- PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 11,835,421 - PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - PTAB · Oct 7, 2022 · IPR2021-00680 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7, 9–11, 14–16, 19, 21, 32–37, 39, 47, and 49–57 are unpatentable as obvious; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
Nonecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,469,934 - PTAB · Nov 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01243 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision
Petitioner failed to prove claims 1–8, 10, and 11 of the ’290 patent, claims 1–8 and 10–13 of the ’173 patent, and claims 1–6 and 8–19 of the ’510 patent obvious over Fohr, Sato, and …
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We recognize that it may be necessary “to look to interrelated teachings of multiple patents . . . in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed.” KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner in these proceedings, however, directs us to no persuasive reason why an ordinary artisan would have turned to the heat-retaining battery module of Hallaj when working to implement a plurality of Sato’s cells in a pack to replace the capacitors in Fohr. Pet. 36–38 (nowhere addressing that critical point); Reply 13 (devoting four sentences to rebuttal of Patent Owner’s persuasive evidence that one would not have combined the disclosures of Hallaj, Fohr, and Sato in the manner claimed); see Ex. 1033, 15 (Examiner’s observation, in confirming the patentability of the challenged claims during reexamination, that Sato contains “no information as to how Sato’s cells would be implemented in a pack”). We view Petitioner’s unexplained leap from the single battery cell of Sato to the heat-retaining battery module of Hallaj as a classic example of impermissible hindsight reconstruction driven not by any teaching in the prior art, but by the claim requirement of a “plurality” of cells implemented in a battery pack. Pet. 36–38; Reply 13. Patent Owner, by contrast, comes forward with persuasive evidence, which we credit, showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been led to arrange a plurality of Sato’s cells in the heat-retaining battery module of Hallaj because such a modified battery pack would have been unsuitable for use as a replacement for the capacitors in Fohr. Specifically, we credit the testimony of Dr. Blomgren, who cogently explains why a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been led to the proposed modification. Ex. 2147 ¶¶ 79–85.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“We are not persuaded by Dr. Riley’s testimony that Fohr effectively teaches that both lithium-based battery cells and capacitors can achieve the 20 Amp Limitation, on a theory that “it’s actually the tool that draws the power” and “the right lithium cell” would be “a drop in replacement for this application.” Ex. 2169, 121:12–16 (Dr. Riley’s deposition testimony); Resp. 17. Dr. Riley readily admitted an unfamiliarity with capacitors, and identified no suitable “drop in” ready lithium cells available at the time of the invention. Ex. 2169, 121:11–122:4 (“[I]f I had a cell that could do similar things, I’d certainly swap it in there.”). On that point, we find more credible Dr. Blomgren’s testimony that “there is no guarantee that a given pack of battery cells can provide the current that a tool tries to draw.” Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2147 ¶ 60).” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We hold that the prior art references asserted in the Petition are representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (absence of specific findings on “level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown’” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). To the extent that a more specific definition is required, we hold that an ordinary artisan would include one holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with two or three years of experience in battery design. That definition comports with the very similar definitions advanced by the parties. In that regard, Petitioner asserts that an ordinary artisan would encompass a person holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with three years of experience in battery design. Pet. 8; Ex. 1007 ¶ 9. Patent Owner similarly asserts that an ordinary artisan would include a person holding a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering with two years of battery design experience. Resp. 8; Ex. 2105 ¶ 24.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In our Decisions to Institute, we construed the 20 Amp Limitation to require that “the battery cells, when configured together in a battery pack, are capable of producing reasonably close to 20 amps of discharge current or greater over the course of delivering their entire rated capacity.” Dec. 5. Neither party disputes that construction, which we adopt for the purposes of this Final Written Decision. To the extent that any other claim term requires express construction, we discuss the construction in our analysis below. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy). The following facts are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,944,173 - PTAB · Mar 11, 2015 · IPR2014-01108 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding after settlement, before a final decision on the merits.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” The requirement for terminating review with respect to Petitioner is met. Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Asustek Computer Inc., Dexin Electronics Co., Ltd., and Thermaltake Technology represent all petitioners in this review. The Board has discretion to terminate this review with respect to Better Mouse Co., LLC as Patent Owner. The above represent all parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,532,200 - PTAB · Oct 30, 2014 · IPR2014-01171 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion to terminate the proceeding and the request to keep the settlement agreement confidential; no trial had been instituted.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties have requested that this trial proceeding be terminated pursuant to a settlement. On October 28, 2014, we authorized the parties via e-mail to file a joint request to terminate this proceeding and to file the settlement agreement as business confidential information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c). The parties filed their joint motion on October 29, 2014. Paper 15. With their motion to terminate, the parties also filed a copy of a” slip op. at 1
NonePatents in suitUS 7,021,594 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00555 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without issuing final written decisions.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
None - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00557 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five related inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,047,705 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00554 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id.” slip op. at 2
None - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00556 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id. 1 Unless otherwise noted, citations are to the record of IPR2013-00554; similar papers may be found in the records of the other related proceedings. Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,607,803
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.