- PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00652 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’403 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties assert that each claim term should be construed in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 73); see Ex. 1002 ¶ 22 (opining the same). And, in the respective claim construction sections of their briefs, the parties do not propose any claim terms for express construction. We agree with the parties that no claim terms require express construction to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that the Petition fails to demonstrate that Kahn discloses element [1.2] because the evidence cited does not disclose a “first computer system being configured to provide remote control of the first pump or first valve” (i.e., a fluid-handling device). Kahn is directed to providing access to fluid sensing data and analyzing and providing visual information on that data, but Petitioner has not identified any disclosure of the capability to remotely control fluid-handling devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, code (54), 1:27–36, 2:50–3:2. More specifically, Kahn’s disclosures that Petitioner relies on for allegedly teaching remote control are deficient. We discuss each. First, Petitioner points to the following, “[f]or instance, as illustrated in FIG. 1C, a fluid control device such as a valve 15A is located on the input side of a sen[s]or unit 110.” Ex. 1005, 8:19–21, cited in Pet. 13. This portion of Kahn, however, does not disclose remote control. Second, Petitioner cites to the following: Finally, or in addition to, the communication unit 112B can include on-site alerts such as optical (indicator lights), audible alerts (e.g., alarm sounds), tactile (e.g., vibration of the unit) or can be interfaced to an appropriate control valve for simply shutting off the supply of fluid upon the detection of emergency events, for instance. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1005, 10:62–67). We agree with Patent Owner that this portion of Kahn teaches on-site alerts and local control of the fluid-handling device. See Prelim. Resp. 7. This portion of Kahn does not disclose remote control.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,294,403 - Tanklogix, LLC v. Sitepro, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00651 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, 7, and 9–20 were unpatentable over any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2024). For the reasons given below, on this record Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art are similar, although Patent Owner proposes two years of experience along with a bachelor’s degree whereas Petitioner proposes “significant” experience. Patent Owner also proposes an alternative with more extensive experience in lieu of a bachelor’s degree. Although we find Petitioner’s proposed qualifications acceptable, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed qualifications for the purposes of this Decision because they offer a wider range of qualifications that nonetheless comport with the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis and findings herein, however, do not turn on any differences in the parties’ proposed qualifications.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“target value” is part of a command that is sent from a computing device to a server and then to a controller. The controller then receives a measurement of the fluid by a sensor and determines whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” If the measurement does not satisfy the “target value,” further operations are undertaken. The recited operation sequence makes clear that the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” is not as Dr. Wooley opines because the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time is represented by the measurement taken by the sensor, 11 Some claim language less relevant to construing “target value” was omitted for ease of reference. which the controller then uses to determine whether the measurement satisfies the “target value.” Additionally, claim 1 recites that the “target value” is sent as part of a command to the controller. The “target value” is not sent to the controller from the sensor, as might be expected if the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value” were as Dr. Wooley opines. Petitioner and Dr. Wooley’s construction would also result in “target value” meaning effectively the same thing as the measurement of the fluid by the sensor, a concept that is separately recited in claim 1 and to which the “target value” is compared. The Specification of the ’680 patent does not support Petitioner’s understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of “target value.” Although the Specification does not recite “target value,” it recites “target state,” and describes “target state” sufficiently to understand the plain and ordinary meaning of “target” as used in “target value” and “target state.” In particular, the ’680 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, the process 104 includes receiving, via a network interface, from a remote user device, (e.g., via a command-center server) a command to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state.” Ex. 1001, 11:48–51. This portion reflects that the command is seeking to change a state of a fluid-handling device to a target state. In other words, the “target value” or “target state” is not generally “the particular operating condition that a device is in at a particular time”; rather, it is a value or state that the fluid-handling device is desired to be in, as Patent Owner and Dr. Durham explain. Additionally, just as claim 1 recites a directional component for the “target value” to be sent to the controller in a command, so too does the Specification describe a “target state” as being sent in a command from a remote user device. Thus, the Specification clearly supports the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Patent Owner and Dr. Durham and not the plain and ordinary meaning proposed by Petitioner and Dr. Wooley. slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“time-stamped process data, report exception therein to the remote host, and extract and transmit time-stamped process data to the remote host.” Ex. 