• Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00958 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–28 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–12 and 19–28 over Linnarsson, McCloskey, and ordinary skill; claims 13–18 over those references plus McCloskey II.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1085 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to McCloskey (i.e., Ex. 1004). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1085).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner is correct that, under Sanofi-Aventis, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, as we noted when instituting this proceeding, “Sanofi-Aventis further held: ‘A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to “respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.”’” Dec. on Reh’g 16 (quoting Sanofi- Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23)).” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1085 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to McCloskey (i.e., Ex. 1004). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1085). Despite the exclusion of the second Hall-Ellis declaration, there is ample evidence in the record demonstrating that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. McCloskey itself states: “Received: 31 January 2007 / Accepted: 29 May 2007 / Published online: 23 October 2007.” Ex. 1004, 1. McCloskey additionally states that it was published in a 2007 print issue of “Biochem Genet,” with Petitioner adding that the full name of the journal is BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS and that McCloskey was published in a December 2007 volume of the journal. Id.; Pet. 22. McCloskey also includes a copyright notice by “Springer Science+Business Media, LLC” with a date of 2007. Ex. 1004, 1. Patent Owner argues that this is unreliable hearsay that should be excluded. PO Mot. To Exclude 4 (citing Neste Oil Oyj v. REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC, No. IPR2013-00578, Paper 53 at 5–7 (Mar. 12, 2015); Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., No. IPR2014-00148, Paper 429 at 13–18, 21–22 (Apr. 23, 2015)). We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument or its reliance on these cases. The facts before us are different.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner does not directly dispute Petitioner’s proposal but does offer its own proposal. PO Resp. 21. Patent Owner proposes that the skilled artisan “would have had a Ph.D. in molecular biology, molecular genetics, biochemistry, physics, mechanical engineering, or a related discipline, with 7 Exhibit 1002 is a declaration by Petitioner’s witness, Gregory Cooper, Ph.D. two years of academic, research, or industry experience in the field of genomic or transcriptome sequencing.” Id. (citing Ex. 2013 ¶¶25–268). Both of the parties’ proposals as to the level of ordinary skill in the art are consistent with the disclosure of the ’013 patent and the asserted prior art. The distinction between the parties’ proposals would not change the outcome of this Decision. Thus, we adopt and apply Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 10,697,013 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,697,013
• Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 31, 2025 · IPR2023-00955 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–4, 6–11, 20, and 23–25 over Linnarsson and McCloskey; claims 5, 12, 21, 22, and 26 with ordinary-skill knowledge; claims 13–19 with McCloskey II.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part

    “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1085 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s in the prior sentence and in the subtitle to the relevant portion of its Objection. Id. requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s February 15, 2024, objection to McCloskey. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1085). Despite the exclusion of the second Hall-Ellis declaration, there is ample evidence in the record demonstrating that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. McCloskey itself states: “Received: 31 January 2007 / Accepted: 29 May 2007 / Published online: 23 October 2007.” Ex. 1004, 1. McCloskey additionally states that it was published in a 2007 print issue of “Biochem Genet,” with Petitioner adding that the full name of the journal is BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS and that McCloskey was published in a December 2007 volume of the journal. Id.; Pet. 29. McCloskey also includes a copyright notice by “Springer Science+Business Media, LLC” with a date of date of 2007. Ex. 1004, 1. Patent Owner argues that this is unreliable hearsay that should be excluded. PO Mot. To Exclude 4 (citing Neste Oil Oyj v. REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC, No. IPR2013-00578, Paper 53 at 5–7 (Mar. 12, 2015); Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo, Inc., No. IPR2014- 00148, Paper 4210 at 13–18, 21–22 (Apr. 23, 2015)). We are not persuaded 10 Patent Owner actually cited to “Pap.41” of Standard Innovation. PO Mot. To Exclude 4. There is no Paper 41 in the record of that case. We presume Patent Owner intended to cite Paper 42, which is the final written decision in that case. by Patent Owner’s argument or its reliance on these cases. The facts before us are different. In Neste Oil, the Board “note[d] that the alleged ‘stamps’ of Exhibits 1125 and 1132 are actually handwritten dates, added to the documents by an unknown person at an unknown time.” Neste Oil, Paper 53 at 6. In contrast, the dates relied upon by Petitioner are printed, appear to have been included at the time of printing, and appear to have been printed by, or at the direction of, the journal and/or copyright holder, both of which are identified by McCloskey. Ex. 1004, 1. In Standard Innovation, the alleged prior art exhibits were “printouts of … webpages” bearing a copyright indication of “© 2003-2013,” which the petitioner argued was proof of subset of the webpages being disseminated publicly in 2003. Standard Innovation, Paper 42 at 13. This is a far cry from McCloskey, which is a journal article and which includes specific date information, not only of publishing, but also of when the journal received and accepted the article for publication as well as when it was copyrighted. Ex. 1004, 1.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner is correct that, under Sanofi-Aventis, a petitioner bears the burden of persuasion to establish that an asserted prior art reference is analogous art to the claimed invention. See Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1377 (“We agree with [the patent owner] that [the petitioner] did not carry its burden to argue that de Gennes is analogous to the [challenged] patent.”); id. (“In evaluating whether a reference is analogous, we have consistently held that a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent.”); id. at 1378–79 (“We have routinely held that the petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability.”). However, as we noted when instituting this proceeding, “Sanofi-Aventis further held: ‘A petitioner is not required to anticipate and raise analogous art arguments in its petition; instead a petitioner can use its reply to “respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, patent owner response, or decision on institution.”’” Dec. on Reh’g 15 (quoting Sanofi- Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1379 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23)).” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “by Patent Owner’s argument or its reliance on these cases. The facts before us are different. In Neste Oil, the Board “note[d] that the alleged ‘stamps’ of Exhibits 1125 and 1132 are actually handwritten dates, added to the documents by an unknown person at an unknown time.” Neste Oil, Paper 53 at 6. In contrast, the dates relied upon by Petitioner are printed, appear to have been included at the time of printing, and appear to have been printed by, or at the direction of, the journal and/or copyright holder, both of which are identified by McCloskey. Ex. 1004, 1. In Standard Innovation, the alleged prior art exhibits were “printouts of … webpages” bearing a copyright indication of “© 2003-2013,” which the petitioner argued was proof of subset of the webpages being disseminated publicly in 2003. Standard Innovation, Paper 42 at 13. This is a far cry from McCloskey, which is a journal article and which includes specific date information, not only of publishing, but also of when the journal received and accepted the article for publication as well as when it was copyrighted. Ex. 1004, 1. That McCloskey is what it purports to be (a journal article) and that it was published in 2007 are corroborated by multiple pieces of evidence.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “In sum, we find Petitioner’s rationale that a skilled artisan would have made the proposed combination to solve the problem of amplification bias persuasive.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 10,240,197 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,240,197
