- Ledup Manufacturing Group Ltd. v. Seasonal Specialties, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2026 · IPR2024-01259 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–15 are unpatentable; claims 3 and 8 are not shown unpatentable, principally because the Petition lacked a sufficient motivation to combine Inoue and Smith.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument because it advocates for the importation of functional limitations from the ’794 Patent Specification into the claims––namely the disclosure that the bypass circuit continues to conduct electricity, and keeps the remaining lights lit, even when one or more individual lighting elements in the series are burned out, missing, or defective. See PO Resp. 7–9. It is well settled that it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. Moreover, the language that Patent Owner wishes to import into the claim from the Specification is functional language that describes the function of the resistor bypass circuit. As explained below in the section addressing the subsequent claim recitation “conducting current at all times across the light sources when current is flowing through the circuit regardless of whether the LED light source are conducting current therethrough,” functional language is evaluated in view of the applied prior art to determine whether it imparts additional structure to distinguish the claimed invention over the prior art. Accordingly, to the extent the preamble recitation is limiting, we need not provide an express construction for “[a] resistor bypass circuit for a series lighting circuit.”” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“We understand the term “inherent resistance” to mean the resistance at a particular operating current or voltage across the LED light source. Neither party disputes our understanding of the term “inherent resistance.” See Dec. on Inst. 9–10; PO Resp. 7–9; Pet. Reply.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related discipline, and four years of practical experience in designing or fabricating LED lighting systems, including controlling and driving LEDs,” or alternatively “would have had a master’s degree and three years of experience, or a Ph.D. degree and two years of experience.” Ex. 1013, 31 ¶ 3; see also Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for the purpose of institution. See PO Resp. 2. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’794 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments because, as explained above in Section II.A., we decline to import functional language into the claim from the Specification to construe the preamble recitation as requiring the function of “continu[ing] to conduct electricity and keeps the remaining lights lit, even when one more individual lighting elements in the series are out, loose, broken, missing/removed, or defective.” Having considered both parties’ arguments and corresponding cited supporting evidence, we are persuaded that Inoue discloses each of the limitations of claim 1. Based on the entire record, we determine Petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Inoue. See Pet. 25–26.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 11,533,794 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,533,794 - Aylo Freesites Ltd v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-00940 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious over Leaning and over Leaning with Klemets; claims 12–20 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. Houh, Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a B.S. degree in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree) and two years of experience in networking or streaming media, or a M.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree).” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its post-institution papers. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, we are satisfied that this definition of the level of skill is consistent with the teachings of the ’234 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We determine that no construction of “virtual timeline” is necessary. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, as discussed below, the parties’ dispute appears to be about whether the “virtual timeline” identified by Petitioner is used to arrange the requested streamlets, as is also recited in claim 9. We address that argument below. See infra § II.D.10.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“On this record, we determine that the recitation “to achieve continuous presentation” is limiting and requires an amount of continuous (uninterrupted) playback/presentation after an upshift or downshift. The specification describes agent controller 702 determining whether to upshift based on a trigger threshold Θup, which itself is based on various factors including a current read ahead margin and a minimum safety margin. See Ex. 1001, 17:44–58. If agent controller 702 can sustain upshift quality, then it will upshift and request higher quality streams. See id. at 17:58–61. Conversely, when an upshift is not possible, agent controller 702 determines whether to downshift based a different threshold Θdown, which itself is based on the same sort of factors. See id. at 18:4–7. When the stream quality is not adequate, it downshifts. See id. at 18:7–14. These disclosures are similar to the language of claim 12, which recites “repeatedly generating a factor indicative of a current ability to receive the digital content at a rate sufficient for presenting the digital content as the digital content is received, . . . wherein the factor relates to a performance of the network” and “making the successive determinations whether to change the requested bit rate based on the factor to achieve continuous presentation of the digital content using the individually-requestable portions of the highest bit rate one of the copies determined receivable at that time.” Ex. 1001, 20:5–16 (emphasis added). That is, claim 12 refers to “achiev[ing] continuous presentation” based on what is “sufficient for presenting the digital content,” trading quality to ensure continuous playback.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable
