- PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00054 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–16 on all four grounds, finding at least one claim more likely than not unpatentable based on obviousness, indefiniteness, or lack of written description.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in a post-grant review. We institute a post-grant review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 321, if unrebutted, shows that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the petition is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324. On the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’781 patent is unpatentable under a presented ground. See generally Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of post-grant review. Our reasoning is discussed below.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“STANDING Petitioner states that it certifies that: (1) the ’781 patent is available for post grant review because its earliest claimed effective filing date is October 9, 2018, and the patent issued less than nine months ago, on December 3, 2024; and (2) Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting a post grant review on the grounds in this petition. Pet. 5. This is sufficient. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(note)(A)–(B), § 321; 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(a). Patent Owner does not contest standing. See generally Prelim. Resp. B. REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner states that “[t]he real parties-in-interest are Petitioner Straumann USA, LLC and its affiliates Institut Straumann AG and JJGC Indústria e Comércio de Materiais Dentários S.A.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner raises no objection and itself identifies “Smart Denture Conversions, LLC is the real party-in-interest.” Paper 4, 2; see generally Prelim. Resp. C.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 42. And, as set forth above, Patent Owner asserts that, for the sake of its present arguments, it matters not which of the two proposed definitions we use for this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 21. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’781 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This issue may be further developed at trial by the parties, if desired. C.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court thus, by default, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner indicates that None of the claim terms of claims 1–16 need to be construed to determine the patentability issues presented in this petition. The petition applies the ordinary meaning of the claim language as it would be understood by a POSA after reading the ’781 patent. Ex. 1002, ¶130. Petitioner will propose a construction if Patent Owner argues or the Board determines that one is required for any term. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1002). And, Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction at this point. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not expressly construe any claim terms; however, this position is preliminary and we may change it based on the fully developed record at trial.8 D.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,156,781 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00956 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in an inter partes review. We institute an inter partes review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’992 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“These two proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan share many consistencies, for example, the types of degrees and experience such a person would have had, but differ in the number of years of experience. Petitioner proposes the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had at least five years of experience and Patent Owner proposes at least three years (which would necessarily include five years, too). Patent Owner also proposes that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have consulted a dentist, oral surgeon, prosthodontist, or periodontist with experience in dental implants and prosthetics. At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 40. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’992 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This parties may further developed this issue at trial, if desired. C.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board interprets claim terms in an inter partes review using the same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Here, the first claim limitation at issue is broad, i.e., different thread pattern/profile between a definite and a temporary screw, and the Specification’s and priority applications’ disclosure is narrow and specific, asymmetric buttress style threads in a temporary screw and symmetrical threads in a definite screw (are different). Any apparent predictability in or maturity of the relevant field here must be contrasted with the fact that the Specification, considering the ’992 patent itself or any of the identified priority applications, never once even discusses the (claimed) concept of specifically differing the thread style between a temporary and a definitive screw. Any differences in thread style are not called out by the disclosure, but are described and can be discerned only in relation to the respective threads’ functionality, i.e., Fig. 75’s temporary screw 190 has buttress-style threading so it can be pulled out rather than unscrewed from the abutment; Fig. 9’s definitive screw 75 has male threads that fill the female threads of the abutment 8 for a secure permanent engagement. Ex. 1001, 15:23–30, 21:25–44, 23:3–36; Ex. 1012, 97–98, Figs. 9, 75. And, although it is possible for a single disclosed species to provide written description support for a claimed genus, “a sufficient description of a genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350; see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That does not appear to be the case here—the present record does not support that the described asymmetrical buttress, serrated style of different temporary screw threading (relative to that of the definitive screw and regardless of the direction of the threads for rotation) is sufficiently representative of the genus’s “different” thread patterns/profiles. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 (a buttress style thread does not function the same as a buttress reverse or 75º joint profile or rounded, or trapezoidal thread).” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,937,992 - PTAB · Nov 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00827 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7–14, 16–19, 22–26, and 28–32, finding a reasonable likelihood that Renisch anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but, on this record, are not persuaded. We recognize that Dr. Sonka provides a different opinion than Petitioner and Dr. Rosen. Dr. Sonka testifies that in his opinion “the distinctions between Renisch and claim 1 go beyond terminology.” Ex. 2014 ¶ 79. At this stage, in the absence of a full record, we need not record, it appears that Renisch discloses the elements of limitation [1(c)] at paragraphs 26–31, where it discloses obtaining a scanned 3D image of a fuller anatomy, i.e., a segmentation map, and then using a segmentation unit (76) to define the boundaries of anatomical structures of interest within that fuller anatomy, i.e., creating a plurality of segmentation masks, using a library, models, clustering, edge detection, region growing, neural networks, and/or an atlas of normal anatomical structures, and then identifying hot spots of interest within those anatomical structures of interest, and identifying organs with lesions and those without. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26–31. Based on the record before us and the specific disclosures in Renisch, as discussed in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has met the “reasonable likelihood” standard necessary to institute an inter partes review proceeding. Although we address only Ground A and claims 1 and 10 herein for the purposes of institution, as noted above, we will address all asserted grounds and challenged claims in any final decision.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We do not perceive a need to construe any claim limitation at this time. This, however, does not preclude the parties from arguing proposed constructions of the claims during trial. Indeed, the parties are hereby given notice that any disputed claim construction, in general, should be addressed at trial and, if so, should be addressed clearly in a designated section of briefing rather than relegated to arguments on the merits of patentability. Claim construction, if necessary, will be determined at the close of the evidentiary record and after any hearing. slip op. at 15
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Compliance with the Particularity Requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) Patent Owner asserts that the Petition fails to meet the particularity requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). Prelim. Resp. 18–26. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner’s excessive internal cross-referencing impermissibly forces the Board and Patent Owner to piece together scattered portions of the Petition (and exhibits).” Id. at 26. Patent Owner concludes that “the Petition fails to adequately map the references to the claim elements with particularity.” Id. We disagree. Using claims 1 and 10 as an example, Petitioner asserts: Claim 10 recites a “system for automatically processing 3D images” that is substantively identical to the “method for automatically processing 3D images” recited in claim 1, addressed above. Whereas claim 1 (the method claim) recites a series of steps, each performed “by a processor,” claim 10 (the system claim) recites a “processor” with stored instructions that perform the same steps recited in claim 1. Similarly, dependent claims 11–14, 16, and 26 are substantively identical to dependent claims 2–5, 7, and 19. Pet. 41–42. Claims 1 and 10 contain similar elements and limitations. Petitioner’s reference, for example, in the Petition’s analysis of claim 10, back to the analysis of claim 1 concerning nearly identical elements and limitations (id. at 42) is a matter of efficiency and is sufficiently clear for us to determine the basis for Petitioner’s challenges. We determine that the Petition does not violate the statutory requirement for particularity.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but, on this record, are not persuaded. We recognize that Dr. Sonka provides a different opinion than Petitioner and Dr. Rosen. Dr. Sonka testifies that in his opinion “the distinctions between Renisch and claim 1 go beyond terminology.” Ex. 2014 ¶ 79. At this stage, in the absence of a full record, we need not record, it appears that Renisch discloses the elements of limitation [1(c)] at paragraphs 26–31, where it discloses obtaining a scanned 3D image of a fuller anatomy, i.e., a segmentation map, and then using a segmentation unit (76) to define the boundaries of anatomical structures of interest within that fuller anatomy, i.e., creating a plurality of segmentation masks, using a library, models, clustering, edge detection, region growing, neural networks, and/or an atlas of normal anatomical structures, and then identifying hot spots of interest within those anatomical structures of interest, and identifying organs with lesions and those without. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26–31. Based on the record before us and the specific disclosures in Renisch, as discussed in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has met the “reasonable likelihood” standard necessary to institute an inter partes review proceeding. Although we address only Ground A and claims 1 and 10 herein for the purposes of institution, as noted above, we will address all asserted grounds and challenged claims in any final decision.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,941,817 - PTAB · Oct 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00817 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Boerjes-Geng and Boerjes-Geng-Babayoff obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On this record, we determine that Petitioner has developed this ground sufficiently to meet the reasonable likelihood standard for institution. Having determined that Petitioner has met its burden as to its Ground 2 arguments, and because the Board must institute on all grounds or none, SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 364–65 (2018) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a), we institute trial in on all grounds presented in this proceeding. Nevertheless, we address the additional grounds below.” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–30). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative proposal. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 9
