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  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01235 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable under either obviousness ground because Szrek did not disclose a pre-printed lottery ticket without lottery numbers associated at customer purchase.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “real party in interest. Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 32–34. In the Institution Decision, we stated: To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party of interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial. Inst. Dec. 11. In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner did not raise the issue of challenging Petitioner’s identified real party in interest. See generally PO Resp. Thus, we need not address this issue further because we find that Patent Owner has waived any challenge to Petitioner’s identification of the real parties in interest in this proceeding. See Paper 12 (Scheduling Order), 9 (“Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.”).” slip op. at 5

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13).5 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. 5 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’135 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

      “Following the block quote from Yacenda, the applicant then stated, “[b]ased on the foregoing, Yacenda’s system is directly opposite of the instant claims, as the instant claims require a ‘pre-printed lottery ticket’ which has no lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.’” Ex. 1002, 76. This statement is clear and unmistakable. It (1) specifically states that “the instant claims require” and (2) then states what the claims require—a “‘pre-printed lottery ticket’ which has no lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.” We fail to see how the applicant could have been more clear in stating a requirement of the Challenged Claims. And, by doing so, the applicant narrowed the scope of what would otherwise be encompassed in the meaning of “pre-printed lottery ticket” and therefore what would otherwise be encompassed in the scope of the Challenged Claims—a lottery ticket which has lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.” slip op. at 27

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “We do not find Mr. Hutton’s testimony particularly helpful. First, we have addressed the points raised by his testimony in our discussion above because they are largely the same as the arguments raised in Petitioner’s Reply. Second, we find his testimony entitled to very little weight because he applies an incorrect understanding of the caselaw, which mirrors Petitioner’s incorrect and arguably misleading quotations of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Quest. In particular, in paragraph 5, Mr. Hutton states the following as his understanding of the law as it applies to prosecution disclaimer: “I also understand that in order to disclaim embodiments within the specification, the statements should have some indication that the applicant intended to surrender embodiments from the specification.” Ex. 1038 ¶ 5 (emphasis added). This then leads Mr. Hutton to state: “[t]hus, in my opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not view applicant’s statements as a disclaimer, because the applicant never stated that they intended to surrender multiple embodiments described in the specification.” Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added). As we explained above in responding to a similar argument by Petitioner, the caselaw does not require an applicant to expressly state whether a disclaimer excludes particular embodiments of the subject specification when disclaiming claim scope during prosecution. See Quest, 924 F.3d at 1229. And, as noted above, counsel for Petitioner agreed that such a statement explicitly disclaiming particular embodiments is not required. Tr. 12:18–13:17. Third, although we have considered Mr. Hutton’s testimony, we find it “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of” “pre-printed lottery ticket.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. In particular, we are cognizant of the Federal Circuit’s guidance that we “should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by . . . the prosecution history.” Id. at 1318 (internal quotation omitted). In this instance, for the reasons explained above, we find that Mr. Hutton’s testimony is clearly at odds with the applicant’s arguments during prosecution and that his testimony is based on a misunderstanding of what is required by the governing caselaw for prosecution history disclaimer.” slip op. at 43

    Patent outcomesUS 9,865,135 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,865,135
  • Intel Corporation v. Besang Inc.No claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00991 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1 and 13–17 not unpatentable, finding the asserted obviousness grounds deficient in claim limitations or motivation to combine.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The parties proposed definitions differ in that Petitioner would permit a degree in “materials science” and require three years, as opposed to two years, of relevant experience. Compare Pet. 9 with PO Resp. 14. On this record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition, as it is more consistent with the prior art of record and the disclosures of the ’702 patent. We note, however, that neither party contends that the outcome of this case depends on the slight differences in the proposed definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “1996) (“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.”). Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the intrinsic record, we agree with Petitioner that the ’702 patent does not support a construction of “stackable add-on layer” that encompasses memory cells formed by sequential deposition on a substrate without being formed and then added to a separately formed substrate. Pet. 11–12. First, the plain language of the claim does not require merely a “layer” having a plurality of vertically oriented semiconductor memory cells, but rather “a stackable add-on layer” having a plurality of vertically oriented semiconductor memory cells; that plurality is bonded to the dielectric layer. Ex. 1001, 12:29–32. A construction that gives meaning to all words of the claim is preferred. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”).” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “As discussed above, we do not understand a “stackable add-on layer” to include memory cells that are formed by sequential deposition on or above a substrate without being added to a separately formed substrate. It is undisputed, and indeed it is Petitioner’s assertion, that Lee’s memory devices are formed by sequential deposition. Pet. 16, 29 n.11, 51 (“In Lee, each level 3104 is deposited on the underlying level of array 3101.”). Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that Lee discloses every limitation of independent claim 13 under our claim construction. Thus, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 13 would have been obvious in view of Lee. 3. Analysis: Claims 14–17 Claims 14–17 each depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 13. Petitioner’s arguments with respect to these claims do not remedy the deficiencies noted above with respect to claim 13. Pet. 31–41. Accordingly, Petitioner does not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 14–17 would have been obvious over Lee.” slip op. at 19

