• Mobile Tech, Inc. v. Invue Security Products Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Dec 4, 2018 · PGR2018-00004 · APJ Stacey G White · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show an abuse of discretion in finding claims 1–45 supported and enabled.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). When requesting rehearing of a decision, the challenging party must identify specifically all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in the record. Id. When considering a request for rehearing of a decision on whether to institute trial, the Board reviews its decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, on factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence, or represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We address Petitioner’s arguments with these principles in mind.” slip op. at 3

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “’472 patent is eligible for post-grant review. Dec. 16. Here, eligibility for post-grant review depends on the effective filing date of the challenged claims. When determining the effective filing date, a claim is entitled to the benefit of an earlier filing date when an earlier application discloses the claimed invention “in the manner provided by § 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the best mode).” See id. at 6 (citing US Endodontics, LLC v. Gold Standard Instruments, LLC, Case PGR2015- 00019, slip. op. at 7 (PTAB Dec. 28, 2016) (Paper 54)). The ’472 patent was the latest in a chain of continuation applications that dates back to U.S. Patent Application No. 13/169,9685 (“968 Application”), which was filed on June 27, 2011. Ex. 1001, at [63]. We previously determined that the 968 5 There are other applications in this chain, but none of those applications are relevant to the issues presented here and thus, we do not address those applications. Application and the ’472 patent have substantially identical specifications and figures. See Dec. 7 (finding that the 968 Application and the patent application from which the ’472 patent issued are substantially identical). We thus determined that we were able to “analyze the ’472 patent’s eligibility for post grant review through a discussion of Petitioner’s arguments as to written description support in the ’472 patent.” Id. at 8. We then found that Petitioner failed to establish that the challenged claims lack written description support or are not enabled. See id. at 12, 15–16.” slip op. at 4

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “The ’472 patent expressly recites: Actuation of activation switch 85 causes logic control circuit 18 of programming station 3 to randomly generate a unique security code (i.e. SDC) that is transmitted via communication circuit 20 to communication circuit 79 of programmable key 5, which in turn stores the randomly generated SDC in security code (SDC) memory 81 of the key . . . . [T]he SDC initially provided by the programming station 3 is randomly generated and is unique to that programming station and always remains with that programming station for subsequent use. Thus, the SDC initially generated always stays with the programming station 3 and is subsequently programmed into one or more programmable keys 5. Ex. 1001, 9:23–43 (emphases added); see also id. at 10:6–12 (“[T]he particular programming station 3 of the retail store [is] used to program the key with the SDC.”). The ’472 patent also discloses that the programming station “reprogram[s] or refresh[es] the SDC into the key” after the programmable key times out, which occurs after a predetermined period elapses from the time that the programmable key was last programmed or refreshed. See e.g., id. at 12:63–13:8. Specifically, the programming station performs a “handshake” with the key “to determine whether the key has not previously been programmed with a SDC (i.e. a ‘new’ key), or is an authorized key that is being presented to the programming station a subsequent time to refresh the SDC,” and once a proper “handshake” is completed, the programming station “permits the SDC generated by the logic control circuit and/or stored in the memory to be transmitted . . . [to] the programmable electronic key.” Id. at 16:4–19. Thus, the programming station is responsible for generating the SDC and transmitting it to the programmable key. More to the point, the ’472 patent discloses that “the programming station will deactivate a SDC stored in the SDC memory of a key if an incorrect SDC is encountered when the programming station is attempting to reprogram or refresh the key.” Id. at 13:13–17 (emphases added). This contradicts Petitioner’s proposition that a key programmed with one SDC from a first programming station can then program that same SDC into a second programming station. The ’472 patent expressly teaches how to deal with a situation in which a second programming station encounters an incorrect SDC in the memory of a key: it deactivates the SDC stored in the key.” slip op. at 7

  § 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 9,659,472
• NVIDIA Corporation v. Polaris Innovations LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 20, 2018 · IPR2017-01781 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8–12, 14, 16–23, 26–31, 43–45, and 48–51 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish data arrangement alteration or a sufficient motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the ’344 patent (POSITA) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and at least 2 years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 13. Neither Patent Owner, nor its declarant, Dr. Przybylski, offers a different assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 36 (“I am applying the definition of the level of experience of a person of ordinary skill in the art that has been put forward by Dr. Tredennick in his declaration. I do not necessarily agree with the definition offered there, but I do not presently believe that the exact