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  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00031 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request by authorizing a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision finding claims 1–9 unpatentable under § 101.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,246,093
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00021 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,618,707
  • PTAB · Jan 25, 2022 · IPR2021-00205 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted Google's rehearing request and instituted IPR on claims 5–7, 9–12, 21–23, 25–28, 37, and 39–42 on all petitioned grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6–7. Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7

    • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

      “should exercise its discretion under § 314(a) to deny at least one of Petitioner’s two overlapping petitions. Petitioner concurrently filed two petitions against the ’554 patent: IPR2021-00204 (Petition 1) and IPR2021- 00205 (Petition 2).” Prelim. Resp. 18. Petitioner contends “Petition 2 challenges only claims with an admitted later priority date . . . [and n]one of the claims challenged in Petition 2 are addressed in Petition 1. The two” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “E. Obviousness Analysis We determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing the obviousness of the limitations of claim 1 and of claim 5 (which includes the limitations of claim 1) and, on that basis, institute inter partes review of all the Challenged Claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims.”). Although dependent claim 5 is the first Challenged Claim in the Petition, we begin our analysis thereof by analyzing its underlying base claim, namely, independent claim 1.” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,874,554
  • PTAB · Jan 25, 2022 · IPR2021-00204 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 8, 17–20, 24, 33–36, and 38 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “as our basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution are no longer in the Western District of Texas. Ex. 1023, 16; Ex. 3003. In the Request for Rehearing, Petitioner argues that (at that time), “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit directed the WDTX to transfer the district court cases to the NDCA [Northern District of California] (Ex-1023 at 16) . . . the cases against LGE and Samsung will be given a new case schedule in the NDCA, delaying not 3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “3 In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the following factors: 1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. only the trial date but the overall investment in the case by both the parties and the court.” Request 5. We agree. In fact, the cases in NDCA are currently stayed pending an appeal of the Federal Circuit’s Decision. Ex. 3003. In weighing the Fintiv factors, we relied on the involvement of the ’554 patent in the WDTX cases as the basis for our weighing four of six factors and for our holistic assessment of the factors in favor of our exercising our discretion to deny institution. DDI 7–13. However, the WDTX cases no longer provide any basis for exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7

    • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

      “B. Multiple Petitions In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner also argues “[t]he Board should exercise its discretion under § 314(a) to deny at least one of Petitioner’s two overlapping petitions. Petitioner concurrently filed two petitions against the ’554 patent: IPR2021-00204 (Petition 1) and IPR2021- 00205 (Petition 2).” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner contends “Petition 2 challenges only claims with an admitted later priority date . . . [and n]one of the claims challenged in Petition 2 are addressed in Petition 1. The two petitions therefore differ materially both in substance and in the defenses Patent Owner may potentially raise, and were needed to comply with the word limits.” Paper 3, 3. Patent Owner argues this reason is moot because Patent Owner “has opted to not raise a priority dispute at the pre-institution stage.” Prelim Resp. 18–20. We determine that Patent Owner may raise a priority challenge post-institution so Petitioner’s reason for two petitions is still valid. Thus, we determine that denial of one of the two petitions is not appropriate in this case.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We are also guided by the principle that we need only construe claim terms if, and to the extent that, it is necessary for the purpose of the proceeding. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The Petition states, “[n]o claim terms need to be construed by the Board at this time.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner “does not propose any claim constructions.” Prelim. Resp. 21. Petitioner does present an implied construction of “location information” which we discuss below, in Section III.E.1.d., in association with Petitioner’s contentions regarding that claim term. Nevertheless, in this Decision, we give the claim terms their ordinary and customary meanings.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,874,554
  • PTAB · Nov 4, 2021 · IPR2020-00487 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Rehearing

    Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under §103: claims 1–4, 7, 10–13, and 16 over Golan and Martin; the remaining claims over combinations adding Ahiska, Levey, or Parulski.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “We initially concluded that Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Paper 9 (“Decision Denying Institution” or “DDI”). Specifically, we concluded that Petitioner’s rationale for combining Golan and Martin was not sufficiently supported by a rational underpinning. Dec. 26 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). Accordingly, we declined to institute trial on the challenged claims of the ’233 patent. Id. Petitioner filed a request for rehearing (Paper 10, “Rehearing Request” or “Reh’g Req.”) of our Decision Denying Institution. We granted that request and instituted trial (Paper 13, “Institution Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”) on all challenged claims on all grounds set forth in the Petition. Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 16, “Patent Owner Response” or “PO. Resp.”).1 Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 25, “Petitioner’s Reply” or “Pet.” slip op. at 2

