• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Biofrontera Inc. / Biofrontera Bioscience GmbH et al. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01312 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 16, 17, and 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Lundahl and Larsen; Ground 2 was conceded, and the motion to exclude was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has not provided a valid justification for requiring a POSITA to have both an engineering degree and a medical degree. Prelim. Resp. 22. We agree, insofar as Petitioner has not clearly set out any particular explanation or evidence in support of its dual-degree requirement. In all other respects, we note that the parties’ proposed definitions are largely similar. Because we determine that Patent Owner’s proposed definition is reasonable and consistent with the ’028 patent and the cited art, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition. In any event, our Decision does not turn on this level of skill determination. B.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “device “[f]or the treatment of large-area tissues,” such as the backs of human patients, wherein several applicators 13 are “flexibly connected to each other through hinges.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 72). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have been motivated “to incorporate Larsen’s solution of connecting light applicators by hinges, to allow for adjustability of Lundahl’s device to provide the desired irradiance and irradiance uniformity to all target areas during PDT.” Id. (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 127). According to Petitioner, a “POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Lundahl with Larsen, because both references describe similar illuminators for using light to treat conditions on a patient’s skin.” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 128). Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lundahl also involves using LEDs as a light source instead of Lundahl’s fluorescent tubes. Id. According to Petitioner, a POSITA would have been motivated to make this change because: (1) LEDs had a lower cost and a longer lifetime than fluorescent tubes; (2) fluorescent tubes were known to have inconsistent light output within the tube itself; and (3) “the use of LEDs would be more practical to reduce spacing between light sources and the edges of the panels, as opposed to the bulky metal couplings at the end of fluorescent tubes, to reduce optical dead space across the light surface.” Id. (citing Ex. 1014, 4:41–42, 6:31–42; Ex. 1015 ¶ 129). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success with this modification because Lundahl and Larsen “describe similar illuminators and the conversion from fluorescent tubes to LEDs was a routine practice prior to 2015.” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 131). Patent Owner does not meaningfully dispute the Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine Lundahl and Larsen. See generally PO Resp. To the extent Patent Owner argues that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the combination because it would negatively affecting uniform illumination (PO Resp. 24), the motivating benefit here—using adjustable LED panels instead of monolith fluorescent tubes—outweighs the alleged disadvantages for the many reasons given by Petitioner, including greater adjustability and improved LED performance. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify.”); Reply 14. We are persuaded that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Lundahl and Larsen for the reasons advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s reasoning (i.e., that it would have been obvious to try placing the hinges on the inner side surfaces) is unsupported and conclusory. PO Reps. 53–54. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner fails to identify a single prior art reference showing hinged structures on inner side surfaces. Id. This argument ignores that Larsen expressly identifies hinges on at least bottom side surfaces, and Petitioner merely proposes modifying their location from the bottom sides to inner sides. We find credible Dr. Grove’s testimony that relocating hinges would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. Dr. Jokerst testifies that a POSITA would have been discouraged from placing hinges between Larsen’s adjustable applicators, because the hinges would create gaps that interfere with uniform illumination as well as the panels’ wiring, and create issues with the use and alignment of the panels. Ex. 2050 ¶ 175. However, a system with discrete panels connected by hinges (like in Larsen) will already have wiring, use and alignment technical challenges, regardless of the location of the hinges— the expected consequence of connecting multiple movable electronic panels. Moreover, the ’028 patent acknowledges in its discussion of conventional illuminators that placing hinges between panels was already known. Ex. 1001, 2:7–15. With respect to Dr. Jokerst’s opinion that the hinges would create gaps negatively affecting uniform illumination, we are persuaded that it would have been within the skill of a POSITA to locate the hinges on the inside surfaces “in a nearly flush arrangement,” such that the gaps would be minimized. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. We also credit Dr. Grove’s supplemental testimony on this issue, directly refuting Dr. Jokerst’s testimony regarding gaps and uniform illumination (and therefore within the proper scope of reply, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument otherwise (Mot. 9). See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–20 (explaining LED light divergence and that the physical space caused by hinges “is easily addressed” to maintain uniform illumination).9 We further point out that the ’028 patent also suggests that gaps do” slip op. at 24

