• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Njoy, LLC / Njoy Holdings, Inc. v. Juul Labs, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00231 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 14–16, 18, 27–29, 31, and 32 were not proven unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish the claimed airflow path or a reason to make the proposed combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed levels of skill are similar and differ in that Petitioner’s relevant degrees and corresponding two years of experience additionally includes “industrial design” and “product design” and familiarity with “electrically powered vaporizing articles, their components or the underlying technologies” where Patent Owner requires two years of experience “designing electro-mechanical consumer products or an advanced degree.” Compare Pet. 7, with PO Resp. 2. Patent Owner alleges that “Petitioner has failed to establish unpatentability under either standard,” indicating that the level of skill in the art is not a dispositive issue. PO Resp. 3. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’123 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’123 patent and the prior art. We note that the outcome of this Decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “In this case, Mr. McAlexander meets both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill in the art. As a result, we are persuaded Mr. McAlexander has the requisite skill and relevant expertise to offer testimony in this matter. For example, Mr. McAlexander has a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and far more than 2 years of experience in the electrical engineering field. Ex. 1027, 3–6, 7. In addition, Mr. McAlexander has provided expert consulting services in a wide range of technology areas involving the process and design of electro-mechanical consumer products. Ex. 1003 ¶ 5. Through one of Mr. McAlexander’s business ventures, his laboratory has “performed detailed airflow analyses, designing and constructing specialized apparatuses to emulate human breath, allowing for precise activation testing of ENDS devices.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 16. That said, a declarant’s expertise, even clothed as a skilled artisan, does not entitle a naked opinion persuasive weight. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, Patent Owner had the opportunity to, and in fact did, thoroughly cross examine Mr. McAlexander about the purported deficiencies in his testimony. See, e.g., Exs. 2052, 2054; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“Vigorous cross examination [and] presentation of contrary evidence . . . are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). Therefore, to the extent Patent Owner credibly identifies deficiencies in Mr. McAlexander’s testimony or that testimony lacks factual support or is based on broad, conclusory assertions, we will assign appropriate weight. See Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that it is within the Board’s discretion, as the trier of fact, to accord appropriate weight to the evidence presented).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner contends that the parties proposed a construction for “pressure valve,” a limitation appearing in claims 18 and 31, during the ITC investigation. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1001, 41:58–65). Patent Owner contends that the terms of the ’123 patent should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. PO Resp. 4. Because resolution of the issues presented in this case do not require construction of the term “pressure valve,” we do not expressly construe this claim term. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. To anticipate a claim, a reference “must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but must also disclose those elements ‘arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1369. “The requirement that the prior art elements themselves be arranged as in the claim means that the claims cannot be treated . . . as mere catalogs of separate parts, in disregard of the part-to-part relationships set forth in the claims.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Indeed, the prior art reference “must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371 (citation omitted). “[D]ifferences between the prior art reference and the claimed invention, however slight, invoke the question of obviousness, not anticipation.” Id.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,130,123 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,130,123
• Tennant Company v. Oxygenator Water Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · IPR2021-00625 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand

  Claims 13, 14, and 17–27 were not shown unpatentable because Tennant did not establish that Wikey or Davies inherently disclosed the claimed microbubbles and nanobubbles.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11. On September 19, 2024, we authorized the parties to file supplemental briefing, stating also that the “parties are not authorized to present new factual assertions, provide additional exhibits, or raise new arguments beyond those directed to the issues raised in the remand.” Ex. 3001. Pursuant to this authorization, Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 61; “Pet. Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Patent Owner filed a Lead Brief on Remand (Paper 62; “PO Br. Rem.”) in support of its contentions. Petitioner filed a Reply Brief on Remand (Paper 66; “Pet. Reply Br. Rem.”). Patent Owner filed a Responsive Brief on Remand (Paper 65; “PO Resp. Br. Rem.”).” slip op. at 3

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, and in line with our previous determination that “Wikey appears to disclose each limitation of claim 13 except ‘microbubbles and nanobubbles having a bubble diameter of less than 50 microns’” (Final Dec. 20), we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey inherently discloses microbubbles or nanobubbles. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated that Wikey discloses every limitation of claim 13.” slip op. at 56