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Aspar would improve Lee, would solve a problem in Lee, and that Petitioner is proposing to use Aspar in a way that is not disclosed in the reference. PO Resp. 49–50 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 153–162); Tr. 57:24–58:12; Pet. 61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (asking whether a technique “would improve similar devices in the same way”), 420 (asking whether there was a known problem in the art), 421 (asking whether one of ordinary skill in the art had reason to “pursue the known options”); Intel, 61 F.4th at 1381 (explaining that obviousness may be demonstrated by showing that there was a known problem in the art (“cache coherency in multiprocessor systems”) and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that that the prior art solution to this problem (“global segmented secondary cache”) would improve the system of another prior art reference). Petitioner does not persuasively show that there was any known problem in the art with respect to Lee or its monolithic method of constructing memory arrays. Nor does Petitioner provide persuasive argument or evidence that Aspar’s wafer bonding would improve Lee’s memory device.10 For example, Petitioner states in a conclusory fashion that Aspar would address the known problem of “fabricating 3D structures,” but does not explain what those problems were or why Lee fails to solve them. Pet. 61. Dr. Sechen’s testimony merely parrots the Petition, providing no further analysis or explanation of what problem might exist in Lee when fabricating its 3D structures. Ex. 1003 ¶ 212. The Petition notes that Aspar transfers “thin layers of very good thickness homogeneity and with a high crystalline quality,” but the Petition never asserts that Lee’s direct deposition method fails to provide these same or similar qualities. Pet. 60–61.” slip op. at 27

    Patent outcomesUS 7,378,702 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,378,702
  • Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCNo claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Feb 22, 2024 · IPR2020-00558 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand

    The majority determined claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable over Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst; the dissent would have found them obvious.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “We determine Patent Owner’s reading of the claim limitation is the better one. The limitation begins with the verb “locating,” and it therefore makes sense that the clause would recite what is located (i.e., encryption information) and where it is located (i.e., within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video). In other words, it is reasonable that the second and third clauses of the limitation both modify the first clause (for example, as could perhaps be expressed through the use of commas as “locating encryption information, that identifies encrypted portions of frames of video, within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video”).10 On the other hand, Petitioner’s reading of the limitation, 10 In general, we recognize that the use of commas to set off phrases in claim drafting is not consistent. We included commas above to illustrate Patent Owner’s understanding of the claim limitation. allowing only the second clause to modify the first, while not unreasonable, makes less sense. That is, the encrypted information identifies the encrypted portions of frames, which in turn are within the requested portions of the selected stream of protected video. Reading the claim in its entirety, the encrypted portions of frames would be understood to be located within the requested portions of the stream; it does not seem necessary for the claim to expressly recite that aspect. For example, the very next limitation— limitation [m] of claim 1—refers to “each encrypted portion of the frames of video” but does not expressly recite “within the requested portions of the selected stream.” Ex. 1001, 27:58–60. Thus, when limitation [l] recites “within the requested portions of the selected stream,” it seems more likely that the clause refers to where that encrypted information is located rather than simply to indicate the obvious location of the encrypted portion of the frames of video. We therefore view Patent Owner’s reading of the claim language as the better one.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundMixed

      “I am persuaded that the Petition demonstrates that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to combine Chen, Lindahl, and Hurst, as asserted by Petitioner. As the Federal Circuit found, the Petition pointed to and relied upon the portions in Chen describing pre-Chen art, without scalability or FEC features that were part of what Chen describes as aspects of its own inventive system. Netflix, slip op. at 9–10 (citing Pet. 17– 19, 69–70). I agree with Petitioner that “Chen-924 teaches several embodiments that adaptively stream alternative representations of a video using partially encrypted container files.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1010, 14:41– 15:60). I determine that Chen-924 provides support for the rationale provided in the Petition, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Chen and Lindahl in view of the disclosure of Chen-924. As discussed above, the Petition does not rely solely on privacy concerns and improvements to efficiency as its motivation to combine the references. See Pet. 18–19 (specifying piracy concerns, improvements to the efficiency of adaptive streaming, optimization of the balance between bitrate and bandwidth, and improvements to the end-user experience with fast startup and seek). With respect to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have” slip op. at 52