• Parse Biosciences, Inc. v. 10x Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 17, 2024 · IPR2023-00876 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6 as obvious over Linnarsson and McCloskey, and claim 5 as obvious over those references and ordinary skill.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “Clearly, the second Hall-Ellis declaration is offered to prove that McCloskey is a prior art printed publication. See, e.g., Ex. 1065 ¶50 (“In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that [McCloskey] was publicly available no later than [January 3, 2008].”). Thus, the second Hall-Ellis declaration should have been served within ten business days of Patent Owner’s October, 27, 2023, objection to the admissibility of McCloskey. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2) (“The party relying on evidence to which an objection is timely served may respond to the objection by serving supplemental evidence within ten business days of service of the objection.”). Because it was not filed until March 29, 2024, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration. In its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, Petitioner argues that, under Hulu LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, No. IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 (Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential), it was allowed to wait until its Reply to file the second Hall-Ellis declaration. Paper 37, 1–2. The Board in Hulu does state that, “if the patent owner challenges a reference’s status as a printed publication, a petitioner may submit a supporting declaration with its reply to further support its argument that a reference qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, at 15 (37 C.F.R. § 42.23). However, the Board’s statement was referring to the scope of permissible reply arguments under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). See Hulu at 14 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)’s requirement that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition, patent owner preliminary response, or patent owner response”). The Board in Hulu does not purport to interpret 37 C.F.R. § 42.64 or even discuss supplemental evidence. Petitioner clearly missed the deadline imposed by 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2), which was triggered by Patent Owner’s October 27, 2023, objection to McCloskey. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is granted with respect to the second Hall-Ellis declaration (i.e., Ex. 1065).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “We find that both references are analogous art to the ’981 patent, as there is ample supporting evidence in the record, including that to which the Reply cites (citations identified in the immediately preceding paragraph). Indeed, Patent Owner does not dispute the merits of either argument. PO Sur-Reply 27–28. Rather, Patent Owner, argues that we “should not now permit Petitioner to rewrite its clearly-deficient Petition.” Id. at 28. Petitioner’s Reply does not re-write its Petition. What Petitioner’s Reply does, in response to Patent Owner’s arguments, is precisely what Sanofi-Aventis contemplates as being proper in a reply brief. Indeed, in ruling against the petitioner in Sanofi-Aventis, the Federal Circuit specifically noted that the petitioner could have used its reply brief “to explain how [the prior art reference] is analogous to the [challenged] patent” but did not do so. 66 F.4th at 1379–1380. Here, in contrast, Petitioner used its Reply brief to explain how Linnarsson and McCloskey are analogous to the ’981 patent. Petitioner’s explanation in its Reply brief was both proper and persuasive.” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “That McCloskey is what it purports to be (a journal article) and that it was published in 2007 are corroborated by multiple pieces of evidence. McCloskey names four authors, all four of whom are named inventors of US 2007/0020640 A1, published Jan. 25, 2007 (“McCloskey ’640”). Ex. 1004, 1, Ex. 2001, code (76). Patent Owner concedes that McCloskey and McCloskey ’640 involve the same subject matter, having argued that the consideration of McCloskey ’640 supported discretionary denial of the Petition based on McCloskey. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 22 (“Petitioner’s secondary reference, an article by McCloskey, is at best cumulative of the far more detailed McCloskey ’640, which was raised by the Office and substantively discussed as the basis for a potential rejection using its asserted disclosure of a polynucleotide-specific tag—the same purported teaching for which Petitioner relies on McCloskey here.”). Notably, McCloskey ’640 was published on January 25, 2007. Ex. 2001, code (43). That is just days before McCloskey was received by BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS on January 31, 2007. See EX. 1004, 1 (“Received: 31 January 2007 / Accepted: 29 May 2007 / Published online: 23 October 2007”). In other words, it appears that the authors sought to have their research published in a scientific journal promptly after the subject matter of their research had been published by the Office. Further, the existence of McCloskey and its publication year of 2007 is confirmed by other sources in the record. See Ex. 1029, code (56) (United States Patent identifying as a cited reference: “McCloskey, et al. Encoding Pcr products with batch-stamps and barcodes. Biochem Genet. Dec. 2007;45(11-12):761-7. Epub Oct. 23, 2007.”); Ex. 1053, code (56) (same); Ex. 1060 (article’s bibliography citing “McCloskey ML, Stöger R, Hansen RS, Laird CD. Encoding PCR products with batch-stamps and barcodes. Biochem. Genet 2007;45:761–767. [PubMed: 17955361]”). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied with respect to” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “The Petition states that “Petitioner does not believe that any terms require explicit construction in view of the prior art being presented.” Pet. 36. Despite this stated position, Petitioner proposed constructions for “multiplex-identifier (MID)” and “providing a sample.” Id. Patent Owner, in its Preliminary Response, stated that it “agrees that at this time, solely for purposes of an institution decision on the Petition, no terms require explicit construction.” Prelim. Resp. 45. In instituting the IPR, we found no need to provide an express construction of any claim term. Inst. Dec. 6. In the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner repeats that it “does not believe any term needs construction,” but nonetheless “applies the Petition’s definitions for ‘MID’ and ‘sample.’” PO Resp. 19. The Petition defines MID as “‘a tag or combination of tags associated with a polynucleotide whose identity (e.g., the tag DNA sequence) can be used to differentiate polynucleotides in a sample.’” Pet. 36 (quoting Ex. 1001, 6:33–38). The Petition defines sample as “‘a quantity of material from a biological, environmental medical, or patient source in which detection, measurement, or labeling of target nucleic acids is sought.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 12:7– 10). We apply these same definitions in our analysis.” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 10,155,981 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,155,981
• Duration Media LLC v. Rich Media Club LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 19, 2024 · IPR2023-00953 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 were not proven unpatentable under either §103 ground because the evidence did not show the claimed viewability determination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We find Patent Owner’s argument persuasive. Indeed, it is unclear how Petitioner’s proposal accounts for the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. See Daiichi Sankyo, 501 F.3d at 1256 (identifying these factors, among others, as “a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art”). Nor does Petitioner, in its Reply, address, let alone rebut, Patent Owner’s arguments that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had some experience and/or knowledge in internet advertising. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner proposes that a “person of ordinary skill in the art would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a similar major involving computer programming (or at least four years of practical computer programming experience) and at least two years of experience (in or out of college) in the field of internet advertising.