- PTAB · Oct 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00057 · APJ Hung H Bui · IPR · Remand
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because the conjunctive construction required a hardware action, which the asserted grounds did not show.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (requiring a petition for inter partes review to identify how the challenged claim is to be construed and where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) when the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations.4 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Additionally, the obviousness inquiry typically requires an analysis of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements,” but “must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“(1) The Claim Language Supports a Conjunctive Construction There is a “heavy presumption” that the terms used in claims “mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.” SuperGuide, at 875 (citing Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed.Cir.2002)).” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. First, the construction of the phrase “at least one of [A] the display, [B] the audio and [C] the hardware (HW) action” is conjunctive in light of the language of the claims and the specification of the ’887 patent. As such, Petitioner has the burden, but fails to show all three (3) components to be reproduced at Yun’s mobile device, including: [A] the display, [B] the audio and [C] the hardware (HW) action by the HW component of the mobile device. Second, as Patent Owner observes, and we agree, “Petitioner ignores the requirement for ‘the hardware (HW) action’ entirely” and does not even mention any “hardware (HW) action.” Prelim. Resp. 14 (Paper 10).” slip op. at 34
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“6 In the Petitioner’s Reply to the Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, Petitioner presents several arguments to address the Fintiv factors, Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In support of Factor 6, Petitioner argues for the first time that Overton (not Yun or Lu) is allegedly teaching “the hardware (HW) action” aspect of the claims. Prelim. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1006, 11:13–24 “force feedback . . . to the input devices 142 [shown in Figure 1]”). However, we decline to consider this belated argument raised for the first time in the context of a Fintiv analysis instead of the Petition.” slip op. at 41
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,934,887 - PTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00141 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Remand
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Nishida-based challenges.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“partes review of U.S. Patent No. 8,266,749 B2 (“the ’749 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). The Petition challenges the patentability of claims 1–21 of the ’749 patent. Nike, Inc. (“Patent Owner”)2 filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). With our authorization, Petitioner filed a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response (Paper 10) and Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 13). We discretionarily denied institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Paper 20. Petitioner filed a request for Director Review of the Decision denying institution. Paper 21. Director Review was granted, the Decision denying institution of inter partes review was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Board. Id. at 4. Specifically, the case was “remanded to the Board with instructions to consider Petitioner’s Nishida grounds and to determine whether the Petition should be instituted.” Id. at 3–4.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’749” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In support of Petitioner’s position, Dr. Adanur testifies that “Nishida discloses that the unfinished surface area 1.1 is part of the web 1 itself,” that Nishida discloses that the computer-controlled process can (using Nishida’s phrase) “put in” up to seven different textile fibers or yarns into the web of material in one operation, and that, “[t]hus, Nishida discloses simultaneously knitting its layouts 2 and tongue 40 (each a ‘textile element’) with the unfinished surface area 1.1 (a ‘surrounding textile structure’).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 216 (citing Ex. 1022, 2:12–20, 4:47–55, 5:45–49). For purposes of institution, we credit that testimony over the testimony of Dr. Pastore, because, on the current record, we regard Dr. Adanur’s testimony as more consistent with the evidence. This and the other related issues may be explored more fully during the trial.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) in the field of the ’749 patent in March 2004 would have been someone with at least a few years of experience in knit materials and knitting methods and machines that can be used in making footwear, or a bachelor’s degree in textile-related sciences, engineering, or industrial product design, or equivalent academic or work experience, including in the footwear industry. EX1002, ¶68. Such a person of ordinary skill would have at least a general understanding of general construction processes and materials used in the manufacturing process of fabric-based articles. For individuals with a lower educational level, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s working experience compensates for any such lower educational level, or vice versa. See id. Pet. 23–24. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, Nike applies Skechers’ definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,266,749 - PTAB · Aug 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00658 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision
The Board canceled original claim 1, denied the proposed substitute claim as indefinite under § 112, and did not reach the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We have, on the complete record now before us, mainly the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Hatch, who testifies that the designer of ordinary skill in the art would be a person who has a bachelor’s degree in furniture design or an equivalent field or alternatively two years of practical experience designing furniture . . . [which] is appropriate given the relatively simple nature of the design at issue, which involves little more than two boards forming a tabletop. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 34–35. Based on the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of a designer of ordinary skill as it is supported by the testimony of Mr. Hatch. Id. ¶¶ 33–38. We also note that, based on the complete trial record, our” slip op. at 18
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“In contrast, Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Williams, testifies based on his “experience[,] that tenons are generally included in the larger portion of two table top portions.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 55. However, Mr. Williams’ experience does not explain why an ordinary observer would understand such functional and ornamental characteristics of tenon and hole arrangements. Id. Nor does this testimony proclaim that tenons must be in the larger of two table top potions. Indeed, even considering an ordinary observer imbued with Mr. Williams’ level of expertise and experience, and understanding for instance that it may be more likely that the wider portion includes tenons, this does not resolve the glaring inconsistency that Figure 1 illustrates holes and Figure 8 illustrates tenons. In other words, Mr. Williams’ “experience” does not resolve the visible tension that, on one hand, Figure 1 illustrates holes as part of the claimed ornamental design in the wider portion of the table top, and on the other hand, Figure 8 illustrates tenons as part of the same wider portion of the table top. The problem here may be more eloquently explained as “Two roads diverged in a yellow wood[,] And sorry I could not travel both.” Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, The Poetry of Robert Frost—The Collected Poems, 105, Henry Holt and Co. (1969). Considering the entire record before us in this case we credit Mr. Hatch’s testimony. The issue is not, as Patent Owner has framed it, whether “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would understand how the tenons and holes should be positioned on each of the table top portions.” Reply Opp. 7. The question is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art viewing the design for a table top in the proposed substitute claim as would an ordinary observer, understand whether or not the wider portion of the table top as Figures 1 and 6, holes. As Mr. Hatch persuasively explains, in the proposed substitute claim a majority of the drawings for the wider portion, i.e., Figures 1–6, omit the tenons added in Figure 8. Ex. 1011 ¶ 37 (Mr. Hatch testifying that “Figure 8 is the only amended figure that adds tenons/dowels.”) Indeed, Figures 1 and 6 not only fail to illustrate tenons, but actually are amended to include holes rather than tenons, as described in the Motion to Amend. See, e.g., Motion to Amend 6 (Patent Owner describing, “Figure 1: Removal of disclaimer of a total of four holes by amending the outline of the four holes from broken lines to solid lines.”). On the complete record in this proceeding, we determine that a” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“On the complete record in this proceeding, we determine that a designer of skill in the art considering the claim from either their own, or the perspective of an ordinary observer, would be uncertain whether the wider portion of the claimed table top depicted in Figures 1–8 includes tenons, or holes. It is reasonable that anyone observing two distinct ornamental designs for the same wider portion of the table top would be unclear as to the claimed ornamental design where holes are shown in one figure but tenons are shown in another figure illustrating the same wider portion of the table top. Observing as a whole, the figures illustrating the table top in the proposed substitute claim, the question remains, does the wider portion of the table top include tenons, or holes? See Maatita, 900 F.3d at 1376 (“Ultimately, a patent is indefinite for § 112 purposes whenever its claim, read in light of the visual disclosure (whether it be a single drawing or multiple drawings), ‘fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.’”) (quoting Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014)). proposed substitute claim fails to “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty.” See Nautilus, 572 U.S. at 910. Thus, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proposed substitute claim is indefinite and we accordingly deny Patent Owner’s Noncontingent Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 29
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteUnpatentable
“Federal Circuit recently explained that “a design patent is indefinite under § 112 if one skilled in the art, viewing the design as would an ordinary observer, would not understand the scope of the design with reasonable certainty based on the claim and visual disclosure.” In re Maatita, 900 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In Maatita, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s finding of indefiniteness of a design for a shoe bottom, i.e., a shoe sole, finding that Maatita’s two-dimensional drawing clearly demonstrates the perspective from which the shoe bottom should be viewed. A potential infringer is not left in doubt as to how to determine infringement. In this case, Maatita’s decision not to disclose all possible depth choices would not preclude an ordinary observer from understanding the claimed design, since the design is capable of being understood from the two-dimensional, plan- or planar-view perspective [] shown in the drawing. Id. at F.3d 1378–79. Different from Maatita, the issue in this proceeding is not whether an ordinary observer would sufficiently understand a three-dimensional ornamental design from a two-dimensional figure, but whether inconsistencies between figures of the proposed substitute claim render the scope of the claimed table top uncertain. See Maatita, 900 F.3d at 1376 (The Federal Circuit specifically distinguishing Maatita’s single two-dimensional drawing from indefiniteness issues raised by inconsistent drawings: “[h]ere, we are not dealing with inconsistencies in the drawings, or inconsistencies between the drawings and the verbal description, but” slip op. at 24
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Nautilus - PTAB · Mar 11, 2015 · IPR2014-01108 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding after settlement, before a final decision on the merits.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” The requirement for terminating review with respect to Petitioner is met. Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Asustek Computer Inc., Dexin Electronics Co., Ltd., and Thermaltake Technology represent all petitioners in this review. The Board has discretion to terminate this review with respect to Better Mouse Co., LLC as Patent Owner. The above represent all parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,532,200 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00555 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without issuing final written decisions.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
None - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00557 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five related inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,047,705 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00554 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id.” slip op. at 2
None - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00556 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id. 1 Unless otherwise noted, citations are to the record of IPR2013-00554; similar papers may be found in the records of the other related proceedings. Based on the present record, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these inter partes reviews both as to Sealed Air and Pregis without rendering a final written decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,607,803 - PTAB · Sep 12, 2014 · IPR2013-00558 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated the five inter partes reviews without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[a]n inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and patent owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.” In these proceedings, the Board instituted trial on March 6, 2014 (Paper 13), but has not yet reached a decision on the merits with respect to the patentability of any involved claim. Accordingly, the requirement for terminating the reviews with respect to Sealed Air, as Petitioner, is met. Also under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a), “[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review, the Office may terminate the review or proceed to a final written decision under section 318(a).” Sealed Air is the sole Petitioner. The Board, therefore, has discretion to terminate these reviews with respect to Pregis. In their joint motions, the parties contend that the trials are at a “sufficiently early stage,” as Sealed Air has not yet filed its Replies to Pregis’ Patent Owner Responses, and no motions are outstanding at this time. Paper 45, 2-3. The parties also note that they have agreed to dismiss the co-pending district court action Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc. v. Sealed Air Corporation (D. Del. Civil Action No. 13-1084-LPS), involving the patents and parties before us here. Id.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,047,705 - PTAB · Aug 20, 2014 · IPR2014-00145 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding as to all parties after settlement, without issuing a final written decision.
RulingsOther- BurdenOther
“§ 42.74(a). Generally, however, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Otto Bock has not yet filed a Patent Owner Response, and we have not decided the merits of the proceeding. In view of the parties’ settlement agreement, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate the involvement of Össur. Moreover, in view of the early stage of this proceeding, and the concurrent settlement of the district court litigation, we determine that it also is appropriate to terminate the proceeding with respect to Otto Bock. As a result, it is appropriate to enter judgment in the form of termination and without rendering a final written decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.72; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.2.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,726,726
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.