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Jokerst testifies that a POSITA would have been discouraged from placing hinges between Larsen’s adjustable applicators, because the hinges would create gaps that interfere with uniform illumination as well as the panels’ wiring, and create issues with the use and alignment of the panels. Ex. 2050 ¶ 175. However, a system with discrete panels connected by hinges (like in Larsen) will already have wiring, use and alignment technical challenges, regardless of the location of the hinges— the expected consequence of connecting multiple movable electronic panels. Moreover, the ’028 patent acknowledges in its discussion of conventional illuminators that placing hinges between panels was already known. Ex. 1001, 2:7–15. With respect to Dr. Jokerst’s opinion that the hinges would create gaps negatively affecting uniform illumination, we are persuaded that it would have been within the skill of a POSITA to locate the hinges on the inside surfaces “in a nearly flush arrangement,” such that the gaps would be minimized. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. We also credit Dr. Grove’s supplemental testimony on this issue, directly refuting Dr. Jokerst’s testimony regarding gaps and uniform illumination (and therefore within the proper scope of reply, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument otherwise (Mot. 9). See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–20 (explaining LED light divergence and that the physical space caused by hinges “is easily addressed” to maintain uniform illumination).9” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,697,028 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,697,028
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2022-00572 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under §103 because the prior-art combinations teach the limitations at issue under the Federal Circuit’s construction of “style.”

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Lemay Web discloses that the style settings of width, height, pause, and repeat for the pocket watch images can be changed by changing the values for width, height, pause, and repeat in the HTML file. Ex. 1004, 89–90. This results in changing the size, duration, and frequency of the display of the multiple pocket watch image objects without changing the image files or the Java applet. Id. That is, the 12 image objects of Lemay Web can be uniformly formatted by applying and altering the style settings of the HTML file, which is stored separately from the image objects and the Java applet. Id. at 88– 89. In our Final Written Decision, we wrote that “Lemay Web discloses that the image files that are displayed as the animation object are separate from the HTML.” Ex. 1004, 88–89.” Dec. 22. The Federal Circuit wrote that “how the Board evaluated what constitutes separateness in the prior art software is less than clear.” Opinion, 13 n.7. To be clear, the animation of Lemay Web comprises 12 different pocket watch image objects. Ex. 1004, 89. The HTML file that contains the style settings for the 12 different pocket watch image objects is stored separately from the 12 different pocket watch image objects. Id. at 88–91. The style of the 12 different pocket watch image objects can be altered by changing the values of the style settings in the separate HTML file, thus allowing the style to be uniformly applied to each of the associated 12 pocket watch image objects when the pocket watch image objects are created on the web page. Id.; see Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 28–29; Dec. 21–22. In conclusion for issue (B), we find that Lemay Web teaches applying the style located in the separate HTML file to the pocket watch image objects when creating the pocket watch image objects on the web page. Therefore, Lemay Web’s style is “defined separately from any single object” as claimed. Because Lemay Web’s style can be applied to one object and more than one object and Lemay Web’s style is defined separately from any single object, we find that the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “As directed by the Federal Circuit, we determine whether the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style,” but otherwise do not revisit our analysis of claim 1. Remand Opinion 7, 13–14. The Federal Circuit construed “style” to mean “a collection of one or more settings that is defined separately from any single object but can be associated with one or more objects,” with the understanding that “associated with one or more” means capable of being associated with both one object and more than one object. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “What you see in the bottom right is an excerpt from the Lemay Web book . . . [y]ou can still use the Java applet just by putting this applet code into your HTML file. So this shows the animator class is going to be run within height or how big a window within the browser should be allocated in this applet. You can . . . tell the animator class how long to pause in between each image. So that’s a style that’s being applied to all of the multiple images that make up this animation. Ex. 2029, 746:23–747:7. Patent Owner then asked GoDaddy’s expert “for each unique animation you want to create with this animator class that’s shown here, you’re going to have to have a unique set of HTML code with the settings along with any of the images you’ll want to associate with the animator class, right?” Ex. 2030, 793:7–11. GoDaddy’s expert testified, with reference to Exhibit 2027, 80, that “Yeah. I’m not a hundred percent sure I understand your question, but yes, if you had six animations on a page, for example, you’d have six blocks of markup that looked like the markup at the bottom right of that slide, starting with applet.” Id. at 793:12–16. In addressing Patent Owner’s question about “each unique animation,” GoDaddy’s expert provided a hypothetical example of a