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2045 ¶54). We agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have some experience in internet advertising, although we fail to see why one year would not be enough to familiarize sufficiently a computer scientist and/or programmer with the types of problems encountered in the art or prior art solutions to those problems. Based on the competing proposals, arguments, and evidence before us, we adopt and apply the following level of skill in assessing Petitioner’s challenges to the patentability of the claims of the ’329 patent: a person that would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical (or similar) engineering with about three years of experience being in the field of internet advertising.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s resurrected argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of § 311(b). Section 311(b) provides: “A petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed cancel the claims of the ’329 patent on the basis of Badros, Harkins, and Krassner. Pet. 11. Petitioner did not base its request, in whole or in part, on the Krassner publication. Id. Krassner clearly is a patent. It issued on August 13, 2019, far too late to be § 102(b) prior art. Even if we assume Krassner is also a “printed publication” withing the meaning of § 311(b), the same date would apply: August 13, 2019. Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the document that is Krassner was published prior to when it issued on August 13, 2019. That another document (the Krassner publication), which published much earlier, may contain the same or similar disclosure is not relevant to when Krassner was patented or published. In sum, Krassner is not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). b) Whether Krassner is Prior Art Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) Although Krassner is not prior under 35 U.S.C.§ 102(b), we” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner responds that, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, “Harkins teaches that its invention can be used in web pages.” Pet. Reply 18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶30). Although Petitioner’s citation is off by one paragraph, Petitioner’s response about what Harkins teaches is correct. See Ex. 1004 ¶29 (“The present invention may be implemented for provision of virtually any type of advertising (e.g., print, radio, television, Internet, billboard, etc.) via any type of advertising medium (e.g., newspaper, magazine, radio broadcast, Web pages, billboards, etc.) without departing from the scope of the present invention.”). We find that Harkins is from the same field based on its express statement that it is applicable to “virtually any type of advertising” and “any type of advertising medium,” including “Web pages.” Ex. 1004 ¶29. Further, even if this were insufficient to place Harkins in the same field as the ’329 patent, we find that Harkins is reasonably pertinent to the particular problems with which the ’329 patent inventors were involved. In sum, we find that Harkins is analogous art to the ’329 patent.” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted

    “Paper 60 (“PO Mot. To Exclude”), 9–10.6 Patent Owner is correct in this regard and, thus, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude with respect to the testimony in the second Smedley Declaration and the Madansky Declaration opining that Badros teaches the determination limitation. Paper 60, 9–12. Petitioner, in its Opposition to the Motion to Exclude, argues that Patent Owner’s arguments about the “viewability test” were “surprising.” Paper 62, 8. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument. The “viewability test” is a claim limitation. Petitioner should have anticipated that Patent Owner would argue that limitation. See In re Gardner, 449 F. App’x 914, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court has held that when evaluating claims for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, all the limitations of the claims must be considered and given weight.” (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Univ. of Strathclyde v. 6 Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude seeks to exclude, in part or in whole, Exhibits 1020–1022, 1025–1030, and 1034–1040, which were submitted with Petitioner’s Reply, of which Exhibits 1026 and 1027 are the declaration by Dr. Madansky and the second declaration by Dr. Smedley, respectively. Mot. To Exclude. The Motion to Exclude also seeks to exclude “Exhibits” 1017 and 1018, which are not filed or of record in this case but which are referenced in the Reply. Id. For example, Exhibit 1017 is the Krassner publication, which Petitioner unsuccessfully moved to add to the record as supplemental information. See Paper 21, 3 n.1 (expunging the Krassner publication and stating that it “need not -- and indeed may not -- be re-filed under a new exhibit number”). Apart from the portions of Dr. Smedley’s second declaration and Dr. Madansky’s declaration opining that Badros teaches the “determination” limitation, we dismiss the Motion to Exclude as moot. obviousness determination generally requires a finding that “all claimed limitations are disclosed in the prior art’.” (citing PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Petitioner argues that “[v]iewability tests were well known for well over a decade prior to the ’329 patent’s priority date.” Reply 9. If that were the case, then Petitioner should have made its argument in the Petition. Section 312(a) of Title 35 is titled “Requirements of Petition,” and it specifies that a petition must identify, among other things, “the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim, including . . . (B) affidavits or declarations of supporting evidence and opinions, if the petitioner relies on expert opinions.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5) (“The petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon; and . . . the supporting evidence relied upon to support the challenge.”). Thus, “Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Board’s Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 73 (Nov. 21, 2019).7 Dr. Smedley’s testimony in his second declaration, that “Badros discloses Patent Owner’s ‘viewability test’” (Ex. 1027 ¶11), is clearly evidence to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. The same is true of Dr. Madansky’s testimony that she agrees with Dr. Smedley in this regard. Ex. 1026 ¶4.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,443,329 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,443,329
• Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited / Globalfoundries U.S. Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 20, 2017 · IPR2016-01249 · APJ Michael J Fitzpatrick · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, and 9 and proposed claims 11–12 are unpatentable as obvious over Ding and Zhang; proposed claim 13 is patentable and allowed by amendment.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “essentially of” for “being composed of.” PO Resp. 11 (citing AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). In AFG, the Court noted that, “[i]n 1942, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals [had] stated that ‘“composed of” should be regarded as synonymous with “consisting of.”’” AFG, 239 F.3d at 1245 (quoting In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 1019 (CCPA 1942)). However, as further explained in AFG, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had “qualified this statement . . . by remarking that ‘the words “composed of” may under certain circumstances be given, in patent law, a broader meaning than “consisting of.”’” Id. (quoting In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d at 1020). The Court in AFG ultimately construed “composed of” to mean “consisting essentially of.” Id. (“[W]e do agree based on the specification and other evidence before us that the term ‘composed of’ in this case is not completely closed. Rather, we think that ‘composed of’ in this case should be interpreted in the same manner as ‘consisting essentially of.’”). Thus, “composed of” means either “consisting of” or “consisting essentially of.” Id. The term “consisting of” prohibits any 4 <111> and <002> are indices that pertain to an orientation or direction of crystals. Ex. 1003 ¶51. unspecified components. Id. (citing PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). The term “consisting essentially of” prohibits only unspecified components that materially affect the basic and novel characteristic(s) of a claimed invention. Id. (citing Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). By arguing that “being composed of” means “consisting essentially of” as opposed to “consisting of,” Patent Owner argues for broader claim scope. For purposes of this Decision, we construe “being composed of” to mean “consisting essentially of,” as Patent Owner argues.5 In conclusion, we construe “first film being composed of crystalline metal containing nitrogen therein,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 5, to mean “first film consisting essentially of crystalline metal containing nitrogen therein.”6” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The parties propose similar definitions of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an equivalent of a Master of Science degree from an accredited institution in electrical engineering, materials science, or physics, or the equivalent, a working knowledge of semiconductor processing technologies for integrated circuits, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor processing analysis, design, and development.