- Apple Inc. v. Mozido Corfire-Korea, Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 27, 2023 · IPR2022-01149 · APJ Paul J Korniczky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Hertel, Chitti, Spodak, and Tedesco, with additional references for claims 5–10.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We do not see any substantive difference between the parties’ proposals. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the ’692 patent and the applied prior art, but note that our obviousness evaluation would not differ if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Other than the claim terms discussed below, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any other terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner because there are several issues with its proposed construction. First, the claims do not recite that a temporary payment card “can only be used for a payable time” nor does Patent Owner direct us to specific claim language suggesting the claims should be limited to the two embodiments identified by Patent Owner. EPOS Techs. Ltd. v. Pegasus Techs. Ltd., 766 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so limited.”). The claim language is not limited to the embodiments identified by Patent Owner. SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment”). Claim limitation 1.8, for example, recites only “resetting the setting of the temporary payment card when the payable time passes such that the mobile payment card is no longer set as the temporary card and payments are made through a main card.” Ex. 1001, 8:3–6. This limitation broadly relates to embodiment 2 listed above (i.e., “if no payment is made with the temporary payment card during the payable time, the main payment card is reset at the expiration of the payable time”), and is not limited to embodiment 1 listed above. Second, Patent Owner’s proposed construction renders superfluous portions of limitation 1.8. If “temporary payment card” is construed so that it “can only be used for a payable time,” then this construction renders superfluous the portion of limitation [1.8] that specifically recites a condition on resetting the temporary payment card (“when the payable time passes . . . .”). Ex. 1020 ¶ 25. Third, Patent Owner’s proposed construction that the temporary payment card “can only be used for a payable time” excludes embodiments in the ’692 patent. Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that does not encompass a disclosed embodiment is rarely, if ever, correct.” (alteration omitted)). The ’692 patent, for example, discloses that a user can reset the temporary payment card “even if the payable time remains” by sliding down the temporary payment card on the screen. Ex. 1001, 5:16–19 (“When the user intentionally slides down the temporary payment card as shown in FIG. 13 even if the payable time still remains, the setting of the temporary payment card is reset.”). Thus, the ’692 patent does not require that the temporary payment card can “only be used for a payable time” because a user may intentionally remove the card before the payable time expires.” slip op. at 15
- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“IV. CONCLUSION8 For the reasons discussed above, we determine Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that all of the challenged claims are unpatentable, as summarized in the following table:” slip op. at 61
Patent outcomesUS 10,223,692 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,223,692 - Nearmap US, Inc. v. Eagle View Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 14, 2023 · IPR2022-01009 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Littleworth, Linder, and Middlebrook.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“For the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has made a” slip op. at 57
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“support the conclusion that Linder has no applicability to Littleworth. For example, Dr. Bajaj references Linder’s example on page 11 of a series of images taken by an airplane and “photographed strip by strip, turning around the aircraft after every strip, so that the strips are taken in a meander-like sequence.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 65, 67 (citing Ex. 1012, 10–11). Dr. Bajaj points to Linder’s statement that “[t]he two images of each model have a longitudinal overlap of approximately 60 to 80%,” “neighbouring strips have a lateral overlap of normally about 30%,” and that “this is not only necessary for stereoscopic viewing but also for the connecting of all images of a block within an aerial triangulation.” Id. This portion of Linder, however, is only an example, and merely illustrates that there needs to be a certain amount of overlap between the images in order to correlate them. It is consistent with Littleworth, which also contemplates that the overlapping images are correlated by identifying and coordinating “suitable control points” among the images “to create the three-dimensional model.” Ex. 1005, 755–756; see Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 34–35, 37.” slip op. at 54
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artUnpatentable
“support the conclusion that Linder has no applicability to Littleworth. For example, Dr. Bajaj references Linder’s example on page 11 of a series of images taken by an airplane and “photographed strip by strip, turning around the aircraft after every strip, so that the strips are taken in a meander-like sequence.” Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 65, 67 (citing Ex. 1012, 10–11). Dr. Bajaj points to Linder’s statement that “[t]he two images of each model have a longitudinal overlap of approximately 60 to 80%,” “neighbouring strips have a lateral overlap of normally about 30%,” and that “this is not only necessary for stereoscopic viewing but also for the connecting of all images of a block within an aerial triangulation.” Id. This portion of Linder, however, is only an example, and merely illustrates that there needs to be a certain amount of overlap between the images in order to correlate them. It is consistent with Littleworth, which also contemplates that the overlapping images are correlated by identifying and coordinating “suitable control points” among the images “to create the three-dimensional model.” Ex. 1005, 755–756; see Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 34–35, 37.” slip op. at 54