“server comprises at least two servers and wherein at least one streamlet is requested from a first of the at least one server and at least one other streamlet is requested from a second server of the at least one server other than the first server.” Ex. 1001, 19:7–12. Petitioner references its mapping of the “at least one server” in claim 1 to Leaning’s server 1. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1004, 2:15–16, 2:18–22, 2:31–32, 5:8–14, Fig. 1), 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 6:13–26, 9:3–7, 16:6–12), 37; see supra §§ II.D.2.b–c. Petitioner contends that, “[t]o the extent Leaning does not disclose at least two servers wherein one sub-file (streamlet) is requested from a first server and another sub-file (streamlet) is requested from a second server such an arrangement would have been obvious in view of the knowledge of a [an ordinarily skilled artisan].” Id. at 37. Citing the common nature of such an arrangement, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to provide multiple web servers containing the same sets of sub-files for streams in order to have redundancy in the system and allow for clients to establish connections with multiple servers and request a first sub-file from a first web server and, if the connection between the first web server becomes congested or the first web server otherwise fails or becomes unavailable, request a subsequent sub-file from the second web server. Id. at 37–38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85; Ex. 1012, 108,5 Fig. 4-11). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s analysis for claim 3. We are persuaded that it would have been obvious to implement Leaning’s server 1 as two servers that store different streamlets based on Dr. Houh’s uncontested testimony about system redundancy. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 85. His testimony is backed by a contemporaneous reference about HTTP that shows requests for different objects from different servers over parallel TCP connections. See, e.g., Ex. 1012, 108–09, Fig. 4-11. Thus, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claim 3 would have been obvious over Leaning.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 11,991,234 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,991,234 - Fubotv Media Inc. / Yanka Industries, Inc. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00917 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 3–18 as obvious over Leaning, and claim 2 as obvious over Leaning and Ala-Honkola.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. “continuous playback” This term appears in independent claims 1 and 13. For example, limitation 1D of claim 1 recites “adapting the successive determinations to shift the playback quality based on the factor to achieve continuous playback of the video using the streamlets of the highest quality copy of the video that is determined to be sustainable at that time.” Claim 13 recites a similar limitation. Petitioner contends “[t]he claims’ plain language only requires that the shift in playback quality is made ‘to achieve continuous playback.’” Pet. Reply 1 (citing claim 1). According to Petitioner, “shifting quality ‘to achieve continuous playback’ is aspirational, not limiting, language.” Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Petitioner asserts that “[n]othing in the claims requires uninterrupted playback before, during, or after the shift in quality.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredMixed
“continuous playback.” We also do not rely on Exhibit 1045. Accordingly, we consider Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike in this regard to be moot. For these reasons, we do not strike Petitioner’s reply arguments or supporting evidence regarding claim construction. B. Leaning’s Clear Buffer Step Patent Owner alleges Petitioner has shifted its position on reply slip op. at 89
Patent outcomesUS 10,757,156 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,757,156 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00432 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 8, 9, 11–13, 18, and 19 as anticipated or obvious over Zhang; the remaining claims as obvious over the listed combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyOther
“and digital selector 240 disclosed by Zhang is “digital circuitry,” which is configured to receive a plurality of frequencies comprising a plurality of desired/undesired television channels from ADC 220 and to output the desired television channels to demodulators 250 as a digital datastream. Tr. 71:14–17 (PO Counsel: “There is no dispute that in both Zhang and the patent, an RF signal that has both desired and undesired channel comes in and what’s sent to demodulators are desired channels. Nobody is disputing that.”), 134:3–5 (PO Counsel: “The issue is not whether the black box 230- plus-240 is the digital circuitry. It is. The issue is not whether or not that overall circuitry selects channels. At some level, it does.”). In other words, Zhang teaches digital circuitry that is (1) capable of receiving a plurality of frequencies including desired/undesired television channels and (2) capable of distinguishing between the desired/undesired channels to output the desired television channels to a demodulator. We find these uncontested facts to be highly probative of Petitioner’s contention that, to a skilled artisan, Zhang suggests that its digital circuitry is capable of selecting the desired television channels from a digitized plurality of frequencies that include both desired/undesired television channels. This is because Zhang’s digital circuitry is able to take what is input originally as a digitized plurality of frequencies having both desired/undesired television channels and, using those frequencies, pick out the desired television channels that are subsequently output to a demodulator. Zhang teaches that “because only the selected channels are later demodulated” the disclosed digital circuitry is “much faster than traditional analog channel switching through RF tuners” and it “dissipates less heat because fewer resources are required when demodulating only the selected RF channels.” Ex. 1013 ¶ 28 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA.” Pet. 21. Although Petitioner proposes corresponding structure for the term “digital circuitry” recited in claim 1, it does so only “[t]o the extent” that term “is construed to be a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. 112, paragraph 6.” Id. at 22. But Petitioner does not argue or suggest that “digital circuitry” should be construed as a means-plus-function term; nor does Petitioner make an argument to overcome the presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, does not apply. See id. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally PO Resp. Because neither party actually argues “digital circuitry” is a means-plus-function term, the presumption holds and we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 9,210,362 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,210,362 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00438 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–76 are unpatentable: Zhang anticipates or renders some claims obvious, and the other challenged claims are obvious over combinations including Zhang.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons given, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–76 of the ’206 patent are unpatentable as follows.6” slip op. at 48