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶64). Patent Owner argues that such an individual would have had “at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical, Materials, Mechanical, or Chemical Engineering, or a related degree, and at least two years of experience working in semiconductor processing and fabrication, semiconductor equipment manufacturing, or semiconductor materials.” PO Resp. 18 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶24). Neither party explains in detail why its proposed level of ordinary skill in the art should be adopted nor how the different levels affect the parties’ analyses. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ declarants, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “As to Petitioner’s predictable-results assertion, Petitioner persuasively argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added nitrogen to the crystalline tantalum layer of Ding for three independent reasons. First, Petitioner argues that the presence of nitrogen in Ding’s crystalline tantalum layer would make it more easily removable by chemical mechanical polishing (“CMP”), which removal by polishing both Zhang and Ding teach to do. Pet. 24–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶140, 142, 143; Ex. 1004, 1:30–34, 4:34–37; Ex. 1005, 7:56–65; Ex. 1019, 12–13; Ex. 1021, 354–63). Second, Petitioner argues that the presence of nitrogen in Ding’s crystalline tantalum layer would inhibit, to some additional extent, copper diffusion. Id. at 26–29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶144–146; Ex. 1023, 8). Third, Petitioner argues that adding a small amount of nitrogen to Ding’s crystalline tantalum layer would reduce its resistivity, which was known to help reduce a device’s power consumption and RC delays. Id. at 29–30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶147; Ex. 1015, 81 (Table 1)). Patent Owner counters that none of these purportedly predictable results are realistic. PO Resp. 46–52. With respect to the first reason offered by Petitioner (to make the first film more susceptible to CMP), Patent Owner argues that: (A) adding only “[a] small amount of nitrogen” to Ding’s crystalline tantalum layer would not change its CMP characteristics; and (B) “[a]dding significant amounts of nitrogen” would result in Ding’s previously crystalline layer becoming amorphous. Id. at 48. Patent Owner does not disclose what it considers “small” and “significant” amounts of nitrogen. Id. As a result, we cannot apply Patent Owner’s argument (even if it were persuasive) to the facts before us. Also, Patent Owner’s argument is based exclusively on declaration testimony that does not cite to any underlying evidence, let alone documentary evidence. See id. at 47–49 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶¶190–98). In contrast, Petitioner’s argument is supported by declaration testimony, which, in turn, is based on underlying evidence, including documentary evidence. See Pet. 24–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶140, 142, 143; Ex. 1004, 1:30–34, 4:34– 37; Ex. 1005, 7:56–65; Ex. 1019, 12–13; Ex. 1021, 354–63); see also Ex. 1003 ¶139. With respect to the second reason offered by Petitioner (to inhibit, to some additional extent, copper diffusion), Patent Owner argues that, in Petitioner’s asserted combination, “there would be no nitrogen to provide any copper diffusion benefit.” PO Resp. 49. Patent Owner’s argument is premised on Zhang teaching exclusively an upper surface of pure tantalum. Id. But, Zhang explicitly teaches that the upper surface may have a nitrogen content of, for example, 1%, 2%, 3%, or 4%. See Ex. 1004, 3:59–62 (“At the upper surface, the atomic percent tantalum may be at least 95% and the atomic percent nitrogen may be less than 5% if copper adhesion is particularly problematic.”). With respect to the third reason offered by Petitioner (to reduce resistivity), Patent Owner argues that adding nitrogen would actually increase resistivity. As pointed out by Petitioner, however, Patent Owner’s declarant, Harlan R. Harris, Ph.D., conceded that adding nitrogen does lower resistivity. Reply 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1036, 125:3–20). Dr. Harris testified as follows: Q. When the nitrogen flow ratio is zero in the ’324 patent, and the power is kept constant, wouldn’t that result in a film that could be pure tantalum? A. All three of those data points are at the exact same position on the graph. The N2 concentration, which is the numerator of the ratio, is set at zero. And in this particular position, the nitrogen concentration would be assumed to be zero in the film. Q. So is it within the scope of what’s taught in the ’324 patent to have a film that would have no nitrogen at all? A. It’s also apparent to anyone who is examining this of skill in the art that you can decrease from that number, which is favorable in terms of the value of resistivity by adding flow rate in the data points for all of the positions greater than zero. So you decrease resistivity by the addition of any amount of nitrogen, therefore, a person skilled in the art would not be motivated to not have nitrogen, based on this data. Q. You’re referring to the decrease in resistivity as nitrogen is added? A. Yes. Q. Which is desirable? A. You want the resistivity to go down. Ex. 1036, 124:15–125:20. We are satisfied by each of Petitioner’s proffered reasons for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have added nitrogen to Ding’s crystalline tantalum layer, as taught by Zhang. Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1 and 5 would have been obvious over Ding and Zhang.” slip op. at 24

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

    “obvious over Ding in view of Zhang. Patent Owner’s proposed claims 11 and 12 are unpatentable because they introduce limitations—nitrogen throughout the first film (claim 11) and nitrogen at the upper surface of the first film (claim 12)—that are met by the very references asserted in the ground of unpatentability involved in this inter partes review. Patent Owner’s Motion to substitute claims 11 and 12 is premised, incorrectly, on Zhang requiring pure tantalum (and, thus, no nitrogen) at the upper surface of its tantalum-rich tantalum nitride film. In fact, Zhang does not require any portion of the tantalum-rich tantalum nitride film to be pure tantalum. Ex. 1004, 3:53–54 (“The tantalum-rich tantalum nitride film has a range of approximately 0-30 atomic percent nitrogen.”). And, Zhang explicitly teaches that the upper surface may include nitrogen. Id. at 3:57– 62 (“A lower atomic percent nitrogen at the upper surface typically gives better adhesion to copper films. At the upper surface, the atomic percent tantalum may be at least 95% and the atomic percent nitrogen may be less than 5% if copper adhesion is particularly problematic.”); Ex. 1036, 40:1–6, 42:2–9, 42:15–21, 54:14–20 (Dr. Harris acknowledging that the upper surface of the film would contain some nitrogen). Accordingly, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that Patent Owner’s proposed claims 11 and 12 are not patentable over the art of record in this inter partes review. Put another way, and as Petitioner argues, claims 11 and 12 (like challenged claim 5) are unpatentable as they claim subject matter that would have been obvious over Ding in view of Zhang. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); Amend Opp. 6–7 (“The instituted obviousness ground[] based on Zhang and Ding already include[s] the newly-added limitations Patent Owner seeks to add in its Substitute Claims 11–13. Thus, the Substitute Claims 11–13 remain unpatentable over each of the instituted grounds.”).14 Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend is denied with respect to claims 11 and 12.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 6,538,324 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,538,324
• United States Department Of Homeland Security v. Larry GoldenOther
