- Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00745 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 45–47, 51, 59, 60, 68, and 69 are unpatentable; claims 56 and 57 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 85–88 and 91 are unpatentable; amendment is granted for claims 92 and 93.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for the person of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt “at least,” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of 3 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness. skill reflected in the specification of the ’474 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that “no formal constructions are presently necessary,” and that it “maps [the] prior art in this Petition in a manner consistent with Patent Owner’s allegations of infringement before the district court.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1017; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21–25). Patent Owner states that it believes there is no need to construe any terms of the challenged original claims because there is no underlying controversy regarding any claim terms. PO Resp. 10. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express construction of any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“3. Motivation to Combine Buibas and Sinyavskiy Petitioner argues that “it would have been obvious to partition Buibas’[s] spiking networks according to the specific techniques disclosed in Sinyavskiy” for multiple reasons. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 71–72, 85, 92, 179–203; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 12, 185, 188, 191, Fig. 6A; Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). First, Petitioner asserts, one of ordinary skill “would have been motivated to partition Buibas’[s] spiking neural network as suggested by Sinyavskiy to parallelize task execution on the robot and improve learning capabilities (e.g., through faster learning, greater computing efficiency, and task-specific learning models) of the Buibas mobile robotic apparatus as described by Sinyavskiy and discussed by Dr. Janet.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). Second, Petitioner contends, “partitioning Buibas’[s] robotic brain as suggested by Sinyavskiy would have beneficially expanded the range of tasks that the robot could perform by dedicating partitions to specialized tasks.” Id. at 13– 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 12, 185, 188, Fig. 6A; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 71–72, 85, 92, 179–205; Ex. 1003 ¶ 65). Third, Petitioner argues, one of ordinary skill “would have been motivated to partition Buibas’[s] spiking neural network as suggested by Sinyavskiy to permit unused partitions or unused resources in the partitions to be reassigned for different tasks,” which would allow for a network processing apparatus that has increased processing capability for the same network capacity while also having a lower cost, size and power consumption. Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 190–192, 105, 34, code (57); Ex. 1003 ¶ 66). Fourth, Petitioner argues that “Buibas briefly mentions that its spiking neural networks can be partitioned but discloses little detail about the partitioning,” which would invite one of ordinary skill to turn to other references, such as Sinyavskiy, for additional detail on how to implement partitioning. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 67). Fifth, Petitioner asserts, combining Buibas and Sinyavskiy would merely “involve[] the application of known techniques (e.g., Sinyavskiy’s partitioned neural network) to a known system (e.g., Buibas’[s] mobile robot and robotic brain) to yield predictable results (e.g., Buibas’[s] robot using a spiking neural network partitioned as taught in Sinyavskiy),” particularly because “the partitioning of the Buibas neural network is reminiscent of Recurrent Fuzzy Neural Networks (RFNNs) that were already commonplace at the end of the 1990’s.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 68). Finally, Petitioner contends, the proposed combination merely involves “use of known techniques (e.g., Sinyavskiy’s partitioned neural network) to improve a similar system (e.g., Buibas’[s] mobile robot and robotic brain).” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 69). Petitioner further argues that one of ordinary skill “would have reasonably expected success implementing the combination, especially as Buibas and Sinyavskiy describe highly similar systems involving spiking neural networks used for training/operating robots.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70). Indeed, Petitioner contends, “Buibas itself confirms that its spiking neural network can be partitioned, while Sinyavskiy provides the details for doing so.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 92; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We agree with Patent Owner and Dr. Saber that these “weights” are numerical values associated with connections among neurons, and the “weight vectors” are merely lists of weights. PO Resp. 13–14; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 66–67. When input is provided to the neural network, the network uses the weights of its connections in a feedforward calculation manner to provide an output that can include an instruction for operating a device. Ex. 2001 ¶ 66. We agree with and find credible Dr. Saber’s testimony that Buibas’s merging of weights or weight vectors results in updated network weights, and does not, by itself, disclose the merging of instruction sets for operating a device, or the correlation of the same set of inputs for all or a portion of a circumstance representation with instruction sets for operating two different devices. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 65, 67, 69–71.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 11,663,474 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,663,474 - Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01469 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not determined unpatentable under the asserted prior-art grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelOther
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the ’336 patent’s effective filing date would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optics, or physics with at least three years of experience working in the design of LED lights or lighting fixtures; a master’s degree in one of the above disciplines with at least two years of experience; or equivalent experience.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–29). Dr. Eden’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertion. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–28. Patent Owner “adopts for purposes of this proceeding only” Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Resp. 10 (citing Pet. 14). We adopt Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’336 patent as” slip op. at 40
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Alleged Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness (i) General Principles Before reaching a conclusion about obviousness, we consider evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1048. For such evidence to have substantial weight, “its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Roku, Inc., 140 F.4th 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (noting that the Board did not err by requiring “a nexus to the challenged claims as opposed to the patent as a whole”). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). The patentee “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Whether a rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “turns on the nature of the claims and the specific facts.” Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 8 F.4th 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The presumption analysis should consider the unclaimed features in the product tied to the objective evidence to assess their significance and impact on the correspondence between the patented invention and the product. Quanergy Sys., Inc. v. Velodyne Lidar USA, Inc., 24 F.4th 1406, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2022). When, “for example, the patented invention is only a small component of the product tied to the objective evidence, there is no presumption of nexus.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Absent a presumption of nexus, the patentee may prove nexus by” slip op. at 76
Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,336 - Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00101 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not shown unpatentable under the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we” slip op. at 32
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner
“III. WHETHER THE PETITION IS TIME BARRED The parties dispute whether the Petition is time barred based on a” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. Among other things, the Director determined based on a “review of the current record” that (1) Menard is not a real party in interest in this proceeding and (2) Menard is not a privy of Petitioner. Id. at 5. Further, the Director remanded the case to the panel and instructed the panel “to determine whether the Petition presents a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), and to determine whether to institute inter partes review accordingly.” Id. at 5–6.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenMixed
“U.S. Patent No. 10,299,336 B2 (“the ’336 patent”) (Exhibit 1001). For the reasons explained below, a preponderance of the evidence shows that claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 in the ’336 patent are unpatentable and does not show that claims 8, 16, and 17 are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2024).” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,336 - Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451 - Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2023-01235 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable under either obviousness ground because Szrek did not disclose a pre-printed lottery ticket without lottery numbers associated at customer purchase.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“real party in interest. Prelim. Resp. 1–2, 32–34. In the Institution Decision, we stated: To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party of interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial. Inst. Dec. 11. In its Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner did not raise the issue of challenging Petitioner’s identified real party in interest. See generally PO Resp. Thus, we need not address this issue further because we find that Patent Owner has waived any challenge to Petitioner’s identification of the real parties in interest in this proceeding. See Paper 12 (Scheduling Order), 9 (“Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.”).” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 13).5 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. 5 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’135 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed patent owner constructionDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“Following the block quote from Yacenda, the applicant then stated, “[b]ased on the foregoing, Yacenda’s system is directly opposite of the instant claims, as the instant claims require a ‘pre-printed lottery ticket’ which has no lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.’” Ex. 1002, 76. This statement is clear and unmistakable. It (1) specifically states that “the instant claims require” and (2) then states what the claims require—a “‘pre-printed lottery ticket’ which has no lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.” We fail to see how the applicant could have been more clear in stating a requirement of the Challenged Claims. And, by doing so, the applicant narrowed the scope of what would otherwise be encompassed in the meaning of “pre-printed lottery ticket” and therefore what would otherwise be encompassed in the scope of the Challenged Claims—a lottery ticket which has lottery numbers associated with it at the time of customer purchase.” slip op. at 27