Patent outcomesUS 8,670,961 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,670,961 - Uv Engineering Solutions LLC v. Trojan Technologies Group UlcInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 11, 2023 · IPR2023-01015 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–5 and 8–24 were unpatentable over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2022).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The primary dispute between the parties is whether the person having ordinary skill in the art works with lamps generally (Petitioner) or works with ultraviolet lamps for fluid treatment systems (Patent Owner). Although the specification of the ’654 patent focuses on ultraviolet lamps for fluid treatment systems (see Ex. 1001, 1:24–2:29), the claims of the patent are not so limited. Rather, the claims broadly claim “lamps” without reciting any field of use. See id. at 6:2–8:24. Because the claims are not limited to ultraviolet lamps or fluid treatment centers, Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill is more consistent with the claims. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed description of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Because construction of the disputed claim limitation is not necessary to resolve the controversy, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have “modif[ied] the terminal pins 126, 128, 130, and 132 of Ellner to be angled relative to the longitudinal axis as shown in Titchener so as to create a reliable connection between cables as disclosed in Titchener.” Pet. 12. Petitioner further argues that “[s]uch a modification would be a simple substitution of one known element (i.e., angled connectors 5a and 5b of Titchener) for another (i.e., non-angled terminal pins 126, 128, 130, and 132 of Ellner) to obtain predictable results.” Id. at 12–13. According to Petitioner, the combination of the teachings of Ellner and Titchener result in a lamp in which “each of the first elongate electrical connector (i.e., terminal pin 126, 128 modified to be angled as shown in Titchener) and the second elongate connector (i.e., terminal pin 130, 132 modified to be angled as shown in Titchener) configured to form an oblique angle with respect to the longitudinal axis.” Id. at 13.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,167,654 - PTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-00822 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1 and 4–7 on the ground that they would have been obvious over Raleigh.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2019). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of claims 1 and 4–7 of the ’047 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1 and 4–7 of the ’047 patent on the asserted ground of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“in 2013 would have had experience in and knowledge of telecommunications and networking technologies. A POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent. A POSITA would have also had two years of experience in telecommunications and networking. Lack of education can be remedied by additional professional experience, and lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Patent Owner takes no position with respect to Petitioner’s description of this hypothetical person. Prelim. Resp. 13–14. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’047 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther
“Here, neither party asserts that any term requires specific construction to resolve the controversy. Pet. 12; Prelim. Resp. 12. We agree that no term is in controversy, and therefore, we do not need to construe any term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Consequently, each claim term is given its ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“showing sufficient for institution that Raleigh teaches limitations [1.4] and [1.5]. We agree that the claimed activation request and response for the group plan, communicated between the unified services platform system and the third party application service provider system, is taught by a combination of Raleigh’s service provider application process (Figure 35) and Raleigh’s service selection process (Figure 36). Pet. 18–19, 22, 33–35. We credit Dr. Houh’s testimony supporting Petitioner’s rationale for combining the teachings of Raleigh. Dr. Houh testifies that the service selection process of Figures 36A and 36B may be conducted in conjunction with the selection of a service provider as described in Figures 35A and 35B. Ex. 1003 ¶ 90. Dr. Houh further testifies that Raleigh describes a comprehensive architecture that would suggest to a person having ordinary skill in the art that the service selection and activation procedures of Figures 35 and 36 are interrelated and combinable. Id. ¶¶ 51–52. Dr. Houh points to statements in Raleigh that the teachings of numerous Figures, including those describing managing services for a master service account, “can apply equally” to the teachings of Figures 35 and 36. Id. ¶ 51 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1841, 1847, 1851, 1853, 1855, 1856). Dr. Houh testifies that, in view of these statements, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Raleigh’s service selection processes with purposes of institution, such a combination is supported by the current record and teaches limitations [1.4] and [1.5].” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,883,047 - PTAB · Dec 7, 2023 · IPR2023-00839 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–26 on both asserted obviousness grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“General Plastic, Paper 19 at 16. The General Plastic factors “are not dispositive, but part of a balanced assessment of all relevant circumstances in the case, including the merits.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 58 (Nov. 2019) (“Trial Practice Guide”), https://go.usa.gov/xpvPF (citing General Plastic, Paper 19 at 15).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“6. Conclusion Regarding Ground 1 Based on the current record, we preliminarily determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in its challenge to claims 1–26 as unpatentable in view of RFC 3209 and Raz.” slip op. at 34
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in its Preliminary Response. At this preliminary stage and on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, apart from the phrase “at least” modifying the number of years of professional experience. Inclusion of such qualifiers renders the articulation vague by being open-ended thus encompassing the level of experience of an expert, someone with more than ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s articulation otherwise appears consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes any express claim constructions. Pet. 4; see generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the current record and without any opposition from Patent Owner, we see no need for express construction of any term at this stage of the proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 18
