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  • PTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00545 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 3–11, 13–21, and 23–30 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable based on the grounds advanced here. Thus, for reasons explained below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1, 3–11, 13–21, and 23–30 of the ’904 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “F. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2024). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.” slip op. at 11

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Id. at 18–19. Petitioner also notes that “[a] person could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Id. at 19. Patent Owner does not offer a definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition appears to be consistent with the field of the invention reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’904 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “1. Rationale for proposed combination Petitioner asserts Merriman061 teaches that it is “highly desirable to target advertisements to the appropriate potential customer base” and discloses “techniques for gathering profile information about users and 26 1:52–53, 1:64–2:3, 2:6–30, 4:44–5:7, 5:50–59, 7:46–8:30, 8:39–46; Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). According to Petitioner, Jaye “recognizes the importance of collecting profile information for targeted advertising” and discloses “techniques for combining profile information from multiple local websites visited by users into more comprehensive global profiles that may be shared with ‘interested outside parties, such as advertisers.’” Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1005, code (57), 1:18–38, 2:6–10, 2:6–8, 2:15–3:40, 5:5–19, 6:1– 7:45, 8:40–10:41,14:22–25; Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “incorporate Jaye’s techniques for collecting and combining profile information to enhance and improve Meriman061’s ad targeting by providing more information about the users to whom the ads are targeted.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 123). Having reviewed the arguments and evidence included in the Petition, including the Houh Declaration, which are not substantively addressed by Patent Owner at this stage, we are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, for purposes of this Decision, that it would have been obvious to combine Merriman061 and Jaye in the manner set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 26

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,494,904
  • PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00698 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    Instituted review of claims 1–11, 18–20, 23–25, and 28 on all petitioned grounds, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness challenges.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Doolittle, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’539 patent “would have had an undergraduate degree (i.e., B.S., B.S.E. or the equivalent) in electrical engineering, materials science, physics, or a similar discipline” and “would also have one to two years of experience in the field of LED packaging design.” Pet. 6. Petitioner additionally contends that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience, and vice versa.” Id. Petitioner further contends that “[t]his person would have been capable of understanding and applying the teachings of the ’539 patent and the prior-art references discussed herein,” and “[m]oreover, the prior art reflects the level of skill at the time of the claimed invention.” Id. (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 38–42). Patent Owner states that “solely for the purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner and its technical expert employ the same level of skill in the art as Petitioners.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’539 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness analysisbelow. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner contends that “no construction should be necessary to institute this petition.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner “requests that the Board adopt the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 22. Having considered the record, we determine that, at this stage, no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We note, however, there may be some claim terms below whose constructions that the parties may wish to address during trial.” slip op. at 10

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “and “how” the references would have been combined. As the Petition explains, Krummacher discloses radiation scattering particles having a size range of 50 to 1000 nm. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1107 ¶ 39). Petitioner further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would use Stokes teachings to further refine that size range to optimize the particle size to preferentially scatter blue light. See id. at 26–27. Petitioner further provides reasons, suggested in Stokes itself, why a person of ordinary skill would have made this modification to Krummacher. See id. at 27–28 (citing Ex. 1108, 7:17–26; Ex. 1102 ¶ 128). Petitioner provides sufficient evidence that such a particle size selection was within the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 122–128, 140–144; Ex. 1108, 7:1– 17; Ex. 1124 ¶¶ 80–81. We note that we have reviewed the testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Schubert, but this testimony does not, at this stage, diminish the weight we give to Petitioner’s expert. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Krummacher and Stokes accounts for this limitation and that a person of ordinary skill would have combined the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 23

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’539 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,614,539
  • PTAB · Sep 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00207 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Director review

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–7, 11–14, and 16–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsDirector review decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision granting Patent Owner’s request for discretionary denial and denying institution (“Decision,” Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed an authorized response. See Paper 121 (“DR Request”); Paper 13 (“Patent Owner Response”). The Director granted the DR Request and referred the Petition to the Board “to handle the case in the normal course, including by issuing a decision on institution addressing the merits and other non-discretionary considerations, as appropriate.” Paper 14 (“Order Granting Director Review”).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”) We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’228 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability. See SAS Inst. Inc. v Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 364–65 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (a)” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “As noted above, Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response and thus does not respond at this time. Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of our Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “a “single caching agent,” which is recited in claim 1 here. ’1344 IPR, Paper 31 (“Final Written Decision”), 16–18. We concluded that a “‘single caching agent’ means ‘one caching agent for the processor, which may be formed from distributed portions.’” Id. at 18.” slip op. at 14

    Claim constructioncites KSR · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 8,984,228
  • PTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 10–12, 22–25, 28, 30, 32, and 33 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Director reviewOther