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties indicate that in the co-pending litigation in the District Court for the Western District of Texas (see supra Section I.B), the Court provided preliminary constructions of two specific claim limitations. Pet. 16–17; Prelim. Resp. 8. Patent Owner adds that “district court subsequently adopted these constructions in its final claim construction order.” Prelim. Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2001). We determine that the constructed limitations do not impact the analysis below, but nonetheless, we adopt this those constructions for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“identify areas that need replacing, such as ‘a margin line’ to be removed, ‘areas of poor margin preparation,’ and ‘holes or areas of incomplete scan[s],’” and that the user can identify regions of a prepared tooth surface requiring additional preparations and “supplemental scanning” (Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 189, 193, 196)), Boerjes is silent with respect to replacing at least a portion of the removed surface portion of the model using the received second scan data of the patient’s teeth, per claim 1. Boerjes certainly contemplates the re-scanning of the dentition, but does not assert partial insertion of new data into an existing 3D model. Even under the “comprising” language of claim 1, for example, the complete replacement of a 3D model cannot teach or suggest “replacing at least a portion of the removed surface portion” without repudiating the language of the claim by making a portion be the entire model. Even if, as Petitioner asserts, “removing portions of a virtual model has been a well-known and routine technique in 3D modeling,” and the “process of replacing a user-identified portion would have been well within the skills of a POSITA” (Pet. 35), the disclosure of Boerjes does not teach or suggest such processes. Although Boerjes allows for the possibility that portions of a model can be identified as needing replacement or supplementation, it does not disclose the partial replacement required by the instant, independent claims. Boerjes’s actual disclosure details that supplemental scanning is used to compensate for an inadequate scan, but not disclosed to be used to stitch together before-and-after models that have undergone an intervening physical change. slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,791,936 - PTAB · Oct 27, 2025 · IPR2025-00816 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on all challenged claims 1–19; Ground 1 met the reasonable-likelihood threshold, while Ground 2 was instituted under the all-grounds rule.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the Chishti patents and Sachdeva to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the Chishti patents and Sachdeva to meet the limitations of the claims challenged under this ground.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away found
“with Chishti-876’s purported teaching away and disparagement, we note again that “round-tripping” is defined in the Specification as “the technique of moving a first tooth out of the path of a second tooth, and once the second tooth has moved sufficiently, moving the first tooth back to its previous position before proceeding to a desired final position of that first tooth.” Ex. 1001, 13:8–12. Chishti-876 teaches that its “path scheduling algorithm determines the treatment path while avoiding ‘round-tripping,’ i.e., while avoiding moving a tooth along a distance greater than absolutely necessary to straighten the teeth. Such motion is highly undesirable, and has potential negative effects on the patient.” Ex. 1005, 14:46–51. The Petition does not expressly address this teaching in Chishti-876, nor does it address the prior Board finding in the ’444 IPR, in which the Board recognized that this teaching constitutes a teaching away from round-tripping. See Ex. 1008, 11– 12. On this record, it appears that Chishti-876 teaches away from “moving a tooth along a distance greater than absolutely necessary to straighten the teeth.” In short, Chishti-876 disparages “moving a tooth along a distance greater than absolutely necessary to straighten the teeth” (Ex. 1005, 14:46– 51) which is a broad statement that appears to encompass the more specific round-tripping movement taught in Becker. Petitioner itself concedes that “indirect movement was understood to be avoided if possible.” Pet. 17. Although Petitioner attempts to characterize indirect movement or round-tripping as a preferable or necessary option (see, e.g., Pet. 15–17), these arguments are insufficiently supported on this record.” slip op. at 27
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“as of August 30, 2006 (the earliest claimed priority date) would have been part of an interdisciplinary team. This team would have included a member with an advanced degree related to dentistry (e.g., BDS, MDS, DDS, DMD) with experience in orthodontics, including 1–3 years of orthodontic training or equivalent experience, and experience using clear aligners. The team may have also included members with a degree in a technical area related to software, graphics, computers, or a related discipline. This technical team member would have had 1–3 years of software development experience. For all team members, more education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,369,456 - PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00749 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 based on the petition’s grounds and granted ZF’s motion to join the Mobileye IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Mobileye IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Mobileye IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See Mobileye IPR, Paper 14 (analyzing challenges in the Mobileye Petition).