- Digital Global Systems, Inc. v. Deepsig, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 6, 2026 · IPR2024-01358 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 7–11, 15–19, 23, and 24 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4–6, 12–14, and 20–22 were not shown unpatentable because the prior art did not teach the claimed received-signal feedback and transmitter-model update.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that: Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent degree and at least two years of experience working with of radio communication systems and machine learning. Additional work or research experience can substitute for less or different education, and vice-versa. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–34). Patent Owner does not appear to challenge this level of skill. We use Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision because it appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art and ’704 patent.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“parameters “associated with the base station.” PO Resp. 31–32. In particular, Patent Owner argues that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Id. at 31. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner offers no reason to believe that a transmitter “implemented in a base station” is not “associated with the base station.” Pet. Reply 4–5; see also id. at 3–6 (entire argument). A plain reading of a “model associated with a base station” would encompass a model that operates in a base station. We do not see anything in the ’704 specification that would indicate “associated with” has any special meaning, or has a meaning contrary to our understanding of the plain meaning. We do not see the word “associated” outside the claims, whereas we see the word “implement” throughout the specification, generally in reference to an actual use of a model (consistent with our plain reading). See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:35–39, 6:3–17, 10:55–11:3 (discussing “implementations” where the model or some other feature of the system is used in a particular way). Accordingly, we construe a model “implemented in a base station” to be “associated with the base station.”” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“scenarios” (see PO Resp. 16–21), Patent Owner argues that “Jüschke does not disclose any association of the weight or bias parameters, . . . to any deployment scenario, and . . . base station” (id. at 19). For the reasons explained in our claim construction section above, we construe “deployment scenarios” to include “inline mode” models located within a base station, according to the list of deployment scenarios set out in the ’704 patent. See Ex. 1001, 2:38–65. The in-line deployment scenario depicted in Figure 6A of the ’704 patent bears a striking resemblance to the arrangement depicted in Figure 1 of Jüschke. In both figures, the analog radio signal is fed directly into the model and then the model directly outputs the signal to the amplifier. Compare Ex. 1001, Fig. 6A, with Ex. 1005, Fig. 1. As construed, the “deployment scenarios” represent the physical configurations of the device in which the model is found, such as “in-line.” Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Jüschke’s similar in-line configuration is a “deployment scenario” as claimed because it teaches an inline model for a cellular system transmitter (i.e., base station). Pet. 26–29 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005, Fig. 1, ¶¶ 6, 59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 146–147); see also Ex. 1001, 2:37–41 (stating that “[t]he particular deployment scenario[] may be . . . sending a radio transmission from a cellular base station that includes the . . . model . . . in an inline mode”).” slip op. at 26
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Based on our claim construction analysis of claim 4, above, we agree with Patent Owner that claim 4 requires an actually transmitted signal and an update of the transmitter’s model. This claim construction eliminates Petitioner’s position regarding Holt teaching a modeled signal. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 17–23. We then turn to Petitioner’s argument that Holt teaches updating a model using an actually transmitted signal. See Pet. 59–60. There, Petitioner relies on a disclosure in Holt of an “actual communication channel 302 used to train the channel model 208.” Ex. 1006, 18:1–2. This is depicted in Figure 6 of Holt, in connection with a “fourth loss function” which is used to “train the decoder model.” Id. at 18:42–48; see generally id. at 17:58–18:51 (describing Figure 6). Whether training the channel model or the decoder model, Holt here does not disclose using the actual communication channel to train the encoder, i.e., transmitter. In sum, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “obtaining a received radio signal,” and even if it did, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior art describes the claimed step of “updating the value of the model parameters” in the manner required by claim 4. Claims 12 and 20 are nearly identical to claim 4, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons. See Pet. 76. Claims 5, 6, 13, 14, 21 and 22 depend from claims 4, 12, and 20, and Petitioner’s ground fails for similar reasons as those claims. See id. at 77–80.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 11,018,704 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,018,704 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01110 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16, finding a reasonable likelihood they are obvious over Kim and over Chu and Choi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable 1 Deputy Director Stewart was recused in this matter. claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” and that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, except as to the date that pertains to such skill level. Prelim. Resp. 4–5. Namely, Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner is incorrect” that “the ’171 Patent is entitled to an effective date of no earlier than January 22, 2021.” Id. at 5. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’171 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of required experience.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“claim construction standard as that applied in federal courts in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), which is generally referred to as the Phillips standard. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under the Phillips standard, “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “Petitioner submits that no formal claim constructions are necessary.” Pet. 1–2. Similarly, “Patent Owner does not contend that any formal claim construction is necessary” at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 5. For the purpose of institution, we need not explicitly construe any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 870–71 (Fed. Cir. 2010). For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must [] convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.”), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). On the record before us, we do not agree that the ’171 Patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than Jan. 11, 2021. In particular, we do not agree that PCT ’199 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 4, 2016 filing date. The disclosures of PCT ’199 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support show: (1) transmission packets for multi-user uplink data, which includes padding such that multi-user upstream data transfers from each resource terminate at the same time (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 17–21); (2) performing padding on a trigger frame that triggers multi-user simultaneous transmission, where the trigger frame includes AID information of the performing preset padding before the FCS field of the trigger frame according to one embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20); and (4) inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, according to another embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20). PCT ’199 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a frame for allocating resource for uplink (UL) multi-user (MU) transmission to one or more terminals that includes the AID field set to a value related to a first padding field, when the padding field is included in the frame. In particular, we discern no disclosure that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) an AID field for the MU UL resource allocation frame is set to a value, (2) that the AID field is set to a value related to the padding field, and (3) that the AID field is set to a value related to the padding field, and conditioned on the inclusion of the AID field in the frame. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner’s assertions are premised on the PCT ’199’s disclosure of a preset padding being performed before the FCS field of the trigger frame and the disclosure of inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, we note that these disclosures are directed to two embodiments. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20. PCT ’199 does not provide any suggestion that the two embodiments are used together, or that the redundant AID information of one embodiment can serve as a preset padding of the other embodiment.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,716,171 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01111 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18, finding a reasonable likelihood they are unpatentable over Kim and over Chu in combination with Choi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable 1 Deputy Director Stewart was recused in this matter. claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” and that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, except as to the date that pertains to such skill level. Prelim. Resp. 4. Namely, Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner is incorrect” that “the ’186 Patent is entitled to an effective date of no earlier than April 8, 2019.” Id. at 4–5. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’186 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of required experience.” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must [] convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.”), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). On the record before us, we do not agree that the ’186 Patent is entitled to a filing date earlier than April 8, 2019. In particular, we do not agree that PCT ’199 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 4, 2016 filing date. The disclosures of PCT ’199 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support, show: (1) transmission packets for multi-user uplink data, which includes padding such that multi-user upstream data transfers from each resource terminate at the same time (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 17–21); (2) performing padding on a trigger frame that triggers multi-user simultaneous transmission, where the trigger frame includes AID information of the stations assigned to each channel (see Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 134–135, Fig. 20); (3) performing preset padding before the FCS field of the trigger frame inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, according to another embodiment (see Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20). PCT ’199 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission for one or more terminals that includes an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field, and the trigger frame including the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. In particular, we discern no disclosure that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals and including an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field; (2) the AID field for the trigger frame is set to a specific value, and (3) that trigger frame includes the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. Moreover, to the extent that Patent Owner’s assertions are premised on the PCT ’199’s disclosure of a preset padding being performed before the FCS field of the trigger frame and the disclosure of inserting redundant AID information prior to the FCS field of the trigger frame, we note that these disclosures are directed to two embodiments. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 136, Fig. 20. PCT ’199 does not provide any suggestion that the two embodiments are used together, or that the redundant AID information of one embodiment can serve as a preset padding of the other embodiment. On the record before us, we also do not agree that KR ’754 describes the invention in enough detail such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could conclude that the inventor was in possession of the invention as of the March 17, 2015 filing date of KR ’754. The disclosures of KR ’754 cited by Patent Owner to show written description support show: (1) multiplexed terminals over respective channels, (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 65–66, Fig. 10); (2) differing the number of AID values in the batch acknowledgment (BA) information field when the number of terminals assigned to each channel differs, setting the length of each multiplexed group ACK differently, and, if necessary, aligning the lengths of the multiplexed group ACKs based on the channel with the longest assigned BA information by adding zero padding or repeatedly inserting BA information (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 66–70, Fig. 11); and (3) applying the use of the AID field padding and the use of BA padding in a downlink OFDMA trigger process during multi-user downlink transmission to align the length of the trigger when the AP notifies the terminals assigned to each channel by inserting zero padding or repeating AIDs (see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 71–72, Figs. 11–12). KR ’754 does not describe the invention in enough detail to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the inventor possessed a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission for one or more terminals that includes an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field, and the trigger frame including the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. In particular, we do not discern disclosure in KR ’754 that conveys that the inventor possessed the following: (1) a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals and including an AID field used to identify whether the trigger frame includes a padding field; (2) the AID field for the trigger frame is set to a specific value, and (3) that trigger frame includes the padding field when the AID field is set to a specific value. We find misplaced Patent Owner’s argument that “KR ’754’s discussion about Figure 10 and Figure 11 would have been understood [by a POSITA] as disclosing a padding method used to improve predictability and consistency trigger frame” (Prelim. Resp. 12) because: (1) it addresses uplink transmissions and not a trigger frame indicating uplink transmission to one or more terminals; (2) it does not address that the padding field is included in the trigger frame when the AID field is set to a specific value; and (3) it is unsupported attorney argument regarding the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Argument of counsel cannot take the place of objective evidence. See Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 572 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We also find misplaced Patent Owner’s argument that “the padding discussed by KR ’754 regarding its Figure 12 embodiment is not limited to downlink transmission and would have been understood by a POSITA as also being used to schedule uplink ones” (Prelim Resp. 14) because: (1) KR ’754 does not provide any suggestion that the same technique can be used for uplink transmission trigger frames; (2) Patent Owner’s argument does not address that the padding field is included in the trigger frame when the AID field is set to a specific value; and (3) Patent Owner’s argument is unsupported attorney argument regarding the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Gemtron, 572 F.3d at 1380. For the foregoing reasons and based on this record, for the purpose of institution, we find that the ’186 Patent is not entitled to an effective filing date earlier than April 8, 2019 and find that Kim is prior art. We note that the limitations at the heart of the written description dispute were added in an amendment filed August 9, 2020. See Ex. 1002, 214–21. In further briefing, the parties should address the respective burdens of production and persuasion for establishing that the ’186 Patent is entitled to an earlier” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments because they are premised on Choi’s teachings as limited to AIDs transmitted via a control frame broadcast as a TIM element. A prior art “reference must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not limited to the particular invention it is describing and attempting to protect.” EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted). Chu, Choi, and the testimony of Dr. Ding (Ex. 1003), we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Chu’s teachings with Choi’s use of specific AID or ΔAID values as indicators of the end of meaningful data and the beginning of padding that would allow client stations to reliably determine where the useful content of the trigger frame ends and where optional padding begins, with the benefits of improved parsing efficiency, enhanced synchronization, and reduced likelihood of misinterpreting padding as data as padding. See Pet. 46–48 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–156; Ex. 1015 ¶ 93; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 24, 184), 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–163, Pet. 45–48); KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 29