1005, Abst. (emphases added). Almadi explains that its remote field systems must include a plurality of controller units “to issue commands to, and gather and process data from a plurality of field devices, including remote systems and instruments, . . . [and] a database server for the storage of process data retrieved from the remote subsystems and instruments.” Id. at 2:22–30 (emphases added). Based on these disclosures, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not established that Almadi discloses element [1.4]. Specifically, the teachings from Almadi identified by Petitioner refer to process data, which is data retrieved from the remote subsystems/field devices. Thus, we understand that Almadi’s teaching—of using an Ethernet switch to transmit “process data”—describes transmitting data from the remote subsystems/field devices. See Ex. 1005, 3:13–17, cited in Pet. 15. But claim 1 and particularly element [1.4], recites “sending, with the server, the target value to the network address [which identifies a controller of the fluid-handling device13] via the network,” which is different than sending process data from the field devices to the remote host or database server for storage.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,175,680 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. Unm Rainforest InnovationsAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2021-00375 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Remand
Proposed substitute claims 44–47, 49, and 50 are unpatentable as obvious under collateral estoppel; the Board denied Patent Owner’s motion to amend.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“the Acting Director of the USPTO (Paper 81, “Acting Director’s Order”) and after a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“the Federal Circuit”) in ZyXEL Communications Corp. v. UNM Rainforest Innovations, 107 F.4th 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Federal Circuit Decision”) regarding the Board’s original Final Written Decision (Paper 68, “Final Written Decision” or “Final Dec.”) in this proceeding. In particular, the court remanded to the Board to determine if proposed substitute claims 44–47, 49, and 50 are unpatentable as obvious under collateral estoppel based on the court’s holding that claims 1–4 and 6–8 are unpatentable as obvious. ZyXEL, 107 F.4th at 1371, 1384.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“proposed substitute claim 44 presents the same issues as those litigated before the Federal Circuit: whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the first key element and whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the second key element.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Final Written Decision, and the Federal Circuit Decision, as well as the postremand briefing, we determine that the application of collateral estoppel to proposed substitute claim 44 is appropriate. It is also appropriate to apply collateral estoppel to substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50. This is because proposed substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50 depend from proposed substitute claim 44 and recite identical limitations to dependent claims 2–4, 6, and 7. Therefore, the resolution of the question of obviousness of the subject matter of proposed substitute claims 45–47, 49, and 50 necessarily presents the same issues of whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the first key element and whether it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include the second key element.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 8,265,096 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,265,096 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00255 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–27 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 23, and 27 are obvious over Wilcox, Londergan, Raskin, and Wu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“c) Summary For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has made sufficient showings at this stage of the proceeding that the Wilcox-Londergan-Raskin- Wu combination teaches or suggests every limitation in claims 1, 23, and 27 of the ’139 patent, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine those teachings and suggestions to arrive at the inventions recited in claims 1, 23, and 27, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges to claims 1, 23, and 27 based on the combination of Wilcox, Londergan, Raskin, and Wu. Accordingly, institution of an inter partes review is appropriate under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 33
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s formulation or offer any competing formulation in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Mr. Haeberli, however, testifies as follows in his Declaration: 29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Dr. Terveen has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Dr. Terveen’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. We find Mr. Haeberli’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’139 patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“missing in the prior art. Prelim. Resp. 29–34. Limitations [1.4], [23.5], and [27.4] each recite: “wherein the first and second partial search strings are separated by a string separator character in the first search field.” Ex. 1001, 29:47–49, 31:33–35, 32:29–31. Petitioner asserts that both of the Lotus Notes references teach receiving a first search string and a second search string in a single search field, separated by “a string separator character (e.g., a Boolean AND operator and/or a comma).” Pet. 25–26 (footnote omitted). We are not fully persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. In particular, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s argument that a Boolean operator such as “AND” is a string separator character. Patent Owner has pointed to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a string separator character consists of just one character.17 Consequently, based on the 17 As Patent Owner argues, the intrinsic evidence does not support this interpretation of the claim language. Prelim. Resp. 31–32. “First, the ’139 patent distinguishes between string separator characters (such