence and the claimed invention, such that the objective evidence should be considered in determining nonobviousness. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). A patentee is entitled to a presumption of nexus “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “[T]he patentee retains the burden of proving the degree to which evidence of secondary considerations tied to a product is attributable to a particular claimed invention.” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1378. The Federal Circuit has held that “if the marketed product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them, then a nexus is presumed and the burden shifts to the party asserting obviousness to present evidence to rebut the presumed nexus.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “A finding that a presumption of nexus is inappropriate does not end the inquiry into secondary considerations”; rather, “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Fox Factory, 994 F.3d at 1373–74 (quoting In re Huang, 100 F.3d 125, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “Ultimately, the fact finder must weigh the [objective indicia] evidence presented in the context of whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious to a skilled artisan.” See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33, 33 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020) (precedential) (citing WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“However, as Petitioner argues above, Houston discloses that a client can provide an email to the server to invite others to share a folder, and Houston explains that “attaching files [to emails is] cumbersome for many computer users.” Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003, Fig. 4, 1:41–42, 3:40–43, 7:50–51). From this, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious for the email invitation to notify how to access the folder, rather than sending the folder contents itself. Id. Petitioner further argues that the claim 17[d] requirement would have been obvious over the combination of Houston and Garcia given the disclosure in Garcia of sharing a folder by sending an email with a link to the folder, instead of an attachment. Id. at 27, 57 (citing Ex. 1004, Figs. 9, 11–12, 10:32–34, 10:38–40, 11:39–43, cl. 3). We are persuaded that the record supports Petitioner’s arguments regarding this claim requirement. Both Houston alone, and the combination of Houston and Garcia, teach or suggest sending an email with a link to a folder to be shared, rather than the folder contents. Only if the recipient clicks on the link are the contents of the folder shared. Ex. 1004, 11:29–31. The act of clicking on the link in the email after the email is received is the required “initiation of the communication” that must occur separately from the email itself, as required by claim 17[d]: “causing generation of at least one email [that] does not include a file attachment, for permitting avoidance of at least one file from being communicated to and stored at the second node until an initiation of the communication of the at least one file by a user of the second node is detected and the communication commences via at least one server that stores the at least one file” (emphasis added). It does not matter if Houston or Garcia automatically downloads local copies of files when a recipient clicks on the email link, because that is a separate step following the step of claim 17[d].” slip op. at 46
Patent outcomesUS 11,611,520 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,611,520 - Google LLC v. Security First Innovations, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00214 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Foster; the Board did not reach the instituted Orsini anticipation or obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention of the ’609 patent, “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with three years of experience in the area of securing data from unauthorized access or use,” and that “[a] higher level of education may substitute for less experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Initially, we note that Petitioner’s challenge is based on the parties’ proposed district court constructions for “data set.” See Pet. 65–66. But neither party proposes a construction for “data chunks” in this proceeding. Notably, the 83-column Specification of the ’609 patent itself does not use the term “data chunks.” Even so, the meaning of “data chunks” is readily apparent from the plain language: the data chunks are generated “based on a data set,” and the claim defines the steps that comprise the chunk generation, including the relationship between the chunks and the data set. See Ex. 1001, 83:15–30; In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (In all aspects of claim construction, “the name of the game is the claim.” (quoting Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims–American Perspectives, 21 Int’l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 497, 499 (1990))).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues, and we agree, that “it does not need to show that there was a known problem with the prior art system in order to articulate the required rational underpinning for the proposed [modification].” Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1002–03 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cited in Pet. Reply 14–15). Petitioner persuasively explains: [C]ontent-owner storage would not negate benefits of content-service providers (“CSPs”) storing Foster-encrypted content. [The skilled artisan] knew CSPs (e.g., cable-TV companies) often purchased/licensed content from content owners and then securely stored it before delivering to recipients. [Ex. 1099], 84-94. CSPs typically and beneficially encrypted and stored that content for repeated use (e.g., downloads by different customers) – rather than repeatedly encrypting it on-the-fly – and for backup purposes. Petition, 77-78 (citing EX1045, EX1050, EX1059-EX1060; [Ex. 1003], ¶¶206-213); [Ex. 1111], ¶¶102-114 (citing EX1073, [0043] (VOD “pre-encrypt[s]” and “stores the content”); EX1097, 2:31-53 (“real-time encryption [for VOD] poses much greater cost and space issues”); EX1075, 1:51-67; EX1105, [0034]-[0037]; EX1080, 2-7). Pet. Reply 15; see id. at 16–17 (“EX1060, e.g., describes prior-art VOD systems where CSP intermediary ‘servers . . . store all movies.’” (citing Ex. 1060 ¶¶ 7–8 (cited in Pet. 77)) (alteration in original)). As for Patent Owner’s allegation that Petitioner’s proposed modification to Foster would “compromise” Foster’s security, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that, “[b]eyond a conclusory expert declaration, [Patent Owner] offers no evidence that hacking risks or overall storage requirements would increase by storing content at a CSP/intermediary rather than a content owner.” Pet. Reply 17. Petitioner also argues, and we agree, “even if it required ‘increased cost and complexity’ to make CSP storage more secure, that does ‘not show that [the technique] was unknown or could not have practical applications,’ and thus does not support non-obviousness.” Id. at 17–18 (quoting In re Cree, 818 F.3d 694, 700–701 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); id. at 18 (“[I]t is a commonplace fact that design decisions entail making tradeoffs among multiple objectives.” (quoting Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 2021 WL 4944471, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 25, 2021)); see Allied Erecting and Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine [or to modify].”). Although Patent Owner disputes whether a rational reason exists to modify Foster to arrive at the subject limitation (discussed above), Patent Owner otherwise does not dispute reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See generally PO Resp. 32–56.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 11,068,609 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,068,609 - Google LLC v. Security First Innovations, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00215 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Foster and Hayhurst; the Board did not reach the anticipation and obviousness grounds based on Orsini.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with three years of experience in the area of securing data from unauthorized access or use.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38). Petitioner also asserts that a “higher level of education may substitute for less experience.” Id. 2 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. Patent Owner submitted the Declaration of Dr. Rubin in support of its Response, and in that Declaration, Dr. Rubin accepted Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 20–21. For the reasons given, we apply the same level of ordinary skill in the art that we did in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 4.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“See Section II.C.3.a.ii supra. Although Dr. Rubin calls Hayhurst’s security benefits “ancillary” (Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 108–109, quoted in PO Resp. 40), this does not align with Hayhurst (see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 2, 7, 8, 21). For example, Hayhurst describes the security measures in the Technical Field section (id. ¶ 2) and the Summary of the Invention section (id. ¶¶ 7, 8). Hayhurst also discusses piracy deterrence in both the Summary of the Invention section (id. ¶ 8) and the invention’s detailed description (id. ¶ 21). Because Dr. Rubin does not give sufficient weight to Hayhurst’s discussion of piracy deterrence and security, we do not credit Dr. Rubin’s testimony on this issue. See Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 108–109. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that Hayhurst is reasonably pertinent to the network-security problem that the inventors were trying to solve. See Reply 5–6.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Neither party explicitly proposed constructions during trial, and we do not see the need for construing any terms in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“3. Claim 1 a. Analogous Art “To be considered within the prior art for purposes of the obviousness analysis, a reference must be analogous.” Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Wang Lab. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland Gmbh v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 10,452,854 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,452,854 - BMW Of North America, LLC / Robert Bosch LLC et al. v. Foras Technologies Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2023-01373 · APJ Carl W Whitehead Jr · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 and 13–22 are unpatentable as obvious over Bigbee and Nguyen because the combination teaches determining whether lockstep is recoverable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We regarded Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Institution Dec. 8–9. In its Response, Patent Owner does not take exception to our definition. See PO Resp. 3. However, Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering (or a related field) and approximately two years of work experience with computer architecture design.” Id. We find Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art are not meaningfully distinguishable from one another. Accordingly, we do not see the need to modify our adoption of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. However, our findings would not change even under Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We are satisfied that Mr. Jones qualifies as a person of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Ex. 2008, 1 (“Summary” including “embedded systems including both software and hardware”, “Representative Design Work” including, e.g., “Design and implement multiple device drivers for complex Integrated circuits,” “Design of a highly fault tolerant, distributed data acquisition and control, system for a rebreather . . . system architecture, hardware design and layout, embedded firmware, documentation,” “hardware and firmware design,” “[h]ardware and firmware for controlling a unique, battery powered diesel burner…”), 2–3 (list of Publications). We are also satisfied that Mr. Jones’ degree in Electrical and Mechanical Engineering is sufficiently “equivalent” to a degree in Computer Engineering or Computer Science. See PO Sur-reply 11. We decline to give Mr. Jones’ declaration no weight for several additional reasons. One, Petitioner has not moved or otherwise sought to exclude Mr. Jones’ declaration, nor has Petitioner filed an objection. See Pet. Reply 2–5; see also Hearing Tr. 32, 33:15–34:8. Two, we are afforded broad discretion in assigning weight that is to be accorded expert testimony. See Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Board was well within its discretion to give more credibility to [one expert over another] unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so.”); see also CTPG5 34–36. In sum, Petitioner has not persuaded us that Patent Owner’s expert’s testimony should be given no weight because Mr. Jones is not qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art according to our definition. See Pet. Reply 2–5; see also PO Sur-reply 10–13. 5 Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (CTPG) (Nov. 2019) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner did not challenge Petitioner’s position on these terms. See Prelim. Resp. 1–13. We determined there were no claim terms that needed to be construed in our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 9– 10. Post-institution, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction of these terms and “does not believe either term requires construction, because . . . Petitioner fails to demonstrate obviousness regardless of how these terms [(“lockstep is recoverable” and “loss of lockstep is recoverable”)] are construed. PO Resp. 2. We agree with Patent Owner that no claim construction is necessary for purposes of this Decision. That is, we do not discern any claim terms that are in controversy on the full record. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find Mr. Jones’ testimony amounts to conjecture because it is unsupported by evidence, for the reasons explained by Petitioner. See Pet. Reply 10–11; Ex. 2007 ¶ 32; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight”). However, we find that Dr. Brogioli provides sufficient persuasive evidence as to how firmware FRC logic would be used and modified in the Bigbee/Nguyen combination. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 57–58, 96–98. As discussed above, Bigbee uses firmware FRC logic to check for an error within a processor core. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 35–37, Fig. 4A. Bigbee’s firmware FRC logic does not determine if lockstep is recoverable. Id. Similar to Bigbee, Nguyen also uses firmware FRC logic to check for an error within a processor core. See Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 9, 18, Fig. 7. However, the difference is that Nguyen’s firmware FRC logic determines if lockstep is recoverable. Id. We find for the reasons given by Petitioner and Dr. Brogioli including those summarized supra, that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Bigbee by implementing Nguyen’s determination in firmware. Pet. 33–35 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1002 ¶ 94 (stating that “[i]mplementing logical steps in firmware was known in the art”); ¶ 95 (stating that Bigbee’s system “is compliant with well-known industry standards”); ¶ 98 (stating that “firmware is flexible” and “can be modified after production, updated, and supported relatively quickly and inexpensively.”)). In contrast, Patent Owner’s arguments fail to convince us that a person of ordinary skill in the art, having knowledge of Nguyen’s teaching of determining lockstep recovery, would not have able to modify Bigbee’s firmware FRC logic to determine if lockstep is recoverable. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”); see also id. at 418. Accordingly, Petitioner has presented reasoning, with rational underpinnings, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reasons to modify Bigbee’s firmware FRC logic based upon Nguyen’s teachings and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Accordingly, we find for the reasons given that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that this element is taught or suggested by the Bigbee/Nguyen combination.