• Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. LG Electronics Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 27, 2016 · IPR2015-01409 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4, 8, and 9 are unpatentable under § 103; claim 30 was not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not teach shutdown based on total processor use below a threshold.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenOther

    “III. ANALYSIS A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, and that burden never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must establish the facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d).” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Public accessibility” is the touchstone in determining whether a reference is a “printed publication.” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A reference is publicly accessible upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “construction in light of the specification of the patent in which [they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We presume a claim term carries its “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe only those claim terms necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We decline to disregard all of Mr. Gafford’s testimony. In light of Mr. Gafford’s education and experience (a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering and over 43 years working for corporations in the design, manufacturing, and support for computer systems and microprocessors, see Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 14–20), we see no reason why Mr. Gafford’s frequent participation in other cases—even to ultimately mixed results—makes his testimony here unhelpful in understanding the evidence in this case. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). In assessing the merits of this case, we have considered the proffered testimony from Mr. Gafford, as well as Patent Owner’s Declarant Dr. Friedman, and accorded weight based on the testimony’s substantive persuasiveness.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 7,636,863 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,636,863
• Elekta, Inc. v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 23, 2016 · IPR2015-01401 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4–7, 14, 15, 53, 60, and 61 are unpatentable over Jaffray 2001 under §§ 102(b) and 103(a), and over the stated Jaffray combinations under § 103(a).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We construe only those claim terms necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 2. “capable of implementing a treatment plan” Patent Owner takes the position that to be “capable of implementing a treatment plan,” a radiation treatment system cannot still be in development and must pass industry-established quality assurance validations that are prerequisites to commissioning such systems for use on real patients. See PO Resp. 17–18. We decline to read in these additional limitations. Neither the claims nor the Specification has any support for excluding devices that are still early in development, or those that have not yet been validated against established quality standards. The broadest reasonable construction of the term requires no more than a system capable of implementing one or more treatment plans. 3. “communications network” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts “[a] communications network is a communication system that facilitates communication between many devices and that uses a networking protocol to selectively route messages to their intended devices.” PO Resp. 28. In Reply, Petitioner proposes a broader construction: “a link between two or more components of the radiation treatment system that allows information to be shared between them.” Reply 11. We agree with Petitioner. In the three instances when the ’021 patent Specification recites “communications network,” it describes only a generic connection between components. See Ex. 1001, 2:36–40 (explaining that “[t]he couch 218 may be connected to the therapy simulator rotatable gantry via a communications network”), 4:16–18 (explaining that “the computer 220 connects to the simulator 100 and the command processor 225 via a communications network 240”), 6:16–18 (explaining that “box 451, processor 425, and computer 450 connect to simulator 400 via communications network 440”). Figures 1 and 3 of the ’021 patent depict the communications network (items 240 and 440) simply as arrows connecting various components. Notably absent from the ’021 patent is any reference to networking protocols or a routing mechanism, and nothing in the term’s plain language requires a networking protocol or selectively routing messages as Patent Owner suggests. We agree with Petitioner under the broadest reasonable construction, a communications network is simply a link between two or more components of the radiation treatment system that allows information to be shared between them. 4. “a high energy radiation source” and “a cone-beam radiation source”” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “i. Jaffray 2001 Teaches “a radiation treatment system capable of implementing a treatment plan” All of the challenged claims require a “radiation treatment system capable of implementing a treatment plan.” We agree with Petitioner that because Jaffray 2001 teaches “[t]he adaptation of this system to a medical linear accelerator for on-line image-guided radiation therapy demonstrates the suitability of this technology for intra-therapeutic guidance,” Jaffray 2001 discloses a system capable of implementing a treatment plan. See Pet. 18 (quoting Ex. 1003, 800); Ex. 2024 ¶¶ 25–28 (explaining that “a medical linear accelerator, by its very nature, is capable of implementing a treatment plan”), ¶¶ 29–30 (explaining that Fig. 2(a) from Patent Owner’s Exhibit 2015 confirms that Jaffray 2001’s medical linear accelerator is capable of implementing a treatment plan). In contesting this element, Patent Owner notes that one of the other Jaffray references—Jaffray JRO 1999 (Ex. 1007)—states its design “allows normal operation of the accelerator with the imagers removed and the kV xray tube retracted.” Ex. 1007, 775. Patent Owner interprets Jaffray JRO 1999’s statement to mean in all of Jaffray’s systems, removing the imaging system was “necessary” before the linear accelerator could implement a treatment plan. PO Resp. 8–9; Ex. 2020 ¶ 58. Patent Owner argues further Jaffray 2001’s system was not capable of implementing a treatment plan because it was still in development and had not been tested or validated against established industry standards that must be met before the FDA will commission such devices for medical use. See PO Resp.17–18; Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 49–52. We disagree. As explained above, under our claim construction, the claim limitation at issue requires only a system capable of implementing one or more treatment plans, not one that is ready to certify for actual medical use on real patients. Jaffray JRO 1999’s reference to allowing normal operation with the imagers removed does not undermine that teaching; it simply indicates the disclosed system permits radiation therapy with the imagers removed, a feature beneficial for “limited situations in which the treatment plan may require extreme angulation.” Reply 3; see Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 7–8. We find Jaffray 2001 discloses a radiation treatment system capable of implementing a treatment plan as the challenged claims require.