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  • PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted

      “partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,266,749
  • PTAB · Nov 29, 2024 · IPR2024-00133 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Sturman and Ho.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • RemandOther

      “(“Decision Denying Institution” or “DDI”). Petitioner filed a request for Director Review and the Director vacated and remanded our Decision Denying Institution. Paper 11 (Petitioner’s Request for Director Review); Paper 12 (“Remand Dec.” or “Remand Decision”). Specifically, the Director directed that we: shall issue a new decision on institution resolving the claim construction of “a non-promotional background object.” Consistent with Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Board should resolve the proper meaning of that term by first assessing the intrinsic evidence, and then consulting extrinsic evidence if necessary. See, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Slyde Analytics, LLC, IPR2024-00040, Paper 14 at 7–8 (Vidal Aug. 2, 2024) (discussing the Phillips framework). The Board shall consider all remaining necessary issues, and determine whether to institute trial consistent with this decision. Id. at 7–8 (footnote omitted).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 Based on the current record, there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious in view of Sturman and Ho. 4. Analysis of Claims 2–10 Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’089 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue those claims. See Prelim. Resp. 26–36. Those challenges, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 42

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

      “draws a distinction between foreground and background objects. Specifically, the prosecution history makes it clear that foreground objects are “in the forefront of the game play as primary objects to be manipulated or used during game play” and that background objects are “outside the primary focus of game play and as unexpectedly interactive components.” Ex. 1002, 85. However, whether an object is “outside the primary focus of game play and as unexpectedly interactive components” is based solely on the subjective perspective of the user. That is, what one user may consider a primary focus or expected object, another might consider outside the primary focus and unexpected. As the Director made clear in the Remand Decision, it is “improper[]” to have a claim construction “based on the subjective perspective of a user.” Remand Dec. 7; see also Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“We are not prepared to assign a meaning to a patent claim that depends on the state of mind of the accused infringer.”). Accordingly, we cannot and do not adopt that as our construction of the term background. Not finding a construction of “background” based on the intrinsic evidence, we turn to the extrinsic evidence. See Remand Dec. 7 (“[T]he Board should resolve the proper meaning of that term by first assessing the intrinsic evidence, and then consulting extrinsic evidence if necessary.” (emphasis added)). Specifically, as part of the Decision Denying Institution, we considered various dictionary definitions of the word “background.” According to those definitions, “background” refers to “[t]he part of a pictorial representation that appears to be in the distance and that provides relief for the principal objects in the foreground.” Ex. 3002 (AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY); see also Ex. 3003 (“the scenery or ground behind something,” “the part of a painting representing what lies behind objects in the foreground”) (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY). Consistent with those dictionary definitions, we construe the term “background” to mean the part of a pictorial representation that is not in the foreground. The prosecution history provides more useful guidance as to what a “non-promotional” object is. As the applicant argued in the Amendment discussed above, a non-promotional object is one “which does not have an ‘area’ in which advertisements directly appear, but instead represents a ‘hot spot’ that, upon activation, causes ‘hidden promotional content’ to then appear.” Ex. 1002, 85–86. In other words, a non-promotional object does not display a promotional message unless the hotspot is activated. This understanding of the meaning of non-promotional is consistent with an earlier argument (Ex. 1002, 113–25) the applicant made during the prosecution of the ’089 patent.12 At that time, the applicant argued: In an exemplary embodiment, the location in-game may be represented by a non-promotional object, such as a blank chalk board depicted in the background of the gaming environment. See Applicant’s Specification at ¶ [0045]. Upon activating the hot spot (e.g., by throwing a dart at the chalk board), a promotional message may be drawn on the chalk board and displayed to the user. See id. In other words, Applicant’s amended claims 15 and 22, inter alia, may present promotional content once the game user activates, unknowingly, a “hot spot” associated with a non-promotional object—the non-promotional object is not an ordinary or visible place for advertisement, the 12 This argument was made on December 2, 2011, which is prior to the amendment adding the term background on July 15, 2013. Compare Ex. 1002, 117 (then pending claim 15 without the word “background”) with id. at 80 (amendment adding “background” to claim 15). user does not know that the object has a hidden hot spot, and the user does not know that activating the hidden “hot spot” will display promotional content. Ex. 1002, 122 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 15