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded our anticipation determinations as to claims 13, 14, and 17–27. Tennant, 11.1 The Federal Circuit further stated: “Because we vacate and remand to the Board to consider Tennant’s anticipation argument, we do not reach Tennant’s obviousness arguments (which depends on its contention that either Wikey or Davies produce nanobubbles).” Id. at 11.” slip op. at 3

  Patent outcomesUS RE45,415 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
• Hanwha Solutions Corporation / Hanwha Q Cells USA, Inc. v. Rec Solar Pte. Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2022 · IPR2021-00989 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 11, and 13 were not shown unpatentable under either obviousness ground because Petitioner did not establish a motivation to combine Yagiura and Shimasaki.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner’s position is persuasive. We agree that documents from the Japanese Patent Office are self-authenticating official government documents. The technical issues regarding missing pages in the originally filed version of the document do not cause us to question authenticity. We also agree that Petitioner uses the documents to establish what the documents teach rather than establishing the truth of what the documents teach. In Reply, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner relies on the date printed on the document to prove up the truth of when the document was published. Mot. Excl. Reply 1–2. To the extent this is the case, an exception to hearsay applies because the document is a record of a public office. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B) (a record of public office is an exception to the hearsay rule if the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances “indicate a lack of trustworthiness”). Here, Patent Owner does not persuasively demonstrate a lack of trustworthiness; Patent Owner does not identify any substantively meaningful distinction in the missing pages of the originally filed document and does not identify any evidence to suggest that the missing pages were anything more than a harmless clerical error. For the reasons above, Patent Owner’s motion to exclude is denied with respect to these documents. B.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Petitioner’s proposal is too broad. PO Resp. 8. For example, a person who merely installs solar panels for three years (satisfying “professional experience in solar energy”) while having some familiarity with module manufacturing would not be of ordinary skill in the design aspects of the ’060 patent as, for example, reflected by the claims at issue and the ’060 patent’s text and figures. See, e.g., Ex. 1101, Figs. 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 3:22–7:44. On the other hand, we also determine that Patent Owner’s proposal is too narrow. A person could, for example, have ordinary skill in the art of the ’060 patent by virtue of non-professional experience (for example, academic experience). When assessing relevant experience, research work done for a university (beyond mere classroom study) would have been just as valuable as research work done for a corporation. Also, ordinary skill in the art could be demonstrated by work that requires understanding of the ’060 patent’s field even if not “designing, developing, and/or researching” in the field itself We, thus, determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’060 patent would have been someone with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or the like, and at least two years of (a) experience designing, developing, and/or researching in the field or (b) experience in solar energy that required an understanding of the ’060 patent’s field. Alternatively, that person would have had an advanced degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or the like and at least one year of” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “qualifies as evidence in this matter. The Federal Circuit has held that expert testimony about the perspective of person of ordinary skill in the art (as Dr. Kimball provides here) must come from a person having at least ordinary skill in the art. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools, Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–78 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (holding that ITC Administrative Law Judge abused discretion by admitting expert testimony of witness who lacked the experience of a person having ordinary skill in the art); see Mot. Excl. 6–7 (arguing this point). Patent Owner, however, cites no authority that expert testimony on such matters come from a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Cf. Scentair Tech., LLC v. Prolitiec Inc., IPR2021-00012, Paper 22 at 61 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2022) (similarly noting a party’s lack of authority on this point). Beyond needing to come from a person of ordinary skill in the art, expert testimony is admissible if the expert has the “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Furthermore, “[t]here is … no requirement of a perfect match between the expert’s experience and the relevant field.” USPTO, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 34 (Nov. 2019). Here, Petitioner adequately establishes that Dr. Kimball qualifies as a” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Petition argues that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not dispute this. PO Resp. 13. We determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Final Written Decision. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms that are in controversy, and only to the” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,749,060 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,749,060
• Netflix Inc. / Hulu, LLC v. Divx, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 9, 2021 · IPR2020-00646 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5, 8, 9, 13–15, 18, and 21–23 were not shown unpatentable because Kaku was not established as analogous art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot shown unpatentableNon analogous artNot shown unpatentable