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

      “I agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, specifically pages 1–7, attempt to address aspects of claim 1 for the first time on remand. I also agree that Patent Owner’s arguments attempt to recharacterize limitations [j] and [k] to raise issues that Patent Owner did not raise previously, in contravention of our Order that issues raised needed support from “where those issues were raised in previous briefings by the parties.” Paper 56, 2. I have addressed whether scalability and FEC are integral to how Chen operates above, as well as whether the Petition relies on those aspects, supra. The questions about how Chen operates and what portions of Chen are asserted in the ground of unpatentability were previously raised, but now are being considered or reconsidered, based on the Federal Circuit’s decision. In Patent Owner’s Remand Brief, pages 1–7, the citations to argument previously raised do not support the arguments now presented by Patent Owner on remand. As such, I determine Patent Owner’s new arguments fall outside the scope of remand, and I dismiss these arguments seeking to distinguish limitations [j] and [k] from the cited prior art combination.24” slip op. at 62

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMixed

      “7 Patent Owner’s Brief on Remand recognizes that there are two arguments Patent Owner raised in its Patent Owner Response that were not addressed in the Final Written Decision. See PO Remand Br. 1 (citing PO Resp. 24–37 (the construction of “locating encrypted information . . . within requested portions”), 38–58 (referring to Patent Owner’s “common keys” argument)). 8 The Final Decision also addressed Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 42). See Final Dec. 28–37 (granting-in-part, denying-in-part, and dismissing-in-part Petitioner’s Motion). Our determinations on that Motion were part of Petitioner’s appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Paper 52. Because the Federal Circuit did not address this aspect of the Final Written Decision and the Federal Circuit’s decision does not impact our previous rulings on the Motion, we maintain those rulings here. Additionally, on remand, Petitioner requested authorization to file a motion for sanctions, which we held in abeyance until the parties’ briefing on remand was complete. See Ex. 3003, 1. Petitioner requests sanctions because of the impropriety of Patent Owner’s remand brief, including new claim construction arguments for limitations [1j] and [1k], and prejudice to Petitioner. Id. at 3, 5. Although we reserved further consideration of Petitioner’s request, we expanded both the time and pages allowed for Petitioner’s responsive brief, and also allowed Petitioner to address any related issues in its responsive brief. Id. at 1. Having considered the parties’ briefing on remand, and given that we do not reach the claim construction arguments that Petitioner objected to in its request for authorization to file a motion for sanctions, we deny Petitioner’s request.” slip op. at 5

    Patent outcomesUS 10,225,588 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,225,588
  • PTAB · Dec 12, 2022 · IPR2021-00862 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish the proposed prior-art combinations and the required motivation to combine with a reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “The parties present compelling argument and evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would include those with experience in ophthalmology, as well as in the research, manufacture, and design of medical optics or medical lasers. Pet. 25; PO Resp. 9–10. The evidence of record also demonstrates that few individuals actually had such comprehensive experience. Rather, teams of individuals with different expertise and various academic degrees (Ph.D.s, B.S.s, and M.D.s) would work together to design laser surgery systems intended to make incisions in the lens of the eye. See, e.g., Ex. 1041 (several authors are M.D.s); Ex. 1042 (the authors’ degrees include Ph.D.s, an M.D., and a B.S.); see also Ex. 1053; Ex. 1054; Ex. 1055; Ex. 2010; Ex. 2019. Thus, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been either an ophthalmic surgeon or someone with a Ph.D., M.S., or B.S. degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as nuclear engineering, having experience in researching, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., five years of experience for a Ph.D. or more to compensate for lesser degrees), and that such persons would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or physiology and the medical doctor would consult the engineer on technical issues). This definition marries the two proposed by the parties.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner does not assert that any claim term requires express construction. See Pet. 6 (stating that it “reserves the right to respond to any constructions that [Patent Owner] submits”). Patent Owner does not present any remarks regarding claim construction. See generally PO Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction because it is not essential to our conclusions on patentability. See Nidec Motor., 868 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “summarized above, we find that the evidence of record does not support a conclusion that it would have been simple, straightforward, or otherwise routine to convert Swinger’s manual HeNe aiming system and Swinger’s surgeon-identification-of-target-tissue step to a computer-controlled, OCT-guided laser system. Even assuming that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Swinger and Baikoff to achieve a laser surgical system incorporating an OCT imaging system, that combination still would not have achieved the required “computer system” of the claims and all of its programmed surgical functionality, particularly, using a computer system to construct an anterior capsulotomy cutting region based on the image data. Petitioner relies on the ability of a person of ordinary skill in the art to configure Swinger’s computer control unit with the missing functionality, thus necessitating an electronic conversion of the steps performed using Swinger’s direct visualization method using a HeNe aiming beam to manually identify a surgical treatment region for laser surgery. Ex. 1039, 34:52–57; Ex. 2088 ¶¶ 55–59, 66. That conversion, however, involves the incorporation of OCT imaging technology as the basis for a computer-controlled system to plan and then implement the planned cataract surgery, two technological leaps that the record fails to show were known or suggested. In particular, the evidence of record does not support a conclusion that OCT was a well-known system used routinely, if at all, in the identification of treatment regions in the lens or lens capsule for cataract surgery, and further does not support a conclusion that a computer-controlled system to plan and to implement a planned cataract surgery in the lens was commonplace or even considered before the invention.” slip op. at 25

