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  • PTAB · Jan 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01108 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–8, 10–15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 under § 103 and granted BRP’s motion to join the Foil Boarding IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “At this stage of the proceeding and based on our preliminary review, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of the Challenged Claims for the same reasons discussed in our Decision on Institution in the Foil Boarding IPR. Granting the Petition and joining Petitioner to the Foil Boarding IPR will provide us with the opportunity to more fully consider Patent Owner’s arguments—first raised in response to the petition in the Foil Boarding IPR—in the context in which they were first raised. Those common arguments will be fully considered in the Foil Boarding IPR, with the benefit of a complete record.8 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of the Challenged Claims of the ’044 patent. We therefore grant the Petition, and institute inter partes review of the Challenged Claims.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “challenges the same claims on the same grounds using the same prior art, Kyocera factor (2) favors joinder. See Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. Indeed, the Board “routinely grants motions for joinder where the party seeking joinder introduces identical arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing proceeding.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Raytheon Co., IPR2016- 00962, Paper 12 at 9 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2016). Moreover, because the issues to be decided are the same and Petitioner avers that it will take an “understudy” role to Foil Boarding in the Foil Boarding IPR by consolidating all filings, refraining from advancing new arguments, binding itself to any discovery agreements, and limiting its deposition time to the time already allotted, Kyocera factors (3) and (4) also favor joinder. See Mot. 4–6; Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. For the reasons explained above, we find that joining Petitioner to the Foil Boarding IPR is appropriate under the present circumstances. We, therefore, grant Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,359,044
  • PTAB · Jan 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01107 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 under § 103 and granted BRP’s motion to join IPR2024-00085.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “At this stage of the proceeding and based on our preliminary review, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of the Challenged Claims for the same reasons discussed in our Decision on Institution in the Foil Boarding IPR. Granting the Petition and joining Petitioner to the Foil Boarding IPR will provide us with the opportunity to more fully consider Patent Owner’s arguments—first raised in response to the petition in the Foil Boarding IPR—in the context in which they were first raised. Those common arguments will be fully considered in the Foil Boarding IPR, with the benefit of a complete record.8 Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing the unpatentability of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. We therefore grant the Petition, and institute inter partes review of the Challenged Claims.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s Motion. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments. Because the Petition challenges the same claims on the same grounds using the same prior art, Kyocera factor (2) favors joinder. See Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. Indeed, the Board “routinely grants motions for joinder where the party seeking joinder introduces identical arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing proceeding.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Raytheon Co., IPR2016- 00962, Paper 12 at 9 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2016). Moreover, because the issues to be decided are the same and Petitioner avers that it will take an “understudy” role to Foil Boarding in the Foil Boarding IPR by consolidating all filings, refraining from advancing new arguments, binding itself to any discovery agreements, and limiting its deposition time to the time already allotted, Kyocera factors (3) and (4) also favor joinder. See Mot. 4–6; Kyocera, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4. For the reasons explained above, we find that joining Petitioner to the Foil Boarding IPR is appropriate under the present circumstances. We, therefore, grant Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,586,659
  • PTAB · Dec 19, 2024 · IPR2024-01068 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 8, 9, 11–23, 26, 27, and 29–36 on all petitioned grounds and granted NXP's conditional motion to join the TI IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, we institute inter partes review of the Challenged Claims of the ’528 patent. We also grant Petitioner’s Conditional Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner to IPR2024-00936.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied

