- Servicenow, Inc. v. BMC Software, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 18, 2015 · IPR2015-01329 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 4, and 7 obvious over Glasser and Davis.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s evidence does not establish that the ACLs in Glasser’s system are stored in a folder or file within a hierarchical namespace. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Glasser stores the ACLs in registry 167, separate from the hierarchically organized arrangement of folders and files that Petitioner identifies as the asserted “objects” defined in the ’586 patent. See Pet. 34 (arguing that the Windows 95 “folders and files [in Glasser and Davis] qualify as ‘objects’”), 35 (“Glasser and Davis confirm that folders and files are self‐contained entities that contain data, and therefore, qualify as ‘objects’ that were added to the namespace.”). Petitioner also acknowledges that “[a] folder object in Glasser can inherit values from the access control list (ACL) of its parent folder” (Pet. 43 (emphasis added)), which is not the same thing as inheriting ACL values from the parent folder. Therefore, Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that i) the ACLs are contained in Glasser’s hierarchy of folders and files, which are the recited “objects” identified by Petitioner, and ii) the ACLs are “shar[ed] . . . with a plurality of the one or more computer system[s],” because the ACLs are not dynamically inherited by a child folder (the recited “instance” object) from a parent folder, i.e., “from the prototype” object, as recited in claim 1 of the ’586 patent. For the reasons given above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner that Glasser or Davis discloses the self-contained “objects” defined in the ’586 patent or “sharing the plurality of objects with a plurality of the one or more computer system[s]” by “dynamic[] inherit[ance],” as recited in claim 1. Claims 4 and 7 depend from claim 1. Therefore, for the same reasons, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s obviousness argument regarding claims 4 and 7. III. CONCLUSION Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in this Petition, based on the ground asserted and information presented therein. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is ORDERED that the Petition is denied.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“according to their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the patent specification. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1279–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The ’586 patent provides the following definition of the term “object”: “As used herein, an object is a self‐contained entity that contains data and/or 1 U.S. Patent No. 5,956,715 issued September 21, 1999 to Glasser et al., on an application filed September 23, 1996, which is a continuation of an earlier application filed December 13, 1994. Ex. 1003 (“Glasser”). Petitioner asserts that Glasser qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (e). Pet. 21. 2 Davis, selected excerpts from Fred Davis, THE WINDOWS BIBLE, Peachpit Press (1996). Ex. 1004 (“Davis”). Petitioner asserts that Davis qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 22. procedures to manipulate the data. Objects may be stored in a volatile memory and/or a nonvolatile memory.” Ex. 1001, 9:19–22. The ’586 patent uses lexicography to define the term “object” with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. Petitioner and Patent Owner both agree to the broadest reasonable construction of “object” as it is defined in the ’586 patent. Pet. 14, 16; Prelim. Resp. 8, 10. Therefore, we construe the term “object” as “a self-contained entity that contains data and/or procedures to manipulate the data, which may be stored in a volatile memory and/or a nonvolatile memory.”3” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner’s evidence does not establish that the ACLs in Glasser’s system are stored in a folder or file within a hierarchical namespace. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Glasser stores the ACLs in registry 167, separate from the hierarchically organized arrangement of folders and files that Petitioner identifies as the asserted “objects” defined in the ’586 patent. See Pet. 34 (arguing that the Windows 95 “folders and files [in Glasser and Davis] qualify as ‘objects’”), 35 (“Glasser and Davis confirm that folders and files are self‐contained entities that contain data, and therefore, qualify as ‘objects’ that were added to the namespace.”). Petitioner also acknowledges that “[a] folder object in Glasser can inherit values from the access control list (ACL) of its parent folder” (Pet. 43 (emphasis added)), which is not the same thing as inheriting ACL values from the parent folder. Therefore, Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that i) the ACLs are contained in Glasser’s hierarchy of folders and files, which are the recited “objects” identified by Petitioner, and ii) the ACLs are “shar[ed] . . . with a plurality of the one or more computer system[s],” because the ACLs are not dynamically inherited by a child folder (the recited “instance” object) from a parent folder, i.e., “from the prototype” object, as recited in claim 1 of the ’586 patent. For the reasons given above, we are not persuaded by Petitioner that Glasser or Davis discloses the self-contained “objects” defined in the ’586 patent or “sharing the plurality of objects with a plurality of the one or more computer system[s]” by “dynamic[] inherit[ance],” as recited in claim 1. Claims 4 and 7 depend from claim 1. Therefore, for the same reasons, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s obviousness argument regarding claims 4 and 7.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,895,586 - Sensus USA, Inc. v. Certified Measurement, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 11, 2015 · IPR2015-01439 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claim 43 unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the [P]etition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the [P]etition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). For the reasons given below, on this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim of the ’453 patent. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and decline to institute an inter partes review of the ’453 patent.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s identification of the real parties-in-interest is incomplete, and that the Petition should be denied as failing to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Prelim. Resp. 30–31. Patent Owner asserts that in a related litigation involving the ’453 patent, Petitioner identified an insurance company as covering some of the costs of defending the action against Patent Owner. See Ex. 2001. Patent Owner argues: A hallmark of indemnity or insurance agreements that are available to satisfy part or all of a judgment or to reimburse payments of same is an ability for the insurer or indemnitor to control over [sic] aspects of the litigation, including the defense and maintenance of an inter partes review which seek[s] to invalidate the subject patent. Prelim. Resp. 30. Patent Owner’s argument is generic and fails to identify any specific evidence that any parties other than those identified by Petitioner actually is exercising control over or could exercise control over this proceeding.1 Accordingly, we decline to deny the Petition on this basis. D. The References Petitioner relies on the following references: U.S. Patent No. 4,077,005, issued Feb. 28, 1978 (Ex. 1005, “Bishop”); U.S. Patent No. 5,199,068, issued Mar. 30, 1993 (Ex. 1006, “Cox”); U.S. Patent No. 5,689,442, issued Nov. 18, 1997 (Ex. 1007,” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“Petitioner does not propose a construction for “augmented measurement” aside from stating that it “is described in the individual claims of the patent.” Pet. 17. Nevertheless, Petitioner’s argument suggests that generating an “augmented measurement” requires effecting some combination of the elements recited in the claim—the first signal, the second signal, and the third signal. See Pet. 27 (asserting that Cox disclosing “combining” the previously recited elements of the claim in arguing that Cox teaches “generating an augmented measurement”). Thus, both Petitioner and Patent Owner recognize that generating an augmented measurement requires combining specified elements of the claim. We agree. The parties’ recognition that an augmented measurement requires combining specified elements of the claim is consistent with the specification of the ’453 patent. The ’453 patent explains that an “augmented measurement comprising the cleartext time plus the physical measurement” is created by adding a physical measurement of any physical parameter or event to a time. Ex. 1001, 7:66–8:2.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive because Petitioner fails to show that Bishop’s position P signal is formed from two separate signals based at least in part on two physical measurements. Petitioner’s cited portions of Bishop fail to disclose how position P is generated aside from stating that “position P of the ship is determined to an accuracy of + 2 nm . . . by the ship’s navigation equipment 48.” Ex. 1005, 2:63–66. Petitioner, however, has not identified where, if at all, Bishop discloses how the navigation equipment generates the position of the ship. Petitioner’s citations to Bishop’s column 3 refer to Bishop’s disclosure of generating a combined message, which Bishop designates as IS + P + T1, and then enciphers. See, e.g., id. at 3:7–23. Additionally, Petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 40 of the Nielson Declaration fares no better. Dr. Nielson’s testimony includes the same statements as the Petition without providing additional explanation or evidentiary support for us to conclude that Bishop expressly or inherently discloses that its position P signal is formed from two separate signals based at least in part on two physical measurements. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the assertion that Bishop discloses each and every element of claim 43 of the ’453 patent.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,289,453 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. et al. v. Imperium (IP) HoldingsInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 2, 2015 · IPR2015-01231 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted anticipation or obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“only if “the information presented in the [P]etition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the [P]etition.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). For the reasons given below, on this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim of the ’884 patent. Accordingly, we deny the Petition and decline to institute an inter partes review of the ’884 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)
“the setting step of claim 1. Petitioner, however, has not persuaded us, on this record, that Hashimoto likely discloses the claimed adjusting step. First, the citations and parentheticals in Petitioner’s claim charts do not, on their face, teach or suggest this step. Second, even though Petitioner points to Hashimoto’s disclosure of combining photoelectric charge accumulation time changes with gain control, Petitioner does not explain how Hashimoto actually combines these two features. Hashimoto’s discussion of gain control, in the context of Figure 10, suggests that gain is controlled via offsets, specifically offset A or offset B. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 11:15–20 6 In addition, Petitioner cites to paragraph 74 of the Neikirk Declaration (Pet. 31), which cites to the same portion of Hashimoto but does not provide additional explanation as to how this disclosure teachings the “adjusting” step of claim 1. Ex. 1003 ¶ 74 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:64–5:8; Ex. 1003, footnotes 1–5, 7). (“Accordingly, when the shutter speed is changed from 1/100, the gain is corrected or controlled with the offset, thus obtaining proper brightness control. The offset A is used when the shutter speed is changed from 1/100 to 1/50, and the offset B is used when the shutter speed is changed from 1/100 to a higher speed.”). In Hashimoto’s discussion of gain control, however, Petitioner does not identify, and we are unable to discern, a teaching of “adjusting the overall system gain by adjusting the integration time while maintaining the integration time at an integral multiple of the period of the periodic intensity.”7” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“depend from claim 14. Petitioner relies upon the same teachings of Hashimoto, discussed above with respect to claims 1 and 14, in Petitioner’s challenges to (1) claims 1–6 and 14 as obvious over Hashimoto and Kinugawa; (2) claims 14 and 17–19 as obvious over Hashimoto and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art; (3) claims 17–19 as obvious over Hashimoto, Nishiyama, and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art; (4) claims 17–19 as obvious over Hashimoto, Nishiyama, Kinugawa, and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art; and (5) claims 17–19 as obvious over Hashimoto and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Pet. 31 (referring to Petitioner’s discussion of claim 1), 38 (referring to Petitioner’s discussion of claim 14). Petitioner does not assert that Kinugawa, Nishiyama, or the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art9 remedies the deficiencies discussed above with respect to claims 1 and 14, or that the “adjusting” step of claim 1 and the “gain control block” of claim 14 would have been obvious in light of any of these additional references or teachings. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above with respect to Hashimoto and claims 1 and 14, Petitioner has not established, on the record before us, a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the assertions that as of 9 For the purposes of this Decision, we need not decide whether Petitioner’s reliance upon the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art violates 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), which limits the grounds under which a petitioner may request cancellation of claims in an inter partes review to “a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications” (emphasis added). the effective filing date of the claimed invention: (1) claims 1–6 and 14 would have been obvious over Hashimoto and Kinugawa; (2) claims 14 and 17–19 would have been obvious over Hashimoto and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art; (3) claims 17–19 would have been obvious over Hashimoto, Nishiyama, and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art; (4) claims 17–19 would have been obvious over Hashimoto, Nishiyama, Kinugawa, and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art; and (5) claims 17–19 would have been obvious over Hashimoto and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 17
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,271,884 - Arris Group, Inc. / Tellabs, Inc. et al. v. Cirrex Systems LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00815 · APJ Trenton A Ward · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 30 is unpatentable as anticipated by Nicholson and Yokoyama and obvious over Shih.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“claim language. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Comm. Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To overcome this presumption, the patentee must “clearly set forth” and “clearly redefine” a claim term away from its ordinary meaning. Id. The disavowal must be “unmistakable” and “unambiguous.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This standard is “exacting.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012). We do not find that Patent Owner has met this exacting standard, and, in the absence of an express definition for the term “thin-film filter,” we decline to incorporate Patent Owner’s lengthy recitation as the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “thin-film filter.” In view of the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “thin-film filter” and the disclosure in the ’953 patent Specification, we construe the term “thin-film filter” to mean “a filter comprised of stacked layers for filtering light.”” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Claim 30 further requires “a mask in intimate contact with at least one of said filter surfaces, said mask substantially opaque in at least some spectral region.” For this claim limitation, Petitioner relies upon Nicholson’s disclosure of absorbance layer 12, shown in the annotated Figure 1 above. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:23–25). Nicholson states that the “absorbance layer 12 [is] formed of highly optical absorbent material such as carbon black.” Ex. 1005, 3:24–25. Petitioner argues that this highly absorbent material, such as carbon black, would be substantially opaque in at least some spectral region. Pet. 31–32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 94). As discussed above, we construe a mask as “a material that blocks the passage of at least selected photons.” We are persuaded that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates that absorbance layer 12 in Nicholson provides a material that blocks the passage of at least selected photons. In its Response, Patent Owner argues that Nicholson does not anticipate because it fails to teach a thin-film filter with layers having packing factors approaching 100%. PO Resp. 6–7. As we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “thin-film filter” requiring these limitations, Patent Owner’s arguments are moot. In fact, during the oral argument, Patent Owner conceded that, if the Board were to adopt the same construction for “thin-film filter” as set forth in the decision to institute, Nicholson would anticipate claim 30. Tr. 38.5 As discussed above, we maintain the same construction for “thin-film filter” as in the decision to institute. Dec. on Inst. 6. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 30 is anticipated by Nicholson.