level of experience of a person of ordinary skill impacts my opinions offered herein.”). Based on the evidence of record, we adopt Dr. Tredennick’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the language “at least.” Thus, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Even if so, the arrangement of the data must be altered to give full effect to the claim language. The portions of the specification of the ’344 patent cited by Petitioner confirm this. In one instance, the ’344 patent states: In the first error coding path 120, the first data arrangement alteration device 122 is adapted to create a second data block on the basis of the first data block, which comprises the given number of data in a second arrangement, and to output it to the first error coder 124. Ex. 1001, 3:63–67 (emphasis added), cited in Paper 47, 2. Another passage states: The data arrangement alteration device 222 is adapted to receive, at the input 222E or 102, a first data block comprising a given number of data in the first arrangement, and to generate, on the basis of the first data block, a second data block comprising the given number of data in a second arrangement . . . . Ex. 1001, 6:14–18 (emphasis added), cited in Paper 47, 2. These passages show that data arrangement alteration takes data and puts those data into a different arrangement. Petitioner also cites the ’344 patent’s disclosure of a deserializer changing the “representation” of data. Paper 47, 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:58–62, 9:2–7). But, in this operation, “the second data block 440 . . . comprises the same data, namely the 72 bits of the first data block 435 in a second arrangement which is different from the first arrangement of the first data block.” Ex. 1001, 9:32–35 (emphasis added). Petitioner also cites an example in the ’344 patent in which the burst length is halved from eight time pulses to four time pulses. Ex. 1001, 11:52–61, cited in Paper 47, 4. The ’344 patent describes that, in this scenario, only half of the bits (36 out of 72) “will be occupied with processable data.” Ex. 1001, 11:59–60. Petitioner contends that this describes an output of 72 bits that is larger and different than the input of only 36 bits. Paper 47, 4. The ’344 patent, however, describes providing “a further subarea of the matrix 420 for this mode, and to control the multiplexer 430, via the mode register 110, such that this subarea will be read out, so that, for example, only 36 of the 72 bits will be occupied with processable data.” Ex. 1001, 11:56–60 (emphasis added). Thus, it is the subarea having the 36 bits of processable data that is read out. But even if Petitioner is correct that the output is larger than the input in this example, data arrangement alteration still requires an alteration of the arrangement of the input data, even if the output contains additional data. In all of the examples in the specification of the ’344 patent, therefore,” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “a data arrangement alteration algorithm’ is described in the ’344 patent as a ‘data arrangement alteration device,’ which is part of the ‘one or more devices’ of the first means of claim 19. Thus, the corresponding structure is ‘a data arrangement alteration device.’” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:14–25, 6:42–65, 7:10–24; Ex. 1019 ¶ 32). In the Decision on Institution, we addressed Petitioner’s proposed construction for “means for performing a data arrangement alteration algorithm,” but we did not adopt it. Dec. on Inst. 11–12. Rather, we set out the following construction of this term: Limitation Function and Structure Claim 19: means for performing a Function: performing a data data arrangement alteration arrangement alteration algorithm algorithm Structure: data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222 and equivalents. See id. at 3:27–34, 5:65–6:25, 6:42–65, 8:55–57, 10:34–45, Figs. 1–4. During the trial in this proceeding, neither party further disputed this interpretation. Having considered the entire record developed during trial, we determine that this is the proper interpretation for “means for performing a data arrangement alteration algorithm.” Thus, we apply this interpretation in our analysis below.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As discussed above in the section addressing claim interpretation, “data arrangement alteration” requires alteration of the arrangement of data, not merely alteration of data. Petitioner’s allegation that Yoon’s data bus inversion alters some portion of the data is insufficient to show that Yoon describes altering the arrangement of data, as required by the claims. For the same reasons, we are not persuaded that Yoon’s data bus inversion devices describe the same or equivalent structure as that set forth in the specification of the ’344 patent, namely data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222, as set forth in our claim interpretation discussion above. Because Petitioner has not shown Yoon describes the “data arrangement alteration” limitations of independent claims 1, 16, 19, and 43, Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Yoon anticipated these claims. Dependent claims 8–12, 14, 26–31, and 48–51 incorporate the “data arrangement alteration” limitations by virtue of their dependency from their respective independent claims, and, therefore, Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Yoon anticipated these claims.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,161,344 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,161,344
