• Google LLC v. Eyesmatch Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00296 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1–6 and 10–12 over Rosenberg and Park, and claims 3, 4, 7–9, and 11–18 over Rosenberg, Park, and Geisner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “December 18, 2012, would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a closely related field such as computer science, and two years of work experience with image capture and processing systems or related fields.” Pet. 7 (citing Karam Decl. ¶ 91). Petitioner adds that “[a] person with less and/or different education, but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard.” Id. According to Petitioner, [t]he prior art also evidences such level of skill.” Id. Patent Owner states that it “applies Petitioners’ proposed level of skill for purposes of this Response.” PO Resp. 9 (citing Forsyth Decl. ¶¶ 53–54). For this Decision, we adopt the formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and applied by Patent Owner as consistent with the prior art before us in this proceeding.10” slip op. at 9

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Turning to the substantive issues, we find the District Court’s “mirror tracking mode” construction to be well-reasoned and supported by the record, and we therefore adopt that construction and its reasoning. As the District Court points out, both the “double the distance” and “same size” aspects of its construction are expressly discussed in the ’109 patent, which is incorporated in the ’110 patent. See Ex. 2008, 16 (citing Ex. 1021, 2:5–27, Figs. 5A, 5B), 40 (citing “same reasons set forth regarding the term ‘it appears to mimic a reflection of a mirror’” in support of construction of “mirror tracking mode”). So, too, is “flipping” or reversing of the image disclosed. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1021, 14:46–51, 15:41–47), 40.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Post-institution, Patent Owner invites us to construe limitation 1[f]’s recitation of “mirror tracking mode” and limitation 1[c]’s recitation of “adaptive transformation mapping.” PO Resp. 9–14. Regarding the latter, Patent Owner explains that “[i]n the District Court Litigation, ‘adaptive transformation mapping’ was construed as ‘continuously variable transformation mapping’ and ‘transformation mapping’ was construed as a ‘selected set of image transformations.’” Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 2008, 14, 37; Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 25, 27). Patent Owner does not, however, identify any way that those claim constructions affect our analysis of the parties’ patentability disputes. We find it unnecessary in resolving the parties’ patentability disputes to construe expressly limitation 1[c]’s recitation of “adaptive transformation mapping.”” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “persuasively address limitation 1[f]’s “mirror tracking mode.” In particular, Petitioner does not address persuasively the requirement, as explained in Section II.B above, that mirror tracking mode involves processing camera-captured images in a way that “maintains roughly the same size regardless of the user movement.” At odds with this requirement, Petitioner founds its case on an assertion that “Haan teaches the claimed mirror tracking mode” because “if the viewer is within 35 cm of the camera, a tracking mode is entered, applying resizing transformation.” Pet. 44 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75–76, 80–82, 90–94, 97; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 205–210). The resizing transformation Petitioner references actually involves magnifying the user’s image by an amount that changes based on the user’s position relative to the camera, quite the opposite of maintaining image size regardless of the user movement. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 75–76, Fig. 8. Thus, Petitioner’s initial position is unpersuasive. Petitioner’s shift to Haan’s “reflective mirror mode and conventional mirror period in the dual mode” is also unavailing. Reply 8. Consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments, Petitioner does not provide persuasive evidence that these operating states of Haan’s device involve any processing of camera-captured images. Sur-reply 13–14. To the contrary, Haan suggests that anytime its device provides an unmagnified image, it comes from a reflection off a physical reflective surface. See, e.g., Ex.1005 ¶ 76 (“This can be done for instance by using the device as a simple mirror, i.e. not displaying an image on the display device, but using the device in the reflective mode.”) (emphasis added), ¶ 92 (“a simple reflective mode, to act as a mirror”), ¶ 29 (“for a first range of positions, no image is displayed, whereby the reflective layer acts as a mirror, and for a second range of positions, the recorded image is displayed.”) (emphasis added). We also find unpersuasive Petitioner’s Reply arguments based on Haan’s disclosure of smoothly transitioning from “using the device as a simple mirror” (i.e., using a physical reflecting surface) to displaying a magnified image. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76, 80). To the extent this may establish a point around the transition at which Haan’s system displays an image with relatively little magnification, it does not establish that Haan teaches, suggests, or renders obvious holding the displayed size roughly constant, “regardless of the user movement.” Indeed, given Haan’s focus on helping the user see things more clearly with image magnification, Petitioner’s argument that it would have been obvious to hold the size of the image constant is not persuasive. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 4.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,982,110 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,982,110