  PTAB · Oct 1, 2015 · IPR2014-00714 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board canceled claims 11, 74, and 81 and denied substitute claims 154–156 because they broadened claim scope, lacked written-description support, and were not shown patentable over Mostov.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “A petition for inter partes review must identify “all real parties in interest.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). The Office Patent Trial Practice Guide provides guidance regarding factors to consider in determining whether a party is a real party in interest. 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759–60 (Aug. 14, 2012). Considerations may include whether a non-party “funds and directs and controls” an IPR petition or proceeding. Id. at 48,760. Additional relevant factors include: the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. Generally, a party does not become a “real party-in-interest” merely through association with another party in an unrelated endeavor. Id. A party also is not considered a real party in interest in an inter partes review solely because it is a joint defendant with a petitioner in a patent infringement suit or is part of a joint defense group with a petitioner in the suit. Id. Whether a party who is not a named participant in a given proceeding is a “real party-in-interest” to that proceeding “is a highly fact-dependent question.” Id. at 48,759. There is no “bright line test.” Id. Courts invoke the term “real party-in-interest” to describe relationships and considerations sufficient to justify applying conventional principles of estoppel and preclusion. Id. Here, even assuming this contention is timely, Patent Owner has failed to provide any evidence, besides the mere fact that the other parties are co-defendants in a lawsuit or alleged infringers, to support the contention that Petitioner has failed to name all of the real parties in interest. That one fact, without any further proof of control or involvement by these parties in this proceeding, is insufficient to establish that Petitioner has failed to name” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “ii. Petitioner’s Expert Patent Owner asks that we “dismiss [Petitioner’s] Expert Declaration and disqualify [Petitioner’s Declarant] for making and using a false writing.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s Declarant falsely claimed that certain patent applications were patents by listing them under the heading “Patents” in his Resume. Id. at 8–9. A Patent Owner Response is not the proper vehicle to seek to exclude testimony. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c). Moreover, even if it were the proper vehicle, we are not persuaded that the alleged “falsehood” that Patent Owner identified—listing patent applications, which are clearly identified as such, under a heading titled “Patents”—is, in any way, misleading. Thus, we decline Patent Owner’s request that we dismiss Dr. Vishwanath’s testimony.3 C. Motion to Amend As discussed above, in the Motion to Amend, Patent Owner requests” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “i. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Neither party puts forward a succinct definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s declarant, however, has put forward a detailed discussion of various references dated before April 20064 (the date Patent Owner now alleges is the priority date) related to subject matter of the ’990 patent. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 20–74, 94–99. We have reviewed that discussion and the references cited in those paragraphs. We have found it accurately reflects the teachings of the references. Moreover, we agree with Petitioner’s declarant that the references are analogous to the claimed invention, and, as such, represent the level of skill in the relevant art at the time of the invention. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that the Board did not err in concluding that the level of ordinary skill was best determined by the references of record); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91(CCPA 1978) (“[T]he PTO usually must evaluate . . . the level of ordinary skill solely on the cold words of the literature.”); see 4 We accept this date as the priority date only for the sake of argument. also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”’).” slip op. at 13

  • ScopeMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “We agree with Petitioner and find, based on the Patent Owner’s own arguments, that these terms improperly broaden the scope of the claims. As Patent Owner explains, the added language is broad enough to include the removed items, and is intended to reflect the entire genus of “monitoring equipment” and “communications devices” that “are capable of communication and capable of receiving signals.” Mot. to Amend 4, 5. Thus, the claim has been broadened to not only include the listed species that have been removed, but anything falling within the claimed genus. Accordingly, we find that this amendment impermissibly broadens the claim. As for the second change in the claim language, we find that Patent Owner has failed to show why removal of the entire passage “wherein, the communication device receives a signal via any of one or more products listed in any of the plurality of product grouping categories,” would not impermissibly broaden the scope of claim 154. The deletion of this limitation necessarily broadens the claim in that limitation’s aspect. See In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“For example, a reissue claim that deletes a limitation or element from the patent claims is broader in that limitation’s aspect.”). Given that Patent Owner has entirely deleted this limitation and Patent Owner bears the burden of showing entitlement to the amendment, it was incumbent on Patent Owner to explain why removing this entire passage from claim 154 would not broaden the scope of the claim. See In re Bennett, 766 F.2d 524, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“[A] claim is broadened if it is broader in any respect than the original claim, even though it may be narrowed in other respects.”).” slip op. at 17

  § 102 anticipation
• Sdi Technologies, Inc. v. Bose CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2015 · IPR2014-00346 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 25, 26, 51–53, 55–62, 75, and 76 are unpatentable as obvious over WinAmp, Irman Web Pages, and Altec Lansing Manual.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “As Patent Owner points out (PO Estoppel Br. 2–3), under 35 U.S.C. § 318(b), a claim is not cancelled until all appeal rights have terminated. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Rule 42.2 implicitly defines “adverse judgment” to be a final written decision. “Adverse judgment” is not defined expressly. However, its use in Rule 42.73(d)(3) (“the adverse judgment”) is best read as a reference to the earlier use of the term in 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), which states (b) A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial; (3) Concession of unpatentability or derivation of the contested subject matter; and (4) Abandonment of the contest. This is consistent with the Office’s comments to Rule 42.73(d)(3), which explains that a “patent owner whose claim is canceled is precluded from taking action inconsistent with the adverse judgment.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,614. Petitioner has not persuaded us that “adverse judgment” carries a broader meaning in subsection (d)(3) of Rule 42.73 than subsection (b) of the same Rule.” slip op. at 9

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” We recognize that “Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge,” such as an Internet Archive standard (or non-standard) affidavit, is one example of evidence that satisfies the authentication requirement. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). Nevertheless, there are other examples that suffice. Specifically, a document can be authenticated with evidence of “Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Rule 901(b)(4). Petitioner argues that Irman Web Pages includes such distinctive characteristics, including the Internet Archive logo and header at the top of the exhibit and an Internet Archive date-stamped URL affixed to the bottom of the exhibit. Opp. to Mot. to Exclude 5–6. Patent Owner does not dispute that Irman Web Pages is a true and correct copy of an Internet Archive record. Petitioner further argues (and we confirmed) that following the date-stamped Internet Archive URL verifies that the web page exists on Internet Archive’s servers. Id. at 7. Moreover, an answer to another Internet Archive frequently asked question explains how its time stamps correspond to its record keeping:” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We start with the ordinary meaning of “respond.” In the Decision on Institution, at 9, we considered a dictionary definition advanced by Patent Owner (cited to again in the PO Resp., at 12). According to WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1935 (unabridged 1993) (Ex. 2103), “respond” means, inter alia, “2 : to say something in return : make an answer” and “3 : to show some reaction to a force or stimulus . . . : react in response.” Patent Owner only cited to definition 2, “to say something in return : make an answer.” As the dictionary shows, however, the ordinary meaning also is broad enough to encompass definition 3, “to show some reaction to a force or stimulus . . . : react in response,” which corresponds to our preliminary construction.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “1. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The declarants for Petitioner and Patent Owner essentially agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and several years (e.g., three years) of experience with audio systems. Compare Lippman Decl., Ex. 1017 ¶ 19, with Stevenson Decl., Ex. 2120 ¶ 21.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,364,295 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,364,295