web page having six animations, and explained that the six animations have six blocks of markup. Ex. 2030, 793:13–16. We find that this testimony means that if a web page has six unique animations, then for each unique animation, a corresponding HTML file contains the style settings for the image objects of that animation, such that the “six animations on a page . . . have six blocks of markup.” Id. We find that the subsequent testimony of GoDaddy’s expert cited by Patent Owner is consistent with the expert’s initial testimony that Lemay Web’s style is “applied to all of the multiple images that make up this animation.” Ex. 2029, 747:5–7. We also find that the subsequent testimony is consistent with and supported by the disclosure of Lemay Web, which teaches that an animation has a set of image files and is added to a Web page using the Animator applet. Ex. 1004, 88 (“[Y]ou’ll learn just enough about Java applets to set up animation on your Web page. . . . To create animation using Java and the Animator applet, you’ll need . . . [a] set of image files . . . that make up your animation.”); see id. at 88–91. That is, Lemay Web, consistent with the testimony of GoDaddy’s expert, discloses that the style settings for the animation of the pocket watch in the HTML file are uniformly applied to the 12 pocket watch image objects. Id. at 88–91.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2022-00597 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under §103 over both listed prior art combinations; Lemay Web teaches the claimed style under the Federal Circuit’s construction.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “As directed by the Federal Circuit, we determine whether the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style,” but otherwise do not revisit our analysis of claim 1. Remand Opinion 7, 13–14. The Federal Circuit construed “style” to mean “a collection of one or more settings that is defined separately from any single object but can be associated with one or more objects,” with the understanding that “associated with one or more” means capable of being associated with both one object and more than one object. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. As discussed above, the plain meaning of an “image object” read in light of the Specification encompasses data that defines an image, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web. Ex. 1004, 89–90. Therefore, the HTML file of Lemay Web, which specifies attributes including width, height, pause value, and repeat value of the pocket watch image objects, is “capable of being applied to more than one” image object, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch image objects described by Lemay Web. Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The Board and Petitioner understood the meaning of “or” in the phrase “one or more objects” in Patent Owner’s proposed construction of style as meaning that “a style . . . can be associated with just one object.” Dec. 22; see Reply 4–5. The Federal Circuit “ultimately conclude[d] that Express Mobile’s proposed construction, with ‘or’ properly interpreted,” means “that the claimed ‘style’ must be capable of being applied to both one and more than one ‘object,’” and “remand[ed] for further proceedings in view of the correct claim construction.” Remand Opinion 13. In doing so, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]t may be that under the correct claim construction, the Board finds that Lemay Web teaches the claimed ‘style’; however, that is still an open fact question for the Board to decide in the first instance.” Id. at n.6. Given that the Federal Circuit has ordered the Board to determine whether the prior art teaches the claimed “style” under the proper construction, we find that Petitioner’s arguments on this issue are timely.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “Contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, the Specification discloses, “Data that defines text button, image, paragraph, or other parent objects . . . can be stored in two-dimensional arrays (by web page and by object number).” Ex. 1001, 22:11–13 (emphasis added). The Specification further discloses that “objects . . . include colors, fonts, images, audio clips, video clips, text areas, URLs and thread objects.” Id. at 2:16–17 (emphasis added); see id. at 8:40. We highlight that the Specification’s use of “object” is consistent with a definition of “object” in the computing art at the time of the invention, which is “(2) A passive entity that contains or receives data; for example, bytes, blocks, clocks fields, files . . . .” George McDaniel, IBM Dictionary of Computing, McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1994, p. 471 (Ex. 3001). Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168
• Cambridge Industries USA, Inc. v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00434 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because Shen and Soldano did not establish a reasonable likelihood of anticipating claims 1–7.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “When rehearing a decision on petition, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party challenging the decision has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “II. ANALYSIS In our Decision, we concluded that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of prevailing that either Shen or Soldano anticipated claims 1–7. Dec. 18, 26. Petitioner argues that we should institute review for three reasons. First, Petitioner argues that we abused our discretion by (a) “refusing” to interpret the scope of the claimed” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Owner’s interpretation of “carrier” as meaning “one or more components for supporting ROSA components such as an AWG.” Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 11). For our analysis of Petitioner’s challenges, we referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as Petitioner’s second alternative construction. Id. We also noted that Petitioner appeared to dispute Patent Owner’s interpretation when it argued that “carrier” should mean “a ceramic or silicon substrate.” Id. (quoting Pet. 10). We referred to this interpretation of “carrier” as the first alternative construction. Id. Rather than resolve this apparent dispute about the meaning of “carrier,” we found that both of Petitioner’s anticipation challenges failed under both interpretations of “carrier.” Id. at 10–26. Because we found that Petitioner had failed to carry its burden regardless of which interpretation of “carrier” applied, we found it unnecessary to resolve the dispute over that interpretation. Id. at 9–10. For the reasons expressed in Parts II.B–C below, we maintain our conclusion that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of proving that either Shen or Soldano anticipates any claim under either interpretation of “carrier.” Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in our alleged “refusal” to interpret “carrier.”” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Reh’g Req. 14. We cannot weigh Petitioner’s arguments based on its assertions about “caselaw” because Petitioner cited no cases to support its arguments. See id. Nevertheless, we infer that Petitioner intends its statements of “caselaw” to refer to the requirements to make out a case for anticipation. If so, Petitioner demonstrably miscasts what appear to be the legal principles for proving anticipation. As stated in our Decision: “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” Dec. 7. Making a showing that a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim thus necessarily requires proof that a single reference “expressly or inherently” describes every element of that claim and with all elements being arranged in the reference as they are in the” slip op. at 7

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 10,379,301
• Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,294,403
• Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,175,680
• Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution denied
  PTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,488,871
• Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00705 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 7–9 and 11 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering, chemical engineering, or a similar engineering field, with at least two years of work experience in fluid dynamics or fluid systems engineering; or (2) a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering, chemical engineering, or a similar engineering field, with at least one year of work experience in fluid dynamics or fluid systems engineering.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Although a final conclusion of obviousness must be supported by findings and analysis establishing a reason to combine or modify the known elements as proposed, the analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner “fails to explain how Zeng’s noise reduction head 20 and inner cover 30, designed for a different atomizer configuration, could be integrated into Sevy’s system without changing the principles of Sevy’s operation.” Prelim. Resp. 13–14; see also id. at 16 (arguing that “Zeng’s components are not mere drop-in replacements”). Although the relied-upon structures from Zeng are, of course, disclosed in that reference as part of another atomizer, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). “Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. As to the alleged change in the principle of operation, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why Sevy’s principle of operation would change with the proposed combination, which replaces Sevy’s alleged “silencer assembly” with similar teachings of Zeng.” slip op. at 27

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,527,094
• Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 4, and 7–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12–13; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Motivation foundInstituted

    “On the current record, this argument does not identify a deficiency in Petitioner’s position as to clauses 1C and 1D. Patent Owner implies that the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D require functionality recited elsewhere in the claim—namely, forming a “fluid dispersion” (Prelim. Resp. 4)—but Patent Owner does not adequately present evidence supporting this implied claim construction. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). Instead, Patent Owner cites to the entirety of claim 1 in support of these implied functional requirements. See Prelim. Resp. 4. Stated differently, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why any particular component (or collection of components) must perform the function of forming the “fluid dispersion” recited in clause 1G. Moreover, even assuming as correct Patent Owner’s assertion that Sevy “requires downstream separation,” Patent Owner has not explained why such a 8 In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner appears to use different terms for the same concept: “downstream separation”; “post-formation correction”; and “post-atomization correction.” See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 3 (“downstream separation”), 4 (“post-formation correction”), 5–6 (“post-atomization correction”). In any response, Patent Owner should clarify the scope of these terms. requirement would fall outside of the scope of claim 1. See Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘[A]ttorney argument is not evidence’ and cannot rebut other admitted evidence.” (quoting Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017))). On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Sevy discloses or suggests the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,583,449

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.