      “As set forth in the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (dated June 21, 2022), at 7, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf, the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board] will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Petitioner’s stipulation (Ex. 1041) satisfies the language from the Director’s Memorandum quoted above. Additionally, we do not see an issue with ambiguity in Petitioner’s stipulation. Specifically, following joinder, this IPR (i.e., IPR2024-01068), which is based on the Petition at issue here (i.e., the Petition filed by NXP), will still be pending even though Petitioner will be joined to IPR2024-00936. Thus, the “IPR from this [P]etition” will be “pending,” which satisfies the language of Petitioner’s stipulation and precludes the actions stated therein. Further, to the extent there was any potential ambiguity, that ambiguity is resolved by Petitioner’s representations in e-mail correspondence (Exhibit 3001), as noted above. Therefore, we need not analyze each Fintiv factor to reach the determination that we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution in view of the parallel litigation.” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “Compare Pet. with TI IPR, Paper 2 (petition); see also Motion 2 (stating that “NXP’s petition challenges the same claims on the same grounds, relies on the same prior art, and includes the exact same substantive arguments as the TI IPR”). Patent Owner raises the same arguments that it presented in the TI IPR. Regarding the first ground, Patent Owner asserts that (1) Petitioner has not shown that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Tayloe, TI Datasheet, and Macnally (Prelim. Resp. 5– 9) and (2) Petitioner fails to provide a sufficient reasonable expectation of success in combining Macnally and Tayloe (id. at 9–12). Additionally, Patent Owner contends we should exercise our discretion to deny institution” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “35 U.S.C. § 315(c). We have explained that a motion for joinder should: (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact, if any, joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013).” slip op. at 10

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,118,528
  • PTAB · Dec 19, 2024 · IPR2024-01066 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claim 14 under all three obviousness grounds and granted NXP’s conditional motion to join the Texas Instruments IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board] will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Petitioner’s stipulation (Ex. 1041) satisfies the language from the Director’s Memorandum quoted above. Additionally, we do not see an issue with ambiguity in Petitioner’s stipulation. Specifically, following joinder, this IPR (i.e., IPR2024-01066), which is based on the Petition at issue here (i.e., the Petition filed by NXP), will still be pending even though Petitioner will be joined to IPR2024-00935. Thus, the “IPR from this [P]etition” will be “pending,” which satisfies the language of Petitioner’s stipulation and precludes the actions stated therein. Further, to the extent there was any potential ambiguity, that ambiguity is resolved by Petitioner’s representations in e-mail correspondence (Exhibit 3001), as noted above. Therefore, we need not analyze each Fintiv factor to reach the determination that we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution in view of the parallel litigation.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, we institute inter partes review of the Challenged Claim of the ’177 patent. We also grant Petitioner’s Conditional Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner to IPR2024-00935.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “join as a party to [an instituted] inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that . . . after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response . . . warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). We have explained that a motion for joinder should: (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact, if any, joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified.” slip op. at 7

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,865,177
  • PTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2023-00402 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 and 17–20 are unpatentable over the Doshi and Guichard grounds; claims 14–16 were not shown unpatentable over Doshi, Guichard, and Xu.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “require “selecting an entity pair from” all of the entity pairs of “said plurality of transport entities.” Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments addressing the claim language, the plain language of claim 1 does not require the selection to be from all of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined. The plain language of claim 1 also does not preclude the selection to be from a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined. Rather, dependent claim 9, through its dependence on claims 1 and 4, explicitly allows for the selection to be from a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities. Patent Owner’s arguments advocate for the importation of limitations from the ’821 Patent Specification into the claim––namely the disclosure that all entity pairs of transport entities examined in step 220 of Figure 2 are input to the entity pair selection step 230. See PO Sur-reply 4. It is well settled that it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. Accordingly, we construe “selecting an entity pair from said plurality of transport entities based at least upon said overall cost” according to its plain meaning, the scope of which includes selecting an entity pair from all or a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not construe “working entity” and “protection entity” in order to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Other Claim Terms and Phrases As demonstrated in our analysis below, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve the controversy before us. See, e.g., Realtime, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375.” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Patent Owner Response.” PO Resp. 25. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is supported by declaration testimony and is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’821 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the entire record and after having considered Petitioner’s citations to Doshi, Guichard, and Dr. Houh’s testimony (Ex. 1003) as well as Patent Owner’s citations to Doshi, Guichard and Mr. Gomez’s testimony, we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Doshi with Guichard’s teachings of reoptimization of a LSP path triggered by an network change. See Pet. 20–22, 40–45; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he results of the combination would have been predictable and there would have been a reasonable expectation of success since Doshi and Guichard both address the same technology.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65). According to Petitioner, “a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in reoptimizing Doshi’s LSP pair selection because Guichard provides significant implementation details, including when to trigger reoptimization evaluations and how to ‘avoid network instabilities.’” Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1006, 5). Petitioner asserts that a reasonable expectation of success is evidenced by other skilled artisans that reoptimized similar systems. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1009, 136; Ex. 1010, 1; Ex. 1023, 34; Ex. 1034 ¶¶ 27–33, claim 19; Ex. 1035 ¶ 24). In support, Petitioner contends that “the combination would be within a POSITA’s skillset since Doshi already sets forth the calculation and selection techniques that would be utilized during the reoptimization evaluation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65). According to Petitioner, “since Doshi is already ‘monitoring and updating . . . network topology’ . . . event-based reoptimization evaluation per Guichard, would be directly applicable.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 270–281).” slip op. at 38