• Sdi Technologies, Inc. v. Bose CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2015 · IPR2014-00343 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 25, 26, 52, 53, 55–61, and 75 are unpatentable as obvious over WinAmp, Irman Web Pages, and Altec Lansing Manual.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel does not applyDecided for patent owner

    “Nevertheless, we agree with Patent Owner that Rule 42.73(d)(3) does not apply in this case, at least because Patent Owner’s appeal rights in IPR- 350 have not been exhausted. PO Estoppel Br. 1. As Patent Owner argues (PO Estoppel Br. 2), the Patent Office has explained in its discussion accompanying the Final Rule that Rule 42.73(d)(3) applies estoppel against a party whose claim has been cancelled and not merely held unpatentable: Section 42.73(d)(3) applies estoppel against a party whose claim was cancelled . . . . The rule is consistent with 35 U.S.C. 316(a)(4), as amended, and 326(a)(4), which require that the Office prescribe regulations establishing and governing the reviews and the relationship of such reviews to other proceedings under title 35. Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and Judicial Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Decisions, Discussion of Specific Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,612, 48,625 (Aug. 14, 2012) (emphasis added); see also 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,614 (Differences Between the Final Rule and the Proposed Rule) (emphasis added): Further, the final rule tailors the provisions to provide that a patent applicant or patent owner whose claim is canceled is precluded from taking action inconsistent with the adverse judgment, including obtaining in any patent: (1) A claim that is not patentably distinct from the finally refused or cancelled claim[.] As Patent Owner points out (PO Estoppel Br. 2–3), under 35 U.S.C. § 318(b), a claim is not cancelled until all appeal rights have terminated. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Rule 42.2 implicitly defines “adverse judgment” to be a final written decision. “Adverse judgment” is not defined expressly. However, its use in Rule 42.73(d)(3) (“the adverse judgment”) is best read as a reference to the earlier use of the term in 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), which states (b) A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial; (3) Concession of unpatentability or derivation of the contested subject matter; and (4) Abandonment of the contest. This is consistent with the Office’s comments to Rule 42.73(d)(3), which explains that a “patent owner whose claim is canceled is precluded from taking action inconsistent with the adverse judgment.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,614. Petitioner has not persuaded us that “adverse judgment” carries a broader meaning in subsection (d)(3) of Rule 42.73 than subsection (b) of the same Rule. Accordingly, Patent Owner is not estopped from raising, in this” slip op. at 8

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “According to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a), “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” We recognize that “Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge,” such as an Internet Archive standard (or non-standard) affidavit, is one example of evidence that satisfies the authentication requirement. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). Nevertheless, there are other examples that suffice. Specifically, a document can be authenticated with evidence of “Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Rule 901(b)(4). Petitioner argues that Irman Web Pages includes such distinctive characteristics, including the Internet Archive logo and header at the top of the exhibit and an Internet Archive date-stamped URL affixed to the bottom of the exhibit. Opp. to Mot. to Exclude 5–6. Patent Owner does not dispute that Irman Web Pages is a true and correct copy of an Internet Archive record. Petitioner further argues (and we confirmed) that following the date-stamped Internet Archive URL verifies that the web page exists on Internet Archive’s servers. Id. at 7. Moreover, an answer to another Internet Archive frequently asked question explains how its time stamps correspond to its record keeping: The Internet Archive assigns a URL to each archived page on its site in the format http://web.archive.org/web/[Year in yyyy][Month in mm][Day in dd][Time code in hh:mm:ss]/[Archived URL]. Thus, the Internet Archive URL http://web.archive.org/web/19970126045828/http://www.archiv e.org/ would be the URL for the record of the Internet Archive home page (http://www.archive.org/) archived on January 26, 1997, at 4:58 a.m. and 28 seconds (1997/01/26 at 04:58:28). Ex. 2121, 4 (brackets in original). Unless Internet Archive deviated from its normal practice in archiving Irman Web Pages, Irman Web Pages presumably was archived on May 8, 1999, the date indicated by the time stamp. Ex. 1010, 1. The archived document itself bears a 1998 copyright logo purportedly affixed by Evation.com, which is consistent with the time stamp added by Internet Archive. Id. at 3. Patent Owner does not dispute that Irman Web Pages is an authentic copy of an Evation.com web site archived, at some point, by Internet Archive. The issue is whether it was archived on May 8, 1999 (and prior to the filing date of the ’682 patent). Consistent with our finding in the IPR- 350 Final Written Decision, at 17–18, we find that the distinctive characteristics on Irman Web Pages, including the logo and time stamp from Internet Archive, in light of Internet Archive’s explanation of its record keeping, constitute evidence sufficient, under Rule 901(b)(4), to support a finding that Irman Web Pages is a copy of an Evation.com web page archived by Internet Archive on May 8, 1999. The fact that the Evation.com copyright date closely predates the Internet Archive time stamp is further evidence showing Irman Web Pages’ authenticity. Moreover, we find the evidence to be sufficient under Rule 901(b)(4) even in the absence of an affidavit under Rule 901(b)(1). Regarding hearsay, we conclude that the date-stamp in the Internet Archive URL is reliable. The reasoning in In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1994), is instructive. In that case, the Federal Circuit analyzed whether certain abstracts of software containing statements of “release” and “first installation” dates, statements that constituted hearsay, evidenced dates of public use. Id. at 1565. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the Board, in an ex parte appeal, is not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 1565–66. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit took a common-sense approach to evaluating whether the statements in the abstracts were reliable and trustworthy, the issue at the root of Patent Owner’s concerns regarding authenticity and hearsay. Id. Specifically, the Federal Circuit explained that “nothing on the face of the documents . . . suggests the information has been altered in any way,” and that to find the documents unreliable would be to assume that the authors had engaged in false or misleading advertising, an assumption that the Epstein court would not make. Id. at 1566. Rather, “because the abstracts appear on their face to be accurate and reliable, and because appellant has failed to proffer any evidence to support his arguments to the contrary, [the Federal Circuit] assume[d] the truthfulness of the various assertions in the abstracts.” Id. The facts introduced in this proceeding, considered as a whole, similarly indicate reliability. For example, as explained above, an answer to an Internet Archive frequently asked question shows that, according to Internet Archive’s regular business practices, the date stamp on an archived web page indicates the date and time on which such document was archived. Ex. 2121, 4. Patent Owner argued at length at the hearing that because Internet Archive relies on third-party web crawlers to collect documents to be archived, we cannot trust the date stamp applied by Internet Archive. See, e.g., Tr. 27:12–30:19. Patent Owner, however, has pointed to no evidence to suggest