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “The evidence of record demonstrates, however, that modifying an existing corneal surgery system to image and perform surgery on the lens was not the simple task asserted by Petitioner. For example, in a patent application filed in November 2009, Petitioner asserted that due to the different depth ranges for the laser’s focus, “laser systems designed for corneal procedures do not offer solution[s] for the considerable challenges of performing surgery on the lens of the eye.” Ex. 2007, 4:65–67, 5:30–36, code (22). Similarly, in a different patent filed in December 2008, Petitioner outlined the various challenges in developing laser surgery systems for creating incisions in the lens, including the difficulty in focusing a laser beam that propagates through regions of the eye with different optical properties and different curvatures. Ex. 2014, 15:51–16:18, code (22). This patent then states: Because of all the described hard challenges, corneal surgical laser systems are qualitatively simpler than lens surgical lasers. This is well supported by the fact that even though corneal surgical systems were suggested about 40 years ago, none have been adapted successfully for lens surgery to date. Id. at 16:13–18. During prosecution of another patent filed in 2008, and in responses to office actions filed in 2012 and 2013, Petitioner argued that a corneal OCT system “simply will not work” on the lens and that it would not have been obvious to modify such an OCT system to image the lens. Ex. 2015, 898, 1591, 1788. This was because OCT systems designed to image the lens would be required to deliver and scan an imaging beam “to a depth ten times bigger and a depth range ten times bigger” than an OCT system designed to image the cornea. Id. at 1591. According to Petitioner, “it is not obvious” to modify an OCT imaging system to achieve a depth and scanning range that is ten times larger than that disclosed in the art. Id. at 898 (“Increasing a system’s performance by an order of magnitude cannot be regarded as obvious.”), 1590–1591. Petitioner’s arguments presented in its own patents and during their” slip op. at 39

    Patent outcomesUS 8,709,001 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,709,001
  • PTAB · Dec 2, 2022 · IPR2021-00853 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 12, and 13 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted combinations lacked a persuasive basis for achieving the claimed system with a reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’725 patent; however, we also agree with Patent Owner that such a definition should be flexible enough to include a person with a lesser academic degree and having experience working in the field, such as an engineer with clinical experience in ophthalmic surgery, as well as also including a medical doctor, such as an ophthalmic surgeon with experience working with medical optics and lasers, and that these people may collaborate. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Such an expanded definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art, including aspects of both parties’ definitions, is appropriate here, based on our review of the record. Thus, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with a PhD, MS, or BS degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as nuclear engineering, having more or less experience in research, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., 5 years for a PhD or more to compensate for lesser degrees), or an ophthalmic surgeon, but that such persons would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or physiology and the medical doctor would consult the engineer on technical issues). This definition marries the two proposed by the parties and is appropriate in view of the record.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not ask that this claim language be expressly construed or contest Petitioner’s proposed interpretation. See Resp. 11–15. Although it is not necessary for our final decision in this proceeding to construe this claim language because it is not essential to our conclusions on patentability, as it is uncontested, we adopt as our own Petitioner’s proposed construction of “imaging device configured to acquire point by point image data from locations distributed throughout a volume of a crystalline lens.”” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “Turning to the disputed term “automatically” in this context, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain meaning of the term “automatically” is that the “control system” can, on its own and without human intervention, perform the subsequently recited step. Resp. 11–15; see also Pet. 10 (Petitioner agreeing this is the plain meaning). This is supported by the Specification, which states, inter alia, that “the entire system is controlled by the controller CPU” and describes alternative embodiments where (1) the system is fully in control and where (2) user input identifies targets. Ex. 1027, 12:23–25, 13:25–44, Figs. 14, 15. However, we also agree with Petitioner that just because the claimed “control system” is configured/programmed to perform (i.e., capable of performing) some tasks “automatically” (i.e., entirely on its own), this does not mean user input (e.g., from a surgeon) must be altogether excluded. Pet. 10–11. In fact, user input must be possible and is within the scope of the independent claim. “By definition, an independent claim is broader than a claim that depends from it, so if a dependent claim reads on a particular embodiment of the claimed invention, the corresponding independent claim must cover that embodiment as well.” Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Here claim 2, requiring automatic target identification, and claim 5, requiring user input on target identification, each depends from claim 1 and illuminates its scope, which must be broad enough to encompass both. Thus, although requiring (in claim 1) that a “control system” can perform certain recited functions, and that some are performed (according to claim 2) “automatically,” that same “control system” must also be capable of allowing a user input on the locations of targets for laser treatment (according to claim 5). Such optional user input required by dependent claim 5 is described in the Specification, which includes embodiments where a surgeon can adjust the size, location, and shape of the treatment pattern, can determine the optimal cutting contours in patients, and can provide “user input” to define targets or adjust computer-defined parameters as necessary. Ex. 1027, 10:55–45; 10:67–11:2, 13:25–55, 13:63–14:2. Regardless, the configuration of independent claim 1’s “control system,” which must be programmed to and capable of performing its own recited steps/functions, is not diminished by the requirements of either dependent claim. Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corporation, 831 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he language of a dependent claim cannot change the scope of an independent claim whose meaning is clear on its face.”).” slip op. at 22