    • Expert testimonyOther

      “Dr. Durand testifies that “a POSITA would have understood that Martin’s teachings of critical alignment for stable transition between images of different points of view apply to electronic camera systems providing continuous zoom video output [i]mages as taught in Golan, regardless of whether a three dimensional illusion is provided.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. Citing Ahiska (Ex. 1007), Border (Ex. 1009), Orimoto (Ex. 1014), and Hansen (Ex. 1019) to support his testimony, Durand further testifies that It was well known in the art that for seamless transition between two images of different points of views in continuous zoom video applications, when calibration between two cameras (e.g., the electronic calibration of Golan) is not sufficient alone (e.g., because of shocking, vibration, thermal variation, etc.), image registration of two images from two imaging sections for position matching (e.g., critical alignment of Martin) may be used. Id. ¶ 57 (citing Ex. 1007, 4:58–62, 10:2–5; Ex. 1014, 1:63–2:1; Ex. 1019, 1059; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 41, 42). The portion of Hansen (Ex. 1019) cited by Dr. Durand addresses how extrinsic calibration errors occur and “a method to recalibrate extrinsic parameters online to correct drift or bias.” Ex. 1019, 1059 (emphasis omitted). Orimoto discloses how misalignment occurs, irrespective of “how exactly the dual lens camera has been conditioned and adjusted by the manufacturer.” Ex. 1014, 1:63–2:1. Border addresses image registration as an alternative to correspondence (i.e., calibration). Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 41, 42. And Ahiska disclose image registration or matching, when calibration is insufficient, to provide a seamless transition between master and slave cameras and “create the quality of a continuous zoom function.” Ex. 1007, 4:58–62, 10:2–5 (“[i]f calibration between the [wide-angle] master and slave cameras is insufficient alone, image registration or matching can be carried out,” “transition[ing] between the master view and the slave view as seamlessly as possible to create the quality of a continuous zoom function”). Petitioner’s third and fourth reasons for combining Golan and Martin are supported by Dr. Durand’s testimony quoted above, which is in turn supported by Ahiska and Border. The portions of Border cited by Dr. Durand address image registration as an alternative to correspondence (i.e., calibration). Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 41, 42. The portions of Ahiska cited by Dr. Durand address the additional step of image registration or matching, when calibration is insufficient, to provide a seamless transition between master and slave cameras and “create the quality of a continuous zoom function.” Ex. 1007, 4:58–62, 10:2–5. Thus, each of Border and Ahiska show a relation between electronic calibration and registration. As such, and for the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s rationale for combining Golan and Martin is supported by sufficient rational underpinning, based on the entirety of the record developed at trial. See KSR, 550 at 418.” slip op. at 21

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends [A] Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art (“POSITA”) at the time of the claimed invention would have a bachelor’s or the equivalent degree in electrical and/or computer engineering or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in imaging systems including optics and image processing. Pet. 5. Petitioner supports its contention with the testimony of Dr. Durand. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Patent Owner “adopts Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. . . .” PO Resp. 7 (citing Pet. 3; Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 31–33). The level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner is consistent with the ’233 patent and the asserted prior art. Where pertinent, we apply Petitioner’s definition in making the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “understood ‘reduce an image jump effect seen in video output images’ to mean “reduce a discontinuous image change in video output images.’” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–43). Petitioner asserts the Specification supports this proposed construction. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 10:30–40). Patent Owner “adopts, for this IPR proceeding only, Petitioner’s proposed construction for the phrase ‘reduce an image jump effect seen in video output images’ and appl[ies] it in [its] analysis herein.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 34–36). We do not discern a dispute between the parties regarding this limitation and we need not expressly construe this limitation to resolve the controversy before us. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,661,233
  • PTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,925,308
  • PTAB · Feb 15, 2019 · CBM2018-00021 · APJ Kristi L R Sawert · CBM · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing on the ethics rules and granted Interrogatories 4 and 5 and Document Request 2, while denying rehearing on the remaining specified discovery requests.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the” slip op. at 2

    • Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, grantedGranted in part

      “Upon reconsideration, we agree with Patent Owner that the timing of Dr. Hendershott’s preparation and the editing of common paragraphs 18–36 is unclear on the current record. For example, Dr. Hendershott testified that he could not remember whether Fish suggested that he provide a history of Wall Street and the exchanges, which are embodied in paragraphs 18–36. See Ex. 1062, 53:14–19. Dr. Hendershott also testified that he received from Fish versions of his declaration containing edits, but did not remember whether any of those edits were substantive in nature. See id. at 51:19–25, 52:8–22. Dr. Hendershott also did not review the edits to his declarations and thus was arguably not prepared to testify as to the circumstances surrounding the creation and editing of the common paragraphs. See id. at 58:2–8. Thus, we grant Interrogatories 4 and 5 and Discovery Request 2, as relevant information only in the possession of Fish and Reed Smith (Bloomberg Factor 3). We deny Document Request 3, however, because we remain unpersuaded that it is relevant to showing that confidential information could have found its way from Fish to Reed Smith. Ord. 11. In particular, Document Request 3 relates to information flowing from Reed Smith to Dr. Hendershott, and is therefore not relevant to whether Fish used or revealed information to Reed Smith relating to its prosecution of the Nasdaq patents.” slip op. at 12