as space, comma, etc.) and ‘modifiers’ (such as AND, OR, NOT, etc.).” Id. at 31; compare Ex. 1001, 30:19–22 (claim 6, “string separator character”), with id. at 31:22–26 (claim 22, Boolean “modifiers”). Moreover, Patent Owner persuasively argues that “a POSITA would not understand Boolean operators such as ‘AND’ to function as string separator characters” and “would have known that the operator AND is a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 110). Even Petitioner acknowledges in a footnote that it may not be appropriate to include the Boolean AND operator in the definition of “string separator character.” Petitioner argues:” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered “reverting some of the changes that had been made to Lotus Notes R5’s ‘Search Builder’ to make it more similar to Lotus Notes earlier 3.0’s ‘Query Builder.’” Prelim. Resp. 16. The issue, however, is not whether “over the years Lotus Notes moved away from a unified search field[,]” as Patent Owner suggests. Id. at 14. The issue is what “inferences and creative steps” a person of ordinary skill in the art would have employed, based on Wilcox and Londergan, when designing a new method and system for search indexing. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner’s argument is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to consider Wilcox and Londergan together in order to “obtain a more complete and comprehensive understanding of the Lotus Notes system,” which in turn would have inspired certain inferences and creative steps that would have resulted in the portions of the claimed invention allegedly disclosed in Wilcox and/or Londergan. Pet. 22. We do not agree with Patent Owner that this argument can only be the result of improper hindsight bias. See Prelim. Resp. 16–17. At this stage of the proceedings and based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Wilcox and Londergan.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,633,139 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00254 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 103(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2025) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”). For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of all challenged claims. We, therefore, institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 on the grounds asserted in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s formulation or offer any competing formulation in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Mr. Haeberli, however, testifies as follows in his Declaration: 29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Petitioner has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Petitioner’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. We find Mr. Haeberli’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’490 patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“art. Prelim. Resp. 30–34. Limitation [1.10] reads, “wherein the first and second partial search strings are separated by a string separator character in the first search field.” Ex. 1001, 30:8–10. Petitioner asserts that both of the Lotus Notes references teach receiving a first search string and a second search string in a single search field, separated by “a string separator character (e.g., a comma and/or a Boolean AND operator).” Pet. 23–24 (footnote omitted). We are not fully persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. In particular, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s argument that a Boolean operator such as “AND” is a string separator character. Patent Owner has pointed to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a string separator character consists of just one character.16 Consequently, based on the current record, for the purposes of this Decision we preliminarily construe the term “string separator character” to mean “a single-character string separator.” The parties are invited to address the appropriateness of this construction in future briefing. If Boolean modifiers are excluded from the definition of a “string separator character,” then the Londergan Search Bar and Search Builder features, which accept only Boolean operators, do not teach or suggest 16 As Patent Owner argues, the intrinsic evidence does not support this interpretation of the claim language. Prelim. Resp. 31–32. “First, the ’490 patent distinguishes between string separator characters (such as space, comma, etc.) and ‘modifiers’ (such as AND, OR, NOT, etc.).” Id. at 32; compare Ex. 1001, 31:14–17 (claim 12, “string separator character”), with id. at 32:19–23 (claim 20, Boolean “modifiers”). Moreover, Patent Owner persuasively argues that “a POSITA would not understand Boolean operators such as ‘AND’ to function as string separator characters” and “would have known that the operator AND is a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 110). Even Petitioner acknowledges in a footnote that it may not be appropriate to include the Boolean AND operator in the definition of “string separator character.” Petitioner argues: To the extent Patent Owner argues the Boolean AND operator is not a string separator character (which Petitioner does not acquiesce is appropriate), it would have been obvious to a POSITA when implementing Raskin’s teachings to perform the search incrementally to use a single-character string separator character, such as a plus sign, as was known in the art (e.g., EX1057, 60, 109, 129, 151), or a comma, as described by the Lotus Notes references (EX1059, 159-165), at least because a POSITA knew that a goal of the incremental search is to minimize the number of characters the user has to enter before obtaining the desired search results. Pet. 24 n.7. limitation [1.10].17 See Ex. 1061, 140–42. The Wilcox Search Bar similarly is limited to strings separated by a Boolean operator. See Ex. 1059, 160–62. The Wilcox Query Builder, however, does teach multiple search strings separated by a string separator character, specifically a comma. Id. at 163 (“If you want to search for documents that contain all of several words, type them in this box, separated by commas.”). Thus, while we do not accept all of Petitioner’s reasoning, there is evidence to support Petitioner’s overall argument that the proposed combination discloses multiple search strings separated by a string separator character, as we have preliminarily construed the term.