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 7,502,958 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,502,958 - Affordable Wire Management, LLC v. Cambria County Association For The Blind And Handicapped, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 7, 2025 · IPR2024-00139 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over the CAB Website and CAB Whitepaper; the Board did not reach the other instituted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as electrical engineering, civil engineering, mechanical engineering or equivalent with 2–3 years of experience in electrical utility systems, planning, and design” and “the number of years of experience could be higher or lower given the level of education and vice versa.” Pet. 23. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner contended Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill is too high. Prelim. Resp. 32. According to Patent Owner, a POSITA would have had “an associate degree in an engineering discipline, and 1–2 years’ experience in electrical power systems” and “[a] lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 21). Our Institution Decision states that we preliminarily determined a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in an engineering discipline and two years of experience in electrical power systems. Inst. Dec. 5–6. Patent Owner’s Response states that Patent Owner applies the Board’s 9 The parties have not directed our attention to any objective evidence of obviousness or non-obviousness. preliminary determination (PO Resp. 6, n.3), and Petitioner did not subsequently address the issue. Based on the full record, we determine a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in an engineering discipline and two years of experience in electrical power systems. We are satisfied that this comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’291 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“the cable hangers (which support the current wires, data wires and other wires). That is, a single multi-function line supports the cable hangers, as a messenger wire, and provides a current path, as a grounding conductor.” Ex. 1001, 2:33–37 (emphasis added). And the sentence following that passage, which is cited by both parties, states: “Accordingly, as used herein, a ‘multi-function line’ means a tension member that supports current wires and/or cable hangers, and, which is conductive.” Ex. 1001, 2:37–40 (emphasis added). The sentences immediately following that sentence provide additional context, stating: “That is, a messenger wire is not a ‘multi-function line.’ Similarly, a conductor that does not support other constructs is not a ‘multi-function line.’” Ex. 1001, 2:40–42 (emphasis added). Thus, the specification indicates that a multi-function line is a tension member, “is conductive,” and supports other constructs such as current wires and/or cable hangers. In contrast, the specification does not mention “effective ground fault current path.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Based on the entire record, Petitioner shows that the combination of the CAB Website and the CAB Whitepaper satisfy the limitations of claim 1. We also agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have had reason to combine the references’ teachings, at least because the CAB Website expressly refers to the CAB Whitepaper, suggesting to a POSITA that the references’ teachings should be considered together. Pet. 47–48; see Reply 6–8.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“First, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not shown that the cited products are coextensive with, and have the required nexus between, the products and claim 1. See Reply 18–29. Even if Patent Owner sells an “Integrated Grounding System” that satisfies each limitation of claim 1, that system is undeniably comprised of “various” “exemplary” interchangeable parts that have uses outside of the claimed invention, that at least purportedly relate to many other of Patent Owner’s patents, and that were known in the prior art. E.g., Ex. 2064, ¶ 304 (identifying “exemplary” product part numbers, including CAB-9605, CAB-9705, CAB-9760, and CAB-9607), n.10; App’x A, A5 (identifying a part number “representative” part the “mid-pier kit”); Ex. 1049, 6–7 (identifying Patent Owner’s patent’s relating to different part numbers). For example, Patent Owner identifies two patent numbers purportedly protecting its “grounding Mid Pier Kit,” the ’551 patent and US Pat. No. 10,461,518. Ex. 1049, 6–7. Patent Owner identifies three of its patents as protecting its copper messenger wire, part number CAB-9605: (i) the ’551 patent, (ii) US Pat. No. 10,461,518, and (iii) US Pat. No. 10,811,859. Id. And Patent Owner identifies eight different patents, but not the ’551 patent, as protecting the cited cable hangers, CAB- 9760. Id. And as explained in the analysis above, all of these parts were known and available in the prior art, as evidenced by the CAB Website and the CAB Whitepaper. We can discern no nexus between the features of the ’551 patent and the alleged objective evidence of nonobviousness given that the so-called “Integrated System” includes multiple, interchangeable, and “exemplary” part numbers that were known in the prior art. See Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC, 69 F.4th 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“But our case law makes clear that objective evidence of nonobviousness lacks a nexus if it exclusively relates to a feature that was known in the prior art—not necessarily well-known.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“If commercial success is due to an element in the prior art, no nexus exists.”).” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 10,177,551 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,177,551 - Netflix, Inc. v. Avago Technologies International Sales Pte. LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · IPR2021-00045 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Remand