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

      “Moreover, even if we did consider only the specific references addressed in the Preliminary Response, we would not reach a different outcome. Patent Owner focuses on a high-level comparison of the references. See Prelim. Resp. 13–19. Such high-levels of similarity are to be expected as all of the references involve advertising in computer game programs. But such high-level similarity is not sufficient. See Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Swarm Tech. LLC, IPR2021-01445, Paper 15 at 16 (PTAB March 2, 2022) (Institution Decision) (“The issue is not just whether the same elements can be found in each of the references, but whether the elements function the same way. That is, even though Leong and Bates have the same elements, that does not mean that the elements interact with each other the same way or perform the same functions as recited in the claims.”); see also Advanced Bionics, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 15 (holding that prior art is substantially the same if “Petitioner relies on [the new art] in substantially the same manner as the Examiner cited [the previous art] during prosecution such that [the new art] discloses substantially the same information as [the previous art] in relevant part.”); Nokia of Am. Corp. v. Alexander Soto, IPR2023-00680, Paper 18 at 7 (PTAB Mar. 28, 2024) (Vidal) (determining the Board erred when “rather than identify material, substantive overlap between the arguments presented in the Petitions and those previously presented to the Office, the Board’s analysis relied on its discussion of high-level similarities but lacked detailed reasoning”); Wolfspeed, Inc. v . The Trustees of Purdue University, IPR2022-00761, Paper 13 at 7 (PTAB Mar. 30, 2023) (Vidal) (vacating the Board’s decision when the “analysis of the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework did not consider sufficiently the material differences between” the art the Office previously considered and the art the Petition cited). Nor were any of Petitioner’s Reply arguments improper. We expressly authorized Petitioner to respond to Patent Owner’s arguments that the prior art relied on in the Petition was substantially the same as prior art that was considered. Ex. 3005 (Email from the Board to the parties) (“Petitioner is authorized to file a preliminary reply brief addressing 1) Patent Owner’s arguments under 35 U.S.C. 325(d). . . .”). Moreover, given the facts of this proceeding, it is not reasonable to require Petitioner to anticipate “substantially the same prior art” arguments and address them in the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner’s argument is a proper reply argument. 3. Conclusion Based on our consideration of Becton Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d), we find that the same or substantially the same art or arguments were not previously presented to the Office. Thus, our analysis ends at this point, and we need not proceed to part two of the Advanced Bionics framework. See Advanced Bionics, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8. We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution based on 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 25

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,688,089
  • PTAB · Mar 2, 2023 · IPR2021-01483 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–18 are unpatentable; the revised motion to amend and both parties’ motions to exclude are denied.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelOther

      “B. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner offers an assessment as to the level of skill in the art as of” slip op. at 10

    • 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied

      “to . . . introduce new subject matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 41.121(a)(2)(ii); Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 6–7. Accordingly, “the Board requires that a motion to amend set forth written description support in the originally filed disclosure of the subject patent for each proposed substitute claim, and also set forth support in an earlier filed disclosure for each claim for which benefit of the filing date of the earlier filed disclosure is sought.” Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 7 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(b)(1)–(2)). For this requirement, Patent Owner must cite “to the original disclosure of the application, as filed, rather than to the patent as issued.” Id. at 8.” slip op. at 56

    • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “insufficiency in its showing that these documents are prior art is a legal determination to be made by the Board, and is not proper for a motion to exclude. Pet. Opp. PO Mot. Excl. 4 (citing Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc. v. 5th Market, Inc., CBM2014-00114, Paper 35, at 52 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2015) (“a motion to exclude is not the proper vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence used to demonstrate that [an item] qualifies as a prior art printed publication . . .. Whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication . . . is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual determinations” and thus “the issue of whether there is sufficient evidence in the record . . . should be presented in the patent owner response—not a motion to exclude”).” slip op. at 64