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,118,602 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00963 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all petitioned grounds and granted joinder to the Volkswagen IPR, with the joined petitioners’ role limited as specified.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We instituted an inter partes review in the Volkswagen IPR. See IPR2022-01567, Paper 8 (“1567 Dec. on Inst.”). We incorporate our previous analysis regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’450 Patent challenged in the Petition for the same reasons. See 1567 Dec. on Inst. 10–73. Therefore, we determine that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“we are persuaded that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the Volkswagen IPR. Petitioner challenges the same claims that are challenged in the Volkswagen IPR on the same grounds using the same prior art and evidence. Petitioner explicitly agrees that it will take an “understudy role” in the Volkswagen IPR, and has shown that the trial schedule will not be affected at all by joinder. See Mot. 7–9; Mot. Reply 1; see also Opp. 2 (Petitioner “has said it ‘will act as an understudy’ until the target IPR petitioner is no longer a party in the proceeding.”). At this stage of the proceeding, we determine Patent Owner’s additional conditions are not necessary. See Opp. 2–3. If Petitioner fails to abide by its own conditions, then Patent Owner should meet and confer with Petitioner and contact the Board, if the parties cannot come to an agreement. For the reasons discussed above, we determine that joinder to the Volkswagen IPR would result in the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the Volkswagen IPR.” slip op. at 18
NonePatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - General Motors LLC / Nissan North America, Inc. v. Neo Wireless LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00962 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 7 and 11 under § 314(a), finding that the General Plastic factors favored denying this follow-on petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent.” General Plastic, Paper 19 at 16. “[O]ur application of the General Plastic factors is not limited solely to instances when multiple petitions are filed by the same petitioner. Rather, when different petitioners challenge the same patent, we consider any relationship between those petitioners when weighing the General Plastic factors.” Valve, Paper 11 at 2, 8–9.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“seeking joinder to Ford Motor Co. v. Neo Wireless LLC, IPR2023-00763. See Mot. 1. Petitioner acknowledges “[s]hould the Ford IPR be . . . not 2 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 effective March 16, 2013. Because the ’450 Patent claims the benefit of an earlier effective filing date prior to the effective date of the applicable AIA amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102 and 103. 3 US 2006/0039274 A1, published Feb. 23, 2006 (Ex. 1005). 4 IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks, Part 16: Air Interface for Fixed Broadband Wireless Access Systems (Oct. 1, 2004) (Ex. 1006). instituted for any reason, Petitioners submit this motion for joinder would be moot, and requests the Board consider Petitioner’s IPR petition on its own merits.” Institution was denied in IPR2023-00763. Ford Motor Co. v. Neo Wireless LLC, IPR2023-00763, Paper 17 (PTAB Nov. 9, 2023). Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder as moot.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Zilkr Cloud Technologies, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 6, 2023 · IPR2023-00809 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Cisco did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 13, 14, and 17 were obvious over de Castro and Robb.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review. B. Real Party in Interest” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“having “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of relevant experience in telecommunications and networking.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–34). Further, Petitioner asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the subject matter of the ’048 patent. This is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Houh. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–34. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of a person of ordinary skill for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Here, Petitioner explains that, “for the purposes of this proceeding and the grounds presented herein, no claim term requires express construction.” Pet. 11 (citing Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017). Nevertheless, Petitioner identifies exemplary uses of the claim terms “definition of a service” and “definition of a plan” in the ’048 patent. See id. at 11–12. In addition, Petitioner asserts the claim term “test environment” during prosecution, but that even if we construe this term consistent with applicant’s proposed construction, Petitioner should prevail on the asserted obviousness ground. See id. at 12–13. For purposes of this Decision and based on this preliminary record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction at this stage of the proceeding. C. Patentability Challenge” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“the plurality of application service provider systems, wherein at least two of the API interfaces are different.” Ex. 1001, 60:13–15. Limitation 13.2 thus requires that the “API interfaces” must be received from the “application service provider systems.”” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,883,048 - International Business Machines Corporation v. Digital Doors, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 5, 2023 · IPR2023-00969 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1, 6, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 21–23, and 27, finding Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition lacked compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. In evaluating the Fintiv factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review,” recognizing that “there is some overlap among these factors” and that “[s]ome facts may be relevant to more than one factor.