Claims 1–3, 9–11, and 17–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Masters; claims 5, 13, and 21 are unpatentable as obvious over Masters and Stone.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“stated that on remand, the Board should “adopt a new construction that includes application instance-level, application-level, device-level, and tierlevel data” and “the Board should determine whether Masters, including its Decision Review Display and Path Display, renders the ‘collecting’ and ‘correlating’ limitations obvious in view of the Board’s new construction. In addition, the Board should consider Masters’ Appendix J in assessing whether Masters’ Path Display teaches life cycle events and the claimed correlating step.” Netflix, 2024 WL 3507601 at *8. After the Federal Circuit issued its mandate, with our authorization, the parties filed the following briefs: Petitioner’s Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 41, “Pet. Remand Br.”), Patent Owner’s Response Brief on Remand (Paper 42, “PO Remand Resp.”), Petitioner’s Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 43, “Pet. Remand Reply”), and Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 44, “PO Remand Sur-Reply”).” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We determine a POSITA would have had “a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a similar discipline, with one or two years of experience,” which is consistent with the parties’ arguments and testimony of the parties’ declarants, as well as the level reflected in the ’722 patent and the asserted prior art. We determine it is unnecessary to reach the parties’ additional statements of the knowledge and skills that a POSITA would allegedly possess, as the parties’ arguments do not hinge on those statements.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner’s proposed construction to be generally consistent with the intrinsic record (including the claim language) and the Federal Circuit’s guidance. However, we decline to adopt the use of “related to” instead of “associated with” in Petitioner’s proposed construction because we determine the language used in the claim, “associated with,” is clear enough on its face and Petitioner provides no persuasive justification for altering the plain meaning to “related to”. Consistent with the Federal Circuit’s guidance, we determine the proper construction of “performance data” further includes data pertaining to the performance of a server and/or a technology tier. Netflix, 2024 WL 3507601 at *6 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:56–57, 4:3–8, 4:14–18, 7:26–29). Accordingly, we determine “performance data” means “data associated with the performance of one or more application instances, including instance-level, application-level, device-level, and tierlevel data and includes data pertaining to the performance of a server and/or a technology tier.” We determine no other terms require express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Applying our construction of “performance data,” we agree with Petitioner that, among other things, the CPU utilization and review time shown in Masters’ Figure 5.6.2.1-2 and Figures 8A and 8B fall within the scope of the claimed “performance data.” See Pet. 50–56; Reply 17. The CPU utilization data and review time data are both data associated with the performance of one or more application instances. Further, the Figures and corresponding description in Appendix J evidence collection of the performance data for each application instance. Pet. 34–38, 50; Ex. 1024, 39. Similarly, the startup of a copy of the Auto-Special process on Altair11 constitutes a life cycle event, as it is the creation of an application instance, and the termination of Auto-Special on Altair7 is another example of a life cycle event, as claimed. Ex. 1024, 39; see Pet. 39–44. We agree with Petitioner that these Figures and related descriptions in Masters teach collecting performance data and correlating the performance data to the life cycle events. See Pet. 46, 50–55. We also agree with Petitioner that Masters’ Figures 9A and 9B similarly show the collection and correlation of performance data, at least with the response time, action time, CPU score, and similar metrics depicted in the Figures. Pet. 47–49. Figures 9A and 9B show the correlation of the performance data to a life cycle event, by, for example, depicting the performance issue (an overload on Altair11) that cause the creation of a new application instance on Altair3. Pet. Reply 12. We agree with Petitioner that the response time to trigger the creation of an application instance on Altrair3 and the amount of time the application instance takes to start are two examples of performance data correlated with the life cycle event. Pet. Masters, Figures 9A and 9B depict Masters’ Decision Review Display that provides a summary of allocation and reallocation actions taken by the RMA, and “[f]or each action, timing information regarding how long it took the Resource Management functions, e.g., the Resource Manager . . . and the Program Controller . . ., to both arrive at a decision and to enact the decided action are shown along with host fitness scores that were used in arriving at the allocation decision.” Ex. 1004, 30:1–10. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments that the Masters’ “response time” “cannot be associated with the performance of the ‘Semi-Auto’ application instance because the response time passes before the instance exists” (PO Remand Br. 4), and we agree with Petitioner that the time required to start an application instance is a metric associated with the creation of that instance. In sum, we agree with Petitioner that Masters teaches the Correlating Limitations.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 7,457,722 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,457,722 - Netflix, Inc. v. Avago Technologies International Sales Pte. LimitedAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · IPR2021-00431 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Remand