      “Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on March 28, 2025. Paper 7. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 20, 2025. Paper 9. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 10.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because, as pointed out by Petitioner, claim 1 does not recite limitations directed to the resolution of the source data of a frame that is to be combined “to provide an image having a relatively high resolution.” We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that claims should not be read to encompass prior art distinguished in the specification based on Patent Owner’s citations to the Background passages of the ’180 Patent. The cited passages disclose foveal image sensors for acquiring both a wide and narrow field of view and having smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region, resulting in sensors that have a high resolution only in the narrow field of view. Consistent with Petitioner’s observation (see Prelim. Reply 2–3), this cited passage at best distinguishes prior art foveal sensors with smaller pixel sizes arranged in the central foveal region and larger pixel sizes arranged in peripheral rings about the central region. See Ex. 1001, 2:10–24. Finally, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the prosecution history. Patent Owner does not direct us to persuasive absent any statements by the Applicant regarding that applied prior art, amounts to prosecution history disclaimer. Aside from declining to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction, for the purpose of institution we need not explicitly construe “combine data of a frame from at least one of the plurality of channels to provide an image having relatively high resolution,” as recited in claim 1. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. 3. Other claim terms and phrases Petitioner also proposes a construction for “data of a frame,” recited in claim 1. See Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not specifically address this claim construction. See Prelim. Resp. 23–30. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe “data of a frame” or any other claim term or phrase. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 12

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner proposes a similar level of skill in the art as Petitioner, namely, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, computer engineering, physics, or a related subject, and two to three years of work experience in digital imaging.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶ 80). person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
  • PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00342 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, and 6–11 based on the asserted obviousness grounds over Broggi, Huttenlocher, and Brady, with or without Bertozzi.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We agree with Petitioner. The specification broadly states that the invention is “for assisting a motor vehicle guidance on the basis of image data” and raises “maneuvering trucks toward docking stations” as a “particular” application. E.g., Ex. 1001, 1:6–8. Similarly, it refers to a docking station for trucks as a “typical destination” used only “for example.” Id. at 3:43–44. Patent Owner does not point to anything in the prosecution history that would inform the construction of “potential destination.” The intrinsic record does not support Patent Owner’s narrow construction. Thus, for purposes of this decision, we do not construe “potential destination” as limited to a fixed location. No other aspect of the construction affects our determination whether to institute.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have been motivated to use Huttenlocher’s pattern-matching technique as part of Broggi’s vehicle-detection method because Broggi suggests using a “traditional pattern matching technique.” Pet. 16–17. Further, Petitioner reasons, the combination would result in “improved vehicle detection and efficient use of processing resources.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1006, 23; Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). For the claimed storing step, Petitioner relies additionally on Brady. Id. at 54–56. Brady discloses a visual vehicle-tracking system that keeps “a vehicle log 102 of all vehicles currently within the scene, including vehicles’ associated track histories, inertial history 104 of the scene . . . and potential future track positions.” Ex. 1007, 11:21–26. Petitioner reasons that skilled artisans would have had reason to use Brady’s teachings as asserted because “Broggi omits implementation details how the associated data is processed and stored” and because the combination “would improve Broggi’s platooning through accurate and consistent tracking of the preceding vehicle positions used in the associated vehicle path determinations, thereby improving the user experience during platooning.” Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1007, 11:21–25; Ex. 1003 ¶ 67).” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableInstituted

      “Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Broggi as relating to platooning rather than guidance to a fixed endpoint. Prelim. Resp. 21–38. All of Patent Owner’s arguments in that regard depend on us adopting Patent Owner proposed construction for “potential destination.” Id. As discussed above, we do not agree that the claimed potential destinations should be limited to fixed locations. See supra at 7–8 (§ II.B.1). Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding platooning rather than guidance to a fixed endpoint. Although Patent Owner asserts that Broggi also does not calculate an “optimized path” as claimed (Prelim. Resp. 29–33), that argument similarly depends on a construction for “potential destination” that is limited to fixed locations. See id. at 31 (arguing that the “car taught in Broggi cannot calculate an ‘optimized path’” because it “has absolutely no knowledge of the destination for the platoon”), 32 (“[I]n Broggi, the ARGO does not calculate a path to a destination because it doesn’t have any knowledge regarding the destination of the preceding car.”). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because, as discussed, the challenged claims do not require an optimized path to a fixed location, but instead read on an optimized path to a transitory location, such as the location of Broggi’s preceding vehicle at a given time. We agree with Petitioner that Broggi teaches an optimized path because it generates steering commands that lead toward the preceding vehicle and because those commands consider the steered vehicle’s capabilities. See Pet. 34–35. Additionally, Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Huttenlocher as failing to disclose the claimed “mathematical tree structure.” Prelim. Resp. 38–62. All of Patent Owner’s arguments in that regard depend on us adopting Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “mathematical tree structure.” Id. As discussed above, we do not agree that the claimed mathematical tree structure is limited to a single tree. See supra at 8–10 (§ II.B.2). Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Huttenlocher’s tree structure. Patent Owner does not otherwise challenger Petitioner’s contentions based on Broggi, Huttenlocher, and Brady. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions and evidence, and conclude on the present record that Petitioner is likely to prevail with the unpatentability of claims 6–8 and 11. D. OBVIOUSNESS OVER BROGGI, HUTTENLOCHER, BRADY, AND BERTOZZI” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,336,805
  • PTAB · Jul 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 because Tesla showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 would have been obvious over Wallen and Berggren.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Director reviewOther