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,911,186 - PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2025-01069 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on Bharadwaj alone and Bharadwaj with Yu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, [a]n expert need not have acquired that skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024). the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’077 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 10; Prelim. Resp. 2–4. Patent Owner, however, notes that, in related district court litigation, Petitioner has asserted that some claims terms are indefinite. Patent Owner argues that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner has taken inconsistent claim construction positions between the district court and the Board. Paper 14 at 1–3 (citing Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, IPR2025-00340, Paper 18 at 4 (PTAB Nov. 5, 2025) (informative); Revvo Techs., Inc. v. Cerebrum Sensor Techs., Inc., IPR2025-00632, Paper 20 at 4–5 (PTAB Nov. 3, 2025) (precedential)). Petitioner responds that, in the related district court litigation, the parties have narrowed the claim construction disputes and that Petitioner accords the plain and ordinary meaning to claim terms and no longer asserts that any claim term of the ’077 patent is indefinite. Paper 15 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1126 (Defendants’ Responsive Claim Construction Brief)). The evidence supports Petitioner’s position because, in the related district court litigation, the defendants agree with the plaintiff (Patent Owner) that certain phrases in the ’077 patent claims should be given their “[p]lain and ordinary meaning” and are “not indefinite.” Ex. 1126, 6 (native page 1). Thus, the record does not show inconsistent claim construction positions that warrant denial under PTAB precedent. See Revvo, Paper 20 at 5 (addressing a situation in which a petitioner advances “different claim construction positions” in district court and at the PTAB). See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Bharadwaj includes subject matter that is not in Bharadwaj-Prov59, namely the change from adding the value Resp. 20; Ex. 1007 ¶ 51 (adding m); Ex. 1006 ¶ 50 (subtracting m); Prelim. Resp. 20. Petitioner, however, points out this change in the Petition and acknowledges that it is after the identified critical date of August 20, 2015. See Pet. 28. Thus, we do not understand Petitioner to be relying on Bharadwaj’s disclosure of subtracting m to determine length, as disclosed in the publication of the non-provisional application, as a prior art disclosure. We understand Petitioner to be relying on disclosures in Bharadwaj-Prov059 for prior art teachings for its obviousness contentions. Patent Owner does not appear to dispute that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art, arguing instead that it is improper to rely “on matters in Bharadwaj beyond ‘incorporation by reference’ of the Bharadwaj-Prov59.” See Prelim. Resp. 20–21. On this record, we determine that Bharadwaj-Prov59’s disclosures are prior art as of its June 2, 2015, filing date by virtue of its incorporation by reference into Bharadwaj, a published US patent application. Ex. 1006 ¶ 1; see Pet. 12–13.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,313,077 - Kia Corp. / Toyota Motor Corp. v. Emerging Automotive LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00981 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable over the Kleve-based grounds; the Board found the Zaid-based grounds did not render their challenged claims unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pet. 2. Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 7, “Prelim. Resp.”). Petitioner filed an authorized Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 8, “Prelim. Reply”), and Patent Owner filed an authorized Sur-reply to Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 9, “Prelim. Sur-reply”). Trial was instituted on the asserted grounds of unpatentability. Paper 10 (“Inst. Dec.”), 56.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends express claim construction is unnecessary and states that all terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not address claim construction in its Response. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). There are no claim terms in controversy that need be construed for our analysis.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Here, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had at least a four-year undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, automotive engineering, or [a] closely related field and [at] least two years of experience in the field of access control systems, vehicle electronics, and/or cryptography.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 79–82). Dr. Almeroth supports Petitioner’s position and further testifies that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 79. Patent Owner does not assert a different level of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention and appears to apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See PO Resp. Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Malek, explicitly adopts Petitioner’s level of skill in the art but states that his opinions would be applicable under any reasonable definition for an ordinarily skilled artisan at the critical time. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 37. For the purposes of this Decision, we too adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’188 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Additionally, we credit the testimony of Dr. Almeroth, who opines that Kleve discloses that certain restrictions are sent with the request to generate a virtual key. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 118–123. Specifically, Dr. Almeroth testifies that Kleve discloses that the virtual key “enable[s] the keyless drive system for the appropriate Temporary User during a given rental period.” Id. According to Dr. Almeroth, this “indicates that rental agreement restrictions were sent with the request so that the virtual key could be associated with said restrictions.