• Trend Micro Inc. v. Cupp Computing AsSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 14, 2023 · IPR2019-00561 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claim 16 was held unpatentable as obvious over APA and Sikdar; claim 7 was not shown unpatentable over Sikdar and Wright.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill Petitioner contended “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’272 patent (i.e., May 30, 2007) . . . would have had a Bachelors’ degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a comparable field of study, plus at least two years of professional experience with computer security systems and networks, or the equivalent.” Pet. 8 (citing Jakobsson Decl. ¶ 49). In our Final Written Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s description of the person of ordinary skill over an alternative formulation by Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Medvidovic. FWD 17. However, we decided that we would reach the same result even under Dr. Medvidovic’s alternative formulation. Id. The level of ordinary skill adopted by us has not been further disputed by the parties, nor is it discussed in the Federal Circuit’s Decision. We therefore apply the same formulation for the reasons given in our Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts that in Petitioner’s analysis of claim 16, “Petitioner reads out any distinctions between ‘at least a subset’ and ‘a subset.’” PO Resp. 45. Petitioner responds that “[t]he Board should reject Patent Owner’s argument that ‘the subset’ must be a ‘proper subset,’ i.e., a set that is less than the full set of outgoing data.” Pet. Reply 5. Petitioner cites dictionary definitions and other additional authorities to support this conclusion. Pet. Reply 5–6 (citing, e.g., Exs. 1022, 1023, 1024). For example, A Dictionary of Computing defines “subset” as “[a] set T whose members are all members of S,” and contrasts this with a “proper subset.” Ex. 1023, 3. Petitioner further points out that the antecedent basis of “at least a subset” for “the subset” in claim 16 supports its construction. Pet. Reply 6. In our Final Written Decision, after considering Petitioner’s evidence and the language of the claim, we found that the references to “subset” in claim 16 should be construed broadly enough to read on providing any portion of the outgoing data, up to and including all the data, and not a proper subset. FWD 24–25. For the reasons summarized above and those given in our Final Written Decision, we find that the term “subset” in claim 16 does not limit the claim to a “proper subset,” i.e., the claimed subset may include all the members of the set.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Applying the Federal Circuit’s “flexible” standard, we find that for the reasons given that Petitioner demonstrates a motivation to combine Sikdar and the APA, as proposed by Petitioner, with a reasonable expectation of success. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments and find that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to add Sikdar’s NAT/PAT capability to the prior art network system of Figure 18, disclosing a software-based firewall. Pet. 55–58; Pet. Reply 23–25. As Petitioner points out, Sikdar’s RSP “does not include any NICs . . . , which are a separate hardware component.” Pet. Reply 24. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s argument is not convincing. More importantly, however, Patent Owner’s argument fails because in Ground 3, Petitioner does not propose combining “any device containing two NICs with the APA.” Id. Petitioner proposes combining “the RSP’s NAT/PAT functionality with the APA.” Id. at 24–25 (citing Pet. 55–58) (emphasis added). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); see also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “non-obviousness, including long-felt need, failure of others, and skepticism by experts in the industry. PO Resp. 50–52. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Before reaching a decision on obviousness of claim 16, we must weigh these secondary considerations. In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1075–76 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The patentee bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). To determine whether the patentee has met that burden, we consider the correspondence between the objective evidence and the claim scope. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). We concluded, in our Final Written Decision, that Patent Owner had failed to meet its burden. FWD 47–50. We agreed with Petitioner that Patent Owner had failed to establish the required nexus to its claims. Id. at 49. We agreed also that Patent Owner had not provided convincing evidence supporting the existence of such objective indicia. Id. We find that, for the reasons given in our Final Written Decision, which we adopt for this Final Written Decision on Remand, Patent Owner’s evidence of secondary factors is insubstantial and unconvincing, and we therefore give it minimal weight in considering the obviousness of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 8,365,272 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,365,272
• Forescout Technologies, Inc. v. Fortinet, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 25, 2023 · IPR2021-01329 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 15, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Mahaffey; the other challenged claims were not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by credible expert testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of our decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal on the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We find that the specification, therefore, supports Patent Owner’s argument that the term “web content filtering” differs from “web filtering”” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring IPR petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)) (emphasis added). This burden does not shift to Patent Owner, except in limited circumstances not present here. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in an IPR). By not providing a claim construction for a key term, “web content filtering,” Petitioner failed to live up to its obligation to provide an understandable explanation of the element-by-element specifics of the unpatentability challenges, including the particular portions of prior art supporting those challenges. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.22(a)(2), 42.104(b)(3)– (4); Harmonic Inc., 815 F.3d at 1363–64; Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” Intel. Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also MModal LLC v. Nuance Communicatons, Inc., 846 Fed. Appx. 900, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (non-precedential).