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons stated below, we exercise our discretion not to institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We do not see compelling evidence from Petitioner that the extracting/parsing data limitation is taught or suggested by Bossemeyer. As discussed supra, in Section II.C, the ’987 patent discloses extraction occurring as an initial step in which a filter removes or extracts security-sensitive data from a data object prior to storage. See Ex. 1001, 19:45–49, Fig. 1A. In contrast, Bossemeyer discloses a “partitioned” memory (see Fig. 3, reproduced supra in Section II.E.1), but does not disclose extracting, i.e., filtering or separating, security sensitive information from source data to obtain extracted data and remainder data. See Easttom Decl. ¶ 29 (“Bossemeyer is entirely silent as to where the information stored in the central server comes from, the form it takes before it gets to the central database server, or how the different pieces of information end up in the different partitioned areas of memory.”). Petitioner points to no disclosure or suggestion that the “proprietary” and “limited access” information in Bossemeyer’s database has been filtered or separated from the “public” information, so as to result in “extracted data” and “remainder data,” as recited in the challenged claims.” slip op. at 22
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“repeatedly refers to Bossemeyer’s “partitioned” database server and attempts to equate “partitioning” with “extraction.” See, e.g., Pet. 24 (“Bossemeyer partitions or separates (e.g., extracts), user data into subsets of extracted data, e.g., limited access information and/or proprietary information, and remainder data, e.g., public information.”) (emphases and color highlighting omitted). We do not find this argument compelling. We agree with Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Easttom, who testifies, “a partitioned memory does not Dr. Easttom explains, a partitioned memory “merely refers to memory with different areas reserved for different types of information.” Id. Petitioner argues that, to the extent Bossemeyer does not explicitly disclose “extracting data,” a person of ordinary skill would have understood that, when Bossemeyer’s central data base server “partitions” user information in terms of accessibility, Bossemeyer teaches “separating sensitive information from user data.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:17–20). We find the reference in Bossemeyer to “partitions” is not a compelling disclosure of extracting, e.g., filtering or removing, security sensitive data from a data object prior to storage. We agree, instead, with Dr. Easttom, that this disclosure in Bossemeyer is “merely referring to the act by the memory partitions of keeping different pieces of information separate from each other, not removing some pieces of data from a larger whole.” Easttom Decl. ¶ 32. He concludes that “[a person of ordinary skill] would have understood that the extracting/parsing process of the ’987 Patent is vastly different than the act of ‘partitioning’ either as used in Bossemeyer or as used in the art at the time.’” Id. ¶ 34.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,349,987 - International Business Machines Corporation v. Digital Doors, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 5, 2023 · IPR2023-00971 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition did not present compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020 00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). “These factors relate to whether efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding.” Id. In evaluating the Fintiv factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review,” recognizing that “there is some overlap among these factors” and that “[s]ome facts may be relevant to more than one factor.” Id.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not institute an inter partes review (also “IPR”) unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” However, institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons stated below, we exercise our discretion not to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Furthermore, we are not persuaded that Dr. Zadok’s testimony provides compelling evidence that this limitation is met by Bossemeyer. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 194–211. We agree with Patent Owner that much of Dr. Zadok’s testimony is based on assumptions that he does not support with facts. Prelim. Resp. 34–41. For example, he testifies, without factual support, that “[t]he system of Bossemeyer retrieves remainder data (e.g., public information such as a customer’s name), retrieve [sic] extracted data (e.g., proprietary or limited access information such as credit card numbers and account PIN/numbers), and then logically merges these pieces of information (i.e., reconstruct the original information to appear as before it was split into different security categories).” Ex. 1003 ¶ 207 (emphases and color coding omitted). Dr. Zadok provides no citation to Bossemeyer, and we see no disclosure that Bossemeyer’s system “logically merges” public information, such as a customer’s name, with proprietary or limited access information, such as credit card numbers and account PIN/numbers. Id. Dr. Zadok even admits that “Bossemeyer does not explicitly state that the ¶ 208. Nevertheless, he speculates (without support) that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that such logical merging would have been obvious to take place for the (secure) transaction to succeed.” Id. Similarly, we are not persuaded by Dr. Zadok’s testimony, referring to an example from Bossemeyer involving access to medical data (Ex. 1005, 5:6–15), that “Bossemeyer discloses permitting reconstruction of some of a user’s medical data (e.g., data including the user’s medical alerts 212, and insurance and prescription information 214) and permitting reconstruction of all of user’s data (e.g., data further including the user’s medical history 216) with additional authorization.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 210 (emphases and color highlighting omitted). We find that Dr. Zadok’s testimony is speculative, hindsight-biased, and unsupported by Bossemeyer, which does not disclose or suggest any such logical merging of data. See, e.g., Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that an articulated reasoning “is especially important to guard against the dangers of hindsight bias”). See Ex 2004 ¶¶ 47–56 (challenging Dr. Zadok’s assumption of merging data in Bossemeyer).” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill would have “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, and approximately two years of experience “[l]ess professional experience can be substituted by additional education and vice versa. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 112–113). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,721,344
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.