      “Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on April 7, 2025. Paper 6. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 27, 2025. Paper 8. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 9.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “establishes sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the combined teachings of Wallen and Berggren teach or suggest all of the limitations recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 14

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,206,670
  • PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 on all four asserted § 103 grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent, and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 5

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “The parties’ dispute on this issue turns on claim construction. Petitioner’s approach requires we read “accumulation” as updating transmission power for each received TPC command. That is consistent with some aspects of the ’153 patent’s description. See Ex. 1001, 9:29–42 (“[S]tep is the magnitude of the amount added to an accumulator upon receipt of each TPC command. . . . [T]he transmit power PTx(k) may be updated each time a new TPC command is received.”). Patent Owner’s approach requires only that TPC commands cumulatively affect transmission power. That also appears consistent with the ’153 patent’s description. See id. at 9:35–36 (“The transmit power PTx(k) may be updated for every frame period.”). Based on those disclosures, it appears that the Specification supports Patent Owner’s broader construction. We need not resolve the “accumulation” claim-construction dispute at this stage, because Petitioner’s Zeira-based ground justifies institution, as discussed below. The parties should address the proper construction for “TPC command accumulation” in the instituted trial.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner that the present record shows Andersson’s and Khan’s approaches couldn’t or wouldn’t be combined in the manner Petitioner asserts. Although shared-channel applications may have motivated Khan’s approach, it seems that scheduling grants applicable to a particular UE could be transmitted to that UE along with Andersson’s TPC commands. Thus, Patent Owner does not undermine Petitioner’s prior-art combination on the present record. The additional record developed through trial may ultimately support Patent Owner on this point, but at present, this argument does not justify denial of institution. Patent Owner additionally takes issue with Petitioner’s asserted benefits such as “allowing for a larger number of active wireless units,” reducing complexity, and reducing latency. Prelim. Resp. 38 (quoting Pet. 26–27). Those disputes raise potential factual issues that are best resolved through trial.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 10,952,153
  • PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00219 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 11–22 based on the Petition’s asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Patent Owner submits that the asserted combination is unworkable and that skilled artisans would not have made it because Andersson’s DPCCH is a dedicated channel sent to a single UE, whereas Khan’s TPC commands and scheduling grants are sent using a shared channel—“a channel that is shared by the UEs attached to a particular base station.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Because Khan’s TPC commands and scheduling grants “are intended for different UEs that share the channel,” unlike Andersson’s TPC commands in a dedicated channel, Patent Owner asserts, “the two frame structures cannot be combined in the manner Petitioner suggests.” Id. at 20–21. Although Andersson describes “other bits” in its data structure, Patent Owner asserts that those “would necessarily be intended for the UE that the DPCCH is dedicated for” and would not work for Khan’s scheduling grants. Id.” slip op. at 8

