- The Kroger Company / Brookshire Grocery Company v. Nexuscard, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 27, 2017 · CBM2015-00183 · APJ Minn Chung · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under § 101 because they claim the abstract idea of collecting, storing, and processing membership discount information without an inventive concept.
RulingsFinal written decision- Burden
“Upon considering all of the evidence of record, we are persuaded Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that claims 1 and 11 fail to recite any elements that individually or as an ordered combination transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesOther
“communication means” Claimed Function: “providing real time (1, 8, 11) 2, 3 communication between [a point of purchase] member merchant’s computer terminal and [a centralized] provider’s computer” Corresponding Structure: a cash register with a communication capability, a credit card verification machine, a terminal, or a scanner, and equivalents “memory storage means” Claimed Function: “containing at least . . . (1, 11) consumer identification code” Corresponding Structure: a magnetic stripe on a card, and equivalents slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“real time “communication without intentional delay, communication” (1, 7, 11) given the processing limitations of the system and the time required to effect the communication” See Dec. on Inst. 8–11. The parties do not dispute these interpretations in their Patent Owner Response and Reply. For this Final Written Decision, after considering the complete record, we see no reason to deviate from those constructions and, therefore, maintain our constructions as set forth above. slip op. at 9
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“Under the approach described in Alice and further explained in Enfish, Internet Patents, and Electric Power Group, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence that claims 1 and 11 are directed to an abstract idea. As discussed above, Petitioner has shown that the claims recite a process to “collect, store, and process information about consumer memberships, merchants, manufacturers, and sales transactions” (Pet. 34), a process that qualifies as an “abstract idea” (id. at 71) of “conventional information processing” in the retail industry (id. at 72), for which conventional components, such as a magnetic stripe scanner, computers, and databases, are merely invoked as tools used in their ordinary and conventional manner (Pet. Reply 8–11). In Electric Power Group, the Federal Circuit explained that the “the realm of abstract ideas” includes “collecting information, including when limited to particular content.” Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353. The court determined, therefore, that the claims at issue were directed to an abstract idea because “the focus of the asserted claims” is “on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.” Id. We are persuaded that claims 1 and 11 in this case are similarly directed to an abstract idea because Petitioner’s argument and evidence shows that the focus of the claims, the claims’ “character as a whole,” is on conventional information processing in the context of membership discount programs that use generic computers and conventional devices as tools to provide discounts without coupons.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 5,924,080 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 5,924,080 - Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC / Microsoft Corporation Inc. v. Adc Technology Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 1, 2016 · CBM2015-00026 · APJ Michael P Tierney · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 8–14 are unpatentable under §103 as obvious over the instituted prior-art combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“D. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Garry E. Kitchen, testifies that, based on his experience in the commercial software art, a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related engineering discipline or equivalent experience or education. Declaration of Garry Kitchen, Ex. 1011 ¶ 33. Patent Owner does not dispute this recitation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art identified by Mr. Kitchen as it is consistent with the prior art of record. See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached
“Petitioner provides specific constructions for each of the interference means appearing in the dependent claims. Pet. 22–24. Patent Owner disagrees that the dependent claims recitation of interference means requires “additional functional limitations piled on top of the disclosed structure.” PO Resp. 7. Specifically, Patent Owner contends that there is only one construction of interference means, namely that which Petitioner provided with respect to the interference means of claim 8. Petitioner disagrees with Patent Owner and contends that the four dependent claims themselves recite specific functions and must further limit the claim from which they depend. Reply 7. We determine that it is unnecessary to determine whether Patent Owner or Petitioner is correct as to the specific construction of the interference means recited in claims 11, 12, 13, and 14 as the claims are unpatentable under either construction. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Program, Data and Combination of Program and Data Claim 8 contains the recitation “the program, the data, and a combination of the program and data together.” Petitioner contends that the term should mean “the program and/or the data.” Pet. 28; Reply 9. Petitioner, however, contends that Patent Owner was silent as to the meaning of the term during ex parte reexamination. Pet. 29. Patent Owner generally contends that the claim recitation is definite and requires operations to be performed either on “a program, or on data, or on a combination of the program and data.” PO Resp. 8. We adopt Patent Owner’s construction (operations are performed either on “a program, or on data, or on a combination of the program and data”) as it is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term and appears to be substantially the same as Petitioner’s construction. Reply, 9–10, Ex. 1011, ¶ 54.” slip op. at 11