Claims 4, 6–8, 12, 14–16, 20, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious over Masters.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“stated that on remand, the Board should “adopt a new construction that includes application instance-level, application-level, device-level, and tierlevel data” and “the Board should determine whether Masters, including its Decision Review Display and Path Display, renders the ‘collecting’ and ‘correlating’ limitations obvious in view of the Board’s new construction. In addition, the Board should consider Masters’ Appendix J in assessing whether Masters’ Path Display teaches life cycle events and the claimed correlating step.” Netflix, 2024 WL 3507601 at *8. After the Federal Circuit issued its mandate, with our authorization, the parties filed the following briefs: Petitioner’s Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 37, “Pet. Remand Br.”), Patent Owner’s Response Brief on Remand (Paper 40, “PO Remand Resp.”), Petitioner’s Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 41, “Pet. Remand Reply”), and Patent Owner’s Sur-reply Brief on Remand (Paper 42, “PO Remand Sur-reply”).” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We determine a POSITA would have had “a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a similar discipline, with one or two years of experience,” which is consistent with the parties’ arguments and testimony of the parties’ declarants, as well as the level reflected in the ’722 patent and the asserted prior art. We determine it is unnecessary to reach the parties’ additional statements of the knowledge and skills that a POSITA would allegedly possess.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner’s proposed construction to be generally consistent with the intrinsic record (including the claim language) and the Federal Circuit’s guidance. However, we decline to adopt the use of “related to” instead of “associated with” in Petitioner’s proposed construction. Consistent with the Federal Circuit’s guidance, we determine the proper construction of “performance data” further includes data pertaining to the performance of a server and/or a technology tier. Netflix, 2024 WL 3507601 at *6 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:56–57, 4:3–8, 4:14–18, 7:26–29). Accordingly, we determine “performance data” means “data associated with the performance of one or more application instances, including instance-level, application-level, device-level, and tier-level data and includes data pertaining to the performance of a server and/or a technology tier.”” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“With that backdrop, we agree with the parties that the claim language itself sufficiently defines the term “application instance” and that it is unnecessary to further define the term.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,457,722 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,457,722 - Affordable Wire Management, LLC v. Cambria County Association For The Blind And Handicapped, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00178 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10, 14–22, 24, and 25 are unpatentable as obvious over Carr and Almy; the Board did not reach the alternative Caveney grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. DISCUSSION A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a skilled artisan would have had “a bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as electrical engineering, civil engineering, mechanical engineering or equivalent with 2–3 years of experience in electrical utility systems, planning, and design.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51). Petitioner also asserts that the number of years of experience could be higher or lower given the level of education and vice versa. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 51).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“In general, a preamble limits the invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Cochlear Bone Anchored Solutions AB v. Oticon Med. AB, 958 F.3d 1348, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). We agree with Petitioner that the preambles of claims 1 and 6 recite an intended use. The bodies of both claims recite a structurally complete system comprising a messenger wire and a plurality of cable hangers that are disposed along and suspended from the messenger wire and have a plurality of cable carrying surfaces structured to support at least one electrical cable of the plurality of electrical cables and are separated by a cable carrier divider. Ex. 1001, 10:27–37. According to the preambles, the system are used “for organizing a plurality of electrical cables extending from a plurality of solar panels.” Id. at 10:24–26. slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner’s construction “only replaces ‘organizing’ with ‘separating’” and “organizing” has a broader ordinary meaning than