• NVIDIA Corporation v. Polaris Innovations LimitedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 20, 2018 · IPR2017-01346 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 8–12, 16, 18, 43, 45, and 48–51 are unpatentable; claims 2, 19, 20, 22, 26–30, and 44 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Tredennick, testifies that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the ’344 patent (POSITA) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and at least 2 years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 13. Neither Patent Owner, nor its declarant, Dr. Przybylski, offers a different assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2002 ¶ 38 (“I am applying the definition of the level of experience of a person of ordinary skill in the art that has been put forward by Dr. Tredennick in his declaration. I do not necessarily agree with the definition offered there, but I do not presently believe that the exact level of experience of a person of ordinary skill impacts my opinions offered herein.”). Based on the evidence of record, we adopt Dr. Tredennick’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the language “at least.” Thus, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “Thus, “data arrangement alteration” requires the alteration of the arrangement of data, not merely the alteration of data.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownOther

    “Structure: first error coding path 120 and equivalents. See Ex. 1001, 3:27–34, 3:57–4:25, 5:53–64, Figs. 1A, 1E. Function: performing a data Claim 19: means for performing a data arrangement alteration arrangement alteration algorithm algorithm Structure: data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222 and equivalents. See id. at 3:27–34, 5:65–6:25, 6:42–65, 8:55–57, 10:34–45, Figs. 1–4. Dec. on Inst. 8–9.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) Metallic Interface, and it bears a copyright date of 1999. Ex. 1004. Citing the Declaration of Jessica Coral Sheldon- Hess, Petitioner contends ADSL is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1014, 4–5). Ms. Sheldon-Hess testifies that, based on ADSL’s Machine Readable Cataloging (MARC) record obtained from Illinois State Library, ADSL was available to the public as of 1999. Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 8–10. Patent Owner does not dispute the prior art status of ADSL. Petitioner’s evidence establishes that ADSL was publicly available as a printed publication more than one year before the U.S. filing date for the ’344 patent, which is March 11, 2008. See Ex. 1001, [22]. Based on this evidence, we determine that ADSL qualifies as a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 8,161,344 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,161,344
• Panduit Corp. v. CCS Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 4, 2018 · IPR2017-01323 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3 and 4 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Eichenberger and Bennett under § 103(a).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Although there are differences between the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art, the parties and their declarants agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a four-year technical degree and some amount of professional experience with fiber optic equipment. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ declarants, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person having a four year technical degree with a minimum of two years of professional technical experience in fiber optic equipment design. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art in our analysis below. However, we note that our analysis would be the same if we adopted either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the evidence of record, we maintain our determination that an optical interconnection module requires an optical connection within the module. See Dec. on Inst. 10. This is consistent with the intrinsic record, particularly the ’600 patent’s disclosure that “the optical paths of connector 40 and the optical connectors at stations 51–56 are optically interconnected by optical fibers disposed in cavity 62 of the module 60, the fiber pairs being formed by the optical fibers.” Ex. 1001, 3:20–24, Fig. 2. As discussed above, the module itself does not require fibers to be plugged into it. Rather, an “optical assembly,” such as that recited in claim 3, is formed by connecting modules via fibers. We further clarify that, because it is an “optical interconnection module,” it must be a module that forms an optical interconnection. This is consistent with the ’600 patent’s disclosure that “[m]odule 60 also includes an optical interconnection section having an optical connector. The preferred connector is an MTP or MPO connector 40.” Ex. 1001, 2:49–51 (emphasis added). In Figure 2, the optical interconnection section optically interconnects with fibers in ribbon 20. The ’600 patent describes that the optical paths of the connector in the optical interconnection section are “immediately adjacent to at least one other optical path for optical alignment with the optical fibers in an optical fiber ribbon.” Ex. 1001, 2:57–60.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are persuaded by these contentions. Eichenberger discloses that “the connectors 64 have key tabs 69 which limit the orientation of the connector when inserted in connector receptacle 56, in that the connector can only be mated to the receptacle with the key tab point upwards in FIG. 1.” Ex. 1004, 7:52–56. We find Eichenberger’s disclosure of a key on the connector for proper mating with the adapter teaches an adapter having a key. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 53. We further credit Dr. DeCusatis’s testimony that “[a] key 69 would provide no orientation limitation without a compatible, keyed adapter 56 configured to receive the key 69.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 54. We further find a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to include a key on adapter 56 to properly mate the keyed connector with the adapter, to the extent this is not taught, as we find it is. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 54; Ex. 1004, 7:52–56.