• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00222 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–11, 13, and 14 are unpatentable over Yu and Miyazaki; claims 15, 16, and 19 were not shown unpatentable over Matsushima.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “at, and before, the earliest claimed priority date of the ’158 patent . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” adding that “[l]ess experience may be sufficient with additional education, and likewise, less education may be sufficient with additional work experience.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–18). Patent Owner does not offer a competing definition or dispute Petitioner's articulation. Based on the entire record, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art because that characterization, we find, is consistent with the ’158 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We determine that the claims require a per-channel determination of integration time—that is, an integration time arrived at for each sensor or channel individually—and cannot be satisfied by a single global value merely applied uniformly across the sensors. We do not, however, read the independent claims to require that the per-channel integration times differ from one another.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We adopt the definition clearly and unambiguously set forth in the specification, which was likewise adopted by the Court in the related litigation. See Pet. 7–8, 55; Pet. Reply 1–2 (district court construing the term to mean “the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene”). The specification states that the integrated photo-charge “is directly related to the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene,” and that “[t]his is known as integration time.” Ex. 1001, 4:4–7. Accordingly, the ’158 patent demonstrates that the inventors indisputably acted as a lexicographer for the term “integration time.”” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “We construe “during a frame” to mean the period during which data for a single frame of an image is captured. The limitation is satisfied where the per-channel integration time is effectuated during the frame; it does not require that the integration time be re-determined mid-frame, nor does it require actuation of a “charge integration switch.” The specification’s only use of the phrase confirms this reading: “each camera channel is controlled during a frame under an independent integration time.” Ex. 1001, 3:45–50. Consistent with that usage, the specification describes selecting an integration time for each channel and then integrating the photo-signal “within a single frame of data,” and describes placing the charge-integration switch in a state to allow charge to accumulate for the selected period and then transferring the accumulated charge upon completion of the integration period. Id. at 4:51–54, 11:3–18. We decline Patent Owner’s proposal to require in-frame actuation of a charge-integration switch, for the same reason we decline to import that structure into “integration time.” We also decline to read the phrase to require mid-frame re-determination of the integration time, because the patent’s own embodiment selects an integration time and then integrates charge during the frame under that selected time. Ex. 1001, 4:51–54, 11:3– 18. So construed, “during a frame” is not redundant of the independentclaim limitation: it adds that the per-channel control occurs within a single frame (intrascene), as distinct from adjustment from one frame to the next (interscene).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 9,232,158 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,232,158
• Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 7, 2025 · IPR2023-00949 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–14 and 16–20 are unpatentable over Kim; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable over Chang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art is essentially the same as Petitioner’s, for example requiring a bachelor’s degree in science or engineering and “at least two years of relevant work experience with capture and processing of data or information, including but not limited to physiological information.” Id.; Pet. 9. In view of the similarity, our record now before us, and as we did in our Institution Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art as it is essentially the same as that proposed by Patent Owner. Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’619 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret a claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Furthermore, “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner indicate that any claim terms require construction. See generally Petition; PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision where no claim terms are in dispute, we need not explicitly construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “What these cases and examples clearly articulate, is that whether there is sufficient description in an anticipation reference for linking different disclosures, elements, and embodiments, is particularly case and fact dependent. Moreover, a finding of anticipation resting upon a reference’s disclosures of elements in different embodiments turns on whether an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that the reference suggests arranging the elements of the embodiments to one another in the same way as the challenged claims. For the reasons that follow, we determine that there is sufficient description and teaching in Kim such that the “combined button” disclosed by Kim, for example in Figure 10(b), can be the same “combined button” as discussed in the embodiment of Figure 18.” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “As to Patent Owner’s first and second arguments, as we discussed in detail above with respect to anticipation, we find that there is sufficient evidence in Kim itself of contextual and even express links between the various combined button embodiments and Figure 18. Section II.D.2.b)(1)– (4). We have already determined “that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand Kim to disclose the ‘combined button’ structure and function that could be implemented on the face or sidewall of a device.” Id. We likewise determine, based on the same evidence, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Kim to suggest that the combined button structure and function, for example in the embodiment of Figure 10(b), could be implemented in an opening on the face or sidewall of a device. Obviousness does not require an instruction manual on how to physically incorporate or combine the disclosures of two embodiments in a reference. As KSR informs us, “in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Moreover, in this case we have only one prior art patent, Kim, so at least the pieces of the puzzle are all in the same box. The persuasive testimony of Dr. Berger that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been familiar with electronic devices with sealed and/or insulated button assemblies, and would understand that those assemblies were not limited to the front face of a device,” is unrebutted in this case. Ex. 1003 ¶ 110. “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Given the background knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art in conjunction with the motivation and teachings in Kim itself for placing sufficient motivation to support the combination of Kim’s Figure 10(b) embodiment with the sidewall placement of the combined button taught in Figure 18 for obviousness purposes. It is well-settled that a single prior art obviousness reference itself can provide motivation for the combination. See General Elec. Co. v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., 983 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Reversing the Board’s finding of nonobviousness over a single prior art reference, the Court explained that “the Board’s approach would require a motivation to combine each element of the claim—even those present together in a reference. This analysis unduly dissects prior art references into collections of individual elements, requiring a party showing obviousness to re-do the work already done in the prior art reference.”). Patent Owner’s third argument is unavailing because although Dr. Anthony testifies that “implementing the fingerprint sensor assembly of Kim’s Figure 10 embodiment in the ‘lateral surface’ of Kim’s Figure 18 embodiment would have complicated the manufacturing process for the resulting mobile device,” Dr. Anthony does not provide testimony or evidence that implementing the combined button on the sidewall would have been difficult or beyond the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2009 ¶ 73. We credit Dr. Berger who explains persuasively that “[p]rior to the ’619 patent’s earliest alleged priority date of June 19, 2017, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that a mobile electronic device could include one or more button assemblies in a sidewall.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 47 (citing Ex. 1013, 4:40, 19:42–20:4, Figs. 13B, 17, 19A, 19B). It is well-settled that a person of ordinary skill can use his or her ordinary skill, creativity, and common sense to make the necessary adjustments and further modifications to result in a properly functioning device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”).” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 10,866,619 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,866,619
• Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Dexcom, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2023 · IPR2022-00914 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 105 and 106 are unpatentable as obvious over Heller and Mastrototaro; Abbott did not prove claims 49, 80, 81, 85, or 86 unpatentable on the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “on the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art to disclose the predictive relationship limitation of claim 49 not taught by Heller are legally deficient. Resp. 28–38. We agree in that Petitioner’s contentions in the Petition amount to no more than a conclusory assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have known” the predictive relationship limitation. See Pet. 38–39. Petitioner’s arguments in the Petition are divorced from any analysis of Heller and fail to articulate why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Heller to teach the predictive relationship in light of what was purportedly known more generally in the art. Merely asserting that a particular limitation was “known in the art” does not constitute a legally sufficient basis for establishing obviousness. See, e.g., Deere, 383 U.S. at 17–18. While Petitioner purports to identify multiple references that teach a predictive relationship, Petitioner circumvents a legally sufficient obviousness analysis by choosing not to assert any of the references in combination with Heller, but to instead argue they all collectively show that “predictive relationships” were broadly known in the art. See Pet. 28–33. Rather than establish some broad understanding by persons of ordinary skill in the art concerning the predictive relationship limitation, Petitioner’s arguments make clear that each reference uniquely addressed the relationship between a particular sensor and the in vivo performance of the sensor. For example, Petitioner asserts Gross teaches a sensor for which “the pre-insertion, factory-determined in vitro performance curve and” slip op. at 32

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “level in Gross is a “measure of sensor current, not ‘analyte concentration’ is contrary to the express disclosure of Gross. Gross expressly discloses a calibration method that requires, after insertion the in vivo measurement of a saturation level G1 “which can be measured by the sensor and which is of importance for the calibration method.” Ex. 1004, 13:3–18 (further stating that a “voltage V1 (FIG. 4C) applied at time t1 gives a current I1, (FIG. 4B) which corresponds to the saturation level G1 (FIG. 4A) of the enzyme”). Gross explains that “the predetermined stimulus is adapted to saturate the sensor such that the first signal is a maximum signal,” and “[w]hen a sensor is such that it can be saturated by a sufficiently large stimulus, it can be preferable to use this phenomenon in calibrating the sensor as it enables a reproducible first predetermined stimulus, i.e. a saturation stimulus to be provided in all cases, thereby removing uncertainty as to whether the means for providing a predetermined stimulus will in fact achieve exactly the right level of uncertainty.” Id. at 3:17–26.” slip op. at 45