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“extreme technical difficulties with even using incremental searches.” Prelim. Resp. 21, 25 (citing Ex. 1021, 126). Patent Owner argues that “[a] POSITA is not motivated to undertake a modification of the prior art with something that the art teaches would be difficult or impossible to do.” Id. at 21 (citing Natera, Inc. v. NeoGenomics Labs., Inc., 106 F.4th 1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2024)). We do not interpret Raskin in this manner. Patent Owner points to a passage in Raskin stating, “almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches.” Ex. 1021, 126. There is a difference, however, between “difficult to implement” and “difficult to use.” For the end-user, Raskin concludes that “[f]rom the point of view of interface engineering, the advantages of incremental searching are so numerous and the advantages of delimited searches so few that I can see almost no occasions when a delimited search would be preferred.” Id. at 126 & n.7 (“A search is either incremental or excremental.”). It is reasonable to conclude that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to choose a search method that offered numerous advantages to end-users. Finally, Patent Owner argues that “Raskin’s entire philosophy to user interfaces was incompatible with Lotus Notes.” Prelim. Resp. 22–25. According to Patent Owner, “Lotus Notes is all about centralized collaboration around documents, files, and file structures[,]” while Raskin “goes in a completely different direction, espousing the elimination of filenames and ‘hierarchical file structures’ including directories and folders.” Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1021, 119). Patent Owner claims that modifying the Lotus Notes references with Raskin would “effectively render[] Lotus Notes’ functionality of hierarchical viewing of and responding to documents unusable.” Id. Petitioner, however, does not propose to incorporate Raskin’s views on hierarchical file structures into the combination of Wilcox and Londergan. It is not necessary for the entirety of Raskin’s teachings to be physically compatible with the Lotus Notes systems described in Wilcox and Londergan. Orthopedic Equip., 702 F.2d at 1013 (“Claims may be obvious in view of a combination of references, even if the features of one reference cannot be substituted physically into the structure of the other reference.”); In re Sneed, 710 F.2d at 1550. Raskin is cited for one purpose: its teachings regarding incremental search. On the current record, we find Petitioner has demonstrated that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the combination of Lotus Notes references according to those teachings in Raskin. slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,552,490 - PTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2025-00253 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 10 are obvious over Wilcox, Londergan, Raskin, and Wu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). If we institute an inter partes review, the trial must encompass all claims and grounds identified in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2025) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner does not comment on Petitioner’s formulation or offer any competing formulation in its Preliminary Response. See generally Prelim. Resp. Mr. Haeberli, however, testifies as follows in his Declaration: 29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Petitioner has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Petitioner’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. We find Mr. Haeberli’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceeding, including the asserted prior art and the ’035 patent, and, accordingly, we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. B.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“in the prior art. Prelim. Resp. 30–34. Limitations [1.4] and [10.4] both recite: “wherein the first and second strings are separated by a string separator character in the first search field.” Ex. 1001, 29:44–46, 30:41–43. Petitioner asserts that both of the Lotus Notes references teach receiving a first search string and a second search string in a single search field, separated by “a string separator character (e.g., a comma and/or a Boolean AND operator).” Pet. 26–27 (footnote omitted). We are not fully persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. In particular, the evidence does not support Petitioner’s argument that a Boolean operator such as “AND” is a string separator character. Patent Owner has pointed to intrinsic and extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a string separator character consists of just one character.17 Consequently, based on the current record, for the purposes of 17 As Patent Owner argues, the intrinsic evidence does not support this interpretation of the claim language. Prelim. Resp. 31–32. “First, the ’035 patent distinguishes between string separator characters (such as space, comma, etc.) and ‘modifiers’ (such as AND, OR, NOT, etc.).” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:45–59, 22:34–46). Moreover, Patent Owner persuasively argues that “a POSITA would not have understood Boolean operators like AND to be a string separator as used in the claims” and “would have known that the operator AND is a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Prelim. Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 109). Even Petitioner acknowledges in a footnote that it may not be appropriate to include the Boolean AND operator in the definition of “string separator character.” Petitioner argues: To the extent Patent Owner argues the Boolean AND operator is not a string separator character (which Petitioner does not acquiesce is appropriate), it would have been obvious to a POSITA when implementing Raskin’s teachings to perform the this Decision we preliminarily construe the term “string separator character” to mean “a single-character string separator.” The parties are invited to address the appropriateness of this construction in future briefing.