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “challenged claims, the claimed subject matter would have been obvious over Jaffray 2001 at the time of the invention. See Pet. 26–27. As explained above, we find Jaffray 2001 discloses every limitation from the challenged claims. In addition, Petitioner explains—with unrefuted support from Dr. Hamilton and the prior art—by 1981 translatable treatment couches moveable in three planes plus angulation and coupled to the gantry via a communications network were standard on linear accelerators. See Pet. 26– 27 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 36; Ex. 1015, 220; Ex. 1010, 1, 2, 12, 39–48). Petitioner also explains—again with unrefuted support from Dr. Hamilton— none of the Jaffray references suggest any changes to these standard features and one skilled in the art would understand the linear accelerator depicted in Jaffray 2001 is the Elekta SL20, which had a translatable treatment couch including the same standard features. Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 128). In addition, Petitioner explains that to the extent Jaffray 2001 fails to disclose a computing unit to capture and store image projection data, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to include one because “to process the image projection data to generate volumetric images, it is necessary to store the image projection data in the computer which will process the data.” Pet. 27 (citing 1016 ¶ 207). Thus, in addition to demonstrating the necessary disclosures in the prior art (through incorporating its anticipation argument), Petitioner identified sufficient reasons that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements the way the claimed invention does. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. In contesting obviousness based on Jaffray 2001, Patent Owner reiterates its argument that Jaffray 2001 does not disclose a system capable of implementing a treatment plan (as required in all of the challenged claims), a computing unit coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network (as required in claims 1, 4, and 5), or a translatable treatment couch coupled to the rotatable gantry via a communications network (as required in claims 14, 15, and 60). PO Resp. 45. Patent Owner asserts also we should reject Petitioner’s obviousness challenge as an improper attempt to “bootstrap” obviousness to anticipation, without identifying any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art or explaining why those elements would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 43. We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments addressing Jaffray 2001’s ability to implement a treatment plan and communications network for the reasons explained in our anticipation analysis above. Moreover, we do not view Petitioner’s obviousness challenge as a mere “bootstrap” to anticipation because Petitioner identified potential differences between Jaffray 2001 and claimed subject matter (i.e., the claimed translatable treatment couch and computing unit to store image projection data) as well as rationale explaining why one skilled in the art would have known to include those elements.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 7,945,021 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,945,021
• Seabery North America Inc. v. Lincoln Global, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Nov 17, 2016 · IPR2016-00840 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied for claims 32, 51, 70–79, and 105–111 because Petitioner did not show Aiteanu taught or suggested comparing performance data to known parameters.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” Section 42.71(c), in turn, references 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “claims, we did not rely on the lack of disclosure of an algorithm in the ’398 patent in concluding that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating obviousness. Instead, we considered Petitioner’s analysis of Aiteanu and found it insufficient to persuade us that the “comparison” element was met: The description in that analysis does not teach or suggest a comparison to known parameters. See [Pet.] 19–21. Because we conclude that Aiteanu does not teach or suggest such a comparison, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on its challenge to these claims. Dec. 22–23. These insufficiencies in the Petition are not cured by attacking the ’398 patent’s disclosure, nor is Petitioner relieved its burden of proving the claims unpatentable. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an inter partes review . . . , the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citation omitted).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Id. at 16 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Board found Petitioner’s analysis of this element in relation to Aiteanu insufficient to describe a comparison to known parameters to arrive at this quality characteristic. Dec. 22. Petitioner’s main argument in its Rehearing Request focuses on a different alleged “quality characteristic” in Aiteanu, namely torch position. Req. Reh’g 5–6. The Petition did not present such an argument, and therefore the Board could not have been overlooked or misapprehended it. Instead, we addressed the argument presented by Petitioner: that calculated weld seam thickness was based on a comparison of known parameters. Pet. 16. For the reasons stated in our Institution Decision and in the Preliminary Response (at pp. 38–39), we concluded that Petitioner did not present sufficient proof that Aiteanu met this condition.” slip op. at 5