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We are not persuaded by these belated arguments, as they are based entirely on testimony by Dr. Cole as to what a person of ordinary skill “would understand” that is unsupported by any citations to Syvanne or other evidence of record. Such unsupported opinions are not entitled to any weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (November 2019)8 (“The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. . . . However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data.”); Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “[E]xpert testimony cannot take the place of disclosure from patents or printed publications. In other words, 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. substitute for disclosure in a prior art reference itself.” Consolidated Practice Guide at 36.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 9,894,034 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,894,034
• Western Digital Corporation / Western Digital Technologies, Inc. et al. v. Martin KusterSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 10, 2022 · IPR2020-01391 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11, 12, and 14–19 are unpatentable: claims 11 and 12 are anticipated by Hsiao, and claims 11 and 14–19 are obvious over He and Cheng or He, Cheng, and Hiller.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill does not differ materially from that presented by Mr. Welch. Both require a bachelor’s degree in many of the same fields and roughly one to two years of experience with USB protocols or USB product development. The arguments presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner do not indicate that the outcome of this case would change depending on the level of ordinary skill in the art. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s description, which we determine to be consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Proof of conception must be by “corroborating evidence which shows that the inventor disclosed to others his ‘completed thought expressed in such clear terms as to enable those skilled in the art’ to make the invention.” Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 601 (CCPA 1950)); see also Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (corroboration requirement “arose out of a concern that inventors testifying in patent infringement cases would be tempted to remember facts favorable to their case by the lure of protecting their patent or defeating another’s patent”). Similarly, an inventor’s testimony alone is insufficient to establish an earlier reduction to practice. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169–71 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Instead, a party seeking to prove an actual reduction to practice must proffer evidence corroborating that testimony. Id. at 1170. The sufficiency of corroboration is determined according to a “rule of reason.” Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This, however, does not dispense with the requirement that some independent evidence provide corroboration. Coleman, 754 F.2d at 360. The requirement of “independent” corroboration requires evidence other than the inventor’s testimony. In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 3. Discussion We find that Patent Owner has not met its burden of establishing that Mr. Kuster conceived and reduced to practice his invention prior to the filing dates of Hsiao or He. By itself, Mr. Kuster’s testimony is insufficient to establish that he reduced his invention to practice prior to the November 23, 2010, filing date or Hsiao or the June 2, 2010, filing date of He. “Throughout the history of the determination of patent rights, oral testimony by an alleged inventor asserting priority over a patentee’s rights is regarded with skepticism, and as a result, such inventor testimony must be supported by some type of corroborating evidence.” Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Price, 988 F.2d at 1194). Patent Owner has failed to provide sufficient independent evidence corroborating Mr. Kuster’s testimony.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with this argument. “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). Moreover, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” so the fact that it would take some creativity to carry out the combination does not defeat a finding of obviousness. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421; see also ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The rationale of KSR does not support [the] theory that a person of ordinary skill can only perform combinations of a puzzle element A with a perfectly fitting puzzle element B.”). We find there is support for making this combination of He and Cheng in the testimony of Dr. Baker that addition of a controller is “conventional” in USB flash drives. Baker Decl. ¶ 167. We find that for the reasons given by Dr. Baker, a person of ordinary skill would have added a controller to He. We determine that the combination of He and Cheng teaches each limitation of claim 11. We address Patent Owner’s argument that there are objective indicia of obviousness, infra. We conclude that Petitioner has demonstrated that claim 11 would have been obvious over He and Cheng.” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for patent owner

    “attorney argument, not evidence.” Pet. Reply 26. We agree. Patent Owner does not back up its argument with testimony or other credible evidence. To demonstrate long-felt need, a patentee must point to an “articulated identified problem and evidence of efforts to solve that problem” which were, before the invention, unsuccessful. Tex. Instruments v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993). All Patent Owner proves, if anything, is that after the USB 3.0 specification issued, a number of companies rushed in to provide contacts that met the new standard. Patent Owner does not demonstrate that they failed where Mr. Kuster succeeded. In fact, there is no evidence that Mr. Kuster ever commercialized his invention.8 8 Victorinox never paid for the work Mr. Kuster did on the USB 3.0 memory device, and to Mr. Kuster’s knowledge, never marketed the product. Kuster Dep. 22:21–24:13. Patent Owner contends “Mr. Kuster’s invention filled the existing need for a durable yet slim USB flash drive compatible with USB 3.0 that was easy to manufacture.” PO Resp. 77. But instead of presenting independent evidence of failure of the others to solve known technical or manufacturing problems, Patent Owner relies on generalized statements concerning the need for USB 3.0 connectors and solutions by others that Patent Owner contends have not been successful. PO Resp. 74–77. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Mr. Kuster’s alleged invention filled a long-felt need where others failed.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,693,206 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,693,206