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,618,707
  • PTAB · Sep 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01860 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing in part, reaffirmed denial of IPR under § 325(d), and granted the request for an expanded panel.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

      “[dissatisfied] party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Moreover, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion falls on Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

      “arguments” is self-evident, so we focus on the next part, “substantially the same prior art or arguments.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphasis added). We conclude that a set of prior art or arguments may be considered “substantially the same” if they are “cumulative to or substantially overlap with issues previously considered by the Office with respect to the patent.” 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). In order for a party to bring this issue to the Office’s attention, the focus of the “substantially” analysis should be on the differences (or lack thereof) between the prior art and arguments presented in the petition, and those “previously . . . presented to the Office.” A party making assertions relevant to Section 325(d) should identify such differences (or lack thereof), whether substantive or procedural, and explain the relevance of those differences (or lack thereof).” slip op. at 8

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Taker Magazine (Ex. 1027) and the Declaration of Neil Ziegmann (Ex. 1024) that purportedly show that the Examiner’s determination was erroneous. We note that Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony is discounted, in that he is an interested party in this proceeding. Cf. Finnigan Corp. v. ITC, 180 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he level of interest of the testifying witness is an important consideration when such testimony is offered to corroborate another witness’s testimony.”). Moreover, even when accorded some weight, we are unpersuaded that the Fur Taker advertisement and Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony come close to showing that the Examiner’s determination concerning nexus was erroneous. In particular, the vast majority of the evidence concerning secondary considerations in the prosecution history has not been challenged by Petitioner, and, thus, for the reasons set forth above, is treated as undisputed fact. To hold otherwise would allow Petitioner to make an end-run around Section 325(d) by merely submitting any piece of new evidence, no matter how minor or inconsequential.” slip op. at 27

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,881,447
  • PTAB · Aug 18, 2017 · IPR2016-00067 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted IPS’s rehearing request and held claims 1–5 and 7–10 not shown unpatentable as anticipated by King ’054 under § 102(e).

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “without prior authorization from the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision from which rehearing is sought should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Id.” slip op. at 3

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “communicated to the inventors of King ’054 by Mr. King. In that respect, we observe the following: (1) it is undisputed that Mr. King and the D+I inventors invented the substantive content that became claims 8 and 10 of the ’310 patent; (2) Mr. King is a common inventor as between each of the ’310 patent and King ’054; (3) the record reflects that there was frequent and numerous collaborative exchanges between Mr. King and the other inventors of King ’310 (i.e., the D+I inventors); and (4) those exchanges occurred prior to the filing of the application that became King ’054. See, e.g., Exs. 2018–31, 2034–42.” slip op. at 6

    • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther

      “Response to IPS’s Request for Rehearing, provides little, if any, basis undermining the above-noted inference. DPT’s attempt, as a part of its Response, to belatedly seek rehearing of our Final Written Decision as to claims 1–5, 7, and 9 of the ’310 patent is both untimely and inadequately supported on the present record.4 Indeed, all the Response does is inappropriately seek rehearing of our Final Written Decision as to claims 1– 5, 7, and 9 of the ’310 patent, and does not follow our instruction of being responsive to the subject of the Request for Rehearing, i.e., the anticipation of dependent claims 8 and 10. See Paper 32, 2 (“The panel would like to hear from DPT as to the content of IPS’s Request for Rehearing. Accordingly, the panel authorizes . . . DPT to file a reply to IPS’s Request for Rehearing.”).” slip op. at 6

    § 102 anticipation
    Patents in suitUS 7,854,310
  • PTAB · Mar 9, 2017 · IPR2016-01074 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Rehearing

    Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted for clarification but otherwise denied; review remains denied for the challenged claims on the Lavelle-365/Jost/Chang and LCM500NP/Lavelle-365 grounds.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part

      “ANALYSIS When considering a request for rehearing, we review the Decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the Decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes [we] misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner

      “defective prior oath that did not include language covering new matter in the continuation-in-part application is properly remedied by the filing of a supplemental oath in the particular set of circumstances presented here, in which the Patent Office accepted the defective, originally filed oath. In any event, we determine that the filing of a supplemental oath, under these circumstances, does not operate to invalidate the patent at issue or prevent Voxx from being considered the Patent Owner.3 Thus, we are not persuaded by this argument.” slip op. at 5

    • BurdenDenied

      “CONCLUSION The Request for Rehearing does not demonstrate that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters raised in the Petition declining to 3 This decision does not address the propriety of filing a supplemental oath in other situations such as during prosecution or in the event of a reissue. 4 We also note that Petitioner filed this request for inter partes review, and in doing so, specifically identified Voxx as the owner of the ’355 patent. See Paper 2, 3. institute review of claims 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20, 26, 30, 32, 38, 39, and 42 over Lavelle-365, Jost, and Chang, and claims 14, 18, 20, and 42 over LCM500NP and Lavelle-365. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,839,355
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