  § 103 obviousness
• Toyota Motor Corporation v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2016 · IPR2016-00419 · APJ Hung H Bui · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Toyota’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution for claims 49–57, 62–64, 66, 68, 70, 71, 73–80, 94, 95, 97, 99–103, 106, 109–111, 113, 115, and 120 because Ohmura did …

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “We have reviewed Petitioner’s request for rehearing and carefully considered Petitioner’s arguments. However, we are not persuaded that the Board misapprehended or overlooked Petitioner’s arguments presented with respect to the patentability of claims 49–57, 62–64, 66, 68, 70, 71, 73–80, 94, 95, 97, 99–103, 106, 109–111, 113, 115, and 120 of the ’342 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “In contrast, all challenged claims of the ’342 patent require (1) “the portable device” to play (i.e., decode) an audio file, and (2) “the integration subsystem” to receive “audio generated by the portable device.” As explained in the Decision, we referred to the requirement that audio generated by the portable device as the result of playing the audio file as “the audio generated by the portable device” limitation, which was consistent with Dr. Thomas Matheson’s Declaration at ¶¶ 50–53. Decision 23; see also Matheson’s Declaration (Ex. 1120 ¶¶ 50–53).” slip op. at 5

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDenied

    “Second, Petitioner identifies numerous portions of Ohmura, for the first time, that it did not identify in the Petition or Reply. In particular, Petitioner contends the Board “misapprehended or overlooked the cited portions of Ohmura that disclose the functions of the construed ‘integration subsystem.’” See Req. Reh’g 10. However, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked portions of Ohmura that were not presented in the Petition or Reply. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to present new arguments.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “As explained in the Decision, we rejected Petitioner’s proposed construction of “integration subsystem” because Petitioner’s proposed construction required the claimed “integration subsystem” to be a microprocessor or processor programmed to perform a method for wirelessly integrating a portable device for use with a car audio/video system, shown in FIG. 24. Decision 13–15. Instead, we construed the term “integration subsystem” as performing the functions as expressly defined by the Specification of the ’342 patent. Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1101, 8:64–9:3).” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction
  Patents in suitUS 8,155,342
• LG Display Co, Ltd. v. Innovative Display Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01717 · APJ Beverly M Bunting · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, 25–29, and 33–35 were not shown unpatentable under §103 over Oe and Etsuo because the proposed combinations lacked sufficient reasoned support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “persuaded Petitioner has provided sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning explaining why one with ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of the applied references to address the noted differences. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”)). We consider Petitioner’s first reason to combine Oe and Etsuo “because they are in the same field of backlighting for liquid crystal display devices.” Pet. 36. The mere fact that both Oe and Etsuo are in the same field of endeavor falls short of an adequate rationale. The same field of endeavor analysis is merely the jumping-off point in reaching the determination of whether a claimed invention is obvious. See K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (to qualify as prior art in an obviousness analysis, references must be analogous art—either from the same field of endeavor, or reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor is involved). Next, we consider Petitioner’s second reason to combine because “both Oe and Etsuo relate to backlight devices that use light sources located at edges of a light guide.” Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 165). Although Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Escuti, he does not proffer any persuasive facts, data, or analysis to support his opinion. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 165 (“Also, both Oe and Etsuo relate to backlight devices that use light sources located at edges of a light guide.”). Merely repeating an argument from the Petition in the declaration of a proposed expert does not give that argument probative value. Dr. Escuti’s opinion lacks sufficient support. For this reason, we do not credit the testimony of Dr. Escuti on this issue. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Petitioner’s second reason is also unavailing because it does not address the entirety of Petitioner’s proposed modification. As discussed above, Petitioner relies on the disclosure in Etsuo for both the position of the plurality of light sources adjacent a single input edge claim element, as well as the output distribution having a greater width component than height component claim element. Petitioner’s reasoning, directed only to the use of light sources at the edge of the light guide, does not explain sufficiently why one of skill in the art would have replaced a single light source positioned adjacent one input edge of Oe, with the plurality of light sources disclosed by Etsuo that have an output distribution defined by a greater width component than height component.” slip op. at 20