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached

    “of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of nonobviousness. 5 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). An obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. However, Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, Petitioner must articulate a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art references. In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Pers. Web Tech., LLC, v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention”) (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015)) (alteration in original).” slip op. at 15

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In light of the foregoing multiple critical misrepresentations, Petitioner’s MTE is denied regarding sufficiency of Dr. Baura’s qualifications because Petitioner did not timely object to the evidence on the basis asserted in the MTE, fails to refute Patent Owner’s showing that Dr. Baura is sufficiently qualified (see MTE Opp. 3–7; Ex. 2010 ¶ 30), and abandons its argument in its Reply to the MTE.” slip op. at 57

  Patent outcomesUS 11,000,213 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,000,213
• Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2020 · IPR2018-01144 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2, 7, and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over Bednar and Gunther; claim 3 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “to the level of ordinary skill in the art was incorrect. Accordingly, because our preliminary finding is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering (or an equivalent subject), together with three years of post-graduate experience designing power management circuits; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or equivalent subject) together with two years of post-graduate experience designing power management circuits.” Inst. Dec. 8; see Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 26–27).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “construction is erroneous. Accordingly, because the ’922 patent defines “power island,” we maintain and reaffirm that “power island” means a “group of components with similar power requirements.”” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “not to expressly construe “conversion controller” was erroneous or that an express construction is required to resolve any dispute between the parties. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm that because the construction of “conversion controller” does not resolve a controversy in the matter before us, we decline to construe it expressly.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “construction of “memory device,” specifically whether it encompasses a latch. Neither party argues that “memory device” is expressly defined in the ’922 patent. Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term controls. And, the standard under which we construe the term is the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification.” slip op. at 86

  Patent outcomesUS 8,004,922 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,004,922
• Department Of Justice v. Discovery Patents, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 9, 2017 · IPR2016-01041 · APJ Matthew R Clements · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11, 12, 14, 16–18, and 20–31 are unpatentable over Monroe ’183; claims 15 and 19 were not shown unpatentable over Monroe ’183.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “A petition for inter partes review may be considered only if, inter alia, “the petition identifies all real parties in interest.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide provides guidance regarding factors to consider in determining whether a party is a real party in interest. 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759–60 (Aug. 14, 2012). Considerations may include whether a non-party “funds and directs and controls” an IPR petition or proceeding. Id. at 48,760. Additional relevant factors include: the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. Whether a party who is not a named participant in a given proceeding is a real party in interest to that proceeding “is a highly fact-dependent question.” Id. at 48,759. There is no “bright line test.” Id. Courts invoke the term real party in interest to describe relationships and considerations sufficient to justify applying conventional principles of estoppel and preclusion. Id. A non-party’s participation with a petitioner may be overt or covert, and the evidence may be direct or circumstantial, but the evidence as a whole must show that the non-party possessed effective control over the petitioner relating to the inter partes review. Zoll Lifecor Corp. v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., Case IPR2013-00609, slip op. at 10 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2014) (Paper 15). We have considered Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, and we determine that Petitioner was not required to identify the Third Parties as real parties in interest because there is insufficient evidence that any of these companies exercised, or could exercise, control over Petitioner with respect to this proceeding. Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the motion practice before the Court of Federal Claims and notification of that action to the Third Parties does not reflect otherwise. Although we acknowledge that the existence of the above-identified indemnification clauses supports Patent Owner’s argument, we are unaware of any inter partes review decision in which a real party in interest finding was based solely on evidence of an indemnification clause, and we decline to do so here.” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

