- PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - Exotec Product France SAS / Exotec North America Inc. et al. v. Opex CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00850 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–12, 14, and 23–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Raizer and Hangzhou.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes an express construction” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In this case, we must determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Hangzhou’s disclosure of driving its auto-guided trolleys 200 under shelves 100 would improve the operation of Raizer’s system in the same way. For us to resolve this question in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). However, bodily incorporation, i.e., “an actual physical substitution of” Hangzhou’s auto-guided trolleys or operating software into Raizer’s system, is not required. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 11,472,632 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,472,632 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Telcom Ventures LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00973 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied the petitions under § 314(a), instituting no trial because the district court case was likely to reach trial first.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“In particular, the projected final written decision due date in the Board proceeding is December 10, 2026.3 DD Req. 13. The district court’s scheduled trial date is June 1, 2026, and the time-to-trial statistics suggest trial will begin by October 2026. Id.; DD. Opp. 17. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding will issue before district court trial occurs resulting in significant duplication of effort, additional expense for the parties, and a risk of inconsistent decisions. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial. Further, Petitioner’s argument that the patent examiner committed “multiple errors” during prosecution are not persuasive. See DD Opp. 7–12.” slip op. at 2
- Director reviewOther
“After considering the parties’ arguments and the record, and in view of all relevant considerations, discretionary denial of institution is appropriate in these proceedings. This determination is based on the totality of the evidence and arguments the parties have presented.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,462,411 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00653 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all claims because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim was unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’504 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Additionally, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and these need be construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 72); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1002 ¶ 47. As reflected above, Dr. Wooley’s testimony as to element [1.2] does not even assert that Cardamone discloses a tank, let alone one or more sensors disposed at a tank as recited in element [1.2]. Thus, Dr. Wooley’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s argument on this issue.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,726,504 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403 - Tanklogix, LLC v. SiteproInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00650 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 18–32 and 34 were unpatentable over Kahn or Kahn and Gutierrez.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of at least one claim of the ’871 patent. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we decline to institute an inter partes review of claims 18–32 and 34 of the ’871 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The respective proposed levels of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art are similar, with Patent Owner proposing two years of experience compared to Petitioner proposing significant experience with remotely controlling fluid-handling devices, like SCADA systems. Patent Owner also proposes more extensive experience in lieu of educational experience. While we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications to be acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’871 patent and the asserted prior art. Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the qualifications adopted.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“actuators and the remote control of fluid handling devices, including the receipt with the user-interface module of “a user command to actuate an actuator via a presented control interface” (limitation [18.7]) and “account authorized to send commands to remotely control fluid handling devices” (limitation [18.11]). We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses or teaches these limitations because the evidence does not provide support that there is remote control of fluid handling devices or the use of a user command on a control interface to send a command to a fluid handling device, for instance. Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but we do not discern that it teaches or discloses the capability to remotely control fluid handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, the Kahn disclosures that Petitioner repeatedly relies upon for allegedly teaching this control are deficient. See Ex. 1005, 10:62–67, 14:35– 15:2, 15:62–16:32; see also Pet. 12–14, 16–18. Kahn discloses that “the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance.” Ex. 1005, 10:62–67. Communication unit 112B is part of the local “sensor unit,” wherein the detection conditions determined by the sensor are communicated to remote devices by communication unit 112B. See id. at 3:31–33, 5:62–6:2, 6:27–35, 7:33–37, 13:7–12, Figs. 1A–1C. Kahn discloses that the sensor units, which include communication units 112B, can be located near shut-off valves and can communicate with distant locations. See id. at 11:1–13. There are no disclosures, however, in the above passages that there is remote control of fluid handling devices, that there is a user command on a control interface that actuates an actuator, or that there is a command sent to the facility actuators via a network connection, as required in limitations [18.5]–[18.7] and [18.9]–[18.12], respectively. Rather, the disclosure indicates that the communication unit 112B includes on-site alerts and that the local (non-remote) communication unit 112B can be interfaced with the control valve.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,488,871 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Cerence Operating CompanyInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00457 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Director review
The Director granted Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied institution under § 314(a) because the district court trial is scheduled before the projected final written decision.