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “We have reviewed the testimony from both Dr. Escuti, and Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Werner (Ex. 2021). We find that both experts have, at times, taken liberties in proffering conclusory statements without real analysis.5 However, it is within our discretion to assign the appropriate weight to the testimony of both Dr. Escuti, and Mr. Werner. See, e.g., 5 Under our rules, expert testimony that does not have a proper basis is entitled to little or no weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding the Board has discretion to give more weight to one item of evidence over another “unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so”); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We, therefore, are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that Dr. Escuti’s testimony be disregarded in its entirety. Instead, we have accorded the testimony of both Dr. Escuti and Mr. Werner the weight that is appropriate in view of the arguments and evidence of record in this trial. 4. Overview of Oe (Ex. 1024)” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “taken into account. In making this determination, we were aided by expert testimony. According to Dr. Escuti, “a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’660 Patent would have at least an undergraduate degree in physics, optics, engineering, or applied mathematics AND 3 years of work experience (or a graduate degree) in a field related to optical technology.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 23. Mr. Werner does not take issue with this testimony, and in fact proposes a similar standard: a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’660 patent would hold an undergraduate degree in physics, material science, electrical engineering, or mathematics and have one or both of the following: (1) three or more years of work experience in a field related to optical technology; or (2) a graduate degree in a field related to optical technology. Ex. 2021 ¶ 76. We find that Mr. Werner’s definition is too limited in that it does not include a person with an undergraduate degree in optics. We, therefore, do not accept his standard and adopt instead Dr. Escuti’s more complete definition.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “disclosure in the specification of the ’600 patent to support Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction of “height” and “width.” Indeed, our review of the specification of the ’660 patent reveals that these terms are not defined explicitly or implicitly. For example, the specification states that “the deformities may vary in shape and/or size along the length and/or width of the panel members.” Ex. 1001, 5:43–44 (emphasis added). With respect to the planar optical conductor, claims 1 and 33 each recite, in relevant part, that the input edge has “at least one input edge with a greater cross-sectional width than thickness.” Ex. 1001, 9:11–12, 10:65–67 (emphasis added). Both claims 1 and 33 recite that the output distribution generated by the plurality of light sources is “defined by a greater width component than height component.”4 Id. at 9:15–16, 11:5–6 (emphasis added). Claim 33 recites that the plurality of LED light sources each have “a greater width than height.” Id. at 11:1–2 (emphasis added). Because the terms “width” and “height” are commonly understood, we also consult a general purpose dictionary. “Width” is defined as “the horizontal measurement taken at right angles to the length.” See Merriam- Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/width, (last viewed July 10, 2015). The dictionary definition of height is “the distance from the bottom to the top of something standing upright.” See Merriam-” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 7,404,660 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,404,660
• LG Display Co, Ltd. v. Innovative Display Technologies LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01717 · APJ Beverly M Bunting · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, 25–29, and 33–35 were held not unpatentable under § 103 over Oe and Etsuo because the combination lacked an adequately supported reason to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “taken into account. In making this determination, we were aided by expert testimony. According to Dr. Escuti, “a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’660 Patent would have at least an undergraduate degree in physics, optics, engineering, or applied mathematics AND 3 years of work experience (or a graduate degree) in a field related to optical technology.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 23. Mr. Werner does not take issue with this testimony, and in fact proposes a similar standard: a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’660 patent would hold an undergraduate degree in physics, material science, electrical engineering, or mathematics and have one or both of the following: (1) three or more years of work experience in a field related to optical technology; or (2) a graduate degree in a field related to optical technology. Ex. 2021 ¶ 76. We find that Mr. Werner’s definition is too limited in that it does not include a person with an undergraduate degree in optics. We, therefore, do not accept his standard and adopt instead Dr. Escuti’s more complete definition.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “Owner’s expert, Mr. Werner (Ex. 2021). We find that both experts have, at times, taken liberties in proffering conclusory statements without real analysis.4 However, it is within our discretion to assign the appropriate weight to the testimony of both Dr. Escuti, and Mr. Werner. See, e.g., 4 Under our rules, expert testimony that does not have a proper basis is entitled to little or no weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding the Board has discretion to give more weight to one item of evidence over another “unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so”); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We, therefore, are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that Dr. Escuti’s testimony be disregarded in its entirety. Instead, we have accorded the testimony of both Dr. Escuti and Mr. Werner the weight that is appropriate in view of the arguments and evidence of record in this trial. 4. Overview of Oe (Ex. 1024)” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Because the terms “width” and “height” are commonly understood, we also consult a general purpose dictionary. “Width” is defined as “the horizontal measurement taken at right angles to the length.” See Merriam- Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/width, (last viewed July 10, 2015). The dictionary definition of height is “the distance from the bottom to the top of something standing upright.” See Merriam- 3 In a related district court proceeding, the claim term “output distribution defined by a greater width component than height component” was determined to have its plain meaning. Ex. 2008, 47. See TR. 21:24–22:8. Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/height, (last viewed July 10, 2015). Within the context of the claims, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions that the term “width” is used other than according to its ordinary and customary meaning with respect to the shape of the input edge of the optical conductor, the output distribution of the light source, and the shape of the LED light source. Along this vein, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contentions that the term “height” is used other than according to its ordinary and customary meaning with respect to the light output distribution. Based on this usage in the claims, no express construction is necessary.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “persuaded Petitioner has provided sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning explaining why one with ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of the applied references to address the noted differences. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”)). We consider Petitioner’s first reason to combine Oe and Etsuo “because they are in the same field of backlighting for liquid crystal display devices.” Pet. 36. The mere fact that both Oe and Etsuo are in the same field of endeavor falls short of an adequate rationale. The same field of endeavor analysis is merely the jumping-off point in reaching the determination of whether a claimed invention is obvious. See K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (to qualify as prior art in an obviousness analysis, references must be analogous art—either from the same field of endeavor, or reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor is involved). Next, we consider Petitioner’s second reason to combine because “both Oe and Etsuo relate to backlight devices that use light sources located at edges of a light guide.” Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 165). Although Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Escuti, he does not proffer any persuasive facts, data, or analysis to support his opinion. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 165 (“Also, both Oe and Etsuo relate to backlight devices that use light sources located at edges of a light guide.”). Merely repeating an argument from the Petition in the declaration of a proposed expert does not give that argument probative value. Dr. Escuti’s opinion lacks sufficient support. For this reason, we do not credit the testimony of Dr. Escuti on this issue. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Petitioner’s second reason is also unavailing because it does not address the entirety of Petitioner’s proposed modification. As discussed above, Petitioner relies on the disclosure in Etsuo for both the position of the plurality of light sources adjacent a single input edge claim element, as well as the output distribution having a greater width component than height component claim element. Petitioner’s reasoning, directed only to the use of light sources at the edge of the light guide, does not explain sufficiently why one of skill in the art would have replaced a single light source positioned adjacent one input edge of Oe, with the plurality of light sources disclosed by Etsuo that have an output distribution defined by a greater width component than height component. We also consider Petitioner’s argument in the Reply that, in addition to Etsuo, Petitioner also relies on Oe’s explicit disclosure of “a plurality of point-like sources of light.” Reply 16–17. Petitioner directs us to the passage of Oe cited in its claim chart (Pet. 40), describing how the light source could be “a plurality of point-like sources of light arranged along the incident surface” (Ex. 1024, 7:30–31). Id. at 16. But Petitioner’s arguments in this regard do not address specifically its proffered reason to combine Oe and Etsuo. Indeed, Petitioner does not explain the relevance of the point-like sources of light to the claim element in question. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) (requiring a full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent). Patent Owner contends that “Petitioner never argues that ‘point-like sources’ are equivalent to LEDs.” PO Resp. 10. We agree. Petitioner’s argument that “Oe discloses a plurality of light sources 4 adjacent to the input edges” (Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1024, 6:5–13; Ex. 1004 ¶ 161)) makes no mention of the specific passage in Oe concerning the point-like sources of light. Indeed, the cited passage states that:” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,404,660 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,404,660
• Toyota Motor Corporation v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jul 6, 2016 · IPR2016-00422 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Toyota did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered both the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any claim. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim of the ’786 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “functionally and structurally separate” from the car stereo, the proposed construction is incomplete in that it omits any requirement of separation or distinctness of the interface from the portable or after-market device connected thereto. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. Second, the proposed construction is too narrow by specifying that the interface “integrates an after-market device with a car stereo.” We note that the Specification of the ’786 patent provides a special definition for “integration” or “integrated.” Ex. 1001, 4:47–52. We discern no reason to import limitations into a claim if they are unnecessary to accord meaning to the claim. Third, the proposed construction is too narrow by requiring the interface to be a microcontroller. In the Specification of the ’786 patent, the term “interface” is described as including not only a microcontroller but also several discrete components, such as resistors, diodes, capacitors, transistors, oscillators, amplifiers, and multiplexers, shown in various embodiments of Figures 3A, 3B1–3B2, 3C1–3C2, and 3D. Ex. 1101, 9:8–20, 10:19–33, 11:4–18, 11:59–67. As such, the term “interface” itself is not limited to a microcontroller. In that regard, note that if the interface itself is construed as a microcontroller, as Petitioner proposes, then the additional claim language reciting that the interface includes a microcontroller would serve no meaningful purpose. slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentable

    “dashed lines, and the parts regarded by Petitioner as the portable or after-market device in green and surrounded by dashed lines. We are unpersuaded by Petitioner’s identification of the part colored blue in the above-reproduced illustration to meet the requirement of the interface in claims 57 and 86. First, there is insufficient showing of separate structural identity between the alleged “interface” and the portion colored green by Petitioner in the same illustration and alleged as by Petitioner as the external device. Both blue and green portions are component parts within Lau’s music server 102. It would be incorrect to regard them as having separate structural identities. Petitioner has not adequately explained what accords these portions separate structural identities, e.g., separate supporting frames, independent housing, etc. Also, Petitioner has not identified any description within Lau that refers to the combination of parts labeled in blue as collectively constituting a unit of any kind, or that refers to the combination of parts labeled in green as collectively constituting a unit of any kind. Thus, the separate structural identity requirement between the alleged interface and a portable MP3 player (claim 57) or an after-market video device (claim 86) is not met.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

    “The above-quoted recitations of claim 92 presumptively set forth elements under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and are construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents 3 Paragraphs 1 through 6 of § 112 were renamed as paragraphs (a) through (f) when § 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112– 29, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (“AIA”) took effect on September 16, 2012. Because the patent application resulting in the ’786 patent was filed before the effective date of the AIA, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. thereof. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). For a means-plus-function element under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, the Board’s trial rules require the Petition to identify the corresponding structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function. Specifically, 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) governs the content of a petition with respect to claim construction and provides: “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function or step-plus-function limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. § 112 [, ¶ 6], the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.”4 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). The “construction” referred to by 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) is the construction proposed by the Petitioner, one that Petitioner believes is the correct construction under applicable law and should apply in the involved proceeding. Here, Petitioner did not comply with 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” slip op. at 25