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“To determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the way a patent claims, it will often be necessary to look . . . [at] the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007). Petitioner argues that thin-film filters were well known in the art. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45). As discussed above, we construe “thin-film filter,” to mean “a filter comprised of stacked layers for filtering light.” Shih discloses that antireflection coatings are comprised of “layers of TiO2 and SiO2” and that “[t]he antireflection coatings enhance the transmission of light in the forward direction through the input fiber 20.” Ex. 1004, 4:42– 48. Thus, we are persuaded that Petitioner has presented sufficiently an “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 30 would have been obvious in view of Shih. slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 6,404,953 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 6,404,953 - Square, Inc. v. Think Computer CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 27, 2015 · CBM2014-00159 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–11, 13–17, and 20–22 are unpatentable under § 103; the motion to amend claims 23–43 is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Beginning with the claim terms themselves, the word “selectively” is used. We discern that the ordinary and customary usage of this word denotes expressly that a particular account need not function simultaneously as both a merchant account and a purchaser account; a user is permitted expressly to select which account mode is desired at the appropriate point in time. The following disclosure in the Specification is consistent with this understanding: An entity (e.g., a person, business, or other legally recognized entity) preferably creates an account within the payment system. The accounts of the payment system are preferably designed so that an account may selectively function as either a merchant or a purchaser during any particular transaction. In other words, within the scope of all transactions, accounts of the payment system can function as bi-directional transaction accounts. Ex. 1001, 3:15–22. Indeed, here, the Specification discloses expressly that being able to select which account mode is desired is the same as “bi-directional transaction accounts.”” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“more properly considered a claim construction. PO Resp. 9. And indeed, when considered in conjunction with Petitioner’s proposed construction, the two constructions are similar. As noted by both Patent Owner and Petitioner, the Specification only mentions “line item data,” or similar wording, as follows: Additionally, as one of the main benefits of having merchant product catalogs integrated into the payment system, line item transaction data can be communicated. The line item data is additionally stored as part of the transaction record of the accounts. This itemized information can be very useful, such as in one application where tax forms are automatically completed by aggregating each category of line item transaction data as appropriate. Ex. 1001, 8:6–13. From the aforementioned portion of the Specification, we determine that the key to a proper construction of “line item data” is that it is information that is itemized and capable of categorization. In other words, “line item data” is an itemized part of a larger whole, more specifically, but not limited to, product catalogs, purchase lists, and transactions records, i.e., at a most granular level, individual products involved in a purchase or sale, as advocated by Petitioner. This focus on itemization and categorization of products is supported by other portions of the Specification cited by the parties, for example, column 2, lines 15–17, which recites that “[t]he integration of the payment system and product catalog functions to enable recording and tracking transactions with itemized detail” (emphases added). See also Ex. 1001, 5:51–55 (“the method may additionally store purchase list information as a transaction record for the merchant account and/or the purchaser account, which functions to form an itemized purchase history” (emphasis added)); 4:4–6 (“[t]he product catalog preferably includes a listing of product descriptions and prices for each product contained within the product catalog” (emphases added)); 4:6–13 (“[a]dditional information may be included for a product such as categories for tax purposes and other purposes, product-related IDs for each distributor of the product (e.g., Stock-Keeping Unit or ‘SKU’), images or media files related to the product, inventory related information (the number of items on hand, on order, etc. at each warehouse location), or any other suitable product-related data” (emphases added)); 4:13–16 (“[t]he product catalog may be a database accessed by outside applications, but may additionally or alternatively include a hosted web-based store through which products can be added to a shopping cart (i.e., a purchase list)” (emphases added)). Accordingly, we construe “line item data” as “itemized information from a larger group of information, related to individual products involved in a purchase or sale, that is capable of categorization,” where non-limiting examples of “line item data” may include one or more of “quantity, description, type, cost, product identifier (e.g., stock keeping unit), tax, duty, shipping or other fees.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“valid reason for combining Bemmel and Dalzell, because Dr. Sadeh- Koniecpol’s opinions of industry custom are unsupported. We are unpersuaded that Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol’s opinions are unsupported, and especially unpersuaded that Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol has not provided adequate support regarding the reasons for combining Bemmel and Dalzell. Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol includes explicit citations to references, in particular Bemmel and Dalzell, for supporting his conclusions, and we determine that any purported “leaps of logic” taken by Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol are reasonable given the underlying support. For example, Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol opines that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the mobile payment system of Bemmel with the electronic marketplace of Dalzell.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 136. Of course, this paragraph considered in isolation would be an unsupported opinion. Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol, however, then goes on to support this opinion with explicit citations to Bemmel and Dalzell. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 137, 139, 140. Dr. Sadeh-Koniecpol then reaches conclusions that we determine flow logically from those citations. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 138, 141, 142.” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Patent Owner asserts additionally that the Board should exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and deny the Petition, because similar art was already before the Examiner during prosecution. We note that 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is normally exercised in a Decision on Institution. Moreover, we have already conducted a full trial in this proceeding subsequent to a Decision on Institution. Furthermore, 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) is discretionary, and insofar as Patent Owner is requesting any vacating of the Decision on Institution, we decline to do so for the reasons set forth above.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 8,396,808 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,396,808 - PNC Bank, Na / Suntrust Bank v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 9, 2015 · CBM2015-00150 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–18 because Petitioner did not show that the patent was eligible for covered business method review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“for the creation of a transitional program for reviewing covered business method patents. “The Director may institute a transitional proceeding only for a patent that is a covered business method patent.” Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(E), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (Sept. 16, 2011). A “covered business method patent” is a patent that “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” Id. § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 331; accord 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (providing the same definition of “covered business method patent”). “The petitioner must demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“discussed above, a teleconference was held with the parties on November 5, 2015. Petitioner and Patent Owner jointly request authorization to file a motion for termination under 35 U.S.C. § 327, the statute governing termination of instituted post-grant reviews due to settlement, but confirmed during the call that no written settlement agreement currently exists. The parties request that the proceedings terminate without estoppel, such that Petitioner can re-file the petitions upon completion of Federal Circuit review of the District Court’s ineligibility determination, if necessary. Patent Owner limits its agreement to Petitioner re-filing the same petitions. Effectively, the parties request that we stay these proceedings pending Federal Circuit review of the District Court’s decision. We deny the parties’ request. As explained below, the ’120 patent is not eligible for covered business method patent review. Deferring entering such a decision is inconsistent with our policy objective of “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.1. We do not reach, and, thus, express no opinion on, eligibility of the claims of the ’120 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Although Petitioner presents constructions for several claim terms, no terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,843,120 - PNC Bank, Na / Suntrust Bank v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 9, 2015 · CBM2015-00110 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · CBM · Institution
The Board denied both petitions and did not institute CBM review of claims 1–18 because Petitioner did not show the patent was eligible for CBM review.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“On this record, Petitioner has not introduced persuasive evidence to show that at least one claim of the ’120 patent claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden of demonstrating that the ’120 patent is eligible for covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 19
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,843,120 - Dr. Michael Farmwald / RPX Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00948 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s adverse-judgment motion, entered judgment against Patent Owner, and cancelled claims 2, 22, 23, and 25.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and it did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,370,371 - Dr. Michael Farmwald / RPX Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00947 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion for adverse judgment and cancelled claims 1, 23, 25, 161, 193, and 202.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,061,551 - Dr. Michael Farmwald / RPX Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00946 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion for adverse judgment and cancelled claims 1, 82, 90, and 91.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition for inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. 6,266,518 B1 (“the ’518 patent”). Paper 1. ParkerVision, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response on September 24, 2014. Paper 7. On December 18, 2014, we instituted this inter partes review of claims 1, 82, 90, and 91 of the ’518 patent. Paper 8.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,266,518
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.