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “generally. “The presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of success is . . . a question of fact,” and this “requirement refers to the likelihood of success in combining references to meet the limitations of the claimed invention.” Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1366–67. Based on the record, we conclude that, even if it would have been potentially advantageous to in some way incorporate the use of Baikoff’s and Li’s OCT imaging and measuring into Swinger’s system and method for cataract surgery (for example, to replace the use of ultrasound imaging with OCT), we agree with Patent Owner that, other than the (ultimately) conclusory testimony of its witness Dr. Izatt (see, e.g., Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 110, 144, 151, 161, 163–165, 168), there is no persuasive evidence that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references with the result being a control system configured to (automatically or not in practice) image cataractous eye tissue, identify the targets therein (capsule and lens) to be cut with a laser, and then operate that laser to actually make those cuts based in some part on that imaging. See Resp. 15–34. We credit Dr. Kang’s testimony that, as of the invention, the person of ordinary skill in the art would not have relieved the surgeon of responsibility for identifying cutting regions for laser capsulotomy and cataract surgery (as taught by Swinger), and relegated such task to a computer, which subsequently performs the procedure. Ex. 2087 ¶¶ 36–38, 42, 46, 62–66; see also Ex. 2088 ¶¶ 56–59, 68–71 (Dr. Walter testifying similarly). Dr. Kang takes issue with Petitioner’s positions that Baikoff and Li teach or suggest such reliance on a computer because, according to Dr. Kang, neither Baikoff nor Li (and indisputably not Swinger) teaches using a computer to identify laser cutting regions or to control laser surgery, and, in fact, they suggest reliance on a surgeon to interpret their OCT images to plan a subsequent surgery. See, e.g., Ex. 2087 ¶¶ 36–38, 42, 46, 62–66. We further credit Dr. Kang’s testimony that Petitioner fails to adequately explain, even were the ordinarily skilled artisan intent on combining Baikoff’s and Li’s OCT imaging systems with Swinger’s cataract surgery system, how it would have been accomplished to overcome the “substantial challenges” and achieve the claimed invention. See id. ¶¶ 63– 66; see also Resp. 27–28 (addressing Petitioner’s lack of explanation as to how to implement the combination).19 We agree that, beyond merely suggesting plugging one system into another, Petitioner does not explain how the person of ordinary skill in the art would have programmed Swinger’s computer control system to use Baikoff’s and Li’s OCT imaging systems and tissue recognition and measurement algorithms to determine capsulotomy cutting regions and then implement the planned cutting with a laser, even from a rudimentary perspective. See Pet. 35–40. Indeed, Petitioner concedes:” slip op. at 50

    Patent outcomesUS 9,125,725 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,125,725
  • PTAB · Nov 14, 2022 · IPR2021-00841 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–15 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations failed to establish obviousness, including a reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’648 patent; however, we also agree with Patent Owner that such a definition should be flexible enough to include a person with a lesser academic degree and having experience working in the field, such as an engineer with clinical experience in ophthalmic surgery, as well as also including a medical doctor, such as an ophthalmic surgeon with experience working with medical optics and lasers, and that these people may collaborate. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Such an expanded definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art, including aspects of both parties’ definitions, is appropriate here, based on our review of the record. Thus, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with a PhD, MS, or BS degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as nuclear engineering, having more or less experience in research, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., 5 years for a PhD or more to compensate for lesser degrees), or an ophthalmic surgeon, but that such persons would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or physiology and the medical doctor would consult the engineer on technical issues). This definition marries the two proposed by the parties and is appropriate in view of the record. B.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner asserts that, although dependent claim 12 is indefinite, its language, “to determine one or more axial locations of the anterior capsule of the lens; and or more anterior capsule axial locations,” (emphasis added) should be construed to mean “to determine one or more axial locations of the anterior capsule of the lens (i.e., one or more anterior capsule axial locations).” Pet. 7–8; see also Ex. 1030, 18:46–50 (claim 12). Petitioner’s position is that, as it reads in the ’648 patent, claim 12’s language is “a nonsense phrase,” rendering it indefinite, but that for the purposes of this proceeding it may be understood by the definition set forth above. Pet. 7–8.” slip op. at 19