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39, 68 (“Once the rental period has expired the virtual key may be reset and cleared from the VCS.”)). Dr. Almeroth further testifies that the virtual key in Kleve is always generated after the rental agreement. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39 (“[O]nce the Temporary User selects the vehicle, pays the appropriate amount and signs a consent agreement, th[e]n the system may generate a virtual key to distribute to the Temporary User and VCS.”), 68). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Almeroth’s declaration testimony contradicts Kleve. See PO Resp. 27–29. Rather, as discussed previously, we find that Kleve’s vehicle owner can set a restriction, such as the rental start period, prior to step 214 in Kleve’s Figure 2 and that such restrictions can be associated with the e-key. We also do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that (1) Dr. Almeroth’s declaration testimony contradicts his deposition testimony or that (2) Dr. Almeroth “admitted his testimony was wrong.” See PO Sur-Reply 7 (citing Ex. 2030, 27:5–10, 27:21–28:1). In a particular embodiment to which Dr. Almeroth was citing, he noted that the e-key is always generated after the rental agreement. See Ex. 2030, 26:14–20. Then the following exchange occurs: Q. So you use typically and always. So always does not refer to all of the embodiments of Kleve, is that fair? A. I think a person of skill in the art could read Kleve and understand that there are probably multiple ways in which the flow of actions among the parties could occur. And I think thinking about a real world scenario, in most cases you have an agreement before you would generate an eKey, but maybe, maybe not. I don’t -- I don't know that the real world is necessarily cut and dry. So reading -- a person reading Kleve would understand it’s describing embodiments where it’s always the case. That might be a pretty common scenario, but I don't know that it would necessarily be a hard and fast rule in every embodiment or in the understanding a person of skill in the art would have. Id. at 28:3–20. There is nothing in the deposition testimony by Dr. Almeroth that appears inconsistent with his declaration testimony nor does there appear to be the kind of admission touted by Patent Owner. Instead, it is Dr. Malek who takes an overly narrow view of Kleve that appears inconsistent with Kleve’s disclosure when read as a whole. See, e.g., Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 56–57. Therefore, we do not credit or agree with Dr. Malek’s testimony that Kleve teaches away from the concept of a virtual key created with the agreed-upon rental period as a restriction. See id. ¶ 57.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 9,365,188 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,365,188 - Good Sportsman Marketing, LLC v. Hangzhou ZH Tech Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 20, 2025 · PGR2024-00034 · APJ Annette R Reimers · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–19 as obvious over Unger and Smith, claim 18 also as obvious over Unger, Smith, and Hakansson, and claims 3–6, 8, 9, and 16 as indefinite.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We note that the identification of a Ph.D. as an example of “more formal education” creates a vast range of education relative to a bachelor’s degree. Thus, we treat the identification of a Ph.D. just as it is—an example—and not a requirement. In this case, “more formal education” can be satisfied by a level of education less than a Ph.D (but greater than a bachelor’s degree). Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition, limited as discussed above, for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that it “does not believe any terms need to be construed to resolve the prior art issues presented in this Petition.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 89). any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found the proposed modification obvious for several reasons. Pet. 30. For instance, Petitioner argues that “Unger contains an express teaching, suggestion and/or motivation to incorporate an element such as Smith’s torsional spring into the lower and/or upper mount assemblies 308, 312 to facilitate attachment and detachment.” Id. Namely, Petitioner points to Unger’s disclosure that device mounts 308, 312 may be flexible or resilient so that device mounts 308, 312 may be bent to engage a portion of hearing protection device 108 and are then allowed to return to a normal state to secure communication device 104 to hearing protection device 108. Id. at 30–31 (quoting Ex. 1004, 6:20–37). Petitioner adds that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood this disclosure “to teach that mount arms 308, 312 could be removable from housing 304 (e.g., as mount arm 312 is in Figure 6) and/or they could be designed to be ‘flexible’ or ‘resilient’ such that they can be manipulated,” and “that ‘resilient’ is defined as ‘bouncing or springing back into shape, position, etc. after being stretched, bent, or, esp., compressed.’” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 117). Thus, according to Petitioner, this disclosure of Unger suggests using a torsion spring. Id. In addition, Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Unger’s disclosure to “suggest the use of a torsion designed to impart this functionality.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 118). Petitioner also asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “understood that there were a limited number of ways to impart the referenced resilient or flexible ‘manipulation,’” and “would have been motivated to look to various known solutions to impart the suggested functionality, including the torsional spring mechanism of Smith that is used in a similar hearing protection device application for a similar purpose as Unger’s mounting arms (to apply a clamping force).” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 120–121). Other reasons for combining the references set forth by Petitioner are the proposed modification: (1) “would have involved applying a known technique to a known device ready for improvement to yield predictable results” (Pet. 39–49 (citing Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Ex. 1002 ¶ 131)), (2) would have constituted “combining prior art elements using known methods to achieve predictable results” (id. at 40 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007); Ex. 1002 ¶ 133)); and (3) would have been “the simple substitution of one known element (i.e., Smith’s torsion spring mechanism) into another (i.e., the connection point of Unger’s lower mount arm 308 and housing 304)” (id. at 40–41 (citing Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ex. 1002 ¶ 135)). Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“i) Conclusion For the above reasons, we find, based on the record before us, that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Unger and Smith. Patent Owner does not contend that any limitations in claim 1 are absent in the combination of Unger and Smith, or that claim 1 would not have been obvious over the combination of Unger and Smith, and therefore, has waived such arguments.8” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 11,736,855 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,736,855 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-01044 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least claim 1 under §103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” which we understand Petitioner identifies as September 7, 2016. Pet. 2, 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Petitioner also contends that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 11. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’879 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 11. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,516,879 - PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-01043 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least claim 1 as obvious over Zhou, Cherian, and Kim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute review. Paper 11. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least 3 years of experience in the research, design or development of wireless communication devices, systems, and/or networks, or the equivalent, as of the Critical Date,” which we understand Petitioner identifies as September 7, 2016. Pet. 2, 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–28). Petitioner also contends that “[i]ncreased educational experience can make up for less work experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not object to Petitioner’s definition at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 11. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’035 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 4; Prelim. Resp. 11. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“expressly discloses multiple options for resetting the timer, including “after the STA 106 transmits a scheduled UL transmission, or transmits a scheduled UL transmission and gets an ACK message.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 81. We find sufficiently persuasive Petitioner’s explanation that “after” in Zhou means after the transmission ends if an ACK is not requested; in the case of an ACK, Zhou expressly discloses starting the timer after receiving the ACK. See Pet. 46–49. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Valenti, testifies that “[a] STA measures the ‘completion’ of the transmission by receiving an ACK— if an ACK is requested—or upon completion of the physical transmission.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 152 (citing Ex. 1018 ¶ 9). On this record, we find this testimony to be sufficiently credible based on the evidence cited. See Ex. 1018 ¶ 9 (“A successful transmission occurs when the node either receives an expected acknowledgment correctly, or transmits a frame that does not require an acknowledgement.”).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,116,035 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00936 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 over all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least claim 1 over Lee.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On this record, we find Petitioner’s contentions persuasive. As noted above, Lee states the following: “[I]f the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame related to multiuser transmission, the STA may not perform the change of the CCA level irrespective of information indicated by the coloring bit.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. Even though the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame for multiuser transmission, Lee states that “the coloring disable bit can also be comprehended as a bit indicating that CCA level change is not performed.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. This supports Petitioner’s contention that the coloring disable bit is signaling information that indicates that a CCA level change is not allowed, even if it indicates other things as well. See Pet. 12.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024). To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’597 patent and the asserted prior art, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the amount of experience.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 8. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6
- BurdenInstituted