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“The obviousness-type double patenting rejection does not demonstrate that the earlier filed ’995 patent described the invention, with all its claimed limitations. First, the rejection was based on obviousness, not anticipation. See Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). (“One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.”). Second, the Examiner’s identification of “common subject matter” consists merely of that which appears in the preamble of challenged claim 8. Although the Examiner stated that there was no apparent reason why the present claims were not presented in the earlier application, Mr. Kitchen presents credible testimony that the clock means limitation “for keeping a predetermined time period after said executing means starts execution of the program or data processing,” did not appear in the earlier filed applications and written description support for it was added in the continuation-in-part ’784 application via new Figure 12. Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 46–47 and 49; compare Ex. 1001, Figures 1–14, with Ex. 1014, Figures 1–11. Based on the evidence of record, we credit Mr. Kitchen’s testimony as it is consistent with the evidence of record and hold that Petitioner has established that claims 8–14 are limited to the July 2, 1998, filing date of the ’784 application, which resulted in the issuance of the ’520 patent.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 6,193,520 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,193,520 - FFF Enterprises, Inc. v. Amerisourcebergen Specialty Group, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 28, 2016 · CBM2014-00154 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable as anticipated by both Dearing under § 102(b) and Gibb under § 102(a).
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“For the foregoing reasons, FFF has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Dearing discloses all elements of challenged claims 1 and 2.10 We, therefore, conclude that these claims are anticipated by Dearing, and thus are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” slip op. at 31
- Skill levelOther
“term in light of its broadest reasonable interpretation, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and as consistent with the specification of the ’607 patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); see In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC v. Lee, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-446). In the Decision to Institute, we construed the term consignment product unit as “products that are considered sold when removed from the cabinet or the product packaging.” Dec. 13–15. We also held that the server system creates an invoice when the product units are removed from the inventory should be given its ordinary meaning, and manage the inventory needed no explicit construction. Dec. 11–13, 15–16. In its Response, ABSG challenges our treatment of all three claim terms.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“While the broadest reasonable interpretation standard does not require us to construe claims to preserve their validity—and indefiniteness of the claims is not before the Board in this proceeding, in any event—we are mindful that adopting ABSG’s construction would mean that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to determine whether a potentially infringing system falls within the scope of the claim unless he or she has access to the contracts governing the sale of the items within the cabinet. See Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A claim is indefinite if its legal scope is not clear enough that a person of ordinary skill in the art could determine whether a particular composition infringes or not.”). Furthermore, legal ownership is a distinction “discernable only to the human mind,” similar to limitations found to have no patentable weight under the printed matter doctrine unless they have a functional or structural relationship to the physical substrate. See In re Distefano, 808 F.3d 845, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Jie Xiao, 462 F. App’x 947, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential). Though the 19 ownership of the products is not printed matter, the logic of those cases is equally applicable here. See King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The rationale behind this line of [printed matter] cases is preventing the indefinite patenting of known products by the simple inclusion of novel, yet functionally unrelated limitations.”); see also Ex parte Graff, Appeal 2012-003941, 2013 WL 3873066, at *3 (PTAB July 23, 2013) (property interests are “legal abstractions” that are given no patentable weight), aff’d by In re Graff, 585 F. App’x 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential). While not controlling on the broadest reasonable interpretation analysis, we nevertheless take into account the fact that ABSG’s proffered construction raises these concerns. For these reasons, we reaffirm our prior claim construction analysis, and interpret consignment product units as “products that are considered sold when removed from the cabinet or the product packaging.”” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We declined to adopt ABSG’s construction because we concluded it was overly narrow, and nothing in the specification tied invoicing to the “unique RFID serial number” of an exact product. Dec. 12–13. Rather, the specification merely states that the server “generate[s] billing and invoice data according to the reports from cabinets of product units that are delivered . . . or consumed.” Ex. 1001, 5:57–60. This could be a report of a unique RFID serial number, but that is not the only possibility. Indeed, the specification states that “serial numbers” are not required by the invention at all. Ex. 1001, 4:58–61 (“[T]he term ‘serial number’ will be used herein to refer to the unique identifier, although those of skill in the art will recognize that any other style of unique identifier can be used.”). ABSG’s citations from the specification, that products are tracked by RFID serial number, are 24 not in the context of invoicing. In view of the complete record, our reasoning from the Decision to Institute holds, and ABSG’s arguments in its Response fail to persuade us otherwise.