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “is . . . a question of fact,” and this “requirement refers to the likelihood of success in combining references to meet the limitations of the claimed invention.” Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1366–67. Based on the record, we conclude that, even if it would have been potentially advantageous to in some way incorporate the use of Baikoff’s and Li’s OCT imaging and measuring into Swinger’s system and method for cataract surgery (for example, to replace the use of ultrasound imaging with OCT), we agree with Patent Owner that, other than the (ultimately) conclusory testimony of its witness Dr. Izatt (see, e.g., Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 132, 135, 145, 149, 152–159, 459– 462), there is no persuasive evidence that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined these references with the result being a control system configured to (automatically or not) image cataractous eye tissue, identify the regions thereof (capsule and lens) to be cut with a laser, and then operate that laser to actually make those cuts based is some part on that imaging. See Resp. 17–28. We credit Dr. Kang’s testimony that, as of the invention, the person of ordinary skill in the art would not have relieved the surgeon of responsibility for identifying cutting regions for laser capsulotomy and cataract surgery (as taught by Swinger), and relegated such task to a computer, which subsequently performs the procedure. Ex. 2087 ¶¶ 61–65. Dr. Kang takes issue with Petitioner’s positions that Baikoff and Li teach or suggest such reliance on a computer because, according to Dr. Kang, neither Baikoff nor Li (and indisputably not Swinger) teaches using a computer to identify laser cutting regions or to control laser surgery, and, in fact, they suggest reliance on a surgeon to interpret their OCT images to plan a subsequent surgery. Id.” slip op. at 45

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We find Petitioner’s case unpersuasive based on Patent Owner’s arguments and the evidence of record. We find that the evidence of record does not support that Swinger, Baikoff, and Li would have been combined by the person of ordinary skill in the art to achieve the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success. Specifically, we find that the claimed elements of the invention directed to a control system configured to (1) operate an imaging device to generate image data of a patient’s lens, (2) process that image data to determine an anterior capsule incision scanning pattern, and (3) operate a laser to scan in the scanning pattern and perform an anterior capsule incision as determined in part by the control system based on the image data, are not taught by the cited prior art and would not have been obvious. Ex. 1030, 17:30–51 (claim 1). We address Patent Owner’s respective arguments and our analysis below. “The presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of success is . . . a question of fact.” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “The reasonable expectation of success requirement refers to the likelihood of success in combining references to meet the limitations of the claimed invention.” Id. at 1367. The evidence of record suggests that the ordinarily skilled artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention based on Swinger’s, Baikoff’s, and Li’s teachings. Further, as our reviewing court has explained, “references to ‘common sense’—” or an ordinarily skilled artisan’s ordinary creativity, “whether to supply a motivation to combine or a missing limitation—cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support, especially when dealing with a limitation missing from the prior art references specified.” DSS Tech. Mgm’t, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 855 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Perfect Web Techs. Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Although here Petitioner has not wholly omitted any reasoned analysis or evidence regarding the claimed computer control system programmed to automatically plan a cutting region based on image data and then perform that planned laser-cutting of the lens capsule (and, for some claims, also the lens), this subject matter is not disclosed in any cited art and we find Petitioner’s evidence and reasoning as to why it would have been obvious without such disclosure to be largely conclusory and unpersuasive.” slip op. at 40

    Patent outcomesUS 9,474,648 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,474,648
  • PTAB · Nov 7, 2022 · IPR2021-00839 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–20 were not determined unpatentable because the cited combinations did not establish the claimed image guided, computer planned cataract surgery.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “The parties present compelling argument and evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would include those with experience in ophthalmology, as well as in the research, manufacture, and design of medical optics or medical lasers. Pet. 24; PO Resp. 10–11. The evidence of record also demonstrates that few individuals actually had such comprehensive experience. Rather, teams of individuals with different expertise and various academic degrees (Ph.D.s, B.S.s, and M.D.s) would work together to design laser surgery systems intended to make incisions in the lens of the eye. See, e.g., Ex. 1041 (several authors are M.D.s); Ex. 1042 (the authors’ degrees include Ph.D.s, an M.D., and a B.S.); see also Ex. 1053; Ex. 1054; Ex. 1055; Ex. 2010; Ex. 2019. Thus, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been either an ophthalmic surgeon or someone with a Ph.D., M.S., or B.S. degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as nuclear engineering, having experience in researching, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., five years of experience for a Ph.D. or more to compensate for lesser degrees), and that such persons would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or physiology and the medical doctor would consult the engineer on technical issues). This definition marries the two proposed by the parties.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Furthermore, we need only construe the claims to the extent necessary resolve the dispute between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Petitioner does not assert that any claim term requires express construction. See Pet. 7 (stating that it “reserves the right to respond to any constructions that [Patent Owner] submits”). Patent Owner does not present any remarks regarding claim construction. See generally PO Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor., 868 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our” slip op. at 12