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“We do not find Mr. Hutton’s testimony particularly helpful. First, we have addressed the points raised by his testimony in our discussion above because they are largely the same as the arguments raised in Petitioner’s Reply. Second, we find his testimony entitled to very little weight because he applies an incorrect understanding of the caselaw, which mirrors Petitioner’s incorrect and arguably misleading quotations of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Quest. In particular, in paragraph 5, Mr. Hutton states the following as his understanding of the law as it applies to prosecution disclaimer: “I also understand that in order to disclaim embodiments within the specification, the statements should have some indication that the applicant intended to surrender embodiments from the specification.” Ex. 1038 ¶ 5 (emphasis added). This then leads Mr. Hutton to state: “[t]hus, in my opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not view applicant’s statements as a disclaimer, because the applicant never stated that they intended to surrender multiple embodiments described in the specification.” Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis added). As we explained above in responding to a similar argument by Petitioner, the caselaw does not require an applicant to expressly state whether a disclaimer excludes particular embodiments of the subject specification when disclaiming claim scope during prosecution. See Quest, 924 F.3d at 1229. And, as noted above, counsel for Petitioner agreed that such a statement explicitly disclaiming particular embodiments is not required. Tr. 12:18–13:17. Third, although we have considered Mr. Hutton’s testimony, we find it “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of” “pre-printed lottery ticket.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. In particular, we are cognizant of the Federal Circuit’s guidance that we “should discount any expert testimony that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by . . . the prosecution history.” Id. at 1318 (internal quotation omitted). In this instance, for the reasons explained above, we find that Mr. Hutton’s testimony is clearly at odds with the applicant’s arguments during prosecution and that his testimony is based on a misunderstanding of what is required by the governing caselaw for prosecution history disclaimer.” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 9,865,135 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,865,135 - PTAB · Feb 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00921 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–3, 5–15, 17–21, and 39 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority, acting on the designation of the Director, to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had a (1) bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study, and (2) approximately two to three years of practical experience with video and/or image processing or coding.” Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–63). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditonal experience can substitute for the level of education, and vice-versa.” Id. at 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–63). Petitioner also identifies knowledge that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 64). Patent Owner states that it “has applied Petitioner’s [person having ordinary skill in the art] for the sake of this Response.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’991 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.7” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. Spatial Coding Petitioner argues that “spatial coding” means “coding in the spatial domain.” Pet. 28. According to Petitioner, the specification of the ’991 patent “describes spatial coding as the coding (e.g., quantizing and entropy coding) of pixel values in the spatial domain ‘without transform,’ but without limiting it to a particular algorithm or technique.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 5:6–23, Fig. 4). “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s construction for the sake of this [Patent Owner Preliminary Response], but reserves the right to challenge this construction in the event of institution.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed construction.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“3. “The Difference Signal” (Claims 13 and 14). Petitioner argues that claims 13 and 14 “contain a drafting error that recites ‘the difference signal,’ without antecedent basis.” Pet. 29. According to Petitioner, a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have understood ‘the difference signal’ in these claims to mean ‘a difference signal representing differences between sample values of a predicted block of data and values for an original input block’ as recited in limitation [1a] of claim 1.” Id. For purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “agree[d] with Petitioner’s construction of ‘the difference signal’ in Claims 13 and 14.” Prelim. Resp. 24. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed construction.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,077,991 - Netflix, Inc. v. Gotv Streaming, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00758 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5–10, 12–14, and 16–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Hariki and Harris; claims 4, 11, 15, and 22–33 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMixed
“in the browser,” e.g., content resulting from HTML files received from the web server. Ex. 2029, 68:15–18. Accordingly, an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that customizing” the “application program environment or display and sound aspects of the device” using a UI content package “would mean that the converted resources (i.e., ‘custom configuration’) of the UI content package were applicable to all HTML files received from the web server and displayed” by the web browser program. Ex. 1002 ¶ 159; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 19, 24, 42.” slip op. at 105
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to exclude evidence (Paper 30) is dismissed as moot; and” slip op. at 134