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 8,285,607 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,285,607 - NRT Technology Corp. / NRT Technologies, Inc. v. Everi Payments, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 22, 2016 · CBM2015-00167 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable under § 101, Akel, or grounds relying on Reeder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We may not institute a CBM patent review “unless the Director[2] determines that the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).3 Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is less likely than not to prevail with respect to all of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we deny the Petition to institute a CBM patent review, as set forth below.” slip op. at 2
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable
“As Patent Owner points out, Petitioner has oversimplified the challenged claims. Prelim. Resp. 31. The challenged claims are not directed simply to the idea of providing money to an account holder or using trial-and-error until success is achieved. Rather, the claims are directed to particular methods of providing money to an account holder using an ATM via a POS transaction after an ATM transaction has failed. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (“Applications of such concepts to a new and useful end . . . remain eligible for patent protection.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Further, Petitioner’s analysis omits any consideration of the elements of the claims as ordered combinations to determine whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application. It was Petitioner’s burden to do so. Petitioner has not shown that the claims are more likely than not patent-ineligible. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (“an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept”).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“It is a petitioner’s burden to explain how a challenged claim should be construed and how, being so construed, it is unpatentable. 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(b)(3)–(4). Petitioner does not propose an express construction for “personal identification number” and does not show that its plain and ordinary meaning would include a password. Further, claim 1 requires entering a PIN into the terminal. In the context of the specification and surrounding claim language, this step is part of the claimed “method of providing money or an item of value to an account-holder.” The teaching on which Petitioner relies, however, relates to a system operator’s back-end access of the Akel system. See Ex. 1006, 6:58–62 (“Each system operator requires a password to access the system . . . .”) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Akel describes a “customer” (distinct from a system operator) as using a kiosk to obtain cash. Id. at 2:56–3:11. But, Akel does not describe entering a password into a terminal, let alone a PIN, as part of that process. Thus, even if Akel’s password fell within the scope of the recited PIN, the Petition would still fail to show how its use by an operator “to access the system” (see Ex. 1006, 258–60) meets the recited “entering a personal identification number into the terminal” as part of the claimed “method of providing money or an item of value to an account-holder.” Petitioner has not shown that Akel teaches “entering a personal identification number into the terminal.” Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that claim 1, or dependent claims 2–8, are more likely than not anticipated by Akel.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable
“The invention date of the ’792 patent is no later than its filing date, which is January 5, 1998. Although the Reeder application was filed, and thus privately known to Mr. Reeder, before the ’792 filing date, such private knowledge is not within the scope of § 102(a). See, e.g., Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“The statutory language, ‘known or used by others in this country’ (35 U.S.C. § 102(a)), means knowledge or use which is accessible to the public.”). Reeder was 8 The AIA took effect on March 18, 2013. Because the application from which the ’792 patent issued was filed before that date, our citations to 35 U.S.C. § 102 are to its pre-AIA version. eventually patented of course but not until after the filing date of the ’792 patent. For these reasons, Reeder is not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), which is the only provision under which the Petition asserted Reeder. Reeder presumptively is prior art to the ’792 patent under a different subsection of the statute, namely § 102(e). However, a reference that is prior art under only § 102(e) may not be asserted in a CBM patent review. Under the AIA, a Petition for a CBM patent review may challenge novelty or non-obviousness of a claim only on the basis of: (i) prior art that is described by section 102(a) . . . ; or (ii) prior art that— (I) discloses the invention more than 1 year before the date of the application for patent in the United States; and (II) would be described by section 102(a) . . . if the disclosure had been made by another before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent. AIA § 18(a)(1)(C). Because Petitioner has not shown that Reeder is prior art that may be asserted in a Petition for a CBM patent review, all of the grounds that rely on Reeder are denied.” slip op. at 15
§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites AlicePatents in suitUS 6,081,792
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.