that third party web crawlers manipulate or misrepresent the dates on which they collect documents for archiving. Moreover, the archived Irman Web Pages document itself includes a copyright date of 1998. Ex. 1010, 3. This evidence is consistent with the subsequent date stamp applied by Internet Archive, giving us additional confidence that Internet Archive’s time stamp is reliable. As explained in the IPR-350 Final Written Decision, at 18, Patent Owner admits that nothing about Irman Web Pages itself suggests that the Internet Archive date stamp is unreliable. Patent Owner has echoed that admission in this proceeding. Tr. 37:15–23. In other words, there is no evidence that either Evation.com, the author of Irman Web pages, or a web crawler acting for Internet Archive misrepresented dates. After weighing all of the evidence, we find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Irman Web Pages is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the residual exception to hearsay articulated in Federal Rule of Evidence 807. To qualify for the residual exception under Rule 807, four requirements must be met: (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. FED. R. EVID. 807(a). As explained above, the Internet Archive’s date stamp, in light of the Evation.com copyright notice, has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The date stamp is offered as evidence of a material fact, i.e., a date on which Irman Web Pages was publicly available. The Internet Archive’s answers to frequently asked questions evidence Internet Archive’s practice of affixing a date stamp on each archived page indicating the date on which the page was archived. As explained in the IPR-350 Final Written Decision, a standard affidavit from Internet Archive likely would not have added materially to this information, confirming only that Irman Web Pages is one of its records, an issue not in dispute. Thus, the date stamp and other corroborating evidence likely are more probative on the point for which they are offered than any other evidence that the proponent could obtain through reasonable efforts. Finally, in consideration of the evidence showing reliability, and the lack of any evidence suggesting otherwise, we are persuaded that admitting Irman Web pages, and the Internet Archive date stamp, will best serve the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice. Patent Owner’s request to exclude Irman Web Pages is denied.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Nevertheless, there are other examples that suffice. Specifically, a document can be authenticated with evidence of “Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Rule 901(b)(4). Petitioner argues that Irman Web Pages includes such distinctive characteristics, including the Internet Archive logo and header at the top of the exhibit and an Internet Archive date-stamped URL affixed to the bottom of the exhibit. Opp. to Mot. to Exclude 5–6. Patent Owner does not dispute that Irman Web Pages is a true and correct copy of an Internet Archive record. Petitioner further argues (and we confirmed) that following the date-stamped Internet Archive URL verifies that the web page exists on Internet Archive’s servers. Id. at 7. Moreover, an answer to another Internet Archive frequently asked question explains how its time stamps correspond to its record keeping: The Internet Archive assigns a URL to each archived page on its site in the format http://web.archive.org/web/[Year in yyyy][Month in mm][Day in dd][Time code in hh:mm:ss]/[Archived URL]. Thus, the Internet Archive URL http://web.archive.org/web/19970126045828/http://www.archiv e.org/ would be the URL for the record of the Internet Archive home page (http://www.archive.org/) archived on January 26, 1997, at 4:58 a.m. and 28 seconds (1997/01/26 at 04:58:28). Ex. 2121, 4 (brackets in original). Unless Internet Archive deviated from its normal practice in archiving Irman Web Pages, Irman Web Pages presumably was archived on May 8, 1999, the date indicated by the time stamp. Ex. 1010, 1. The archived document itself bears a 1998 copyright logo purportedly affixed by Evation.com, which is consistent with the time stamp added by Internet Archive. Id. at 3. Patent Owner does not dispute that Irman Web Pages is an authentic copy of an Evation.com web site archived, at some point, by Internet Archive. The issue is whether it was archived on May 8, 1999 (and prior to the filing date of the ’682 patent). Consistent with our finding in the IPR- 350 Final Written Decision, at 17–18, we find that the distinctive characteristics on Irman Web Pages, including the logo and time stamp from Internet Archive, in light of Internet Archive’s explanation of its record keeping, constitute evidence sufficient, under Rule 901(b)(4), to support a finding that Irman Web Pages is a copy of an Evation.com web page archived by Internet Archive on May 8, 1999. The fact that the Evation.com copyright date closely predates the Internet Archive time stamp is further evidence showing Irman Web Pages’ authenticity. Moreover, we find the evidence to be sufficient under Rule 901(b)(4) even in the absence of an affidavit under Rule 901(b)(1).” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Owner (cited to again in the PO Resp., at 12). According to WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1935 (unabridged 1993) (Ex. 2103), “respond” means, inter alia, “2 : to say something in return : make an answer” and “3 : to show some reaction to a force or stimulus . . . : react in response.” Patent Owner only cited to definition 2, “to say something in return : make an answer.” As the dictionary shows, however, the ordinary meaning also is broad enough to encompass definition 3, “to show some reaction to a force or stimulus . . . : react in response,” which corresponds to our preliminary construction. We next look to the Specification of the ’682 patent to discern whether the patentee intended a more narrow meaning of “respond,” keeping in mind the Federal Circuit’s “caution[] against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.” In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Patent Owner points us to two passages in the Specification. In the first, Ex. 1001, 1:58–2:3, the Specification states that if a computer system “responds” to a control signal from a sound reproduction system, the sound reproduction system determines that the computer system is in a responsive state. Patent Owner infers from this description that the computer system must be sending an answer or reply; otherwise the sound reproduction system would not be able to determine that the computer system is in a responsive state. PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner argues that this is the only use of the word “respond” in the Specification; thus, it is a “valuable guidepost” for understanding how a skilled artisan would have understood the claim language “configured to respond.” Id. at 11–12. In the second passage cited by Patent Owner, the Specification describes a computer program that directs AM/FM tuner 12 (shown in Figure 1, above, as part of the sound reproduction system) to identify the strongest radio signals, which the computer program assigns as presets. Ex. 1001, 9:21–48. Patent Owner argues that this passage describes an answer or reply from the sound reproduction system to the computer. PO Resp. 12–13. Neither of these passages suggests that “respond” should be construed narrowly. The first passage does not describe the behavior at issue in the claim, a sound reproduction system responding to a computer. Rather, it describes a computer responding to a sound reproduction system. To the extent that it implicitly describes an answer or reply (a matter of debate), it nevertheless gives no indication that the term “respond” should be limited to such usage. Rather, it describes an example. As to the second passage, it does not use the word “respond”; thus, it is of limited value in ascertaining how the patentee intended the word “respond” to be understood. Moreover, the second passage, like the first, carries with it no indication that the example it describes was intended to be limiting. At most, Patent Owner’s evidence shows that “respond” can be read broadly enough to encompass its interpretation. Patent Owner has introduced no persuasive evidence, however, suggesting that “respond” is limited to its interpretation.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,401,682 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,401,682
• Athena Automation Ltd. v. Husky Injection Molding Systems Ltd.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Feb 23, 2015 · IPR2013-00290 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Rehearing

  Rehearing was granted to reconsider the anticipation finding for claims 1–7, 12, and 17–20, but denied otherwise because Glaesener did not incorporate Choi with sufficient particularity.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part