• Apple Inc. / HTC Corporation et al. v. Memory Integrity, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · IPR2015-01376 · APJ Kerry Begley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 8, and 15–25 are unpatentable: Pong anticipates claims 1–3, 8, 15, 16, and 25; Pong and Smith render claims 17–24 obvious. Claim 11 is not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenOther

    “and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. Having considered the record before us, we determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 8, and 15–25 of the ’121 patent are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Petitioner, however, has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 11 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Communications AB, Sony Mobile Communications (USA) Inc., LG Electronics, Inc., LG Electronics USA, Inc., and LG Electronics Mobilecomm USA, Inc. (collectively, “Subsequent Petitioners”; and with Initial Petitioners, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition in IPR2015-01376, requesting inter partes review of claims 1–3, 8, 11, 12,3 and 15–25 of the 2 The Petition also lists Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (“STA”) as a petitioner. Paper 6 (“Pet.”), 1. After the filing of the Petition, however, STA merged with and into Samsung Electronics America, Inc. Paper 10. Thus, STA no longer exists as a separate corporate entity. Id. 3 Subsequent Petitioners represented that they included claim 12 “merely to conform” to the Petition and motion for rehearing of the Institution Decision, regarding claim 12, that was pending before the Board and that if the motion was denied, they requested joinder on “all claims except claim 12.” IPR2015-01376, Paper 3 (“IPR2015-01376 Pet.”), 1 n.1, 33 n.5. Because we denied the motion, we understood Subsequent Petitioners to no longer maintain their challenge of claim 12 and to the extent they did, we determined they had not shown the IPR2015-01376 Petition warranted institution of review of the claim. IPR2015-01376, Paper 12, at 12–15. IPR2015-01376 Pet. Subsequent Petitioners also filed a motion for joinder with this proceeding, which we granted. IPR2015-01376, Papers 4, 12.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “addresses Koster—a prior art U.S. patent of record as Exhibit 1009 that was filed on July 13, 2004 and issued on April 13, 2004—Patent Owner’s failure to demonstrate enablement of the proposed substitute claims results in a failure to demonstrate novelty and non-obviousness of the proposed substitute claims over the prior art of record. When arguing how the limitations of the proposed substitute claims distinguish them from the disclosures of the references of record, Patent Owner’s Motion addresses Koster only by asserting that “[a]s to . . . Koster . . . , because, as discussed above, all of the substitute claims find support in the [’]347 Application, . . . Koster . . . is not prior art to any of the proposed substitute claims.” Mot. 22. Because Patent Owner does not persuade us that the proposed substitute claims are enabled by the disclosure in the ’347 Application, we find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s suggestion that the proposed substitute claims are entitled to the filing date of the ’347 Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“For a patent to claim priority from the filing date of its provisional application, . . . the specification of the provisional must . . . enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the invention claimed in the non-provisional application.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The earlier application must contain a written description of the subject matter of the interference count, and must meet the enablement requirement.”); see also Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[If] the 1983 PCT application was . . . not enabled, Novo would not be able to rely upon the application’s priority date to overcome the Brewer patent.”). Accordingly, we also find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s assertion basis for asserting that the proposed substitute claims are patentable over Koster (by itself or in combination with other references of record), we conclude that Patent Owner has not met its burden of demonstrating patentability of the proposed substitute claims over the references of record. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding Board’s requirement that patent owner “show patentable distinction [of the substitute claims] over the prior art of record”); Opp. 1–4. Thus, Patent Owner has not met its burden for proposed substitute claims 26–34.” slip op. at 84

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Decision and maintain in this Decision—in which “states” is not limited to cache coherency states—we determine that Pong’s presence bit vector discloses the recited “probe filtering information” “representative of states associated with selected ones of the cache memories,” where either the write update or the write invalidate protocol is implemented. See Inst. Dec. 7–10; supra § II.B.1.a. First, under this construction, there is no dispute that “states associated with selected ones of the cache memories” includes presence. See Inst. Dec. 9–10; PO Resp. 25 (arguing that Petitioner’s argument that the presence bit vector represents the “state” of presence allegedly is foreclosed only by Patent Owner’s proposed “construction of state as a cache coherence protocol state”); id. at 1–11, 25–27; Reply 15; Ex. 3001, 497–48 (definition of “state”); Ex. 2016 ¶ 87. Nor is there any dispute that the bits in Pong’s presence bit vector represent this state of presence. Pong discloses that when a bit in the presence bit vector is set, the processor that corresponds to the bit “has a copy of the data block,” i.e., a copy of the data block is present. Ex. 1003 ¶ 51. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that in both the write update and write invalidate protocols, a set bit represents the state of presence of a cached copy of the data block in a” slip op. at 42