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“A motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 76 (Nov. 2019).2 Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 4–8. According to Petitioner, “the Petition involves the same patent, challenges the same claims, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art submitted in the Mobileye Petition” and “does not present any new grounds of unpatentability and is substantively identical to the Mobileye Petition.” Id. at 5. Petitioner argues that, “[b]ecause the Petition is substantively identical to the Mobileye Petition, with the same grounds challenging the same claims as instituted by the Board, there are no new issues for Patent Owner to address” and, therefore, joinder with the Mobileye IPR would “not unduly burden or negatively impact the trial schedule in any meaningful way.” Id. at 6. Further, “Petitioner explicitly agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role in the joined proceeding” and “will assume the primary role only if Petitioner in the Mobileye IPR ceases to participate.” Id. at 7–8 (quoting Noven Pharms., Inc. v. Novartis AG, IPR2014-00550, Paper 38 at 5 (PTAB Apr. 10, 2015).” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 9,671,328 - PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00748 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claim 15 under § 103(a) based on Gallagher and Lumia, granted joinder in the Mobileye IPR subject to participation limits, and terminated this proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Mobileye IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the Mobileye IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the ground presented in the Petition. See Mobileye IPR, Paper 16 (analyzing challenges in the Mobileye Petition).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Under the circumstances outlined above, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in the Mobileye IPR. Therefore, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 7
NonePatents in suitUS 9,335,255 - PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00776 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 9, 11, 32–58, 60–62, and 64–67 on all remaining petition grounds, after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 9 is unpatentable over Thomas and Faucette.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 9, 11, 32–58, 60–62, and 64–67 of the ’802 patent is unpatentable, and we on the Grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Settled expectationsOther
“Patent Owner also filed a Request with the Acting Director of the USPTO seeking discretionary denial of institution of inter partes review (Paper 6, the “Request”). Petitioner subsequently filed a brief opposing Patent Owner’s Request (Paper 8). On September 3, 2025, the Acting Director denied Patent Owner’s Request for discretionary denial of institution of inter partes review and referred the case to the panel for an institution decision on the merits (Paper 11).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill would have an M.D. or a Ph.D. degree in virology, immunology, and vaccinology, and at least 3 years of experience in one or more of the research, design, development, and testing of antiviral vaccines. Pet. 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill may be part of a multidisciplinary team having such experience. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 81). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill asserted by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party requests construction of any claim terms. Petitioner asserts that all claim terms should be given their ordinary and customary meaning, and Patent Owner does not disagree. See Pet. 17. Accordingly, we find, for the purposes of this Decision, that no terms of the challenged claims requires construction beyond the ordinary and customary meaning of the terms, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; see also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. construes claims only to the extent necessary to resolve a dispute).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,730,802 - PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00685 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–23 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the claims are obvious over Wei and Liu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Summary Based upon the record as presently developed, we conclude that Petitioner has met its burden of showing a reasonable likelihood of showing at trial that at least claim 1 of the ’370 patent is obvious over the cited prior art. Because we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success at trial in showing that at least one claim is unpatentable on at least one of the stated Grounds, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’370 patent, based on all of the remaining grounds identified in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 44
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“appears to be generally consistent with the level of skill presented in the cited prior art. See generally, e.g., Exs. 1005–1008; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, at this point we reject the portion of Petitioner’s proposed definition that includes having “access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience,” as not reflecting the individual level of skill of a given skilled artisan. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that “[t]he person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art. The actual inventor’s skill is not determinative”) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Consequently, and for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition as defining a person of ordinary skill in the art as a person who would have had “a Ph.D. in immunology, molecular biology, cellular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar experience, and would further have had at least five years of experience with antibodies and antibody engineering.”” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Petitioner states that no term of the challenged claims requires construction to resolve the challenges in this Petition. Pet. 32. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion. See generally Prelim. Resp. We find, for the purposes of this Decision, that no terms of the challenged claims require construction beyond the ordinary and customary meaning of the terms, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“We find, based upon the present record and for the purposes of this Decision, that Petitioner has sufficiently established that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Wei and Liu to determine the activity and suitability of Liu’s humanized anti- EGFR antibodies in an ADC. We acknowledge that Liu is silent regarding the pH selectivity or tissue preference of its binding affinity, but Patent Owner points to no prior art reference that would have informed a skilled artisan upon this point or that would have discouraged a person of ordinary skill in the art from combining the references. See fn.7, supra. And, even if a skilled artisan might have recognized that Liu’s humanized cetuximab might have been potentially problematic if it failed to show pH-selective activity like Wei’s Y104D, the mere fact that some disadvantage may come with an advantage when combining prior art does not foreclose their combination under § 103. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In the instance of Liu’s humanized anti-EGFR antibody, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that its advantages (enhanced activity against tumor cells compared to chimeric cetuximab, thus requiring smaller dosages) could balance or outweigh its possible disadvantages (e.g., possible activity against non-tumor cells). Furthermore, it is in the nature of scientific research to continue to try new substitutions in drug therapy, even if a promising candidate has been discovered. As the Supreme Court stated in KSR: When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103. 550 U.S. at 421.” slip op. at 39
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,792,370 - Gettattle, Inc. v. Afterwords, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00677 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–7, 10, 13, 16, 18, and 19 on all four anticipation grounds because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to determine whether to institute trial in an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’811 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ORDINARY LEVEL OF SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends: As of the effective priority date of the ‘811 patent, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field at the time would be familiar with the pre-existing point of sale and network-based technologies as above, for example in Section I.D. above as well as the “BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION” portion of the ‘811 patent specification. Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 21 – col. 5, l. 10. This person would include someone who has, through education or practical experience, at least 2-3 years of experience in software engineering, such as the development of data sets, database management, and networking integration for dynamic content generation and network-based distribution. Pet. 10. Patent Owner states, “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Petition, p. 10.” Prelim. Resp. 14. We accept and use Petitioner’s proposed, and unopposed, definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. It appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’811 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). C.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“The claim language does little to identify any meaning of “point-of- sale interface.” Looking to the ’811 patent’s written description, it never uses the term “point-of-sale interface,” but it states “moder[n] Point-of-Sale (POS) systems . . . capture rich details around their customers’ purchasing activity.” Ex. 1001, 1:52–54. The Specification further states that “[t]he transaction data may be stored locally to a point-of-sale (“POS”) device or to a remote location, such as a cloud service provider.” Id. at 2:23–25. Regarding the associated term “interface,” the written description states, “[i]n general, as used herein, an interface is a component of computer executable instructions stored in a tangible, non-transitory medium and executed by processor 12 to present a display of information related to the interface allowing someone to view and/or interact with the presented information.” Id. at 4:32–37. We are pointed to and find nothing in the ’811 patent’s prosecution history that sheds any further light on the meaning of this language. See Pet. 12–14; Prelim. Resp. 12–13; Ex. 1003. Based on the intrinsic record, we find that the ’811 patent describes a point-of-sale as being local to a transaction, e.g., a sale/purchase of a product” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this point in the proceeding, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the recited survey module must be autonomous, self-contained, or a web-container package. As discussed above, we preliminarily interpret this term to mean software code for displaying a survey question. We find no support in the current record to add to this definition any additional requirements related to autonomy, self-containment, or a web-based context for the survey module. The Petition (at 19) points to Douglas as teaching the claimed survey module, i.e., in Douglas, software sent to the customer for taking a product survey on the display of the customer’s computer device. Douglas teaches, in response to a customer providing a survey trigger (e.g., purchase data signals), a survey generator creates a transaction-specific survey (e.g., “Was the item you found too expensive?”) and transmits it to the customer’s device (e.g., a mobile phone with a touchscreen); the survey is interactive; and the customer touches or clicks their device’s screen to respond to the survey questions. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 34–35. Moreover, Douglas also discloses that its survey “interact[s] with the customer using one or more software applications on customer device 106,” which may be, e.g., a computer or mobile phone, further, “[t]he one or more software applications may be provided by survey system 101, or merchant 107, or a third party,” and finally, “[t]he one or more software applications may be web-based applications and/or native mobile applications installed on the customer device 106.” Id. ¶¶ 18–20; see also Prelim. Resp. 35 (conceding as much). Thus, Douglas appears to disclose a survey system where a survey server responds to a triggering survey token created by a merchant and sent by a customer, that connects the customer with a particular purchase, by creating a purchase-specific survey question and sending it to a customer’s electronic device, where the survey question is displayed on a web-browser by software, and the customer’s survey answers may then spur the system to generate and follow up with additional questions. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 18–20, 27–29, 33–39. This appears to include the claimed survey module at issue. As for Patent Owner’s argument that the recited survey module must” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,430,811
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.