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “claims 11, 17, and 18. Resp. 10 n. 2. We determine that Petitioner has shown the limitations of claims 11, 17, and 18 to be taught by the abovementioned portions of Chang and Geeks, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reason to combine the references with a reasonable expectation of success. For these reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 11, 17, and 18 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 18

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
    Patents in suitUS 9,848,295
  • PTAB · Dec 26, 2017 · IPR2017-02201 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Order

    The Board dismissed the petition and terminated the proceeding as to all parties because the parties had settled their dispute.

    RulingsOther
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Other

      “and 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, these sections relate, respectively, to termination of “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter” and to termination of “trial,” which “means a contested case instituted by the Board based upon a petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 317; 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.2, 42.72. This proceeding is in the preliminary stage, and no decision whether to institute a trial has been made. As such, we treat the parties’ request as seeking dismissal of the Petition to thereby terminate the proceeding.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “U.S. Patent No. 6,684,060 B1. Mot. 3–4. The parties represent that “there are no other agreements or understandings, oral or written, between DTS and Avago, including any collateral agreements, made in connection with, or in contemplation of, the termination of the present proceeding.” Mot. 3. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to dismiss the Petition (Paper 1) and terminate this proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.71(a), 42.74(a). We also determine that it is appropriate to treat the Agreements as business confidential information to be kept separate from the patent file. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c).” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,684,060
  • PTAB · Sep 24, 2015 · IPR2015-01382 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Order

    The Board granted the renewed joint motion to terminate and terminated the proceeding before deciding whether to institute review.

    RulingsOther
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “I. DISCUSSION On September 18, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Terminate this proceeding (Paper 9), a copy of the parties’ settlement agreement (Ex. 1009), and a Motion to Seal (Paper 8) that includes a request to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c). After reviewing the settlement agreement submitted by the parties, we informed the parties via email correspondence on September 21, 2015, that these papers were insufficient because the settlement agreement was redacted. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (requiring a “true copy” of a settlement agreement be filed in the Office before the termination of an inter partes review); see also APTwater, Inc. v. ThinkVillage- Kerfoot, LLC, Case IPR2014-00132, slip op. at 2 (PTAB June 10, 2014) (Paper 17) (“A redacted version of the settlement agreement will not be accepted as a true copy of the settlement agreement.”). We instructed the parties to file a non-redacted version of the settlement agreement. On September 21, 2015, the parties complied with our instructions by filing a renewed Joint Motion to Terminate this proceeding (Paper 10), and a true copy of the parties’ settlement agreement (Ex. 1010).1 The renewed Joint Motion to Terminate this proceeding also includes a joint request to treat the settlement agreement as business confidential information under 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c). Paper 10, 4–5.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,578,086
  • PTAB · Mar 11, 2015 · IPR2014-01108 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Order

    The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding after settlement, before a final decision on the merits.

    RulingsOther
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” The requirement for terminating review with respect to Petitioner is met. Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Asustek Computer Inc., Dexin Electronics Co., Ltd., and Thermaltake Technology represent all petitioners in this review. The Board has discretion to terminate this review with respect to Better Mouse Co., LLC as Patent Owner. The above represent all parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,532,200
  • PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00555 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order

    The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without issuing final written decisions.

    RulingsOther
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3

    None
  • PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00557 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order

    The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five related inter partes reviews without a final written decision.

    RulingsOther
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,047,705
  • PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00554 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order

    The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.

    RulingsOther
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id.” slip op. at 2

    None
  • PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00556 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order

    The Board granted the joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.

    RulingsOther
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id. 1 Unless otherwise noted, citations are to the record of IPR2013-00554; similar papers may be found in the records of the other related proceedings. Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,607,803
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