  Patent outcomesUS 7,296,121 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,296,121
• Apple Inc. / HTC Corporation et al. v. Memory Integrity, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · IPR2015-00163 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4–6 and 19–24 are unpatentable over Koster and Koster with Smith, respectively; claims 11 and 12 were not shown unpatentable, and the motion to amend was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We begin our analysis by addressing the level of ordinary skill in the art. Dr. Horst and Dr. Oklobdzija agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a “bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science” and “two years of experience in the design of multiprocessor systems.” Ex. 1014 ¶ 8; Ex. 2016 ¶ 8. We adopt this proposal as the level of ordinary skill in the art, based on the testimony of the parties’ experts as well as our review of the ’121 patent and the prior art involved in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “evidence in Patent Owner’s Response, we remain unpersuaded that the ’121 patent supports limiting the broadest reasonable construction of “states” solely to cache coherence protocol states. A claim term will be interpreted more narrowly than its ordinary and customary meaning only under two circumstances: (1) the “patentee sets out a definition and acts as [its] own lexicographer,” or (2) the “patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To disavow claim scope, the specification or prosecution history must “make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature” and the feature is then “deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification” or prosecution history, “might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.” SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see Aventis, 675 F.3d at 1330. To disavow claim scope, the patentee may “include[e] in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Aventis, 675 F.3d at 1330 (internal quotations omitted). In this context, it is not sufficient “that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation.” Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “The heart of the dispute regarding this limitation, however, lies in whether the disclosure of microprocessors as devices in a system necessarily discloses that those microprocessors are “programmed.” Because the ’121 patent does not illuminate this issue, but instead the parties rely on expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence to support their respective positions, we consider this issue to more properly fall within the category of unpatentability as opposed to claim construction. See Pet. 34–36; PO Resp. 12–19, 25–29; Reply 5–8. Thus, we do not further construe the term “programmed” other than to note that the ’121 patent uses the term in the ordinary and customary manner. See Ex. 1001, 7:49–52, 27:64–28:24, 29:1–3; Ex. 2012, 359; Ex. 2013, 590–91; Ex. 2014, 931.” slip op. at 24

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “reasonable likelihood of prevailing on this proposed ground of unpatentability. Inst. Dec. 19–24. We have reviewed Petitioner’s anticipation arguments and supporting evidence, including Koster’s disclosure, the detailed arguments appearing on pages 31–38 of the Petition, and the testimony of Dr. Horst. Despite the counter-arguments in Patent Owner’s Response, and the evidence cited therein, which we also have considered, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each of claims 4–6 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Koster. Petitioner, however, has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence that Koster anticipates claims 11 and 12.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,296,121 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,296,121
• Apple Inc. / HTC Corporation et al. v. Memory Integrity, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · IPR2015-00159 · APJ Kerry Begley · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 8, and 15–25 are unpatentable: Pong anticipates claims 1–3, 8, 15, 16, and 25, and Pong and Smith render claims 17–24 obvious; claim 11 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Electronics Co. Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,2 and Amazon.com, Inc. (collectively, “Initial Petitioners”) filed a Petition requesting inter partes review of claims 1–3, 8, and 11–25 of U.S. Patent No. 7,296,121 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’121 patent”). Pet. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we determined the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 1–3, 8, 11, and 15–25, and instituted an inter partes review of these claims. Paper 12 (“Inst. Dec.”). We, however, did not institute review of claims 12–14, because we determined the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to these claims. Id. at 23–30.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Dr. Horst’s testimony that as a result, from the perspective of the presence bit vector, “every processor indicated as storing a copy of the memory line in its cache is storing a valid copy.” Ex. 1014 ¶ A-11; see Pet. 26–27. In other words, as Dr. Horst testifies, “because a write update protocol always updates caches to keep them valid,” “when a cache line is present[,] it is necessarily valid.” Ex. 1025 ¶ 23; see Reply 17–18. Indeed, Dr. Oklobdzija agrees that because the write update protocol “force[s the caches] to update their value for a cache line every time it changes”—as Pong discloses— “every processor that has the cache line will have the line in a valid state.” Ex. 2016 ¶ 90 (emphasis added); Ex. 1003 ¶ 48; see also Tr. 115:1–23 (Patent Owner conceding that in a write update protocol, any cached copies could be “considered . . . to be valid” because they are “kept usable” and “updated”). Accordingly, based on Pong’s disclosures, as well as the explanatory testimony of Dr. Horst in addition to Dr. Oklobdzija, we determine that in the write update protocol, a set bit in Pong’s presence bit vector represents that the corresponding cached copy is present and valid.” slip op. at 44