    “A reference is considered analogous prior art: (1) if the reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed subject matter, or (2) if “the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved,” even though the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. The field of endeavor test asks if the structure and function of the prior art is such that it would be considered by a person of ordinary skill in the art because of the similarity to the structure and function of the claimed invention. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325–27. A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner proposes constructions for three claim terms, including the term “trick play functionality.” Pet. 22–23. Patent Owner argues for construction of the related claim term “the first and second indexes enabling trick play functionality.” See PO Resp. 41–49. We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any of those claim terms because construction of the proposed terms does not impact our determination that Petitioner has not shown that one of the prior art references is analogous to the claimed invention. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 9

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedNot reached

    “Under the particular circumstances in this case, we need not assess the merits of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude. As discussed above, we have determined that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance that Kaku is analogous prior art to the ’792 patent and do not reach Petitioner’s arguments on the motivation to combine Kaku with Zetts or Seo. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 34

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted

    “As discussed above (supra § III.E.4.a), Petitioner’s papers fail to link Dr. Reader’s declaration testimony on the level of ordinary skill in the art to the analogous art inquiry and fail to identify a field of endeavor for the ’792 patent. We therefore agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s demonstrative slide 53 presents improper new arguments that have not been previously made. See Paper 38, 2 (“The parties may only rely upon evidence that has been previously submitted in the proceeding and may only present arguments that have been previously made in the submitted papers. No new evidence or arguments may be presented at the hearing.”), 5 (“Demonstratives are not a mechanism for making new arguments.”). We therefore sustain Patent Owner’s objections. We note, however, that demonstratives are not evidence. See id. at 5 (“Demonstrative exhibits used at the hearing are not evidence, nor will they be relied upon as evidence. Rather, demonstratives are visual aids to a party’s oral presentation regarding arguments and evidence previously presented and discussed in the papers”); CTPG 84 (“Demonstrative exhibits used at the final hearing are aids to oral argument and not evidence.”). In this Final Written Decision, we rely solely on the arguments properly presented in the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record, not on the demonstratives.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,472,792 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,472,792
• Qualcomm Incorporated / Qualcomm Atheros, Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 7, 2017 · IPR2015-01832 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board found claims 1, 18, 81–84, 86, 88–91, 93, 94, 251–254, 256, 258–261, 263, and 264 not proven unpatentable under either asserted obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “ordinary meaning of “bias signal” is “a signal having a steady predetermined level.” Resp. 28; Reply 6–7. The parties also agree that at least some information signals may be considered “bias signals.” The crux of the parties’ disagreement is which type of information signal. The ’940 patent defines “information signal” as “[t]he signal that contains the information that is to be transmitted. As used herein, it refers to the original baseband signal at the source.” Ex. 1001, 8:48–50 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’940 patent clearly defines “information signal” as “the original baseband signal at the source.” The ’940 patent defines “baseband signal” as: Any generic information signal desired for transmission and/or reception. As used herein, it refers to both the information signal that is generated at a source prior to any transmission (also referred to as the modulating baseband signal), and to the signal that is to be used by the recipient after transmission (also referred to as the demodulated baseband signal). Ex. 1001, 7:41–47. The ’940 patent clearly gives a broad meaning to “baseband signal” such that it encompasses any signal desired for transmission and/or reception, but the definition of “information signal,” as quoted above, does not refer to any baseband signal. Rather, it refers to “the original baseband signal at the source.” Ex. 1001, 8:48–54. By including the terms “original” and “at the source,” the meaning of information signal, as defined by the ’940 patent, is more limited than the definition of a baseband signal. Thus, Petitioner’s contention that the meaning of “information signal,” and, hence, “bias signal” should be expanded to include any “baseband signal” (Reply 4) improperly takes “information signal” out of context. Petitioner’s contention eliminates the terms “original” and “at the source” from the ’940 patent’s definition of “information signal,” without providing any reason why those terms should not be considered. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner and construe “bias signal” to mean “(1) a signal having a steady, predetermined level or (2) the original baseband signal at the source.”” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Further, Patent Owner explains that “[t]he parties agree on the portion of the ‘to gate’ construction that is material to this IPR, i.e., that ‘to gate,’ the switch module must change between connecting and disconnecting the bias signal from the switch module’s output.” Id. at 37 (citing Pet. 13–14). Patent Owner’s proposed construction is consistent with the construction proposed by Petitioner. See Dec. 11 (discussing Petitioner’s construction of “to gate [a signal]” as “to change . . . between (i) connecting a signal at an input to an output such that the input and output have an equal voltage, and (ii) disconnecting the signal from the output” (quoting Pet. 14)). In light of the consistency between the proposed constructions, and in light of the lack of an actual controversy between the parties with respect to the impact of the minor differences in the proposed meanings of this term, we need not construe expressly the term further.4 Petitioner’s Reply does not challenge Patent Owner’s arguments regarding these claim terms. Accordingly, we adopt the construction of “switch module,” as reproduced above, for the reasons explained in our Decision to Institute. See Dec. 8–11. Additionally, we decline to construe expressly the terms “summer” and “to gate,” for the reasons discussed above.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “3. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art as of October 1998 would possess, at a minimum, either (a) a master of science degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience in radio frequency circuit design, or (b) a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering with three or more years of experience with the design and development of RF circuits. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–29). Petitioner’s argument is supported by Dr. Larson’s testimony. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–29. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s designation of the level of ordinary skill in the art as of the date of the invention. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “High Level Radio Frequency (“RF”) Source 10. The RF signal contains the information that television watchers see and hear.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1023, 1:14–17). Petitioner asserts that Dobrovolny’s “RF Source signals are information signals that constitute ‘bias signals’ as that term is defined by the ‘940 patent.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 154, 210). Petitioner’s position is based on its claim construction of “bias signals” as “encompassing information signals.” Id. Notably, in the Petition,5 Petitioner does not assert that the recited “bias signal[s]” would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in light of Dobrovolny’s RF Source signals; rather, Petitioner’s position is that “bias signal[s]” are disclosed expressly. See id. (“RF Source signals . . . constitute ‘bias signals’”) (emphasis added).6 Patent Owner’s primary argument is as follows: [E]ven accepting [Petitioner’s] assertion that the ’940 patent expanded the ordinary meaning of ‘bias signal’ to include ‘information signal’ as defined in the patent . . . . [Petitioner] does not even allege, much less prove, that the purported ‘bias signal’—Dobrovolny’s high frequency Radio Frequency (RF) television signal—meets either of these definitions. Resp. 38–39. Patent Owner reiterates that Petitioner’s “only attempt to prove that the Dobrovolny RF television signal satisfies the claimed first and second bias signals is its assertion that Dobrovolny’s ‘RF signal contains the information that television watchers see and hear.’” Id. at 39 (quoting 5 As discussed infra, see Section III.C., Petitioner’s additional argument that bias signals would have been obvious in light of Dobrovolny’s RF Source signals constitutes a new argument, set forth only in Petitioner’s Reply, and we do not consider it here for the reasons explained below. 6 With respect to independent claim 18, Petitioner relies upon its arguments directed to the similar claim limitations of claim 1. See Pet. 44–45 (referring to Petitioner’s arguments directed to claim 1). Pet. 29). Patent Owner contends, however, that “an ‘information signal’ is not just any signal containing information . . . as [Petitioner’s] argument implicitly presumes. Rather, as defined in the ’940 patent, an information signal is restricted to ‘the original baseband signal at the source.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 8:48–54). Petitioner’s argument in its Reply is based on its incorrect claim construction of “bias signal” as encompassing any information signal. See, e.g., Reply 7 (asserting that the “bias signal” is met by Dobrovolny’s disclosure because it teaches “an information carrying High Level RF Source for reception”) (citing Ex. 1023, 1:14–17; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 154, 210). As explained above, “bias signal” is understood to mean “(1) a signal having a steady, predetermined level or (2) the original baseband signal at the source.” See supra Section II.A. Petitioner does not argue, and has not established, that Dobrovolny’s RF Source signal is either at a steady, predetermined level or is the original baseband signal at the source. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that Dobrovolny discloses the “bias signal” limitations recited in claims 1 and 18, and the claims that depend from each.7 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 6,091,940 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,091,940

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.