separating and includes “to arrange or order” not merely to separate. Reply 4 (citing Exs. 1052, 1053); id. at 5 (“Separated cables may be organized. But not all organized cables are necessarily separated.”). We adopt Petitioner’s interpretation of “organizing” as “to arrange or order.” Reply 4. This meaning is consistent with the preamble language of “[a] system for organizing a plurality of electrical cables extending from a plurality of solar panels” comprising a messenger wire and cable hangers disposed along and suspended from the messenger wire with cable carrying surfaces that support electrical cables separated by a divider. Ex. 1001, 10:24–37. The system organizes electrical cables by (1) suspending them from a messenger wire on cable hangers, (2) supporting the cables on cable carrying surfaces of each cable hanger, and (3) separating the cables on adjacent cable carrying surfaces of the cable hangers by using a divider. The “organizing” in the preamble encompasses each of these ways of arranging or ordering the electrical cables but is not limited to any particular way of doing so and merely recites an intended use of the systems. Because we interpret the preamble as reciting an intended use of the systems, we also interpret this portion of the preamble as an intended use of those systems. Our Decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s interpretation that organizing means separating because the combination of Almy and Carr renders obvious a system for organizing electrical cables extending from solar panels by suspending them from a messenger wire on cable hangers that also separate the cables, as discussed infra in Section II.D. See Reply 12 n.4.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that a skilled artisan would not have replaced Almy’s wire loops with Carr’s hangers to prevent cross-induction because Almy discloses only DC power cables that extend from the photovoltaic (PV) modules to a combiner box and inverter that converts DC current to AC current without disclosing AC cables or data cables in close proximity to Almy’s DC cables that could create a cross-induction effect. PO Resp. 39– 44 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 3, 15, 34, Figs. 3, 6; Ex. 2038 ¶¶ 153, 154, 157–160, 163; Ex. 2004, 85:23–86:2, 148:9–14, 154:12–19). We disagree. We agree with Petitioner that a skilled artisan would have used Carr’s cable hangers to organize electrical cables in Almy’s solar power system and prevent cross-induction between AC, DC, and/or data cables. Pet. 45–46; Reply 12–13; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 53–55. A skilled artisan would know that Carr’s cable hangers would improve Almy’s solar power system by supporting AC, DC, and/or data cables without cross-induction. Pet. 46; Reply 13; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 48, 96–99; Ex. 1005, 1:27–34, 2:15–27, Fig. 1. Carr’s hangers would satisfy regulations requiring AC and DC cables to be separated. Reply 13. Because Almy’s wire loops cannot comply with NEC regulations that require the separation of AC, DC, and data cables, they limit the ability of Almy’s system to power trackers with AC current to move PV modules to track the sun and obtain maximum power. Ex. 1001, 1:20–56; PO Resp. 7–8 (describing the solar industry trend to use trackers and NEC rules requiring separation of AC, DC, and signal cables for such systems). Carr’s hangers would enable Almy’s solar power system to organize AC, DC, and data cables for solar panels and trackers on a single messenger wire to increase efficiency, comply with NEC rules, prevent cross induction, and avoid the costs of trenching and cable trays. Reply 12–13; Pet. 45–47; Ex. 1005, 1:27–34 (Carr’s cable hangers separate arial conducting cables to minimize cross induction); Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 32–36 (describing the benefits of separating electrical cables with hangers), 48, 96–98 (wire loops cannot prevent cross induction between current- and non-current-carrying cables as hangers do); Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 53–55 (NEC rules require separation of AC, DC, and signal cables); see Metso Mins., Inc. v Powerscreen Int’l Distrib., 526 F. App’x 988, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding a motivation to combine to create a solution that complies with road permit regulations). Carr’s hangers would provide a simple, robust means to support and separate current- and non-current-carrying cables to prevent cross induction without deforming under load in Almy’s solar power system. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”); Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 799–800 (Fed. Cir. 2021)) (“This is the so-called ‘known-technique’ rationale. And if there’s a known technique to address a known problem using ‘prior art elements according to their established functions,’ then there is a motivation to combine.”); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (an implicit motivation to combine exists when a combination produces a stronger, cheaper, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, and/or more efficient product); Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 32 (IEEE Standard 142 and NSC Rule 235G require spacing of current-carrying and data cables to avoid cross-linking), 42 (2014 NEC spacing requirements), 96–99 (Carr’s hangers support and space conducting cables to prevent cross-linking).” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,349,291 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,349,291
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.