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. OBVIOUSNESS OVER PONG AND SMITH We turn to the instituted obviousness ground alleging that claims 17–” slip op. at 73

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “addresses Koster—a prior art U.S. patent of record as Exhibit 1009 that was filed on July 13, 2004 and issued on April 13, 2004—Patent Owner’s failure to demonstrate enablement of the proposed substitute claims results in a failure to demonstrate novelty and non-obviousness of the proposed substitute claims over the prior art of record. When arguing how the limitations of the proposed substitute claims distinguish them from the disclosures of the references of record, Patent Owner’s Motion addresses Koster only by asserting that “[a]s to . . . Koster . . . , because, as discussed above, all of the substitute claims find support in the [’]347 Application, . . . Koster . . . is not prior art to any of the proposed substitute claims.” Mot. 22. Because Patent Owner does not persuade us that the proposed substitute claims are enabled by the disclosure in the ’347 Application, we find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s suggestion that the proposed substitute claims are entitled to the filing date of the ’347 Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“For a patent to claim priority from the filing date of its provisional application, . . . the specification of the provisional must . . . enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the invention claimed in the non-provisional application.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The earlier application must contain a written description of the subject matter of the interference count, and must meet the enablement requirement.”); see also Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp., 424 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[If] the 1983 PCT application was . . . not enabled, Novo would not be able to rely upon the application’s priority date to overcome the Brewer patent.”). Accordingly, we also find unpersuasive Patent Owner’s assertion basis for asserting that the proposed substitute claims are patentable over Koster (by itself or in combination with other references of record), we conclude that Patent Owner has not met its burden of demonstrating patentability of the proposed substitute claims over the references of record. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding Board’s requirement that patent owner “show patentable distinction [of the substitute claims] over the prior art of record”); Opp. 1–4. Thus, Patent Owner has not met its burden for proposed substitute claims 26–34.” slip op. at 84

  Patent outcomesUS 7,296,121 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,296,121
• Apple Inc. / HTC Corporation et al. v. Memory Integrity, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 21, 2016 · IPR2015-01353 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4–6 are unpatentable as anticipated by Koster, claims 19–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Koster and Smith, and claims 11–12 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We begin our analysis by addressing the level of ordinary skill in the art. Dr. Horst and Dr. Oklobdzija agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a “bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science” and “two years of experience in the design of multiprocessor systems.” Ex. 1014 ¶ 8; Ex. 2016 ¶ 8. We adopt this proposal as the level of ordinary skill in the art, based on the testimony of the parties’ experts as well as our review of the ’121 patent and the prior art involved in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “For the reasons discussed below, however, despite the arguments and evidence in Patent Owner’s Response, we remain unpersuaded that the ’121 patent supports limiting the broadest reasonable construction of “states” solely to cache coherence protocol states. A claim term will be interpreted more narrowly than its ordinary and customary meaning only under two circumstances: (1) the “patentee sets out a definition and acts as [its] own lexicographer,” or (2) the “patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To disavow claim scope, the specification or prosecution history must “make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature” and the feature is then “deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification” or prosecution history, “might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.” SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see Aventis, 675 F.3d at 1330. To disavow claim scope, the patentee may “include[e] in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.” Aventis, 675 F.3d at 1330 (internal quotations omitted). In this context, it is not sufficient “that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation.” Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “The heart of the dispute regarding this limitation, however, lies in whether the disclosure of microprocessors as devices in a system necessarily discloses that those microprocessors are “programmed.” Because the ’121 patent does not illuminate this issue, but instead the parties rely on expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence to support their respective positions, we consider this issue to more properly fall within the category of unpatentability as opposed to claim construction. See Pet. 34–36; PO Resp. 12–19, 25–29; Reply 5–8. Thus, we do not further construe the term “programmed” other than to note that the ’121 patent uses the term in the ordinary and customary manner. See Ex. 1001, 7:49–52, 27:64–28:24, 29:1–3; Ex. 2012, 359; Ex. 2013, 590–91; Ex. 2014, 931.” slip op. at 24