    “DISCUSSION The requirements for a request for rehearing are set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a request for rehearing, without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. The Petition, in this case, asserts that claims 1–7, 12, and 17–20 are” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “and tooth. But then I guess Choi doesn’t actually use that particular term?” A: “Correct.”). And Petitioner does not explain persuasively that a person of reasonable skill in the art would have understood this language as describing, with sufficient particularity, any specific portion of Choi. See Adv. Display, 212 F.3d at 1282–83 (“To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.”) (citing In re Seversky, 474 F.2d 671, 674 (CCPA 1973)).” slip op. at 6

  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 7,670,536
• Sdi Technologies, Inc. v. Bose Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2014 · IPR2013-00465 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21, 24, 27, 29–47, 50, 63, 64, 68–70, 73, 74, 77, and 78 are unpatentable under §103 over WinAmp, Irman Web Pages, Altec Lansing Manual, and, for some claims, Looney.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “standard affidavit from the Internet Archive would have provided sufficient authentication. See Tr. 87:4–21. The Internet Archive’s standard affidavit, however, merely attests to the general procedures of the Internet Archive and the general characteristics of archived web pages on the Wayback Machine and states that the particular web page is part of its records. Ex. 3004. As Petitioner points out, however, we can follow the URL reproduced in Irman Web Pages and verify that Irman Web Pages is part of the Internet Archive’s records. Pet. Opp. to Mot. to Exclude 8. Thus, Patent Owner’s argument reduces to the contention that Petitioner has not provided an affidavit from Internet Archive attesting to its general procedures. As the Keystone case explains, “[t]he Internet Archive has existed since 1996, and federal courts have regularly accepted evidence from the Internet Archive.” 2011 WL 6436210, at *9 n.9. At the hearing, counsel for Patent Owner was asked to explain why we should consider Irman Web Pages unreliable, and, specifically, why we should consider unreliable the indication that Irman Web Pages was archived on May 8, 1999. Tr. 81:13–22; 82:21–83:9; 85:13–86:9; see also Fed. R. Evid. 807. Patent Owner did not articulate anything about the document itself that would indicate unreliability. Instead, as indicated above, Patent Owner essentially contends that Petitioner committed a technical violation of the Rules of Evidence by not obtaining a standard affidavit from Internet Archive to show that “the web contents [were] available on that particular date.” See Tr. 83:1–2; 85:13– 86:9. Such an affidavit would not have added materially to the record for the reasons outlined above. Petitioner shows that the date on the Irman Web Pages facially appears authentic and is authenticated further by accessing the website. Patent Owner has not carried the burden on its motion to show that Irman Web Pages is not authentic. Therefore, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude, with respect to Irman Web Pages.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “[t]o reach a non-hindsight driven conclusion as to whether a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have viewed the subject matter as a whole to have been obvious in view of multiple references, the Board must provide some rationale, articulation, or reasoned basis to explain why the conclusion of obviousness is correct. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Thus, the issue is not whether Dr. Lippman described combinations of the references that would not have rendered the claims obvious; instead, the issue is whether Dr. Lippman provided a reason, with rational underpinning, for combining the references in the way he proposes. Cf. id at 988 (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). 5 For the reasons stated below, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument. Moreover, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that testimony suffering from hindsight bias should be excluded as inadmissible. Rather, that would go to the weight we give to the testimony. Thus, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude with respect to ¶¶ 39–44 of Dr. Lippman’s testimony. Dr. Lippman testified that a skilled artisan would have made the proposed combination “in order to reduce duplication and clutter, such that one remote would control both the speaker and the computer and using the IR receiver positioned in the speaker.” Ex. 1017 ¶ 41. We conclude that this reason has rational underpinning. Moreover, as explained in the Decision to Institute (Dec. 24–25), adding Patent Owner’s proposed combinations to Petitioner’s proposed combination renders the latter no more than an obvious selection from a finite number (here, three) of predictable solutions. The Federal Circuit has distinguished between circumstances where the challenger of a patent “merely throws metaphorical darts at a board filled with combinatorial prior art possibilities,” which is vulnerable to hindsight bias, and circumstances “where a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known options’ from a ‘finite number of identified, predictable solutions,’” which evidences obviousness. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). We conclude that this case falls into the latter category. Patent Owner’s two combinations and Petitioner’s combination together constitute three rearrangements of the same elements, where each of those combinations is a predictable use of the elements for their intended purposes. Precisely how to arrange these known elements would have been an obvious matter of design choice. See also Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“As the Supreme Court explained, if trying such a limited number of solutions ‘leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.’” (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421)).” slip op. at 22

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “term is necessary. Reply 3. Nevertheless, Petitioner argues that “[t]he claims . . . mean that the assemblages are based on types of metadata (for example, artist, album, genre, etc.), not the metadata (‘The Beatles,’ ‘Abby Road,’ ‘Here Comes the Sun,’ ‘Rock’) itself.” Id. at 11. In essence, Petitioner argues that the claims are directed to assemblages of files based on categories that might be included in metadata, although the files themselves might not include metadata. Petitioner’s position is contrary to the plain language of the claims, which recites that an assemblage is “based on . . . a first type of metadata included in the music files.” Moreover, consistent with the claim language, the ’295 patent describes creating assemblages from metadata contained within the files that store the audio data: A second type of assemblage includes recorded units with common identifying characteristics, sometimes referred to as common “metadata” values. “Metadata” values are typically in file header information of music files in many popular music file formats. Metadata values may include the artist, the composer, the type of music, and others. . . . For example, if an assemblage contains music files having a common composer metadata value of “Beethoven”, each time the assemblage is requested, a computer database program may search all the music files for the metadata value of “Beethoven” as the composer. In this manner, each time a new music file is recorded with “Beethoven” as the composer, it is automatically added to the assemblage. Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 21–44. In light of the claim language and the description in the specification, and consistent with the district court in the ’682/’295 patent litigation, we construe “an assemblage of music files based on a first type of metadata included in the music files” to mean “a first group of music files that is based on a first type of metadata that is located in the music file, which may be in the file header or elsewhere in the file.” We recognize the differences in the claim construction framework employed by district courts, but nevertheless are persuaded that the district court’s construction is the broadest reasonable interpretation.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The declarants for Petitioner and Patent Owner essentially agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and several years (e.g., three years) of experience with audio systems. Compare Declaration of Andrew B. Lippman (Ex. 1017, “Lippman Decl.”) ¶ 19, with Declaration of Dr. Robert L. Stevenson (Ex. 2026, “Stevenson Decl.”) ¶ 20.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,364,295 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,364,295

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.