RulingsDirector review decision- Director reviewDirector review, deniedOther
“After considering the parties’ arguments and the record, and in view of all relevant considerations, discretionary denial of institution is appropriate in this proceeding. This determination is based on the totality of the evidence and arguments the parties have presented. In particular, the projected final written decision due date in the Board proceeding is October 8, 2026. The district court’s scheduled trial date is April 20, 2026. DD Req. 6. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding will issue before the district court trial occurs, resulting in significant duplication of effort, additional expense for the parties, and a risk of inconsistent decisions. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial. DD Opp. 1–2. These considerations favor discretionary denial. Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“In particular, the projected final written decision due date in the Board proceeding is October 8, 2026. The district court’s scheduled trial date is April 20, 2026. DD Req. 6. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding will issue before the district court trial occurs, resulting in significant duplication of effort, additional expense for the parties, and a risk of inconsistent decisions. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial. DD Opp. 1–2. These considerations favor discretionary denial. Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petition is denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,680,334 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Keyless Licensing LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00527 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Director review
The Director denied institution of inter partes review under § 314(a), finding discretionary denial appropriate based on the totality of the evidence and arguments.
RulingsDirector review decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“In particular, the projected final written decision due date for each of these cases is October 9, 2026. DD Req. 6. The district court’s scheduled trial date is April 20, 2026, and the time-to-trial statistics suggest trial will begin in May 2026. DD Req. 3–4. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in these proceedings will issue before district court trial occurs. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial, and there has been meaningful investment in the parallel proceeding by the parties. Id. at 2–3, 5–6. For example, the parties are engaged in the Markman process and fact discovery is nearly closed. Id. at 5–6. Although certain arguments are highlighted above, the determination to exercise discretion to deny institution is based on a holistic assessment of all of the evidence and arguments presented. Accordingly, the Petitions are denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Director reviewOther
“Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE,1 Acting Deputy Chief Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review” slip op. at 1
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,976,922 - Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless / T-Mobile USA, Inc. et al. v. Pegasus Wireless Innovation LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00293 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Director review
The Director granted the Patent Owner’s discretionary-denial request and denied institution under § 314(a), citing the parallel district court trial schedule and investment.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“In particular, the projected final written decision due date for IPR2025-00137 is July 17, 2026, for IPR2025-00138 is July 28, 2026, for IPR2025-00292 is August 5, 2026, and for IPR2025-00293 is August 2, 2026. DD Req. 5; IPR2025-00138, Paper 12, 6; IPR2025-000292, Paper 12, 5–6; IPR2025-00293, Paper 12, 7. The district court’s scheduled trial date is September 8, 2025, and the time-to-trial statistics suggest trial will begin in November 2025. DD Req. 5–8. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in these proceedings will issue before district court trial occurs. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence that the district court is likely to stay its proceeding even if the Board were to institute trial, and there has been meaningful investment in the parallel proceeding by the 2 Unless indicated otherwise, citations are to papers in IPR2025-00137. The parties filed similar papers in IPR2025-00138, IPR2025-00290, IPR2025- 00291, IPR2025-00292, IPR2025-00293, and IPR2025-00317. parties. Id. at 4–5; 11–15. For example, fact discovery has closed and the parties have participated in a Markman hearing. Id. at 14–15.” slip op. at 3
- Director reviewOther
“After considering the parties’ arguments and the record, and in view of all relevant considerations, discretionary denial of institution is appropriate in these proceedings. This determination is based on the totality of the evidence and arguments the parties have presented.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,009,161 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 21, 2025 · IPR2024-01248 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1–11, 16, and 21 unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’071 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes a specific construction of any claim term, although Petitioner contends each term should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 16; see generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, we need not construe any claim terms expressly because the meaning of the terms is not in dispute and an express construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“We find the Petition lacking in particularity because it does not clearly identify what aspect of Jin is alleged to teach the unique signal parameters (or unique estimated signal parameters) recited in claim 1. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (“A petition filed under section 311 may be considered only if — (3) the petition identifies, in writing and with particularity, . . . the evidence that supports the ground for the challenge to each claim . . . .”). First, as reflected above, the Petition asserts that something called a “unique pilot parameter” teaches the recited unique estimated signal parameters. But “unique pilot parameter” is not a term or phrase recited in Jin. See Prelim. Resp. 19 (arguing the same). So, when Petitioner states “Jin discloses that the base station uses the unique pilot parameter (i.e., ‘unique estimated signal parameters’) to ‘identify which user (i.e., mobile terminal) has transmitted the received data,’” it is not clear what element in Jin Petitioner intends to identify by the term “unique pilot parameter.” Dr. Min’s testimony does not help resolve the ambiguity in the Petition. In particular, Dr. Min also refers to a “unique pilot parameter (i.e., ‘unique signal parameter’) for each user.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 89. But, as noted above, Jin does not disclose an element referred to as a “pilot parameter” and it is not clear what element Dr. Min intended to identify in Jin.8” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,814,071
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.