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner fails to proffer evidence sufficient to rebut Patent Owner’s evidence that Koster’s disclosure of a microprocessor does not necessarily disclose that the microprocessor is programmed. Dr. Horst, in his original declaration, asserts that “a requesting microprocessor must be programmed to complete a memory transaction after receiving a first number of responses to a first data request.” Ex. 1014 ¶¶ D-17–D-18. This assertion, however, is conclusory, and does not sufficiently explain why the microprocessor must be programmed or exclude possibilities other than programming. See id.; PO Resp. 27. In particular, Dr. Horst’s original declaration testimony provides no discussion or explanation as to whether a microprocessor composed solely of hardwired logic would necessarily be programmed and whether the functionality described in Koster could not be implemented using hardwired logic. See Ex. 1014 ¶¶ D-17–D-18; PO Resp. 27.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 7,296,121 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,296,121
• Kingston Technology Company, Inc. v. Catr Co. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 10, 2016 · IPR2015-00559 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9, 14, 17, 19, and 21–23 are unpatentable as obvious over Matsumiya and Deng and over Wu and Hoogesteger; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In our Final Written Decision in IPR 149, we found “that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a degree in mechanical engineering or industrial design, but also a general understanding of the use of electrical components, which may be incorporated in mechanical designs.” IPR 149 Decision 23. The parties present the same arguments here, with respect to their views of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as they did in IPR 149. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed in our Final Written Decision in IPR 149 we adopt the same level of skill here. Id. at 22–23.” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Second, Dr. Wolfe testified that Matsumiya discloses “a shaft” that protrudes from each side of the case. Ex. 1016 ¶ 97. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Wolfe admitted that while Matsumiya could disclose a “split axle,” “normally, you’d presume that it’s a through axle.” Ex. 2012, 85:9– 18. Dr. Wolfe did not explain in his direct testimony how either an axle or split axle would be integrated with or attached to at least one side of the case. Third, Petitioner relied on the express disclosure of Matsumiya, not a modification of Matsumiya, as teaching this element of the claims. See Pet. 16 (relying only on Matsumiya’s disclosure). In its Reply, Petitioner asserts, for the first time, that Matsumiya “could also use a snap hinge,” pointing to Professor Visser’s cross-examination testimony. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1050, 127:9–11). Professor Visser’s testimony, however, does not support Petitioner’s argument. Professor Visser testified that Matsumiya does not show a snap-on hinge, and that a snap-on hinge would not have the same functionality as an axle. Ex. 1050, 127:18–21. He also testified that the two concentric rings on the arms of Matsumiya are inconsistent with a snap-on hinge. Id. at 128:17–20. Thus, the issue before us is not whether it would have been obvious to modify Matsumiya to include a snap-on hinge or hinge protuberance on the side of the case because that was not the basis set forth in the Petition and upon which we instituted review; rather, the issue is whether Petitioner has shown that Matsumiya discloses a hinge element or hinge protuberance integrated with or attached to at least one side of the case. In light of the record before us, and as detailed in the discussion above, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that Matsumiya discloses a hinge element or a hinge protuberance “formed on at least one side of the case.” We find that Petitioner has failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Matsumiya discloses this element of the claims, and we find Patent Owner’s evidence in the form of Dr. Wolfe’s cross-examination testimony and Professor Visser’s testimony more persuasive.” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNon analogous artDecided for patent owner

    “Id. at 1:14–23. Accordingly, we find that Kindig’s field of endeavor is hinged enclosures to house appliances that make noise when operated. The ’544 patent states that “[t]he present invention relates to a flash memory apparatus, and more particularly to a flash memory apparatus, wherein a cover is not completely separated from the main body upon being in use so that lost [sic] of the cover is prevented.” Ex. 1001, 1:8–11. The ’544 patent is largely directed to a cover that rotates with respect to a case (as is evident from the parties’, and consequently our, extensive discussion of the hinged connection (i.e., hinge protuberances and hinge holes)), but is not readily disconnected. In fact, the ’544 patent discloses the recited “hooking groove” and “hooking threshold” specifically to prevent the hinge hole from being easily detached from the hinge protuberance. Id. at 3:36–43 (“Furthermore, a hooking groove 34 is preferably formed on the lower periphery of the hinge protuberance 33. A hooking threshold 45 is hooked on the hooking groove 34 and is preferably formed on a rim confining the hinge hole 41 in order to prevent the hinge hole 41 from being easily detached from the hinge protuberance 33 after joining of the hinge hole 41 and the hinge protuberance 33.”). Thus, we find that the ’544 patent’s field of endeavor is hinge assemblies for a flash memory apparatus.” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Second, Petitioner asserts that Kindig’s hinge connection “would advantageously help to retain connection between the cover of Matsumiya and the memory card,” id. at 25, but Petitioner has not shown that Matsumiya fails to retain the connection between case and cover or has difficulty doing so. Rather, from our review the record supports that Matsumiya’s cover is securely attached to the case. Additionally, we are unaware of any teaching in Matsumiya of disconnecting the cover from the case. Similarly, the ’544 patent aims to avoid disconnecting the cover from the case, as discussed above. Kindig, however, is directed to an easily detachable cover. Accordingly, Petitioner’s reason—as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to modify Matsumiya by adding the elements of claim 13 from Kindig—lacks a rational underpinning. 3. Conclusion of Obviousness For the foregoing reasons, after consideration of the entire record, we” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 6,926,544 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,926,544