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“based on the fact that all three references “generally relate to searching.” See Prelim. Resp. 20. The fact that Raskin does not explicitly discuss searching across multiple files does not mean that there would be no motivation to combine Raskin with the Lotus Notes references. Although a conclusion of obviousness must be supported by findings and analysis establishing a reason to combine or modify the known elements in the manner proposed, the analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, [but] can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We conclude on the current record that Petitioner’s rationale for combining Raskin with the Lotus Notes references is not over-broad.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,370,035 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. Network System Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00343 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as obvious over Rădulescu2004 and OCP; the Board did not reach the Weber-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (2006). “[T]he use of the word ‘means’ in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112, para. 6 applies.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part); Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703–04 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[This] presumption may be rebutted if the properly construed claim limitation itself recites sufficiently definite structure to perform the claimed function.” Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1001, 4:46–50. This passage indicates that the interconnect can be a network on a chip and the network on a chip can include wires and buses. That does not necessarily mean that the interconnect can be just wires or buses; rather, it discloses that the interconnect can include wires and buses. In context, the disclosure regarding wires and buses does not support construing the corresponding structure broadly enough to encompass just wires and buses. The networks that constitute the corresponding structure, however, could include networks with wires and buses. Therefore, we agree with Patent Owner that the corresponding structure for the interconnect means should not include a mere bus, switch, and point-to-point wire and instead find that the corresponding structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 is a network, which the ’052 patent describes as a multi-hop interconnection between modules separated by one or more network nodes. See Ex. 1001, 2:33–37. Because this structure corresponds to the construction of “interconnect means” proposed by Patent Owner and adopted by the district courts in the TI and Qualcomm litigations (see supra Section III.C.3.b), and we do not rely in our analysis below on a recourse to “equivalents thereto” as permitted by § 112 ¶ 6, we note that our ultimate conclusions on the unpatentability of the challenged claims would be the same if § 112 ¶ 6 did not apply. iii. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we construe “interconnect means” to cover the structure described in the Specification corresponding to the specified functions of “coupling said plurality of processing modules (M, S)” in the context of claim 6 and “coupling said plurality of processing modules (M, S)” and “enabling a connection-based communication having a set of connection properties” in the context of claims 1 and 7—i.e., a “multi-hop interconnection between modules separated by one or more network nodes”—and equivalents thereof.” slip op. at 28
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“standard as would be used by a district court to construe a claim in a civil action involving the validity or infringement of a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 7,594,052 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,594,052 - Intel Corporation / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00301 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review for claims 1–11, 16, and 21 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial, and denied joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“2026. This date is nearly five months prior to the date on which the final written decision would be due if trial were instituted in this proceeding. And, even if we assume Petitioner’s alleged February–March 2026 trial date, this date too is several months prior to the projected final written decision deadline. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding would issue before trial in the district court, unless the trial was delayed or rescheduled for a later time. Thus, we find this factor weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. See ARM Ltd. v. Daedalus Prime LLC, IPR2025-00207, Paper 10 at 2 (May 16, 2025) (Before the Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office) (exercising discretion to deny institution with the same relative timing between district court trial and final written decision deadline).” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsNot reached
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons discussed below, we exercise discretion pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) not to institute inter partes review. Additionally, for the same reasons and because institution was denied in IPR2024-01248, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“[T]he Director . . . may join as a party . . . any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.”).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,814,071 - PTAB · May 2, 2025 · IPR2024-01450 · APJ Justin T Arbes · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Dziong and Sathyanath.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that at the time of the ’088 patent (January 2006), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately four years of experience working in the field of network communications, including experience with [Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)] tunnels and bandwidth allocation,” where “[a]dditional work experience can substitute for specific educational background, and vice versa.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–21). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been knowledgeable and familiar with the network communications technologies discussed in [the Specification of the ’088 patent], including bandwidth reservations, quality of service techniques, routing protocols (including Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)), tunneling protocols (including [MPLS]), resource reservations (including Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP)), traffic engineering (including relevant extensions to OSPF, IS-IS, and RSVP), and ring networking standards (e.g., Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) and resilient packet ring (RPR) defined by IEEE 802.17). Id. Patent Owner states that “Petitioner’s definition . . . is acceptable for” purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 8 n.3. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’088 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’088 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner argues that “no claim term requires express construction.” Pet. 12–13. Patent Owner does not propose interpretations of any claim terms in its Preliminary Response. We conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“Patent Owner, however, does not explain sufficiently why any of these issues demonstrate a failure to teach limitation [1.1]. We understand Petitioner’s position to be that Dziong identifies “two or more candidate routes” (i.e., A-B-C-D and A-C-D) for a “new connection” (i.e., a new recovery path to protect primary path SRLG 4 in the event of failure) with a “requested bandwidth” (i.e., 15 units) sufficient to protect against failure. See Pet. 27–31 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 36, 70, 89, 90, 104, 105). The 15 units are the “units of demand” on SRLG 4 that must be protected. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 89 (“[E]ach solid line represents all of the demands that have the same link-detour path, which is represented by a corresponding broken line. For example, solid line 606 in SRLG 4 corresponds to one or more demands totaling 15 units of bandwidth between nodes A and D.”), 90. A link in a potential recovery path for that demand on SRLG 4, therefore, would need to have “sufficient recovery bandwidth” to protect against failure (i.e., at least 15 units). Id. ¶¶ 36, 104. That is reflected in the “SRLG 4 failure” column of Figure 6(b) for link A-B (part of the A-B-C-D recovery path shown in blue in Figure 6(a) above). On this record, we do not see why the fact that link A-B also protects against failures of SRLG 3 and 5 and has its own 12 units of demand, or the fact that SRLG 4 also has another 24 units of demand (which link A-B does not protect against), contradicts Petitioner’s position regarding Dziong and limitation [1.1]. See id. ¶¶ 89–90 (“link A-B is not part of the link-detour path for the other 24 XC units of demand on SRLG 4”). At this stage, we find that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Dziong teaches limitation [1.1]. Therefore, we need not evaluate any additional arguments regarding Sathyanath at this time. See Pet. 31–32; Prelim. Resp. 14–16.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“We disagree based on the current record. Dziong refers to both “link-based” and “path-based” recovery. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 6–8. And the two methods are similar in various ways, as Dziong recognizes. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 69 (“While some of the algorithms utilized in a link-based scheme are related to path-based recovery algorithms, there are significant modifications and special considerations that are made in the case of link-based recovery.”), 103 (“In some areas, the issues associated with recovery path calculation for link-based recovery [are] analogous to recovery path calculations for path-based restoration . . . .”). Dziong also purports to incorporate Sathyanath’s application by reference. Id. ¶ 1. And, as Petitioner points out, the references have similar disclosures and similar discussions of bandwidth sharing. See Pet. 1, 20–22; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 10–12, 36–39, 60, 65, 88; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 4, 12–13, 41–45, 200. Thus, on this record, we disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not consider combining the teachings of Dziong and Sathyanath. See In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A reference must be considered for everything that it teaches, not simply the described invention or a preferred embodiment.”); In re Hyon, 679 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming an obviousness determination where two “references both teach processes directed to making the same class of products” and minor differences between the disclosures did not “negate the motivation to combine”). Second, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner “fails to identify specific teachings in Sathyanath that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to implement in Dziong with a reasonable expectation of success” and “does not explain how the features would have been combined or why there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Prelim. Resp. 11. Patent Owner, however, only mentions Petitioner’s introductory statement regarding reasons to combine and does not address the substance of Petitioner’s arguments for claim 1, where Petitioner explains how it is relying on Sathyanath as a secondary reference. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (citing Pet. 22–23). For example, regarding the “sharing definition” of limitation [1.2], Petitioner argues that because Dziong only gives “limited details about the data format used for sharing” reserved bandwidth information, “it would have been obvious to consider . . . Sathyanath’s examples,” relying on two particular alleged “sharing definition[s]” in Sathyanath (i.e., the “aggregate node-link vector” and “TE/Share database”). Pet. 36–39. Based on the current record, we preliminarily find that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing, supported by the testimony of Dr. Mir, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use such data formats to share reserved bandwidth information in the system of Dziong, with a reasonable expectation of success. See id.; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38–39, 72–79.” slip op. at 38
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,596,088
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.