- Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01451 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution: it exercised discretion as to claims 43–46, 49, 50, 62–69, and 72, and found no reasonable likelihood of obviousness for claims 55–58.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition. Patent Owner argues that we should decline to institute inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the Petition raises the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments that were presented previously to the Office. Prelim. Resp. 19–26. In particular, Patent Owner contends that each of the claims in the reexamination was rejected based on Eddison, under either 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and/or in combination with Jewkes under § 103(a), and that Petitioner relies upon Jewkes again under § 102(b) in its Petition. Id. at 23–26. Petitioner makes no attempt to explain why the references that form the bases for Petitioner’s challenge here are not the same or substantially similar prior art to that presented during the reexamination or why the arguments are not the same or substantially similar to those presented previously to the Office. Eddison and Jewkes were relied upon in the reexamination. See id. at 141–60 (Office Action (mailed Aug. 25, 2014)). Additionally, Tandberg was presented to the Office in conjunction with the original prosecution of the ’817 patent. See Ex. 2003; Prelim. Resp. 28.” slip op. at 9
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Patent Owner makes a valid point. Section 1.530(k) of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides: “Amendments not effective until certificate. Although the Office actions will treat proposed amendments as though they have been entered, the proposed amendments will not be effective until the reexamination certificate is issued and published.” This places us in a difficult position. If Patent Owner ultimately succeeds in the appeal of the reexamination, a certificate will issue and the amendments to claim 43 and its dependents will be “effective.” See id.; see Ex. 1007, 166 (showing the amendments to claim 43). Yet Petitioner provides no analysis of the amended limitations of claim 43. See, e.g., Pet. 16. Alternatively, if Patent Owner is unsuccessful in its appeal to the Federal Circuit, claim 43 and its dependents, as challenged in the reexamination, will be declared unpatentable. In either circumstance, any review we undertake of the unamended version of claim 43, and the claims depending therefrom, will be for naught. Accordingly, in light of the above circumstances, reviewing these claims on the record presented would waste judicial resources as well as the resources of the parties.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not articulated a clear reason as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Jewkes’s drilling assembly to include the additional structures taught by Tandberg and Eddison. We recognize that Petitioner points to Tandberg’s teaching that employing the same fundamental structure as an underreamer and as a stabilizer has an advantage, but Petitioner never explains what that advantage is or why it would have prompted one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Jewkes.5 Accordingly, on the record before us, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the combination of Jewkes, Tandberg, and Eddison would have rendered the subject matter of claims 55–58 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 12
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 22, 2016 · IPR2016-01450 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 325(d), citing overlapping prior art and arguments, the pending reexamination appeal, and resource conservation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“D. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Section 325(d) of Title 35 of the United States Code provides: “In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter . . . the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” In light of § 325(d), we consider whether the reexamination contains the same or substantially the same art or arguments as presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Although Petitioner and Patent Owner present proposed constructions for several claim terms, no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. Pet. 15–21; Prelim. Resp. 10–23.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerGranted
“On August 29, 2016, Petitioner requested, via electronic mail, to file a motion to correct its identification of the real party in interest in this proceeding. In particular, Petitioner requested the addition of Baker Hughes Incorporated as a real party in interest. Petitioner indicated that Patent Owner would not oppose its request. In a responsive email on September 29, 2016, we authorized Petitioner to file a motion to correct the identified real party in interest. On October 4, 2016, Petitioner filed an Updated Mandatory Notice in which Petitioner stated that it “moves the Board to allow correction of Petitioner’s Real Part in Interest (‘RPI’) disclosure.” Paper 8, 1. Although Petitioner did not file a motion to correct as it had requested, we treat its updated mandatory notice as such and hereby grant Petitioner’s request. Accordingly, Baker Hughes Incorporated is a real party in interest in this proceeding as well.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,732,817 - Honeywell International Inc. v. Allure Energy, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2016 · IPR2015-01248 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 5, 20, 22–25, and 30 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamashita and Shamoon; claims 2–4, 6–8, and 19 were not proven unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is attempting to improperly limit the construction. As we explained in our Decision on Institution, we declined to limit “comparison” to a particular type of evaluation, and by our construction, we did not find that the “focus” of the “comparison” is to identify “any dissimilarity” as Patent Owner contends. See Inst. Dec. 9. Indeed, as evidenced by the dictionary definitions cited by Patent Owner and that we relied upon, determining dissimilarities is not the “focus” of the plain and ordinary meaning of “comparison” that we adopted. See Inst. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 2003 (defining “comparison” as “the act of looking at things to see how they are similar or different” and “the act of suggesting that two or more things are similar or in the same category”)); see also Ex. 2011 (defining “comparison” as “the representing of one thing or person as similar to or like another” and “an examination of two or more items to establish similarities and dissimilarities”).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Here, we agree with Petitioner that the plain language of the claim is sufficient and no construction is necessary for this term. The claim language already establishes that there are two user profiles, each is associated with a particular and different mobile device, and the profiles include “information to alter an operating condition of the network device according to a preference of a [first/second] user.” The claim already addresses what attributes the user profile must have. We see no support in the claim language or specification for Patent Owner’s additional requirements that the profiles be “individual” and “include information unique to each user.”” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“v. Summary as to Claims 1, 20, 22–25, and 30 Patent Owner raises no evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness in this case. Thus, weighing the evidence of obviousness that is before us, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 20, 22–25, and 30 would have been obvious over the combination of Yamashita and Shamoon.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. Teaching away requires that “a person of ordinary skill upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).4 Patent Owner cites nothing in Yamashita that says that adding the features from Shamoon in addition to the automatic functionality of Yamashita would be unlikely to work; Yamashita alleges only that manual control alone has certain disadvantages. 4 We understand Patent Owner to be arguing both that the references teach away from the combination generally and teach away because, in particular, the combination would change the principle of operation of the system. PO Resp. 33–36. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no teaching away where nothing in the prior art device suggested that the claimed invention was unlikely to work). The lack of teaching away is confirmed by Yamashita’s disclosure of an embodiment requiring manual interaction. See Reply 20 (citing Ex. 1006, 22:31–51). Indeed, although Patent Owner contends that automatic functionality is “not the focus or main purpose of Shamoon,” PO Resp. 35, Shamoon’s system demonstrates that automatic functionality can be combined with manual functionality to result in a working system. See Ex. 1007, 8:36–45. As for Patent Owner’s contentions that Yamashita “abandoned bi- directional communication” (PO Resp. 35), we find no support in the cited portions of Yamashita for these contentions. Although Yamashita does tout the benefits of its automatic control system, the cited portions of Yamashita are silent about the advantages or disadvantages of “bi-directional communication.” As for Patent Owner’s arguments about substantial reconstruction and redesign (PO Resp. 36 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 91)), we do not find the testimony or argument persuasive. Yamashita’s control terminal and mobile terminals already has built in communication abilities (Ex. 1006, 11:31–38), and we find Dr. Selker’s testimony persuasive that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to add the ability to communicate the thermostat reading to verify that Yamashita’s automatic control worked. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 205–207. As for Patent Owner’s allegation that the combination with Shamoon would change Yamashita’s principle of operation, we disagree. Yamashita would continue to work as before; the messages, rules, and control information would continue operate in the same manner. Shamoon would only add additional functionality to allow for an improved user interface and two-way communication. Where the device would operate on the same principles as before, the combination does not change the principle of operation. See Mouttet, 686 F.3d at 1332 (noting Ratti inapplicable where the modified apparatus will operate “on the same principles as before”). As Petitioner explains, Shamoon demonstrates that its known techniques have been used to improve similar devices in similar ways. We find that Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to support the combination. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 205–207, 213. Thus, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Yamashita and Shamoon.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,626,344 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,626,344 - Honeywell International Inc. v. Allure Energy, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2016 · IPR2015-01251 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 9–14, 16, and 26–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamashita and Shamoon; claims 15, 17, and 18 were not proven unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s further narrowing of our construction is improperly limiting. As we explained in our Decision on Institution, we declined to limit “comparing” to a particular type of evaluation, and by our construction, we did not find that the “focus” of the comparison is to identify “any dissimilarity” as Patent Owner contends. See Inst. Dec. 10. Indeed, as evidenced by the dictionary definitions cited by Patent Owner and that we relied upon, determining dissimilarities is not the “focus” of the plain and ordinary meaning of “comparing” that we adopted; rather, each of them emphasizes determining similarities as well. See Inst. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 2002 (defining “comparison” as “the act of looking at things to see how they are similar or different” and “the act of suggesting that two or more things are similar or in the same category”)); see also Ex. 2006 (defining “comparison” as “the representing of one thing or person as similar to or like another” and “an examination of two or more items to establish similarities and dissimilarities”). The specification does not compel a different understanding. The” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“that the parties’ actual dispute is twofold. First, the parties dispute whether the mobile device must be able to transmit location information to the site regardless of whether the proximity setting is enabled or disabled. See Reply 8–9; PO Resp. 14–15. Second, Patent Owner argues that the entire process of proximity detection must be automatic. PO Resp. 14. As we explain below, we agree with Petitioner that this term does not require that the mobile device continue to send location reports if the proximity setting is not enabled, whereas we disagree with Petitioner that the proximity setting is limited to enabling or disabling the ability to send location reports. Instead, we find the specification supports a broader construction. In particular, we find that the specification states that “[f]or example, a user may enable proximity detection using proximity detection selector 1036 and energy use at a site may be altered based on a user[’]s distance to the site.” Ex. 1001, 46:45–48. It further explains that “[i]n some forms, proximity detection selector 1036 can be hidden, displayed, selectable, or any combination thereof in response to a user having a mobile device capable of being detected when a user is at or away from a site.” Id. at 46:50–54. Thus, we consider the broadest reasonable construction of “proximity setting” consistent with the specification to be “a setting that can enable or disable proximity detection, where energy use at a site may be altered based on the user’s location.” Both parties acknowledge that this is a reasonable meaning of the term. Reply 8; PO Resp. 12.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“In sum, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the control terminal in Yamashita receives messages from the wireless terminals that represent the relative location of the mobile terminal (e.g., within 300 m of the site or moving away from the site) and that the control terminal includes a number of rules to compare the messages to determine what control information to send to the controlled appliances, and that as a result of the comparison sends control information to alter the condition of the controlled appliances. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 214–216. Thus, we are persuaded that Yamashita accounts for the “comparing limitations” of claim 9.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find that Petitioner has shown adequately that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Yamashita with Shamoon. In particular, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Yamashita teaches away from the combination or that the combination would change the principle of operation of Yamashita.3 Patent Owner is correct that Yamashita distinguishes manual control, and notes the disadvantages of “burdensome operations” and the possibility the user may forget to perform the required operations. Ex. 1005, 1:35–40. Patent Owner is also correct that Yamashita states that one objective of the invention is a system that can automatically control an appliance based on position without requiring any operation by the user. Id. at 1:44–47. Yet, Yamashita also discloses an embodiment where the user is prompted before a message is sent, which does require an operation by the user. Id. at 23:31–51. Thus, we do not agree that Yamashita disparages all manual interaction as Patent Owner contends. Moreover, teaching away requires that “a person of ordinary skill upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner cites nothing in Yamashita that says that adding the communication features from Shamoon to transmit the thermostat readings to the mobile terminal to the automatic functionality of Yamashita would be unlikely to work; Yamashita alleges only that manual control alone has certain disadvantages, not that communicating information from the site to” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 8,626,344 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,626,344 - Honeywell International Inc. v. Allure Energy, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2016 · IPR2015-01253 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious over Richton and Rosenblatt.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree that the claim language unambiguously requires that there must be outer boundaries. The term “zone” generally refers to an area. We turn to the specification to see how the ’797 patent describes a zone. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in the City of N.Y. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“‘[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis’ and is, in fact, ‘the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”). As Petitioner points out, the specification refers to zones that do not have an outer boundary. See Ex. 1001, 12:41–44 (“detect mobile device 210 within a first zone (e.g., less than one (1) mile from the site, less than three (3) miles from site, greater than five (5) miles from site, etc.).”). Indeed, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument that in order to be “within” the zones there must be an outer boundary, the specification describes an embodiment where the user is “within” a zone that is “greater than five (5) miles from [the] site.” Id. at 12:42–44. In this instance, there is an inner boundary for the zone (five miles), but not an outer boundary.