Patent outcomesUS 8,478,245 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,478,245 - Netflix, Inc. v. Gotv Streaming, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00757 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–10, and 12–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Hariki and Harris; claims 3, 11, and 17–20 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“Alleged Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness (i) General Principles Before reaching a conclusion about obviousness, we consider evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1048. For such evidence to have substantial weight, the patentee “must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220. “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” Id. (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). The patentee “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Whether a rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “turns on the nature of the claims and the specific facts.” Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 8 F.4th 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The presumption analysis should consider the unclaimed features in the product tied to the objective evidence to assess their significance and impact on the correspondence between the patented invention and the product. Quanergy Sys., Inc. v. Velodyne Lidar USA, Inc., 24 F.4th 1406, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2022). When, “for example, the patented invention is only a small component of the product tied to the objective evidence,” and thus the product is not coextensive with the patented invention, “there is no presumption of nexus.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Absent a presumption of nexus, the patentee may prove nexus by showing that the objective evidence resulted directly from “the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–74; see In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For example, “[a] prima facie case of nexus is generally made out when the patentee shows both that there is commercial success, and that the thing (product or method) that is commercially successful is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.” Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Circ. 1988).” slip op. at 113
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMixed
“Conclusion About Obviousness/Nonobviousness For the reasons discussed above, the combined disclosures in Hariki” slip op. at 119
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedNot reached
“In our analyses above, we do not rely on any of Exhibits 2023 to 2027. See, e.g., supra §§ III.C.2–III.C.4. Hence, we dismiss Petitioner’s motion to exclude evidence as moot. See, e.g., Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. v. Spero, IPR2023-00335, Paper 40 at 24 (PTAB July 15, 2024) (dismissing motion to exclude evidence as moot).” slip op. at 135
Patent outcomesUS 8,989,715 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,989,715 - PTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00430 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we grant institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’690 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A POSITA6 would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar discipline, and three to four years of experience working in signal processing and/or communication systems/networks. Additional education may substitute for experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–120). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For this stage of the proceeding, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Since the parties apply what they contend is the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms in their briefs, and have stipulated in the Cox case that the plain and ordinary meaning applies, and Patent Owner argues that the district court’s construction in the Charter case is the plain and ordinary meaning, there is no controversy concerning claim terms that we need to resolve in this Decision. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 10; Ex. 1005, 104–105; Ex. 2001, 2. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). At this stage of the proceeding, therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the claim terms consistent with their ordinary and customary meaning under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We note, however, that Patent Owner seems to consider the court’s construction in the Charter case to require that the claimed “probe” must be of a type that can be compared with a reference signal. Prelim. Resp. 10. We question whether all of the different types of probes mentioned and claimed in the ’690 patent would require comparison with a reference signal. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:7–19. However, this is a matter best resolved, if necessary, on a full record at trial.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“Prelim. Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1013, 37) (annotated in red by Patent Owner). IEEE-802.16’s Table 5 shows that the CID is a field of a generic MAC header. Petitioner does not show sufficiently that the CID, located in the header, specifies content payload of a MAC message, as required by limitation 1A. Petitioner alternatively relies on IEEE-802.16’s ranging code index that it contends is another example of data that is in a ranging request parameter and is used for the ranging response payload. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66; Ex. 1002 ¶ 149). Patent Owner asserts that the portions of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites do not disclose that the ranging code index is sent as part of a ranging request message. Prelim. Resp. 25. Although the parts of IEEE-802.16 that Petitioner cites disclose that the ranging code index is sent from the SS to the BS and is included in a ranging response (Ex. 1013, 49–51, 204–213, 576–579, 665–66), the cited parts do not disclose that the SS sends the ranging code index to the BS in a ranging request. Consequently, Petitioner has not established that IEEE- 802.16 anticipates a ranging code index that is a parameter of a ranging request specifying the content payload of the ranging response corresponding to limitation 1A. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in showing that claim 1 is anticipated by IEEE 802.16.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,284,690 - Keysight Technologies, Inc. / Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00446 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Sourcefire and Emerging Threats; claims 5 and 12 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. The identified aspects of Emerging Threats website would have allowed interested parties to locate the rule sets, download the rule sets and make determinations regarding what rule to use in a packet-handling system, such as Sourcefire. Emerging Threats need not be indexed or broadly searchable under Petitioner’s theory of the ground of unpatentability, namely that Emerging Threats was known, one of ordinary skill in the art would have gone to Emerging Threats, and downloaded the emerging-all.rules file, guided by the documentation wiki. As such, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that “the record evidence of this” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner
“With respect to Petitioner’s assertions of collateral estoppel, notably in the Petition at pages 47, 49, 51, 52, and 54, with respect to limitations [1a] through [1d], we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner is estopped from asserting that Sourcefire is not prior art to the challenged claims, and also estopped from asserting that those limitations are not taught or suggested by Sourcefire, to the extent that the limitations “do not materially alter the question” of patentability relative to the elements of the claims of the ’552 patent. See Soverain Software LLC v. Victoria’s Secret Direct Brand Mgmt., LLC, 778 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Independent Claim 1 a. Petitioner’s Assertions As discussed above, we concur with Petitioner that collateral estoppel exists with respect to limitations [1a] through [1d]. Thus, we begin with a discussion of Petitioner’s assertions regarding claim limitation [1e].” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“how and why persons of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the existing rules to prevent exfiltrations. PO Sur-reply 3. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s assertions to make them “drop” rules, per Sourcefire, relies on what an administrator could have done, not what they would have been motivated to do. Id. at 4–5 (citing Pet. 57–58). We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. We continue to be persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art, combining Sourcefire and Emerging Threats, would have understood that downloaded rules should be reviewed, and it would have been obvious to enable rules that such persons deemed appropriate. We find Dr. Staniford’s testimony to be persuasive on this point. See Ex. 2011, 67:10–68:24, 69:8–72; Ex. 1020, 109. We acknowledge that downloading all of a particualr ruleset from Emerging Threats and enabling all the rules, might have resulted in a drop in performance of the network appliance, but, at the same time, we are significant drop in performance, especially if a potential threat might be sufficient to warrant a minor performance hit. Patent Owner’s counsel acknowledged at oral hearing that instituting all rules of a set in “alert” mode would not result in a decrease in performance, even though some computational outlay must be engaged to engage those alert rules. See Hr’g Tr. 24:24–25:4. We are persuaded that judiciously implementing certain rules would not necessary result in a network device that is unusable. Additionally, there is testimony from Dr. Staniford that “you start out with your rules in alert because there might be false positives. I mean, for the best rule in the world, Snort wasn’t known for false positives in the rules, when you apply them to a large network.” Ex. 2011, 68:2–7. As such, we continue to determine that it would have been obvious, in combining Sourcefire with Emerging Threats, for one of ordinary skill in the art to have downloaded rules and implemented specific rules.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for petitioner
“Reviewing all of the evidence of record, we are persuaded that the Petition’s obviousness rationale based on Sourcefire and Emerging Threats is not guided by impermissible hindsight bias. We find persuasive Dr. Staniford’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “this rule [SID:2003021] was not directed to looking for instances of exploits or attacks (which would be invisible within the encryption) but rather was looking for exfiltration of some kind of encrypted data.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 228. As discussed by Petitioner, such recognition was also made by Mr. Marinho and Dr. Goodrich, such that the rule would have been understood to possibly prevent exfiltrations. We continue to be persuaded that Petitioner provides that a correspondence exists between the REQUIRE-TLS-1.1-1.2 operator in the ’343 Patent and SID:2003021 in Emerging Threats, in that both detect an SSL/TLS version in application packet header field values to detect exfiltration attempts using out-of-date encryption protocols. Pet. 43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 229–230). We are ’343 Patent discloses the interruption of a similar type of exfiltration, without resorting to impermissible hindsight bias, that Patent Owner asserts. Patent Owner has provided no evidence that Petitioner used the specification of the ’343 Patent to find an applicable rule in Emerging Threats, as opposed to the testified-version provided by Dr. Staniford that he recalls “working on a similar feature where we looked for large encrypted transmissions outbound from the network on non-HTTP ports as a possible symptom of exfiltration of large amounts of data.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 228. Thus, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 10,567,343 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,567,343
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.