    Patent outcomesUS 8,830,821 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,830,821
  • PTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00026 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–31 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over Bruckman; the Board did not reach the additional grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments that the ’740 Patent Specification disavows “any configurations where the user port is fixedly assigned to a specific backplane trace” from the full scope of the claim. Patent Owner’s citations to disclosures in the ’740 Patent Specification do not disparage the prior art, but merely contrast the configurations of the user ports and backplane traces disclosed in the ’740 Patent to “some known network element configurations” and “some conventional network elements.” See Ex. 1001, 1:66–2:4, 5:13–21. We find that the comparison of the disclosed configurations of user ports and backplane traces to that of the prior art in the ’740 Patent Specification does not constitute a clear disavowal of the first physical link fixedly assigned to the second physical link. See Continental Circuits LLC v. Intel Corp., 915 F.3d 788, 798 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[C]omparing and contrasting the present technique to that of the prior art does not ‘rise to the level of a clear disavowal’ of claim scope.”). Accordingly, we decline to construe “selecting, in a single computation based on at least one of the frame attributes, a first physical link out of the first group and a second physical link out of the second group” as requiring “the first physical link is not fixedly assigned to the second words of the claim their ordinary and customary meanings.” slip op. at 16

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not construe “interface module.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “(‘POSITA’) in April 2006 would have had a working knowledge of computer networking, including such commonly used technologies as Ethernet and the internet protocol / transmission control protocol (TCP/IP) suite.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 7–9). Petitioner further asserts that “[a] POSITA would two years of professional experience in the field of communication networks, including link aggregation in communication networks.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 7–9). “For purposes of this Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 21. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is supported by declaration testimony and is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’740 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 19

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “1 Juniper Networks, Inc. filed a motion for joinder and a petition in IPR20240-00034, which were granted. Accordingly, Juniper Networks, Inc has been joined as a petitioner in this proceeding.” slip op. at 1

    Patent outcomesUS 7,545,740 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,545,740
  • PTAB · Jul 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Irwin renders at least one challenged claim obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied

      “Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied

      “We disagree. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the fact pattern presented here is not the typical situation in which the factors from General Plastic are considered. In particular, this proceeding challenges claims of a different patent than the patents at issue in PGR2020-00084 and IPR2023- 01235. Challenging claims of different patents significantly distinguishes the facts here from those in General Plastic, and we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to extend General Plastic in this regard. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached

      “Even assuming Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner and assuming we may exercise our discretion to deny institution based on unclean hands (see Kavo Dental Techs, LLC v. Osseo Imaging, Inc., IPR2020-00659, Paper 10 at 19 (PTAB June 10, 2020)), Patent Owner essentially asks us to resolve multiple factual issues related to its contract dispute with Linq3 to justify denial of institution. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1– 26. Many, if not all, of these issues appear to be involved in the contract dispute, which will be resolved by the Arizona state court. We are not in a good position to make determinations about these particular issues at this stage of the proceeding, on the limited record before us. Rather, we find that the state court is better suited to address the conduct of Linq3 of which Patent Owner complains. Accordingly, we leave these matters for the state court. To the extent Patent Owner seeks to pursue its argument that Linq3 is a real party in interest to Petitioner, even though no time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) has been asserted, Patent Owner may raise the issue of real party in interest again in its Patent Owner Response, and the parties may brief and argue the issue during trial.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “5. Weighing the Graham Factors “Once all relevant facts are found, the ultimate legal determination [of obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the record presently before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that Irwin would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1–9 and 11–24 of the ’451 patent obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 38

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,488,451
  • PTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00315 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 9, 10, 12, 20, 21, and 23 on all petition grounds, granted joinder to IPR2024-00137, and authorized withdrawal of Samsung’s Sotera stipulation.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Carriers’ parallel district-court case. The arguments and facts are substantively the same as those presented in the T-Mobile IPR, except Petitioner here is not a defendant in the Carriers’ parallel district-court case. In the T-Mobile IPR, we found that factor 1 is neutral, factors 2, 3, and 5 weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution, and factor 4 weighs marginally against exercising discretion to deny institution. T-Mobile 6 See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). IPR, Paper 15, 10–14. Because Petitioner in the instant proceeding is not a defendant in the Carriers’ parallel district-court case, we find that factor 5 weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution in the instant proceeding. Regarding the other factors, for the same reasons discussed in the decision to institute in the T-Mobile IPR, we find that factor 1 is neutral, factors 2 and 3 weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution, and factor 4 weighs marginally against exercising discretion to deny institution. T-Mobile IPR, Paper 15, 10–14. We turn to Patent Owner’s arguments based on the Petitioner’s parallel district-court case. Our analysis of factors 1 and 4 is the same as that presented in the T-Mobile IPR because no stay has been requested in Petitioner’s parallel district-court case and Petitioner has agreed to be bound by the same stipulation submitted in the T-Mobile IPR. Joinder Mot. 1. Based on the facts presented by the parties, including the May 5, 2025 trial date, we find that factors 2, 3, and 5 weigh marginally in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution. Taking “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review” (Fintiv, Paper 11, 6), we conclude that the evidence of record and our analysis of factors 1–5 relating to both district-court cases favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. Regarding factor 6, for the reasons discussed in our institution decision in the T-Mobile IPR, we determine, on this preliminary record, that the merits here are compelling. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unpatentability as the ones on which we instituted review in the T-Mobile IPR. Compare Pet. 3, 21–56, with T-Mobile IPR, Paper 1, 6, 25–60. Indeed, Petitioner contends that “the grounds of challenge in this Petition are a ‘copycat’ of the Petition filed in” the T-Mobile IPR and the “expert declaration filed in this proceeding is substantively identical to the expert declaration in” the T-Mobile IPR and is “signed by the same expert.” Id. at 1. Patent Owner states that its arguments on the merits in its Preliminary Response “are likewise ‘copycat’ of the merits arguments Patent Owner presented in its preliminary response in IPR2024-00137.” Prelim. Resp. 1 n.1. We instituted inter partes review of claims 9, 10, 12, 20, 21, and 23 of the ’888 Patent on May 22, 2024, based on the petition filed in the T-Mobile IPR after consideration of all arguments and evidence presented by the parties including Patent Owner’s arguments in its Preliminary Response. T- Mobile IPR, Paper 15. For the same reasons discussed in the Decision on Institution in the T-Mobile IPR, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one claim of the ’888 patent is unpatentable. See id. Accordingly, we find the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised.” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and cited supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the T-Mobile IPR. Petitioner timely filed its Motion for Joinder within one month after 7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. institution of trial in the T-Mobile IPR, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Petitioner challenges the same claims that are challenged in the T-Mobile IPR on the same grounds using the same prior art and evidence. See, e.g., Joinder Mot. 1, 6–7; compare Pet. 3, 12–39, with T-Mobile IPR, Paper 1, 6, 16–41. Petitioner states it will take an “understudy” role in the T-Mobile IPR and only assume a primary role should all Carriers cease participation in the T-Mobile IPR. See Joinder Mot. 6. Petitioner further asserts that joinder will have little to no impact on the trial schedule for the T-Mobile IPR and will simplify briefing and discovery. See Joinder Mot. 6, 9–11. Accordingly, joinder to the T-Mobile IPR would further the goals of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). Therefore, for the reasons given, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner to the T-Mobile IPR.” slip op. at 13