    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,706,500
  • PTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00260 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1 and 11–14 on all asserted grounds and consolidated the proceeding with IPR2024-01357.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In our Institution Decision in IPR2024-01357, we analyzed claim 1 of the ’678 patent in light of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. ’1357 IPR, Paper 17, 23–28. We concluded, after reviewing the arguments presented there, that “Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that the combined teachings of Basin-2005 and Basin-2007 render claim 1 unpatentable as obvious.” Id. at 28. In this proceeding, Petitioner has presented a challenge to claim 1 based on those same references that it represents is a “verbatim” copy of its previous challenge to claim 1 in the ’1357 IPR. Pet. 1–2, 28–35. Petitioner supports its challenge with expert testimony. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 107–125.7 Patent Owner has not submitted a response on the merits of this challenge. For the purposes of this Decision, and for the reasons given in the Petition, we adopt the analysis in our Institution Decision in the ’1357 IPR (at pp. 23–28), where we determined that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its obviousness challenge to claim 1 based on Basin-2005 and Basin-2007. Turning now to Petitioner’s challenge to claim 11, Petitioner relies on Basin-2007 and Stokes for the particle size limitations added to claim 1 by that dependent claim. Pet. 35–39. Thus, Petitioner asserts that “Basin-2007 discloses a light scattering material with an average TiO2 particle size that is ‘sub-micron’ (less than 1000 nm).” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 5). 7 Exhibit 1002 appears to be a duplicate copy of Dr. Doolittle’s declaration from the ’1357 IPR. Petitioner concludes, “Basin-2007 renders obvious claim 11 by literally disclosing the selection of average particle sizes that preferentially scatter blue light.” Id. Further, “to the extent that the claim language ‘an average particle size that is selected such that [it preferentially scatters blue light]’ requires an average particle size selected for that reason (rather than an average particle size that leads to that outcome), this claim element is rendered obvious by Stokes.” Id. at 38 (citing Doolittle Decl. ¶ 45) (alterations in original). Petitioner explains that “Stokes explicitly discloses the selection of an average particle size ‘such that the particles preferentially scatter blue . . . LED light as compared to yellow . . . light from the luminescent material.’” Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1008, 7:1–4) (alterations in original). Petitioner provides a motivation for combining Stokes with Basin- 2007 with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 38–39. Petitioner explains that “[t]o the extent that claim 11 is understood to also claim the basis for selecting a particular average particle size, a [person of ordinary skill] would have had reason to use such a basis for selecting average particle size as taught by Stokes.” Id. at 38 (citing Doolittle Decl. ¶¶ 46–48). Further, “a [person of ordinary skill] would have been motivated to apply this principle to Basin-2007, because it would increase the conversion of blue light to yellow light and improve the uniformity of the light source.” Id. at 39 (citing Doolittle Decl. ¶ 48). At this stage, Patent Owner does not provide an opposition to Petitioner’s evidence or arguments on the merits. For the reasons given by Petitioner, including those summarized above, we determine that Petitioner” slip op. at 6

    • Director reviewOther

      “On June 12, 2025, the Acting Director issued a decision denying the request and referring the Petition to the Board “to handle the case in the normal course, including by issuing a decision on institution addressing the merits and other nondiscretionary considerations, as appropriate.” Paper 16, 3. The Acting Director further instructed the Board, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the Board shall consolidate this proceeding with IPR2024-01357.” Id.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “As noted supra, the Acting Director of the USPTO has instructed the Board, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, the Board shall consolidate this proceeding with IPR2024-01357.” Paper 16, 3. Due to the similarity of the parties, counsel, subject matter, and asserted prior art between IPR2024- 01357 and this proceeding, and in view of the Acting Director’s guidance, we exercise our discretion to consolidate this proceeding with IPR2024- 01357. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(a).” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
  • PTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00297 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all petition grounds and granted Microsoft’s motion to join IPR2024-00856.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “III. DECISION ON INSTITUTION Petitioner represents that the challenges to the claims of the’109 patent in the Petition are “intentionally identical . . . in all substantive aspects” to the challenges in the ’856 IPR. See Joinder Motion 2; compare ’856 IPR, Paper 1, 2–4, with Pet. 2–3. Petitioner further represents that this proceeding and the ’856 IPR “rely upon the same analytical framework (e.g., same expert declarant and prior art) in addressing the Challenged Claims.” Joinder Motion 2. Additionally, Patent Owner does not present an opposition to the Petition on the merits and does not oppose joinder. See, e.g., Notice, 1. In view of the foregoing, for the reasons given above and in the ’856 Institution Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to at least one claim of the ’109 patent. We therefore institute inter partes review of all challenges in the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Joinder is a matter within the Board’s discretion based on the particular circumstances of each proceeding. For the reasons given above, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated that permitting Petitioner to join the ’856 IPR would avoid duplication and promote the efficient resolution of both proceedings and is therefore in the interests of justice.” slip op. at 6

    • BurdenInstituted

      “III. DECISION ON INSTITUTION Petitioner represents that the challenges to the claims of the’109 patent in the Petition are “intentionally identical . . . in all substantive aspects” to the challenges in the ’856 IPR. See Joinder Motion 2; compare ’856 IPR, Paper 1, 2–4, with Pet. 2–3. Petitioner further represents that this proceeding and the ’856 IPR “rely upon the same analytical framework (e.g., same expert declarant and prior art) in addressing the Challenged Claims.” Joinder Motion 2. Additionally, Patent Owner does not present an opposition to the Petition on the merits and does not oppose joinder. See, e.g., Notice, 1. In view of the foregoing, for the reasons given above and in the ’856 Institution Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to at least one claim of the ’109 patent. We therefore institute inter partes review of all challenges in the Petition. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,982,109
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