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,489,786
• LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Delaware Display Group LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2015-01666 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Shinohara anticipates them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Following institution, LG Electronics, Inc. filed timely a Petition and Motion for Joinder in Case IPR2015-01666, challenging the same claims of the ’973 patent on the same ground as that on which we instituted review in this proceeding, plus one additional ground. See Paper 24, 2. LG Electronics, Inc. agreed to abandon the additional ground should IPR2015- 01666 be joined with this proceeding. See id. at 2 n.1. To administer the proceedings more efficiently, we granted LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Joinder, joining Case IPR2015-01666 with the instant proceeding. Id. at 5. For purposes of this Decision, we refer to LG Display Co., Ltd. and LG Electronics, Inc., jointly, as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelOther
  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “B. Anticipation by Shinohara A claim is anticipated if each limitation of the claim is disclosed in a single prior art reference arranged as in the claim. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As recently reiterated by the Federal Circuit, “a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). We analyze this ground based on anticipation in accordance with the above-stated principles.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner repeats its unsuccessful argument that, “[w]ithout offering a construction for this term, the Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id. Petitioner responds that this term (1) does not require construction; (2) is limited to a specific embodiment in the specification; (3) and imports a limitation from the specification into the claims. Reply 3–4. Having considered the full record developed during trial, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing the prior art do not rely on a particular construction for this term. See infra.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 7,434,973 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,434,973
• LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Delaware Display Group LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2016 · IPR2015-00506 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable because Shinohara anticipates them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “Following institution, LG Electronics, Inc. filed timely a Petition and Motion for Joinder in Case IPR2015-01666, challenging the same claims of the ’973 patent on the same ground as that on which we instituted review in this proceeding, plus one additional ground. See Paper 24, 2. LG Electronics, Inc. agreed to abandon the additional ground should IPR2015- 01666 be joined with this proceeding. See id. at 2 n.1. To administer the proceedings more efficiently, we granted LG Electronics, Inc.’s Motion for Joinder, joining Case IPR2015-01666 with the instant proceeding. Id. at 5. For purposes of this Decision, we refer to LG Display Co., Ltd. and LG Electronics, Inc., jointly, as “Petitioner.”” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Patent Owner repeats its unsuccessful argument that, “[w]ithout offering a construction for this term, the Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id. Petitioner responds that this term (1) does not require construction; (2) is limited to a specific embodiment in the specification; (3) and imports a limitation from the specification into the claims. Reply 3–4. Having considered the full record developed during trial, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner’s arguments distinguishing the prior art do not rely on a particular construction for this term. See infra.” slip op. at 6

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “the ’176 grandparent application is insufficient. “Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Reply 5–6. We find that the cited disclosures in the ’176 grandparent application do not describe the density, size, depth, or height of the deformities at approximate midpoints between adjacent pairs of light sources. As discussed above, Patent Owner maintains that a skilled artisan reading the ’176 grandparent application would know that “the approximate midpoint between the two light sources is an area farther away from a light source.” PO Resp. 28 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded by this argument, for it does not establish that the approximate midpoint between adjacent pairs of light sources is the only area farther away from a light source. As Petitioner points out, “the increased distance from the light source is not limited to a distance along the length of the panel member, along the width of the panel member, or along any direction at all.” Reply 11. Thus, Patent Owner fails to meet its burden under Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (burden of production shifted to patent owner to prove entitlement to earlier filing date).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner has not demonstrated that the ’176 grandparent application, as originally filed, provides written description support for the disputed limitation. Therefore, we determine that claims 1–5 are not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the ’176 grandparent application and Patent Owner is thus entitled only to the effective filing date of the application for the ʼ973 patent, February 9, 2007. As a consequence, we find that Shinohara qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,434,973 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 7,434,973
• Blue Coat Systems, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2016-00493 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the petition was time-barred under § 315(b); the joinder motion was dismissed as moot.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied

    “II. DISMISSAL OF MOTION FOR JOINDER Because the petition in IPR2016-02000 was denied and inter partes review was not instituted, Petitioner’s Joinder Motion is dismissed as moot. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barInstitution denied time barInstitution denied

    “Petitioner admits that a complaint alleging infringement of the ʼ731 patent was served on Petitioner more than a year before the filing date of the Petition. Pet. 4. Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), that is a bar to the institution of inter partes review unless Petitioner’s request for joinder is granted. See id., final sentence. Because we conclude supra that the joinder motion is dismissed, we conclude also that the Petition should be denied as time-barred under § 315(b). B. Denial on the Same Grounds as the ʼ2000 IPR” slip op. at 3

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 7,418,731

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.