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 9,094,888
  • PTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00317 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 23–27 on all petition grounds and granted Samsung’s motion to join the T-Mobile IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “B. Institution of Inter Partes Review The Petition in this proceeding asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as the grounds on which we instituted review in the T-Mobile IPR. Compare Pet. 3, 12–39, with T-Mobile IPR, Paper 1, 6, 16–41. Indeed, Petitioner contends that “the grounds of challenge in this Petition are a ‘copycat’ of the Petition filed in T-Mobile USA, Inc. et al. v. Cobblestone Wireless, LLC, IPR2024-00135” and the “expert declaration filed in this proceeding is substantively identical to the expert declaration in IPR2024- 00135 and signed by the same expert.” Id. at 1.” slip op. at 7

    • Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner

      “103(a) Chang III. ANALYSIS A. Discretionary Denial Argument Patent Owner asserts “[t]o the extent that the Board institutes review of the First Petition, institution of the Second Petition should be denied as an unnecessary parallel petition.” Prelim. Resp. 3. We denied institution in the first ranked proceeding. See Samsung Electronics America, Inc., v. Cobblestone Wireless LLC, IPR2024-00318, Paper 11 (PTAB June 21, 2024). Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments and cited supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the T-Mobile IPR. Petitioner timely filed its Motion for Joinder within one month after institution of trial in the T-Mobile IPR, as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Petitioner challenges the same claims that are challenged in the T-Mobile IPR on the same grounds using the same prior art and evidence. See, e.g., Mot. 1, 6–7; compare Pet. 3, 12–39, with T-Mobile IPR, Paper 1, 6, 16–41. Petitioner states it will take an “understudy” role in the T-Mobile IPR and only assume a primary role should all Carriers cease participation in the T- Mobile IPR. See Mot. 6. Petitioner further asserts that joinder will have little to no impact on the trial schedule for the T-Mobile IPR and will simplify briefing and discovery. See Mot. 6, 9–11. Accordingly, joinder to the T-” slip op. at 11

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,554,196
  • PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00037 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9, 12–24, and 27–31 under the stated grounds and granted Juniper’s motion to join the Cisco IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response. For the same reasons set forth in our institution decision in the Cisco IPR, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable. We therefore institute trial as to all challenged claims on all grounds stated in the Petition.” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “institution of the Cisco IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As noted, the Petition in this case asserts the same unpatentability grounds on which we instituted review in the Cisco IPR. See Mot. 4–5. Petitioner also relies on the same prior art analysis and expert testimony submitted by the Cisco petitioner. See id. at 5. Indeed, the Petition is nearly identical to the petition filed by the Cisco petitioner. See id. Thus, this inter partes review does not present any ground or matter not already at issue in the Cisco IPR. Id. If joinder is granted, Petitioner agrees to assume an “‘understudy’ role” and agrees that this role shall apply unless the Cisco petitioner ceases to participate in the instituted IPR. Id. at 6–7. Petitioner further represents that it will not advance any arguments separate from those advanced by the Cisco petitioner in the consolidated filings. Id. Because Petitioner expects to participate only in a limited capacity, Petitioner submits that joinder will not impact the trial schedule for the Cisco IPR. Id. at 5. Patent Owner did not file an Opposition to the Motion for Joinder. Based on the above, we determine that joinder with the Cisco IPR is appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 4

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,652,111
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