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “c. Conclusion as to Claim 3 In summary, we find that the combination of Eichenberger and Bennett teaches all of the limitations of claim 3, and we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to, and would have been motivated to, combine the teachings of Eichenberger and Bennett in the manner asserted. Patent Owner does not present any objective evidence of nonobviousness as to any of the challenged claims. Having considered the full record developed during trial, we conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 3 would have been obvious based on Eichenberger and Bennett under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 4. Dependent Claim 4 Claim 4 depends from claim 3 and recites that “all of said optical paths remain with their respective color from one module to another.” Petitioner argues that “[t]he straight ribbon illustrated in modified Fig. 3 shows that all colors are connected to the same colors.” Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79). Although Patent Owner does not provide specific arguments regarding claim 4, the burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate unpatentability, as discussed above. We agree with Petitioner that all of the optical paths stay with their respective colors from one module to another in Petitioner’s proposed configuration because, as discussed above with respect to claim 3, the optical paths stay with their respective colors between the modules. Therefore, having considered the full record developed during trial, we conclude that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 4 would have been obvious based on Eichenberger and Bennett under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 6,758,600 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,758,600
• Panduit Corp. v. CCS Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 4, 2018 · IPR2017-01375 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 6, 7, and 11 are unpatentable under § 103: claim 6 over Toyooka, Eichenberger, and Giebel; claim 7 over Toyooka and Eichenberger; and claim 11 over Toyooka and Giebel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Although there are differences between the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art, the parties and their declarants agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a four-year technical degree and some amount of professional experience with fiber optic equipment. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ declarants, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person having a four year technical degree with a minimum of two years of professional technical experience in fiber optic equipment design. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art in our analysis below. However, we note that our analysis would be the same if we adopted either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We see nothing the record before us indicating that we should deviate from our construction of the term “optical ribbon” in the Final Written Decision in IPR2016-01648. See IPR2016-01648, Paper 27, 10–19. We, therefore, adopt the construction in that case—that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “optical ribbon” in view of the specification of the ’227 patent “encompasses optical fibers that are bonded together in a generally planar array or optical fibers that are grouped and aligned in a generally planar array.” IPR2016-01648, Paper 27, 18–19. We apply this construction below in our analysis of the grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “2. Remaining Terms In our Decision on Institution, we determined that the remaining terms of the challenged claims did not require express constructions at that time. Dec. on Inst. 19. Based on the record developed during trial, we maintain our initial determination that the remaining terms of the challenged claims do not require express constructions.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

  Patent outcomesUS 6,869,227 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,869,227
• Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. v. Nomadix, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 22, 2018 · IPR2018-00392 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing of its denial of institution on the obviousness ground over Slemmer and Vu, finding no abuse of discretion.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “supporting Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the cited references. Req. Reh’g. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner reiterates previous arguments presented in the Petition such as “Vu is one of the first prior art references to teach the handshake” but that “other prior art references also teach it.” Req. Reh’g 8. These arguments were previously addressed. Decision 6–7. Although Petitioner may disagree with our resolution of the arguments that Petitioner presented in its Petition, such arguments were considered fully in our Decision.” slip op. at 4

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,725,899
• Guest-Tek Interactive Entertainment Ltd. v. Nomadix, Inc.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Aug 22, 2018 · IPR2018-00376 · APJ Stephen C Siu · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing and upheld denial of institution on the Slemmer and Vu obviousness ground because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “When rehearing a decision on a petition, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co.,, 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Notably, we must base our determination of a “reasonable likelihood” that Petitioner would “prevail” on “the information presented in the petition,” specifically. In the present case, Petitioner has not provided a basis, legal or otherwise, in support of its position that we must determine a “reasonable likelihood” based on information presented in some other petition, much less based on some other evidence of record in another proceeding. For example, in IPR2016-00077, the panel based its decision on a “Declaration by Mr. Keith Olsen.” That evidence is not of record in this proceeding.” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “supporting Petitioner’s position that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined the cited references. Req. Reh’g. 8–10. In particular, Petitioner reiterates previous arguments presented in the Petition such as “Vu is one of the first prior art references to teach the handshake” but that “other prior art references also teach it.” Req. Reh’g 9. These arguments were previously addressed. Decision 7–8. Although Petitioner may disagree with our resolution of the arguments that Petitioner presented in its Petition, such arguments were considered fully in our Decision.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “construction for the term ‘TCP connection hand shake completion data,’ which resulted in an incorrect determination.” Req. Reh’g. 5. In particular, Petitioner now proposes a broadest reasonable construction of the term “TCP connection hand shake completion data” to mean “two devices initiating a communication session by the first device sending information to a second device, and the second device then responding to the first device.” Req. Reh’g. 7. Based on this newly proposed construction of the term “TCP connection hand shake completion data,” Petitioner argues that Vu discloses this feature. Req. Reh’g. 6–8. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), Petitioner must “identify all matters [Petitioner] believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Petitioner did not present this proposed construction in the Petition. See generally Req. Reh’g.; see generally Pet. We could not have “misapprehended or overlooked” what was not presented.” slip op. at 4

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,266,266
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / EMC Corporation v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 20, 2018 · IPR2017-00477 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1 and 9 are unpatentable as obvious over Cramer and Banga; claim 9 is also anticipated by Cramer, while anticipation was not shown for claim 1.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “skill in the art should be adopted nor how the different levels affect the parties’ analyses. Although there are slight differences between the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art, the parties agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a four-year technical degree with work experience in computer networks or storage systems. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 26); Ex. 2001 ¶ 18. Both parties also agree that additional education may take the place of educational experience. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 26); Ex. 2001 ¶ 18. Based on the evidence of record, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we adopt Patent Owner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, specifically that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had “bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with two to three years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” We agree with both parties that additional education would make up for less professional experience. Ex. 2001 ¶ 18; Ex. 1002 ¶ 26. We note, however, that our analysis would be the same if we adopted either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The Decision on Institution addressed the broadest reasonable interpretation of “control portion,” determining that this term “encompasses a portion of an information packet that includes information used to determine how the packet should be routed.” Dec. on Inst. 14. During the trial, Patent Owner stated that it “does not concede the Board’s construction is correct and maintains that a control portion should be construed to mean ‘a contiguous portion of a packet that includes information used to determine how the packet should be routed.’” PO Resp. 8. Patent Owner, however, further states that “the Board does not need to resolve this issue to decide any dispute in this IPR.” PO Resp. 8. Following institution, the parties did not otherwise address claim construction. See PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 2. Based on the record developed during trial, we determine that we need not expressly construe any term in the challenged claims to decide the issues of patentability before us.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

    “insufficient to support Petitioner’s assertion of anticipation because Cramer does not describe associating first and second host addresses with a common frame address. PO Resp. 21–25. We agree with Patent Owner. Although Cramer describes a filer with a single network adapter, Cramer never expressly describes associating two host addresses with the MAC address of that adapter. In step 410 of Figure 4 of Cramer, “the IP address for the storage device is mapped to a network interface controller (NIC).” Ex. 1005, 9:44–45 (emphasis added). Cramer discloses repeating the process in Figure 4 for each additional device that needs to be configured (Ex. 1005, 10:4–6, Fig. 4 (step 414), but it does not expressly describe that the next volume’s IP address will be mapped to the same NIC. As Patent Owner correctly points out, “[t]he remainder of Cramer’s discussion and figures do not mention or illustrate a single instance where two IP volumes are assigned to the same NIC and therefore share a common frame address.” PO Resp. 22. For example, referring to Figure 5, Cramer discloses: “Connected to Filer 1 is a volume of disks 510. In this example, Filer 1 includes three separate network interface [controllers] (NICs), namely E0, E1 and E2. Filer 2 has NICs E4A and E4B.” Ex. 1005, 10:15–19. Figure 5, therefore, does not show two volumes whose IP addresses are assigned to the same NIC. We do not find express disclosure in Cramer of this many-toone correspondence of IP addresses to frame address. In its Reply, Petitioner notes Cramer describes that filers can serve 150 or more volumes, and Petitioner argues that “there is no suggestion in Cramer that any filer would have 150 or more NICs.” Pet. Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:19–21, 4:47–50); see Ex. 1005, 2:19–21 (“Currently available filer implementations can serve a large number of discrete volumes (150 or more, for example).”). This disclosure may make readily apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art the desirability of using fewer NICs in such a situation and sharing those NICs among multiple volumes, but this is insufficient for anticipation because Cramer still lacks disclosure of associating two IP addresses with the MAC address of one NIC. See Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). Furthermore, Petitioner does not assert that this feature is inherent in Cramer. See Paper 29, 7 (In response to Patent Owner’s Observation 8, Petitioner states: “Petitioner has not relied upon the inherent teachings of any references.”). Having considered the record developed during trial, we determine Petitioner has not shown Cramer expressly describes “the first and second host addresses . . . are both associated with a common frame address that corresponds to a network interface that communicatively couples the packet processor to a network.”” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s position that pointing out similarities in references may not be, by itself, sufficient to support a legal conclusion of obviousness. Rather, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We, however, do not understand Petitioner’s arguments regarding the similarities of Cramer and Banga to be the rationale to combine. Instead, we understand these arguments to be directed to reasonable expectation of success. For example, Petitioner quotes Dr. Karlin’s testimony that “[t]his combination would be straightforward, since Cramer and Banga have similar system designs and would require no more than routine skill in the art because, e.g., the two patents are both NetApp patents, describe similar systems, and are directed to the same person of skill in the art.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 75, quoted in Pet. 60. Petitioner provides separate reasoning to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Banga’s teaching of assigning multiple IP addresses to a common MAC address with the teachings of Cramer. Pet. 59. In particular, Petitioner argues: As explained by Dr. Karlin, “a person of ordinary skill in the art reading Cramer and Banga would be motivated to utilize the common frame address with multiple IP addresses disclosed in Banga with the multiple virtual objects associated with multiple IP addresses disclosed in Cramer. For example, Banga discusses that with a common frame address, ‘the capabilities of the NIC are effectively shared between’ multiple virtual objects and a person of skill in the art would understand the advantages of associating multiple virtual objects with a single NIC having a single MAC, i.e., allowing the capabilities of a single NIC to be ‘effectively shared.’ Banga at 12:1-9.” Pet. 59–60 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 75). Patent Owner argues this is not sufficient articulated reasoning to” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 8,387,132 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,387,132
• EMC Corporation / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 20, 2018 · IPR2017-00374 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–9, 13, 15, 16, and 18–21 are unpatentable as obvious over OceanStore; anticipation and the OceanStore–Condor combination were not established, nor was claim 17 obvious over OceanStore.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “The parties dispute the proper construction of the limitation “[r]epresenting with the corresponding software-based NAS component that the selected distributed devices respectively comprise NAS devices” as recited in claims 1 and 13. See Pet 11–12; PO Resp. 8–11; Reply 3–8. Specifically, the parties proposed the following constructions: Petitioner “using the corresponding software-based NAS components of the selected distributed devices to mimic dedicated NAS devices”” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Although we agree with Patent Owner regarding the use of the term “respectively,” we do not understand its use to require “the selected distributed devices to cause each selected distributed device to separately appear to network-connected user devices as a dedicated NAS device.” We cannot construe individual terms in isolation. Rather, we must consider the claim as a whole in view of the specification. Specifically, we must consider the implications of other terms recited in claims 1 and 13 (e.g., “location information”) and how the claims are supported by the disclosed embodiments.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contests Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, specifically arguing that “Petitioners’ proposed requirements, especially with regard to work experience, are higher than can be reasonably supported.” PO Resp. 5–6. Patent Owner notes that Petitioners’ declarant, Dr. Kubiatowicz, testified on cross-examination that “somebody coming directly out of college, likely, would need a couple of extra years to understand this,” and that “a little bit of professional experience might help them -- would help them understand the details involved in this case.” Id. at 6 (citing Ex. 2002, 25:13–14; 26:2–5). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Shenoy, testified that, at the time “of the ’827 patent, one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with 1–2 years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 19. According to Dr. Shenoy, “[l]ack of experience can be remedied by additional education or vice versa.” Id. Based on our review of the ’827 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’827 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Kubiatowicz and Dr. Shenoy, we adopt and apply Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, specifically that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with 1–2 years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” We also determine that such a person would have been familiar with computer systems architecture and design, and would have been aware of design trends relating to distributed processing systems.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. Based on the record before us, we are not satisfied Petitioner has shown adequately for an anticipation challenge that OceanStore discloses “wherein the respective client agents for particular distributed devices of the plurality of distributed devices have corresponding software-based network attached storage (NAS) components configured to assess unused or under-utilized storage resources in selected distributed devices of the plurality of distributed devices” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 13. Although it appears OceanStore discloses distributed routing in order to find and fulfill a request for an entity with a GUID (global unique identifier) (see Ex. 1003, 193), there does not appear to be an explicit disclosure that any software-based network attached storage (NAS) component on a distributed device assesses unused or under-utilized storage resources in selected distributed devices. Nor does Petitioner adequately explain how such an assessment would be inherent in the disclosure of OceanStore. We note that Petitioner cites to the prosecution history of the ’827 patent while making arguments regarding claim construction. See Pet. 12 n2. Although the ’827 patent prosecution history states that its “client agent programs must be capable of assessing what capabilities are spare and/or unused (unused or under-utilized)” (Ex. 1015, 8), such a statement by the patent applicant does not relieve Petitioner of its burden to point out where such a feature is found in the prior art reference that forms the basis of its anticipation challenge. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that OceanStore describes this limitation of claims 1 and 13. d. Summary Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that OceanStore describes every limitation of claims 1 and 13. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 13 are anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) based on OceanStore. 3. Analysis of Cited Art as Applied to Dependent Claims 3–9 and 15–21 Petitioner contends dependent claims 3–9 and 15–21 of the ’827 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) in view of OceanStore. Pet. 36–44, 46. For the same reason as discussed above in regard to independent claims 1 and 13 above, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 3–9 and 15–21 of the ’827 patent are anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) based on OceanStore.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,275,827 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,275,827
• EMC Corporation / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 20, 2018 · IPR2017-00439 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–6, 8, 9, 13, 15–18, 20, and 21 are unpatentable over Carter; claims 5 and 17 are also obvious over Carter and Pitzel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Patent Owner regarding the ordinary meaning of the term “respectively.” Specifically, we understand that the word “respectively” can be an adverb that means “for each separately or in turn, and in the order mentioned.” The use of “respectively” as an adverb in the English language requires parallelism. See Ex. 3002. In other words, there must be a direct one-to-one correspondence and specific referents must be individually identified before there can be a “parallel list” of attribute values applicable to each, in that order. The term “respectively” also can be an attributive adjective that means “concerning or appropriate to each of several individually.” Id. In the present case, the term “respectively” appears to modify “the selected distributed devices.” Because specific referents are not individually identified, we understand the term to act as an attributive adjective modifying each of several selected distributed devices. Although we agree with Patent Owner regarding the use of the term “respectively,” we do not understand its use to require “the selected distributed devices to cause each selected distributed device to separately appear to network-connected user devices as a dedicated NAS device.” We cannot construe individual terms in isolation. Rather, we must consider claims as a whole in view of the specification. Specifically, we must consider the implications of other terms recited in claims 1 and 13 (e.g., “location information”) and how the claims are supported by the disclosed embodiments.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contests Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, specifically arguing that “Petitioners’ proposed requirements especially with regard to work experience, are higher than can be reasonably supported.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner notes that Petitioners’ declarant, Dr. Kubiatowicz, testified on cross-examination that “somebody coming directly out of college, likely, would need a couple of extra years to understand this,” and that “a little bit of professional experience might help them -- would help them understand the details involved in this case.” Id. (citing Ex. 2002, 25:13–14; 26:2–5). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Shenoy, testified that, “at the time of the ’827 patent, a person of ordinary skill in the art should have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with 1–2 years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 19. According to Dr. Shenoy, “[l]ack of experience can be remedied by additional education or vice versa.” Id. Based on our review of the ’827 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’827 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Kubiatowicz and Dr. Shenoy, we adopt and apply Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, specifically that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with 1–2 years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” See id. We also determine that such a person would have been familiar with computer systems architecture and design, and would have been aware of design trends relating to distributed processing systems.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Despite Patent Owner’s arguments, we find that Carter’s policy element 290 (a software module) is configured to assess unused or under-utilized storage resources in selected distributed devices of the plurality of distributed devices. We understand policy element 290 to satisfy this limitation because Carter specifically discloses that policy element 290 “acts as a controller to determine the availability of resources, such as printer capabilities, hard-disk space, available RAM and other such resources.” Ex. 1140, 36:27–29 (emphases added). We credit the testimony of Dr. Kubiatowicz, who during his deposition stated, “I would say this policy controller certainly can evaluate the hard disk space on the local node, but could also potentially evaluate storage throughout the system by communicating with other nodes.” Ex. 2002, 86:13–16; see id. at 88:5–7; see also id. at 88:12–16 (“What I said was that this policy element is determining the availability of resources. So it’s assessing whether or not hard disk space of various sorts is available. So it’s availability, not just available.”); see id. at 88:18–89:18, 90:5–91:1. We further credit the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Shenoy, who testified that Carter discloses “determin[ing] the free volume space available for allocation.” See Ex. 1144, 142:19–20 (referencing Ex. 1140, 19:14–17). Reading directly from Carter, Dr. Shenoy further testified that Carter discloses “request[ing] the total available space information and us[ing] this information to quickly determine whether to proceed with the allocation processing.” Id. at 142:14–17, 143:1617. In view of the explicit disclosure of Carter and the testimony of both declarants, we find that Carter’s controller performs an “assessment” in order to “determine the availability of resources.” Additionally, Carter states that policy controller 290 “can employ any of the suitable heuristics to direct the elements, such as the paging controller, disk directory manager, and other elements to dynamically distribute the available resources.” Ex. 1140, 36:29–37:2. Thus, we agree with Petitioner’s argument, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Kubiatowicz, that policy element 290 assesses the unused or underused storage resources when it determines the availability of such resources and uses some heuristics when distributing those resources that were assessed. See Pet 39 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 118). Accordingly, based on the entirety of the record before us, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Carter discloses the “assessing” limitations of claims 1 and 13.” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to offer sufficient explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Carter and Condor. Rather, Petitioner appears to argue that, based on the advantages described by Condor (Ex. 1017, 5), and using well-known techniques with unspecified predictable results, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to combine these disparate elements taught in the prior art references to render the challenged claims obvious. Pet. 61–66. Yet, other than Petitioner’s cursory assertion of “advantageously incorporat[ing] the central coordinator in Condor to provide a centralized mechanism to manage resource sharing” (Pet. 66), which cites equally cursory and unsupported testimony by Dr. Kubiatowicz (Ex. 1102 ¶ 199), Petitioner fails to identify what particular advantages or efficiencies would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Condor’s scheduler with Carter’s system. Furthermore, Dr. Kubiatowicz’s testimony regarding predictable results and obviousness to try are similarly lacking in elaboration and substantiation. See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 200–201. Such conclusory statements and unspecific testimony without evidence on the record cannot satisfy the Petitioner’s burden of demonstrating obviousness. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x 982, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The testimony of the Defendants’ expert amounts to a ‘mere conclusory statement’ that may not serve as a basis for finding the asserted claims obvious.”); see also InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that expert’s testimony could not support a finding of obviousness where “testimony primarily consisted of conclusory references to [the expert’s] belief that one of ordinary skill in the art could combine these references, not that they would have been motivated to do so”); see also 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Although Petitioner has not provided a sufficient rationale to combine in this asserted ground of unpatentability, Petitioner has otherwise demonstrated that claims 4, 6, 16, and 18 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because they are anticipated by Carter. Petitioner, however, has not asserted claims 7 and 19 are unpatentable under any other ground in this proceeding. Therefore, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 7 and 19 of the ’827 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Carter and Condor.” slip op. at 59

  Patent outcomesUS 8,275,827 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,275,827

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.