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “We have considered Petitioner’s assertions and evidence, summarized above, and agree with Patent Owner that the combination of Swinger, Baikoff, and Li fails to disclose or render obvious a control system configured to generate an anterior capsulotomy scanning pattern based on image data. PO Resp. 18–23. Petitioner relies on Li for this limitation, however, while Li discloses the use of OCT imaging to measure certain dimensions of the anterior chamber of the eye, Li suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art manually use the measurement data collected by the system. (Ex. 1044, 1; Ex. 2087 ¶¶ 44–46). More specifically, as summarized by Patent Owner: Li does not suggest configuring the control system to do anything at all with the measurements that it makes, much less determine an anterior capsulotomy scanning pattern. Kang [Ex. 2087] ¶¶ 80, 128. To the contrary, Li’s suggestion of using measurements to “improve the fitting of AC-IOL” teaches a [skilled artisan] to manually use the measurement data. Id. Dr. Izatt testified that “in Li, the controller, so to speak, is a human.” Ex. 2057, 207:17–208:7; see also id., 207:20–21 (in Li, “the one who identifies the treatment region is the surgeon”). PO Resp. 19–20 (emphasis removed, alteration in original). That is, Li discloses a system capable of identifying boundaries of certain eye tissue structures, but fails to disclose a controller configured to determine an anterior capsulotomy scanning pattern. Id. at 17 (“Li teaches using its OCT images as a diagnostic tool.”). Thus, while Li discloses the use of OCT to identifying certain boundaries of tissue structures, Li does not disclose any controller configured to process image data for the purposes of determining a scanning pattern for scanning a focal zone of the laser beam for performing anterior capsulotomy as required by the claims.” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “The problem with Petitioner’s argument based on Leapfrog and the like is that Petitioner’s obviousness challenge does not simply require automating a manual step using commonplace modern electronics, but requires the conversion of one cataract surgery treatment region identification system into another. That conversion involves the incorporation of OCT imaging technology as the basis for a computer-controlled system to plan and implement eye surgery, two technological leaps that the record fails to show was known or suggested. In particular, the evidence of record does not support a conclusion that OCT was a well-known system used routinely, if at all, in the identification of treatment regions in the lens or lens capsule for cataract surgery, and further does not support a conclusion that a computer-controlled system to plan and implement cataract surgery in the lens was commonplace. We recognize that Petitioner directs us to the testimony of Dr. Izatt who opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to, for example, use a controller to determine the claimed scanning pattern. Pet. 32–33; Reply 3–5; see also Ex. 1123 ¶ 31 (“Once the anterior capsule is identified, it is a relatively simple process to determine the location to place the capsulotomy.”). Here, however, we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition and supporting testimony fails to provide the requisite reasoned analysis with sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s position on obviousness. In particular, absent some evidentiary support beyond Dr. Izatt’s and Dr. Tipperman’s opinions that it would have been obvious to program a controller to bridge the gap between the functionality disclosed in Swinger and the required functionality of the challenged claims, we are unwilling to accept this line of reasoning. PO Resp. 27; Sur-Reply 4–7; see also DSS Tech. Mgmt., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 885 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (A skilled artisan’s “common sense” or “common knowledge” can potentially “fill in a missing limitation only when ‘the limitation in question was unusually simple and the technology particularly straightforward.’” (emphasis omitted)).” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 9,101,448 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,101,448
  • PTAB · Oct 27, 2022 · IPR2021-00840 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claims 1, 2, 8–16, and 22–35 not unpatentable because the proposed combinations failed to establish the claimed control system and reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

      “art appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’732 patent; however, we also agree with Patent Owner that such a definition should be flexible enough to include a person with a lesser academic degree and having experience working in the field, such as an engineer with clinical experience in ophthalmic surgery, as well as also including a medical doctor, such as an ophthalmic surgeon with experience working with medical optics and lasers, and that these people may collaborate. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Such an expanded definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art, including aspects of both parties’ definitions, is appropriate here, based on our review of the record. Thus, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with a PhD, MS, or BS degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as nuclear engineering, having more or less experience in research, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., 5 years for a PhD or more to compensate for lesser degrees), or an ophthalmic surgeon, but that such persons would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or physiology and the medical doctor would consult the engineer on technical issues). This definition marries the two proposed by the parties and is appropriate in view of the record.” slip op. at 18