• Marvell Semiconductor, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 30, 2015 · IPR2014-00548 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–6, 10, and 13–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2 and 11 were not shown unpatentable because the petition did not establish their variable-length header adjustment limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “Fischer teaches that the comparators in coherent demodulator 114 convert a “‘spread spectrum modulated’ analog signal into a digital signal,” as opposed to “other analog signals.” See PO Resp. 13. To the contrary, Fischer states that “[t]he communicators preferably transmit and receive messages over a wireless physical layer provided by a direct-sequence, spread spectrum (DSSS) radio data link.” Ex. 1004, 14:24–27. Fischer further explains that “[s]ince many of the signals in the coherent demodulator 114 are analog signals, the coherent demodulator 114 includes comparators to establish digital waveforms.” Ex. 1004, 16:58–60. As shown in Figure 5 of Fischer, the coherent demodulator 114 is followed by spread spectrum correlator and decoder 130, which “handles the demodulator 114 output to regenerate the unspread data.” Ex. 1004, 17:58– 60. Thus, we agree with Petitioner, as supported by Prof. Ding, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood Fischer to describe that the demodulator 114 converts the analog DSSS modulated messages received by antennas 100/102 to digital signals and outputs these digital DSSS modulated messages in I and Q format to spread spectrum correlator and decoder 130.” Reply 3–4; Ex. 1013 ¶ 5.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelOther

    “3. Claims 1, 10, and 17 Petitioner argues that each of independent claims 1, 10, and 17 is unpatentable as obvious over Fischer and Nakamura. Pet. 15–26. Notwithstanding the fact that claim 1 recites “means” for performing identified functions, whereas claims 10 and 17 do not recite “means” limitations, the three claims recite similar subject matter, and Petitioner advances the same reasoning in its analysis of all three claims. Id. Patent Owner’s Response also generally addresses claims 1, 10, and 17 collectively in a similar manner. PO Resp. 10–31. Although our analysis below primarily focuses on claim 1, our determinations with respect to claim 1 apply for the same reasons to the identified similar limitations of claims 10 and 17.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “The Petition makes no mention of Nakamura in its discussion of the additional limitations of claims 2 and 11. Yet in reply, Petitioner argues that “[i]n view of Fischer’s variable length preambles, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have found it obvious to utilize Nakamura’s timer function and its repetitive duration function.” Reply 15. Petitioner may not rely on a new argument asserting that Nakamura teaches the additional limitations for claims 2 and 11 presented for the first time in its Reply. Moreover, Petitioner fails to address how either Fischer or Nakamura teaches means for adjusting means for timing when Fischer contains no timer, and when the timer of Nakamura is described as being based on a predetermined period of time. See Ex. 1005, 6:31–36 (“timer 34 permits the switch 14 to transfer from terminal A to terminal B after the lapse of predetermined time”); see also Ex. 2006, ¶¶ 83–84. Petitioner’s contention that “Nakamura’s timer is also flexible” is insufficiently supported by any reference to either Nakamura or the declaration of Prof. Ding. See Reply 16–17; see also Ex. 1013 (no discussion of claims 2 or 11). Petitioner has not demonstrated that the features of claims 2 or 11 are disclosed by the combination of Fischer and Nakamura. 5. Claims 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, and 18–20 Petitioner has persuasively shown that each of the additional limitations of dependent claims 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, and 18–20 are taught by the combination of Fischer and Nakamura. For example, claims 4, 14, and 19 all require a “single monolithic device.” Petitioner has shown that Fischer RF modem 96 is a single monolithic device, and that Fischer communicator 60 is a circuit contained on a single monolithic device that includes RF modem 60. See Pet. 27–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–42. Petitioner has also shown that RF modem 96 includes coherent demodulator 114 that provides in-phase and quadrature data outputs that are responsive to an analog signal that has in-phase and quadrature components, corresponding to the requirements of an analog signal “in the form of in-phase and quadrature components” as recited in claims 5 and 16. See Pet. 28–29; Ex. 1003 ¶ 38. With respect to the limitations of claims 6, 16, and 20 requiring PN modulation and phase shift keyed modulation, Petitioner has shown that Fischer discloses RF modem 96 supports BPSK or QPSK, and that it would have been obvious to implement direct sequence spread modulation by using PN modulation. See Pet. 29; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34, 37. We are also persuaded that Fischer discloses the “antenna selection circuitry” as recited in claim 13 and the “serial data stream” as recited in claim 18. See Pet. 30–31; Ex. 1003 ¶ 40. Patent Owner does not substantively dispute Petitioner’s assertion that Fischer teaches each of these limitations.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner contends that “[i]f reliability alone is the concern,” then “the most reliable method is to use BPSK for the entire packet (as taught by Fischer).” PO Resp. 38. We are not, however, persuaded that “reliability alone is the concern.” Nakamura and Fischer clearly teach a benefit to using both BPSK and QPSK consisting of improved reliability for BPSK with enhanced speed from QPSK. Thus, we find Patent Owner’s contention that those of skill “would not look beyond the teachings of Fischer” unpersuasive. See id. Likewise, Patent Owner’s contention that Fischer already teaches improved reliability by using longer preambles has no bearing on whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have also looked to Nakamura for other means of improving reliability. See id. at 39. We find that Petitioner articulates sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 5,712,870 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 5,712,870

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.