- PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - Texas Instruments Incorprated v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00934 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over DeMaw and, separately, over Macnally.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 7,496,342 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,496,342 - Exotec Product France SAS / Exotec North America Inc. et al. v. Opex CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00850 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–12, 14, and 23–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Raizer and Hangzhou.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes an express construction” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In this case, we must determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Hangzhou’s disclosure of driving its auto-guided trolleys 200 under shelves 100 would improve the operation of Raizer’s system in the same way. For us to resolve this question in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). However, bodily incorporation, i.e., “an actual physical substitution of” Hangzhou’s auto-guided trolleys or operating software into Raizer’s system, is not required. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 11,472,632 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,472,632 - Abbott Laboratories / Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Altivera LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00425 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Beck, Heller, and Lovejoy; the Board did not reach the alternative Bandy grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. See generally PO Resp. Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’307 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“both the unique sensor ID as well as the associated unique wireless device ID is contradicted, or at least unsupported, by the claim language and the Specification. We determine that this limitation does not require authentication of both the unique sensor ID and the unique wireless device ID, or otherwise require authentication using the unique wireless ID. Rather, the limitation only requires authentication of the unique sensor ID. The language and structure of the claim itself, “the remote server authenticates said unique sensor ID associated with said unique wireless device ID,” requires authentication of the unique sensor ID but not the unique wireless device ID. See Ex. 1001, 19:51–52 (emphasis added). The portion of the limitation reciting “associated with said unique wireless device ID” is linguistically an appositive modifying the “unique sensor ID.” Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges the “plain meaning of the claim term is that the remote server authenticates the unique sensor ID and that such unique sensor ID is associated with a unique wireless device ID.” PO Resp. 18.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed constructions of any of these other claim terms or phrases. PO Resp. 24. We agree with the parties that the identified limitations—which each recite a “means” or “means for” performing a particular function—are means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). And we agree with Petitioner’s uncontested identification of the recited functions and corresponding structure for these limitations for the reasons explained by Petitioner. See Pet. 11–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:20–21, 2:24–28, 3:33–36, 17:18–30); id. at 13–15 (citing Ex. 1009, 9:4–6, 9:19–20, 9:57–65, 10:10– 11) (explaining that Lovejoy is incorporated by reference into the ’307 Patent). We adopt the uncontested constructions identified by Petitioner, as” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the improvements offered by the incorporation of Heller’s teachings would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Confirming Petitioner’s assertion that the combination yields improvements, Heller states that it improves the type of glucose monitor used in one of Beck’s embodiments. Beck states that its “medical device 130 includes a glucose meter” which “measure[s] blood glucose levels of blood applied to test strips.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 34. Specifically addressing such “conventional” test strip glucose monitoring, Heller states that its in vivo glucose sensor system addresses a need for continuous or automatic monitoring in a small, comfortable device. Ex. 1016, 2:1–7, 2:15–58, 3:19–25. As such, we agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller to improve Beck’s medical device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. We further agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate sensor implementation details described in Heller, e.g., an A/D converter and patient attachment systems, with Beck’s medical device. Pet. 44–45, 53, 55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 228, 234, 236–238, 259, 267, 278, which do no more than yield predictable results, e.g., converting signals or attaching a sensor to a patient. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[A] combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 7,969,307 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,969,307 - Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,488,451 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01285 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 1 were obvious over the Yerazunis–Fiedler and Ely–Fiedler combinations, respectively.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. With these factors and guidance in mind, we consider parties’ contentions.5 1.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’752 patent. We exercise our discretion to institute inter partes review and, as required, we do so as to all the challenged claims of the ’752 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is supported by Dr. Sarhan’s testimony, except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Only claim terms in controversy require express construction, “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need resolve the controversy.”). Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, we determine no terms require express construction to resolve the disputes at this stage of the proceeding.8 A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,928,752 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01284 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Per Board practice, if the Board institutes trial, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’540 patent. We exercise our discretion to institute inter partes review and, as required, we do so as to all the challenged claims of the ’540 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“issued an order temporarily staying all deadlines and hearings scheduled in the matter.6 Ex. 1058, 1–2. The District Court’s order notes that Patent Owner asserts 8 patents in the litigation, that IPRs have been instituted on 4 of those patents covering 10 of the 14 claims asserted in the litigation, and that further consideration of a stay will depend upon whether IPRs are instituted on patents including the 4 remaining claims. Id. at 1, 3. The District Court also ordered the parties to update their positions on a stay within one week of a decision on institution. It is unclear if, and when, a new trial date would be set. In light of this stay, we determine that this factor weighs strongly against discretionary denial. 2.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronics technology.” Ex. 1051 ¶ 30. Dr. Sarhan further opines that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, which is supported by Dr. Sarhan’s testimony, except that we find that the phrase “at least” in Petitioner’s proposed definition creates a vague, open-ended upper bound for the level of ordinary skill, and we therefore do not adopt that aspect of the proposal.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Having reviewed the parties’ arguments we determine, as explained further below in our analysis of claim 1 (§ III.D.4.a), that an express construction of the term “file” is not necessary at this stage of the proceeding. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,310,540 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01314 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Motorola would prevail on at least one obviousness challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“February 24, 2025, the District Court ordered all deadlines and hearings stayed pending further order of the court. See Ex. 1066. The District Court’s order notes that Patent Owner asserts 8 patents in the litigation, that IPRs have been instituted on 4 of those patents covering 10 of the 14 claims asserted in the litigation, and that further consideration of a stay will depend upon whether IPRs are instituted on patents including the 4 remaining claims. Id. at 1, 3. The District Court also ordered the parties to update their positions on a stay within one week of a decision on institution. It is unclear if, and when, a new trial date would be set. Thus, factors 1 and 2 weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution. The subject matter of the challenged claims is closely related to the subject matter of the claims of the patents in the previously instituted IPRs and the remaining pending petitions, as evidenced by the overlap of the asserted references and arguments advanced in these cases. As detailed in the substantive sections of this Decision, the Petition meets the standard for institution, i.e., there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition. Under Fintiv factor 6, these circumstances weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution. In view of these circumstances, we determine that factors 1, 2, and 6 strongly weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 5
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinarily skilled artisan”) as having at least a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronics technology. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1062, Sarhan Decl. ¶¶ 26–30). Petitioner adds that additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Id. Patent Owner does not comment specifically on the level of ordinary skill in the art. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of an 4U.S. Patent Publication No. 2004/0008255 A1 (Ex. 1019) 5 U.S. Patent Publication No. 2002/0191952 A1 (Ex. 1009) 6 U.S. Patent 5,982,418 (Ex. 1020) 7 Another Declaration of Dr. Sarhan has also been made of record in this proceeding. See Ex. 1003. This Decision distinguishes references to the Sarhan Declarations by Exhibit number. ’910 patent and the references, we apply it for purposes of this Decision. slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“A. A computer processor configured to Petitioner notes that in the parallel litigation Patent Owner contends that this term is not a means plus function limitation. Pet. 9. Petitioner states that for purposes of the petition it has applied means plus function and non-means plus function interpretations to this limitation. Id. For purposes of this Decision, we need not construe this claim limitation. B. File In this proceeding, Petitioner does not propose a construction of the term “file.” See Pet. 9. Patent Owner does not propose a construction of “file” but, nonetheless, states that “Petitioner’s vague and unduly broad definition of ‘file’ is not only contradicted by the prosecution history, but also the extrinsic evidence it relies upon.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Pet. 10– 12). Patent Owner reserves the right to present claim constructions arguments if trial is instituted. Id. at 6. For purposes of this Decision, we address the meaning of “file” in the context of the parties’ substantive arguments and do not articulate a specific construction. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“c) Claim 1 Analysis Petitioner has demonstrated that, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Yerazunis discloses write protecting a segment of the buffer. Yerazunis explicitly states that “[upon] a firing event, specified frame data associated with that firing event both before and after the event is preserved and cannot be overwritten as a result of further use of the gun or subsequent of memory to a second portion of memory to avoid overwriting the data in the first portion of memory upon the occurrence of a second trigger event is an effective approach to designating the first portion of memory as write protected. As Petitioner points out, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood from Yerazunis that retrieving video data for gun firing events necessitates the ability to locate the relevant video data within the buffer and that using pointers in a table to index the data allows for its later retrieval. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1062, Sarhan Decl. ¶ 372). We find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that Yerazunis’ disclosure of a purge button to erase the contents of the circular buffer is further evidence that that entire buffer contents is protected and unprotected as a whole. Prelim. Resp. 30 (citing Ex. 1017, 9:47–51). It is unclear how providing an “optional” purge feature that erases the contents of the circular buffer and captured still images a “user does not desire to retain” supports Patent Owner’s argument that Yerazunis does not disclose write protecting segments of the buffer associated with a trigger event. Ex. 1017, 9:49–53. Inclusion of this feature further supports Petitioner’s argument, as the segments of a circular buffer associated with an event are not overwritten, unless the user invokes the purge feature to erase the contents of the circular buffer. Also unavailing is Patent Owner’s argument that video data preservation in Yerazunis “is a step that occurs after, not as part of, the step of ‘continu[ing] to record for a brief interval.’” See Prelim. Resp. 30–31. Claim 1 is an apparatus claim and does not recite “continuing to record for a brief interval.” See Ex. 1060, 12:19–47 (claim 1). Claim 1 recites “a computer processor configured to . . . continuing to record the sensor data in designated for saving.” Ex. 1060, 12:22, 34–36. Yerazunis discloses that upon detection of a trigger event a predetermined number of frames, e.g., 2 frames, are stored in successive frame locations within the circular buffer. Ex. 1017, 8:26–32; 12:14–28. Yerazunis further discloses that “any desired percentage of frames may be captured prior to or after the trigger event by specifying how many frames are to be captured and stored after the trigger event.” Id. at 8:39–42.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,965,910 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Stellar, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01313 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–25 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on each asserted §103 ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“February 24, 2025, the District Court ordered all deadlines and hearings stayed pending further order of the court. See Ex. 1066. The District Court’s order notes that Patent Owner asserts 8 patents in the litigation, that inter partes reviews (IPRs) have been instituted on 4 of those patents covering 10 of the 14 claims asserted in the litigation, and that further consideration of a stay will depend upon whether IPRs are instituted on patents including the 4 remaining claims. Id. at 1, 3. The District Court also ordered the parties to update their positions on a stay within one week of a decision on institution. It is unclear if, and when, a new trial date would be set. Thus, Fintiv factors 1 and 2 weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution. The subject matter of the challenged claims is closely related to the subject matter of the claims of the patents in the previously instituted IPRs and the remaining pending petitions, as evidenced by the overlap of the asserted references and arguments advanced in these cases. As detailed in the substantive sections of this Decision, the Petition meets the standard for institution, i.e., there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the Petition. Under Fintiv factor 6, these circumstances weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution. In view of these circumstances, we determine that factors 1, 2, and 6 strongly weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(“Petition” or “Pet.”), to institute an inter partes review (“IPR”) of claims 1– 25 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 10,523,901 B2 (“the ’901 patent”). 35 U.S.C. § 311. Stellar, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response, Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”), contending that the Petition should be denied as to all challenged claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Contentions concerning reason to combine the teachings of Yerazunis and Campbell Noting that both Yerazunis and Campbell disclose compact, mountable video recording systems, Petitioner contends an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the eyeglass mounted apparatus of Campbell with the teachings of Yerazunis in order to provide a hands-free instantaneous recording apparatus that for use in policing and security and in military fields. Pet. 16. Petitioner further contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success with such a combination because Yerazunis provides a detailed disclosure of its buffer-based approach and because applying those techniques to Campbell’s eyeglass mounted apparatus would have been a routine matter. Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1017, 10:37–49; Ex. 1062, Sarhan Decl. ¶ 165).” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,523,901 - PTAB · Feb 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01315 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1 and 3 on all three asserted obviousness grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, when instituting an inter partes review, we “will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Here, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all the grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a Bachelors’ degree in electrical engineering or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with electronic and optoelectronic device design.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 34– 37). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Dean Neikirk. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 34–37. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp. 1. We adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“C. Claim Construction In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim is construed using the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 7; see Prelim. Resp. 1. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“E. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1 and 3 over Anzai and Yamazaki Petitioner argues that claims 1 and 3 would have been obvious over Anzai and Yamazaki. Pet. 47–57. Petitioner presents evidence indicating that the Anzai and Yamazaki combination teaches the limitations of claims 1 and 3, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine these references. Id. Patent Owner does not present any substantive arguments regarding this asserted ground. See Prelim. Resp. 1. On this record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 1 and 3 would have been obvious over Anzai and Yamazaki. F. Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1 and 3 over Anzai and Yamada Petitioner argues that claims 1 and 3 would have been obvious over Anzai and Yamada. Pet. 57–63. Petitioner presents evidence indicating that the Anzai and Yamada combination teaches the limitations of claims 1 and 3, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine these references. Id. Patent Owner does not present any substantive arguments regarding this asserted ground. See Prelim. Resp. 1. On this record, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that claims 1 and 3 would have been obvious over Anzai and Yamada.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,158,477
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.