“On this record, we find Petitioner’s contentions persuasive. As noted above, Lee states the following: “[I]f the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame related to multiuser transmission, the STA may not perform the change of the CCA level irrespective of information indicated by the coloring bit.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. Even though the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame for multiuser transmission, Lee states that “the coloring disable bit can also be comprehended as a bit indicating that CCA level change is not performed.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. This supports Petitioner’s contention that the coloring disable bit is signaling information that indicates that a CCA level change is not allowed, even if it indicates other things as well. See Pet. 12.” slip op. at 10
Claim constructioncites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,700,597 - PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00935 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On this record, we find Petitioner’s contentions persuasive. As noted above, Lee states the following: “[I]f the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame related to multiuser transmission, the STA may not perform the change of the CCA level irrespective of information indicated by the coloring bit.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. Even though the coloring disable bit indicates that the frame corresponds to a trigger frame for multiuser transmission, Lee states that “the coloring disable bit can also be comprehended as a bit indicating that CCA level change is not performed.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 68. This supports Petitioner’s contention that the coloring disable bit is signaling information that indicates that a CCA level change is not allowed, even if it indicates other things as well. See Pet. 13.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“To the extent Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art need not be defined as of the critical date, we disagree. Under Section 103, we must determine “if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains” (emphasis added). “Obviousness is determined from the vantage point of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art to which the patent pertains.” In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, we define the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art as of a time before the effective filing date. To the extent Patent Owner’s argument is that, to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art, one need not have been a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the critical date, we agree. Although one must at least possess ordinary skill in the art to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill, time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction The parties agree that no claim terms require express construction. Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 8. On this record, we determine that no terms need express construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successOther
“On this record, it is not entirely clear that comparing a BSS color value to determine if a receiving station is in that BSS is prohibited by the claim’s recitation “not to use” a BSS color, as Patent Owner’s argument implies. Rather, claim 1’s recitation “not to use a Basic Service Set (BSS) color when signaling information indicates that an operation based on the BSS color is not allowed” appears directed to prohibiting a particular operation based on the BSS color, not necessarily disregarding the BSS color entirely. Further, comparing BSS values to determine BSS identity appears consistent with claim 1’s recitation that “the BSS color is an communication terminal recognizes that a BSS color collision has occurred.” On this record, it appears that BSS color would need to be identified to determine if a color collision occurs. See Prelim. Resp. 4 (“BSS color collisions occur when two or more BSSs operating on the same frequency channel (and overlapping in coverage area) use the same BSS color. See ’163 Patent at 2:46-59, 10:41-62. In other words, a wireless communication terminal receives a signal with the same BSS color that device understands applies to it, even though the signal is intended for another device in a different BSS (albeit using the same BSS color). When a color collision is detected, the wireless communication terminal reports to the base wireless communication terminal, which will indicate that a color collision has occurred. ’163 Patent at 3:16-20.”). In that light, we see some merit in Petitioner’s position that an “operation based on BSS COLOR (e.g., allowing access and re-using the channel) is not allowed” based on the Low Power/High Interference Indicator, even if some reference is made to the BSS color to resolve a condition precedent to that determination, namely whether the data are from a different BSS. See Pet. 53–54 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 26; Ex. 1003 ¶ 170). Petitioner’s second theory is based on setting the color field to a reserved value of “0000,” which Petitioner argues “indicates that operations based on BSS COLOR are not allowed and the receiving STA does not use BSS COLOR.” Pet. 54–55 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 25, 29; Ex. 1003 ¶ 172). On this record, we question how setting a color value to 0000 can teach the subject matter of claim 1, which also requires that “the BSS color is an identifier of a BSS.” Petitioner acknowledges that a reserved value of 0000 in the color field does not identify a BSS. See Pet. 54–55 (asserting that a that a COLOR field value of ‘0000’ does not represent a valid BSS identifier”). We also recognize, however, that claim 7, depending from claim 1, recites “the BSS color indicated by the signaling field of the PPDU is a predetermined value” and that claim 8, depending from claim 7, recites that the predetermined value is 0. Thus, Choudhury’s reserved value disclosures appear to teach this subject matter of claims 7 and 8, even if claims 7 and 8 are inconsistent with claim 1’s requirement that “the BSS color is an identifier of a BSS.” See Ex. 1001, 21:23–30 (disclosing that the BSS color value may be set to a predetermined value such as zero).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,129,163
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.