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“attempts to rebut this testimony with testimony from its declarant, Mr. McAlexander, that this statement in Richton only means that the location-action server can be distributed over a couple of remote servers. Ex. 2004 ¶ 71. We do not find Mr. McAlexander’s testimony persuasive for several reasons. In particular, the testimony ignores Richton’s explicit statement that it is not important where the components of the location-action server are located, but that “[o]nly the operative connection between the components is important.” Ex. 1003, 12:58–59. This statement suggests that the functionality can be more distributed than Mr. McAlexander contends. Moreover, Mr. McAlexander’s testimony mischaracterizes Petitioner’s and Dr. Selker’s argument by saying that “[t]his [statement] does not disclose [that] the various components, which carry out the location-based action services, are located on the mobile device.”8 Ex. 2004 ¶ 71. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Selker, however, suggested that this statement in Richton discloses locating the components on a mobile device. Instead, they suggested, and we agree, that because the functionality can be distributed, it enables the functionality to be placed on a mobile device.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“not commensurate with the scope of the claims because “whether” and “within” do not impart the limitations that Patent Owner seeks to include the claims. When Richton determines that the mobile device crosses a particular distance threshold such that the device is now in a particular zone, we find that Richton determines whether the device is within that zone. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 116–119; Ex. 1003, 6:36–50, 8:46–9:10. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Richton teaches or suggests the zone limitations of claims 3–8 and 14.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 8,457,797 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,457,797 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Imperium (IP) HoldingsAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 1, 2016 · IPR2015-01232 · APJ James B Arpin · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 6, 7, 14, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Shimada, including the obviousness-based modifications to its lookup table and photometry teachings.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“construction. Tr. 8:4–15; see also id. at 14:16–15:2 (no need to construe “preparatory power value”). Patent Owner agreed, also stating at the hearing that no claim constructions are necessary. Id. at 19:11–25; see PO Resp. 12 (relating to the claim term “interface”); Tr. 50:19–55:4. Nevertheless, Petitioner notes that the parties appear to disagree regarding the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “weighting.” PO Resp. 16–18; see Pet. Reply 15; Tr. 8:9–15. Petitioner argues that “weighting” means “‘according more weight,’ emphasizing, ‘an area of interest of the image,’ or even emphasizing the entire image.” Pet. Reply 16 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 2, ll. 15–17, col. 9, ll. 1–3; Ex. 2003, 62:10–13); see Tr. 8:24–25 (“according more weight or emphasizing a portion or all of an image”). Patent Owner does not propose expressly an alternative construction, but, in attempting to distinguish the teachings of Shimada, contends implicitly that Petitioner’s construction is overly broad. PO Resp. 18; see Pet. Reply 15 (“Though PO never actually proposes an actual construction for ‘weighting,’ it argues Shimada uses a ‘selection process’ and suggests that, in contrast, the claimed ‘weighting’ must be performed numerically.” (citations omitted)). We find Petitioner’s proposed construction to be consistent with the Specification of the ’029 patent, and we construe “weighting” to mean “according more weight or emphasizing a portion or all of an image.” Nevertheless, only terms that are in controversy in this proceeding need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Because the resolution of this controversy does not depend upon the construction of any other claim term, no other claim terms are construed expressly.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“5 Petitioner proposes an assessment of the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1033 ¶ 20). Patent Owner’s declarant proposes a slightly different and somewhat lower (e.g., two years, instead of four years, of industry experience) assessment of the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2004 ¶ 26. To the extent necessary and for purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s declarant’s assessment, which each party’s declarant meets or exceeds. See Ex. 1033 ¶ 21; Ex. 2004 ¶ 27. 6 There is no requirement to enumerate each Graham factor and to include findings specifically in terms of the factors as long as “the required factual determinations were actually made and it is clear that they were considered while applying the proper legal standard of obviousness.” Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“As discussed above (see supra Section IV.A.3.a.i.), Mr. Parulski explains that “Shimada takes a binary approach (either counting an area or discounting an area), utilizing the central four areas of the image in the calculation and ignoring the remainder.” Ex. 1033 ¶ 92 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 50). Thus, for example, the four (4) center areas may be weighted one (1), and the sixty (60) surrounding areas may be weighted zero (0). See Ex. 2003, 62:18–63:4, 78:19–84:1; see Pet. Reply 17–18. Shimada discloses “uniform” weighting (Ex. 1001, col. 8, l. 60–col. 9, l. 3), and Mr. Parulski explains that uniform weighting equally weights all areas (see, e.g., Ex. 2003, 171:13–20). See Pet. Reply 18–19. Mr. Parulski testifies that this is how Shimada operates when performing photometry uniformly on all 64 areas of Figure 4. See, e.g., Ex. 2003, 69:10–70:22; see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 50 (“[W]hen the photographic subject is in a normal state other than a backlit state, photometry is performed for a wider area.”); but see Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 42–47. We credit Mr. Parulski’s testimony here. Thus, we are persuaded that Shimada teaches “weighting” as that term is here construed. In its Figure 4, reproduced above (see supra Section IV.A.2.), Shimada further depicts a square imaging element measuring eight “areas” on a side and totaling sixty-four (64) areas. As noted above, Petitioner argues persuasively that Shimada teaches assigning numerical values to each of these areas. Pet. Reply 19 (citing Ex. 2003, 69:10–70:22). Further, Mr. Parulski testifies that: Shimada further describes that “the size of the photometric area substantially may be selected by processing only the signals of the required photometric area.” [Ex. 1005 ¶ 50.] It would have been obvious to a POSITA that Shimada’s disclosure of “processing only the signals of the required photometric area” could advantageously be accomplished by using a memory having “luminance weighting tables” with binary values (e.g., “0” or “1”), which enable the CPU to identify the photometric areas to be included in the processing. Ex. 1033 ¶ 115; see Ex. 2003, 84:11–94:11; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). Again, we credit Mr. Parulski’s testimony. Thus, we are persuaded that such an assignment of numerical values discloses a “weighting table,” such as that recited in challenged claim 16, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand, in view of Shimada’s teachings, that such numerical values might be stored in a memory in the form of a table. Pet. 41 n.36; see Pet. Reply 19 (“Claim 16 differs from claims 1, 6 and 7 in that it requires a memory storing a “weighting table.”).” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“power values to determine the main flash values presented in Table 1, that such values must be stored within and/or accessible to Shimada’s system, and that Shimada teaches that storage capacity was a concern in the art. Ex. 1005 ¶ 34; see Ex. 2003, 33:7–34:11, 40:9–15. Shimada expressly teaches that two of the pieces of data used to accomplish Shimada’s purpose may be stored in a single memory, ROM 16 of Shimada’s Figure 1. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20, 32, 42. Based on the art and arguments presented here, the record suggests a finite number of ways in which distinct pieces of data (e.g., the main flash duration and power values, the preparatory flash duration, and the preparatory flash power values) may be stored and that these would be within the technical grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2003, 44:7–45:17, 46:5–47:6; see Tr. 37:3–38:6. On this record, we are persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that saving information in one file, instead of two or more files, has the ability to conserve storage space. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”), 421 (“When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.”); see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 34, 35 (describing known problem of, and solutions for, storage capacity).” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,092,029 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,092,029 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Imperium (IP) HoldingsAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 30, 2016 · IPR2015-01233 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 10 are unpatentable: claim 1 is anticipated by Roe and Toshiba, and claim 10 is obvious over Umeda or Sears combined with either Roe or Toshiba.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with Samsung that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “interface” in light of the specification of the ’290 patent is “a connection used for communicating signals between two or more electrical components,” and we expressly decline to read into claims 1 and 10 requirements that the recited interfaces (1) must perform a data interfacing function “in accordance with a protocol that is recognized and implemented by both the transmitting device and the receiving device” and (2) necessarily must be “higher-level circuits,” as Imperium suggests. Id. at 2, 6–8; PO Resp. 12–13; see Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It is improper for a court to add ‘extraneous’ limitations to a claim, that is, limitations added ‘wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.’” (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988))).” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We are persuaded by Samsung’s arguments and evidence presented in the Petition that Roe’s dual-purpose I/O circuit discloses the “data interface circuit” of claim 1 of the ’290 patent, including single-ended and differential interfaces with selectable outputs arranged as set forth in claim 1, and neither Imperium’s arguments nor its cited evidence persuade us otherwise. See Pet. 17–25; PO Resp. 16–22. As stated in Section II.A.2 supra, we agree with Samsung that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “interface,” as recited in claim 1 of the ’290 patent, is “a connection used for communicating signals between two or more electrical components,” and we do not read into claim 1 any requirement that the recited interfaces must be a “higher-level circuit” that performs a data interfacing function in accordance with any particular protocol. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Imperium’s arguments or Dr. Wright’s testimony that Roe’s I/O circuits are not “interfaces” within the meaning of claim 1. PO Resp. 16–20. We also agree with Samsung that claim 1 does not require sending the selected mode to a downstream receiver. Pet. Reply 12. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Imperium’s argument that Roe does not describe “sending selection signals to any components on the downstream/receive-side of the output lines.” PO Resp. 21. Additionally, because we understand Samsung to rely on Roe’s “dual-purpose I/O circuit” to disclose the claimed “data interface circuit” (see Pet. Reply 12), we are not persuaded by Imperium’s argument that Roe’s “primary interface itself” does not have selectable single-ended and differential components (PO Resp. 21). c. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Samsung has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Roe.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art, adopted in Section II.C.3.b supra, as well as the testimony of both Dr. Wright (Ex. 1040; Ex. 1046; Ex. 2008) and Dr. Baker (Ex. 1008; Ex. 1041; Ex. 2007), we are persuaded by Samsung’s arguments and evidence that it would have been within the skill of a person of ordinary skill in the art to incorporate a dual interface as taught by either Roe or Toshiba into Umeda’s image sensor. We also agree with Samsung that Umeda, Roe, and Toshiba are analogous art with respect to claim 10 of the ’290 patent. See Pet. Reply 17–18; PO Resp. 29. As Samsung points out (Pet. Reply 17), the question of whether prior art references are “analogous” is evaluated with respect to the claimed invention, not with respect to other references. See, e.g., Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103 when it is analogous to the claimed invention.”). A prior art reference is considered to be analogous to a claimed invention if it is either: (1) from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed; or (2) reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is concerned, regardless of the field of endeavor. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In this case, we determine that Umeda is analogous art with respect to claim 10 under at least the first prong of Bigio, and that Roe and Toshiba are both analogous art under at least the second prong. In particular, Umeda generally describes solid state image sensors, including CMOS-type image sensors, that include a data interface circuit and an image processor connected to the image sensor to receive the signals output by the data interface circuit (see supra Section II.C.3.a and citations therein), which are within the same field of endeavor as the CMOS imaging apparatus of claim 10. Moreover, because each of Roe and Toshiba discloses an interface that provides selectable single-ended and differential signal output with reuse of output pins, we find that those references clearly are pertinent to the problem set forth in the ’290 patent, namely fulfilling a “need for an improved interface circuit that would allow either a single-ended or a differential output and using as few pins as possible” (Ex. 1001, 3:17–19; see also id. at 1:11–15 (“The field of the invention relates generally to the field of interface circuits, and more particularly, to interface circuitry for providing selectable single-ended and differential signal output from a CMOS image sensor to an external digital signal processor.”)).” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We are persuaded, moreover, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason in view of Umeda’s teachings, as cited by Samsung, to make the proffered combinations. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 1:61–67 (stating the goal of “mak[ing] the most of the[] characteristic features” of a MOS type image sensor and the importance of using “an appropriate interface” to avoid increases in chip area, package size, and cost), Fig. 14 (listing both single-ended (“PC Card”) and differential (“IEEE 1394”) interface types). We conclude that the recited combination of claim 10 is no more than “the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established function,” and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been prompted to combine those elements in the claimed fashion. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417, 418. We, accordingly, are persuaded that Samsung has shown that the first three Graham factors weigh in favor of finding that Umeda in combination with either Roe or Toshiba would have rendered the subject matter of claim 10 of the ’290 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 6,836,290 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,836,290 - Vista Outdoor Operations LLC v. Liberty Ammunition, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 31, 2016 · IPR2016-00539 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left in place the denial of institution for claims 1–42 on all six grounds, finding no overlooked or misapprehended matter.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS The applicable standard for a request for rehearing is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, opposition, or a reply. Furthermore, when rehearing a decision on a motion, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. at § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“The Board found that these embodiments were distinct, and determined that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on its challenges when combining features from these distinct embodiments. See Decision 13–16, 19, 20. With respect to the anticipation ground (Ground 1), the Board explained that “it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Id. at 13 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). With respect to Grounds 2 and 3, the Board determined that Petitioner failed to explain adequately how Woodring’s distinct embodiments are being combined with one another and the cited art to arrive at the claimed invention. Id. at 18, 20.” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“The Board found that these embodiments were distinct, and determined that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on its challenges when combining features from these distinct embodiments. See Decision 13–16, 19, 20. With respect to the anticipation ground (Ground 1), the Board explained that “it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Id. at 13 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). With respect to Grounds 2 and 3, the Board determined that Petitioner failed to explain adequately how Woodring’s distinct embodiments are being combined with one another and the cited art to arrive at the claimed invention. Id. at 18, 20.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“determined that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on its challenges when combining features from these distinct embodiments. See Decision 13–16, 19, 20. With respect to the anticipation ground (Ground 1), the Board explained that “it is not enough that the prior art reference discloses multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Id. at 13 (citing Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). With respect to Grounds 2 and 3, the Board determined that Petitioner failed to explain adequately how Woodring’s distinct embodiments are being combined with one another and the cited art to arrive at the claimed invention. Id. at 18, 20.” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,748,325 - Arris International PLC / Pace Ltd. et al. v. Sony CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 7, 2016 · IPR2016-00828 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claim 2 was unpatentable under any of the four asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“only if “the information presented in the [P]etition . . . and any [Preliminary Response] . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the [P]etitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the [P]etition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim of the ’295 patent. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and decline to institute an inter partes review of the ’295 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner fails to acknowledge that Allport already provides a different solution to the problem identified by Petitioner—of channel retention in the event of a power interruption—by storing the channel information in the remote control. In other words, Allport already addresses the alleged problem/need that Petitioner asserts would provide a motivating reason to seek a solution, and Allport also provides a workable solution by maintaining the channel information in the memory of the remote control. Petitioner does not allege any deficiency of Allport’s remote control-side arrangement such that modifying it as proposed would result in some type of benefit.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“last channel, his testimony is the only evidence as to why one of ordinary skill in the art allegedly would have incorporated the feature in the base station and not the remote control. In short, he opines that it would be “simpler” because the base station manages the tuning and selection features, and could therefore respond quickly. See id. One significant problem we have with Dr. Russ’s testimony is that he—like Petitioner—fails to acknowledge that Allport’s remote control already stores channel tuning information. In other words, if we were starting from a blank slate (i.e., if Allport had not specified where channel tuning information is stored), Dr. Russ’s testimony might hold more weight—although we would still have the potential problem, identified below, regarding exactly why such incorporation would be simpler—but, as noted above, we are not starting from a blank slate because Allport already stores channel information in its remote control. Thus, we give Dr. Russ’s testimony on this point very little weight. Additionally, as noted above, Dr. Russ fails to explain why storing the last channel would have been simpler in the device responsible for the tuning and selection features (i.e., Allport’s base station) than in Allport’s remote control. In other words, a user would presumably enter the channel information on the remote control and it too would have a direct role in channel selection. Thus, even if we were starting from a blank slate, Dr. Russ’s statement that it would be simpler to incorporate said feature in Allport’s base station is unsupported by sufficient explanation or evidence.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Margulis does not explicitly disclose that subsystem processor 518 “selects said television signal or said Internet data to produce said information signal,” as recited by claim 2. See id. at 13. In describing Figure 1, Margulis states: “Switcher 138 then preferably selects one or more of the program sources 112 as a switcher output program in response to control information typically provided by a viewer of the system 110.” Ex. 1009, 4:58–61. Margulis’s Figure 1 illustrates switcher 138 as a separate and distinct component from base station 156. Margulis, Fig. 1. Margulis’s Figures 5 and 6, the description of which Petitioner relies upon (see Pet. 27–28), specifically point back to base station 156 of Figure 1. See Ex. 1009, 7:5–7 (“Referring now to FIG. 5, a block diagram of the FIG. 1 wireless base station 156 is shown . . . . In the FIG. 5 embodiment, wireless base station 156 preferably includes, but is not limited to, a base station subsystem 1 (512(a)) through a base station subsystem N (512(c)[)] . . . .”); id. at 9:1–3 (“Referring now to FIG. 6, a block diagram of an exemplary base station subsystem 512 is shown . . . .”). In short, it appears that Margulis describes the elements of Figures 5 and 6 as though they are a part of the overall system shown in Figure 1. Margulis’s use of the same reference numeral for the base station—156—in Figures 1 and 5 and same reference numeral for the base station subsystem—512—in Figures 5 and 6, support the same conclusion. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.84(p)(4) (“The same part of an invention appearing in more than one view of the drawing must always be designated by the same reference character, and the same reference character must never be used to designate different parts.”). Additionally, and notably, Petitioner does not argue that Figures 5 and 6 illustrate something other than additional details regarding the overall system shown in Figure 1. And, as discussed above, Petitioner’s citations to subsystem processor 518 do not state explicitly that subsystem processor 518 performs the functions attributed to switcher 138 or as required of the selection unit recited in claim 2 of the ’295 patent. Accordingly, we determine that, based on the record before us, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claim 2 as obvious over the combination of Margulis and Zato.” slip op. at 23
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,733,295 - Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation / Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd. et al. v. Irwin Industrial Tool CompanyNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2016 · IPR2015-01461 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–37 were not shown unpatentable: Redford did not anticipate or render the claims obvious, and Redford combined with Starbuck did not render them obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“The party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the relief requested—namely, that the material sought to be excluded is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a).” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). A presumption exists that a claim term should be construed in light of its ordinary and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“not enough to find that a prior art device is merely capable of being adapted or modified to operate in a manner that would anticipate the claims. See Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1117–18 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“For anticipation purposes, the absence of such a teaching makes it immaterial whether . . . a user . . . could modify the system to activate such remote booting”). Thus, even if “no claim in the ’554 patent requires an arbor or any other particular drive structure,” as Petitioner asserts (Pet. Reply 18), that Redford’s cleaning flange 60 must be modified in order for it to be “use[d] as a conventional hole saw,” as suggested in the Petition (see Pet. 19), means that Redford is not an anticipatory disclosure. Here, we find Mr. Vallee’s testimony that “there is no portion of the cleaning flange 60 that can be easily connected to a rotating device” persuasive. Ex. 2004 ¶ 53. We do not see how “a hole saw arbor could have been threaded or otherwise attached to the stem extending upward from the cleaning flange,” as argued by Petitioner (Pet. 19), without modifying Redford’s structure. Nothing in Redford discloses that “the stem extending upward from the cleaning flange” is either threaded or otherwise attachable to a different drive structure without modification. See also Ex. 2004 ¶ 53 (“No such standard means of attaching a hole saw arbor to the cleaning flange 60 is described in Redford.”) Furthermore, although Redford discloses that “the cleaning flange could be remov[ed]” from nut driver 40 (Ex. 1003, 6:6–10), this is not a disclosure that the cleaning flange includes structure that allows it to be “connectable to a different drive structure for use as a conventional hole saw,” as Petitioner suggests (Pet. 19). In particular,” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive. Petitioner provides insufficient reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added a second, alternate drive structure to Redford’s cleaning flange 60, when Redford already discloses a drive structure that utilizes pin 54 for attaching body 20 to cleaning flange 60. Petitioner’s proposed modification of Redford’s cleaning flange 60 appears to be premised on an impermissible use of hindsight after review of the ’554 Patent, rather than on a supported reason to modify Redford’s cleaning flange 60. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (stating that the fact finder must be aware “of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning”). We also find unpersuasive Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner’s own “expert testified that by the ’554 patent’s priority date, it would have been obvious to incorporate such structures into a hole saw” (Pet. Reply 18 (citing Ex. 1008, 36:5–17)). Here, Patent Owner’s expert (Mr. Vallee) simply answered “Yes” in response to the question, “[y]ou would agree that at the time of the [’554 patent] it was obvious that you would have a mandrel and use a power drill to operate a hole saw, correct?” Ex. 1008, 36:5–17. The issue is not whether it would have been obvious to add a mandrel to any hole saw so that it can be driven by a power drill, as posed by the question; rather, the issue is whether it would have been obvious to modify Redford’s cleaning flange 60—which already uses a pin-type attachment mechanism—to include a second attachment mechanism that would avoid the use of the pin.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,579,554 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,579,554
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.