    “We decline to consider Patent Owner’s constitutional challenge as, generally, “administrative agencies do not have jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of congressional enactments.” See Riggin v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 61 F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1705, 1710 (TTAB 1999) (“[T]he Board has no authority . . . to declare provisions of the Trademark Act unconstitutional.”); Amanda Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 USPQ2d 1080 (TTAB 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003); but see Am. Express Co. v. Lunenfeld, Case CBM2014- 00050, slip op. at 9–10 (PTAB May 22, 2015) (Paper 51) (“for the reasons articulated in Patlex [Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985)], we conclude that covered business method patent reviews, like reexamination proceedings, comply with the Seventh Amendment”).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The ’980 patent states that “the term ‘secured location’ may refer to residences, commercial properties, public venues, such as hospitals and sports arenas, government facilities, military installations and any other location, outside or inside, which is protected by a security alarm system.” Ex. 1003, 3:20–24. This definition is non-limiting and does not exclude a changeable area or region. Based on the record developed during this proceeding, we maintain that the broadest reasonable construction in light of the ’980 patent of “secured location” is “any location, outside or inside, which is protected by a security alarm system.”” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Although the Specification of the ’980 patent gives examples of “response agency,” e.g., Ex. 1003, 1:41–43 (“an emergency response agency (e.g., the police department, the fire department or an emergency medical team)”), Patent Owner does not identify, and we do not find, a definition in the specification limiting “response agency” to 911, police, or fire departments. Patent Owner also does not identify, and we do not find, anything in the entire disclosure of the ’980 patent requiring a “response agency” to be distinct from the “surveillance system infrastructure.” Accordingly, we decline to limit “response agency” to 911, police, or fire departments, or construe it to be distinct from surveillance system infrastructure.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,323,980 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 7,323,980
• LG Electronics, Inc. / Toshiba Corp. et al. v. Straight Path IP Group, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 9, 2016 · IPR2015-01400 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ’469 patent and claim 3 of the ’121 patent are unpatentable under §103; the other challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s argument is not persuasive. We agree with Petitioner that 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) applies only to civil actions for patent infringement, and not to an administrative proceeding, including an ITC investigation. See Amkor, Paper 98, slip op. at 6–18; Brinkman Corp. v. A&J Mfg., LLC, Case IPR2015-00056, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Mar. 23, 2015) (Paper 10). Although Amkor and Brinkman Corp. are not precedential, we find them instructive and directly on point. In Amkor, the Board determined that “had Congress intended for arbitration, ITC, or other non-judicial proceedings to trigger the time bar of section 315(b), it would have used more encompassing language than ‘Patent Owner’s Action’ and ‘served with a complaint,’ which are harmonious with a civil action.” Amkor, Paper 98, slip op. at 11 (determining that the time bar is limited to being triggered by the service of a complaint in a civil action). A similar decision by the Board in Brinkman Corp. reaches the same result and specifically is directed toward an ITC investigation. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner that Petitioner is barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner further contends that WINS discloses that NetBIOS is incorporated into the WINS system and expressly discloses that WINS should be combined with NetBIOS. Id. at 37–38 (citing 198 Ex. 1002 ¶ 81; Ex. 1003, 65). Accordingly, Petitioner concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known about and been motivated to combine the references. Id. Petitioner further contends that a person with ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated similarly to combine WINS and NetBIOS with Pinard because Pinard discloses a telephony application with a graphical user interface that allows a user to establish and manage telephone calls. Id. at 38–39. Petitioner specifically argues that Pinard references Windows 3.1 and WINS references Windows 3.11 and Windows NT, and, therefore, a person with ordinary skill in the art would have known how to adapt the graphical user interfaces in Pinard to the system in WINS. Id. We are persuaded that Microsoft TCP/IP for Windows NT utilizes NetBIOS features for name resolution, as disclosed by WINS, and Pinard’s program is compatible with a Windows operating system, and, therefore, a person with ordinary skill in the art would have readily combined the disclosures of WINS, NetBIOS, and Pinard.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable

    “fail to determine whether a computer or process is connected to the computer network. PO Resp. 48–51. In view of our construction of this claim limitation, we agree with Patent Owner. WINS discloses that once a computer is registered with the WINS server (which is a NetBIOS Name Server (NBNS)) as active and on-line, the WINS server maintains a database of names and addresses as active and on-line by (1) releasing names once a computer is shut down properly, and (2) requiring a renewal time period in which a computer must reregister. Ex. 1003, 62–63, 68–69. WINS discloses that in response to User Datagram Protocol (UDP) name queries, “a mapping in the database does not ensure that the related device is currently running.” Id. at 68. WINS further explains that a “local WINS database should periodically be cleared of released entries and old entries that were registered at another WINS server but did not get removed from this WINS database for some reason.” Id. at 150. In other words, WINS discloses that the WINS database may include entries of computers that are not currently connected to the WINS network. Accordingly, a query to as to whether a second process “is connected to the computer network” in WINS will not determine whether the second process is connected to the WINS network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. As discussed above in our claim construction analysis above (see Section I.E.1), a query as to whether a process “is connected to a computer network” or has an “on-line” status asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate. It is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360. WINS discloses that the WINS server has information that a process “was” connected to the computer network, and that information may no longer be accurate. See Ex. 1003, 68, 150. As such, we determine that WINS does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible,” as construed herein. Similarly, NetBIOS discloses a registration process for resources or nodes to receive a unique name by registering a name. Ex. 1004, 379. During a name query (discovery), a datagram is sent requesting the name and address of another resource. Id. at 396. The NBNS maintains a database of resource names through explicit name deletion, where the node specifies a deletion function and implicit name deletion, which occurs when a node ceases operation. Id. at 379. NetBIOS explains that implicit name deletion “is a frequent occurrence.” Id. Implicit name deletion is managed by assigning nodes a specified lifetime for registered names, where a name is silently released if a node fails to refresh the registered name before the lifetime expires. Id. NetBIOS further discloses a mechanism where the NBNS may correct the information stored after an incorrect response is provided to a requesting node. See id. at 409. However, similar to WINS, NetBIOS discloses that the information stored by the NBNS may be incorrect, and, therefore, will not determine whether a second process is connected to the computer network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. Therefore, NetBIOS also does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible.”” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “In Straight Path, the Federal Circuit held that the claim language “is connected to the computer network” has a facially clear meaning, that “the query transmitted to the server seeks to determine whether the second unit is connected at that time, i.e., connected at the time that the query is sent.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360.11 The Federal Circuit held that the query 11 Petitioner argues that the relevant specifications do not include an embodiment that “guarantee[s]” that an entry in its database is online, and, therefore, Patent Owner’s argument does not distinguish the ’704, ’469, and ’121 patents over the prior art. Addʼl Br. 6‒7. However, such an argument goes towards whether there is written description and enablement support for the claims. In Straight Path, the Federal Circuit did not offer a view as to the sufficiency of the written description or enablement based on the asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate.” Id. The Federal Circuit further explained that “[i]t is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained, “[w]hen claim language has as plain a meaning on an issue as the language does here, leaving no genuine uncertainties on interpretive questions relevant to the case, it is particularly difficult to conclude that the specification reasonably supports a different meaning. The specification plays a more limited role than in the common situation where claim terms are uncertain in meaning in relevant respects.” Id. at 1361. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit construed the limitation “is connected to the computer network” as “is connected to the computer network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server.” Id. at 1363. Petitioner and Patent Owner argue that the limitations “on-line status” and “is accessible” have the same meaning as “is connected to the computer network.” See 209 Pet. 35–36; 209 PO Resp. 36‒48; 198 Pet. 35–36; 198 PO Resp. 35‒46; 196 Pet. 29; 196 PO Resp. 38‒51. Similar to “is connected to a computer network,” the “on-line status” and “is accessible” of the second process are recited in the present tense, and therefore must be claim construction provided by the Federal Circuit because “written-description and enablement challenges were not, and could not have been, part of the inter partes review.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1363. We similarly do not determine whether this claim limitation is supported by the specifications of the ʼ704, ʼ469, and ʼ121 patents. determined at the time of the querying whether the second process “is accessible” or selecting of the process having an “on-line status.” Therefore, we construe “on-line status” and “is accessible” as having the same meaning as “is connected to the computer network.”” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 6,009,469 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,009,469
• LG Electronics, Inc. / Toshiba Corp. et al. v. Straight Path IP Group, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 9, 2016 · IPR2015-01397 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ’469 patent and claim 3 of the ’121 patent are unpatentable as obvious; all other challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

    “2. Section 315(b) Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceedings is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.”” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “In Straight Path, the Federal Circuit held that the claim language “is connected to the computer network” has a facially clear meaning, that “the query transmitted to the server seeks to determine whether the second unit is connected at that time, i.e., connected at the time that the query is sent.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360.11 The Federal Circuit held that the query 11 Petitioner argues that the relevant specifications do not include an embodiment that “guarantee[s]” that an entry in its database is online, and, therefore, Patent Owner’s argument does not distinguish the ’704, ’469, and ’121 patents over the prior art. Addʼl Br. 6‒7. However, such an argument goes towards whether there is written description and enablement support for the claims. In Straight Path, the Federal Circuit did not offer a view as to the sufficiency of the written description or enablement based on the asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate.” Id. The Federal Circuit further explained that “[i]t is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Id. The Federal Circuit explained, “[w]hen claim language has as plain a meaning on an issue as the language does here, leaving no genuine uncertainties on interpretive questions relevant to the case, it is particularly difficult to conclude that the specification reasonably supports a different meaning. The specification plays a more limited role than in the common situation where claim terms are uncertain in meaning in relevant respects.” Id. at 1361. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit construed the limitation “is connected to the computer network” as “is connected to the computer network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server.” Id. at 1363. Petitioner and Patent Owner argue that the limitations “on-line status” and “is accessible” have the same meaning as “is connected to the computer network.” See 209 Pet. 35–36; 209 PO Resp. 36‒48; 198 Pet. 35–36; 198 PO Resp. 35‒46; 196 Pet. 29; 196 PO Resp. 38‒51. Similar to “is connected to a computer network,” the “on-line status” and “is accessible” of the second process are recited in the present tense, and therefore must be claim construction provided by the Federal Circuit because “written-description and enablement challenges were not, and could not have been, part of the inter partes review.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1363. We similarly do not determine whether this claim limitation is supported by the specifications of the ʼ704, ʼ469, and ʼ121 patents. determined at the time of the querying whether the second process “is accessible” or selecting of the process having an “on-line status.” Therefore, we construe “on-line status” and “is accessible” as having the same meaning as “is connected to the computer network.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “fail to determine whether a computer or process is connected to the computer network. PO Resp. 48–51. In view of our construction of this claim limitation, we agree with Patent Owner. WINS discloses that once a computer is registered with the WINS server (which is a NetBIOS Name Server (NBNS)) as active and on-line, the WINS server maintains a database of names and addresses as active and on-line by (1) releasing names once a computer is shut down properly, and (2) requiring a renewal time period in which a computer must reregister. Ex. 1003, 62–63, 68–69. WINS discloses that in response to User Datagram Protocol (UDP) name queries, “a mapping in the database does not ensure that the related device is currently running.” Id. at 68. WINS further explains that a “local WINS database should periodically be cleared of released entries and old entries that were registered at another WINS server but did not get removed from this WINS database for some reason.” Id. at 150. In other words, WINS discloses that the WINS database may include entries of computers that are not currently connected to the WINS network. Accordingly, a query to as to whether a second process “is connected to the computer network” in WINS will not determine whether the second process is connected to the WINS network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. As discussed above in our claim construction analysis above (see Section I.E.1), a query as to whether a process “is connected to a computer network” or has an “on-line” status asks “whether the device ‘is’ connected, not whether it was connected or whether it is still registered as being connected even if that registration information is no longer accurate. It is not a reasonable interpretation of the claim language . . . to say that it is satisfied by a query that asks only for registration information, regardless of its current accuracy.” Straight Path, 806 F.3d at 1360. WINS discloses that the WINS server has information that a process “was” connected to the computer network, and that information may no longer be accurate. See Ex. 1003, 68, 150. As such, we determine that WINS does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible,” as construed herein. Similarly, NetBIOS discloses a registration process for resources or nodes to receive a unique name by registering a name. Ex. 1004, 379. During a name query (discovery), a datagram is sent requesting the name and address of another resource. Id. at 396. The NBNS maintains a database of resource names through explicit name deletion, where the node specifies a deletion function and implicit name deletion, which occurs when a node ceases operation. Id. at 379. NetBIOS explains that implicit name deletion “is a frequent occurrence.” Id. Implicit name deletion is managed by assigning nodes a specified lifetime for registered names, where a name is silently released if a node fails to refresh the registered name before the lifetime expires. Id. NetBIOS further discloses a mechanism where the NBNS may correct the information stored after an incorrect response is provided to a requesting node. See id. at 409. However, similar to WINS, NetBIOS discloses that the information stored by the NBNS may be incorrect, and, therefore, will not determine whether a second process is connected to the computer network at the time that the query is transmitted to the server. Therefore, NetBIOS also does not disclose the claimed “is connected to the computer network,” “on-line status,” or “is accessible.” Given that the combination of WINS and NetBIOS fails to teach or suggest the claims as construed, we need not reach the remaining arguments presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over WINS, NetBIOS, and Pinard, and claim 5 of the ’469 patent is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over WINS, NetBIOS, and Palmer. 198 Pet. 37–47, 54‒ 55, 58‒59. For claims 1, 2, and 5, Petitioner provides citations for where each claim limitation is disclosed by WINS and NetBIOS. Id. Petitioner also articulates reasoning with rational underpinnings why a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have combined the teachings of WINS and NetBIOS. Id. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We determine the record supports Petitioner’s contentions and adopt Petitioner’s contentions discussed below as our own. Furthermore, we have reviewed the Petition and supporting evidence and determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ’469 patent would have been obvious over WINS and NetBIOS. See id.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,131,121 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 6,131,121

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.