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party seeks an express interpretation of any claim language. Pet. 7–8; see generally Resp. Therefore, we need not and do not expressly construe any claim language here. However, in our analysis below, as required for the sake of clarity, to resolve ambiguity, and for consistency with our decisions in the related proceedings addressing similar claim language and similar prior art, we address the claim language and its meaning as argued by the parties. We do so in accordance with the above-noted standards of law. C. slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “The presence or absence of a reasonable expectation of success is . . . a question of fact.” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “The reasonable expectation of success requirement refers to the likelihood of success in combining references to meet the limitations of the claimed invention.” Id. at 1367. The evidence of record suggests that the ordinarily skilled artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed invention based solely on Swinger’s, Baikoff’s, and Li’s teachings. Further, as our reviewing court has explained, “references to ‘common sense’—” or an ordinarily skilled artisan’s ordinary creativity, “whether to supply a motivation to combine or a missing limitation—cannot be used as a wholesale substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support, especially when dealing with a limitation missing from the prior art references specified.” DSS Tech. Mgm’t, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 855 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Perfect Web Techs. Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Although here Petitioner has not wholly omitted any reasoned analysis or evidence regarding the claimed computer control system programmed to automatically plan a cutting region based on image data and then perform that planned laser-cutting of the lens capsule (and, for some claims, also the lens), this subject matter is not disclosed in any cited art and we find Petitioner’s evidence and reasoning as to why it would have been obvious without such disclosure to be largely conclusory and unpersuasive. slip op. at 44

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “Inter partes review must proceed in accordance with the Petition and the arguments set forth therein. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018). “It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the ground for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369. Arguments made in a different document, such as an expert’s declaration, may not be merely incorporated-by-reference in the Petition (Petitioner does not even do so much). 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3); see also General Access Solutions, Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 811 F. App’x 654, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (noting that the Board did not abuse its discretion in enforcing its rules under 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3)) (non-precedential).” slip op. at 58

    Patent outcomesUS 9,107,732 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,107,732
  • PTAB · Oct 26, 2022 · IPR2021-00835 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted obviousness combinations did not establish the claimed image-processing control system or a sufficient basis to adapt the cited systems for lens surgery.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “The parties present compelling evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would include those with experience in ophthalmology, as well as in the research, manufacture, and design of medical optics or medical lasers. Pet. 24; PO Resp. 10–11. The evidence of record also demonstrates that few individuals actually had such comprehensive experience. Rather, teams of individuals with different expertise and various academic degrees (Ph.D.s, B.S.s, and M.D.s) would work together to design laser surgery systems intended to make incisions in the lens of the eye. See, e.g., Ex. 1041 (several authors are MDs); Ex. 1042 (the authors’ degrees include Ph.D.s, an M.D., and a B.S.); see also Ex. 1053; Ex. 1054; Ex. 1055; Ex. 2010; Ex. 2019. Thus, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been either an ophthalmic surgeon or someone with a Ph.D., M.S., or B.S. degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as nuclear engineering, having experience in researching, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., 5 years of experience for a Ph.D. or more to compensate for lesser degrees), and that such persons would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or physiology and the medical doctor would consult the engineer on technical issues). This definition marries the two proposed by the parties.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner does not assert that any claim term requires express construction. See Pet. 7 (stating that it “reserves the right to respond to any constructions that [Patent Owner] submits”). Patent Owner does not present any remarks regarding claim construction. See, generally, PO Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We recognize Petitioner’s argument that the use of a controller for determining an anterior capsulotomy scanning pattern would have been “nothing more than automating a manual activity using well-known components (e.g., controllers and algorithms) in predictable ways, which would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art]” because a controller would be programmed to determine automatically scanning patterns once the boundaries of the ocular tissue are identified. Pet 32 (citing Ex.1001 ¶ 181; MPEP 2144.04; In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95 (CCPA 1958)); Reply 5–6. We also recognize Petitioner’s argument that “[t]he prior art teaches that integrating diagnostic imaging and treatment functionalities in a single automated system is not only desirable, but also straightforward.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1001 ¶ 150); see also Reply 7–8 (quoting Venner, 262 F.2d at 95 (“[I]t is well settled that it is not ‘invention’ to broadly provide a mechanical or automatic means to replace manual activity which has accomplished the same result”); citing Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (updating mechanical invention with modern electronics is understood in the art)). Having considered the parties positions and evidence of record, however, we find that the evidence of record does not support a conclusion that it would have been simple, straightforward, or otherwise routine to convert Swinger’s manual HeNe aiming system and Swinger’s surgeon-identification-of-target-tissue step to an automated, OCT-guided laser system. We provide further analysis below.” slip op. at 28

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

      “Inter partes review must proceed in accordance with the Petition and the arguments set forth therein. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018). “It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the ground for the challenge to each claim.’” Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Arguments made in a different document, such as an expert’s declaration, may not be incorporated-by-reference in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3); see also General Access Solutions, Ltd. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 811 F. App’x 654, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (noting that the Board did not abuse its discretion in enforcing its rules under 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3)) (non-precedential).” slip op. at 40

    Patent outcomesUS 9,095,415 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,095,415

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.