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not respond. See PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“B. Asserted Challenges Based on Zhang Alone Petitioner asserts that claims 1, 3–7, 9, 11, 13, 15–19, 21, 23, 25, 27– 31, 33–35, 38, 40–44, and 46–48 of the ’206 patent are anticipated by Zhang. Pet. 19–45. Petitioner also asserts that these claims would have been obvious over Zhang. Id. Patent Owner disputes certain aspects of Petitioner’s analysis. PO Resp. 3–50. For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 3–7, 9, 11, 13, 15–19, 21, 23, 25, 27–31, 33–35, 38, 40–44, and 46–48 are anticipated by Zhang or would have been obvious over Zhang.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“system may include a digital video recorder (DVR).” Id. at 45–46 (citing Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 5, 43, 48, 60, 73, 98, 112, 118, 191, 197, 212, 281–285, 296, 546). According to Petitioner, “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to include Reisman’s DVR in Zhang’s STB to provide a more feature-filled and individualized user experience, which in the proposed combination still includes Zhang’s wideband front-end receiver components cited for performing Elements [25A]–[25E].” Id. at 46. Petitioner explains that “Reisman’s DVR improves user experience and flexibility by allowing timeshifted and on-demand viewing, and enabling replay and trick-play (fast forwarding, rewinding, and pausing) of live programming.” Id. (citing Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 191, 197, 212, 284); see also id. at 46–47 (asserting that “[a]dding Reisman’s DVR to Zhang’s system would have been nothing more [than] applying a known technique of integrating a DVR into a set-top box . . . to a known STB . . . that was ready for improvement to yield a predictable result” and that “[a] POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success”). Patent Owner does not specifically dispute Petitioner’s contentions in this regard. See PO Resp. Based on Petitioner’s argument and evidence (see Pet. 45–47), we find Petitioner’s proposed combination of Zhang and Reisman teaches all the limitations of claims 25 and 38. We also find that Petitioner’s proffered reasoning for combining Zhang and Reisman supports a legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 11,399,206 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,399,206 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00435 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–82 are unpatentable: claims are anticipated by Zhang or obvious over Zhang, Zhang with Reisman, Zhang with Jackson, or the listed combinations with Pandey.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). That standard involves construing claims in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner asserts that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning to a POSITA.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not respond. See PO Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express interpretation to resolve any controversy in this proceeding. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. Claim 1 recites “the DFE is configured to concurrently select and provide each of the plurality of desired channels . . . without providing any of the plurality of undesired channels.” The claim expressly covers both selecting desired channels and providing desired channels. By reciting “without providing any of the plurality of undesired channels,” the claim expressly excludes providing undesired channels; it does not exclude selecting undesired channels. Thus, the claim covers selecting both desired and undesired channels.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner argues that Zhang’s PVR is not a ‘DVR’ as recited in Elements [27D] and [41D], Reisman discloses this feature.” Pet. 50. Petitioner asserts that “Reisman teaches that STBs in a cable system may include a digital video recorder (DVR).” Id. (citing Exc. 1052 ¶¶ 5, 43, 48, 60, 73, 98, 112, 118, 191, 197, 212, 281–285, 296, 546). According to Petitioner, an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have been motivated [to] include Reisman’s DVR in Zhang’s STB to provide a more feature-filled and individualized user experience, which in the proposed combination still includes Zhang’s wideband front-end receiver components cited for Elements [27A]–[27C] and [41A]–[41C].” Id. Petitioner explains that “Reisman’s DVR improves user experience by allowing time-shifted and ondemand view, and enabling, e.g., fast-forwarding, rewinding, and pausing of live programming.” Id. (citing Ex. 1052 ¶¶ 191, 197, 212, 284–285, 546, 758); see also id. at 50–51 (asserting that the proposed combination “merely applies a known technique of integrating a DVR into a STB . . . to a known STB . . . that was ready for improvement to yield a predictable result” and that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had a reasonable expectation of success”). Patent Owner does not specifically dispute Petitioner’s contentions in this regard. See PO Resp. Based on Petitioner’s argument and evidence (see Pet. 50–51), we find Petitioner’s proposed combination of Zhang and Reisman teaches all the limitations of claims 27 and 41. We also find that Petitioner’s proffered reasoning for combining Zhang and Reisman supports a legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,381,866 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,381,866 - K/S Himpp v. Bragi GmbHAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 21, 2025 · IPR2023-01150 · APJ Larry J Hume · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 are unpatentable; proposed substitute claims 22–42 are unpatentable, and the revised motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Burden
“also determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 22–42 are unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 56
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“also determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 22–42 are unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 56
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“d. Conclusion for Ground 4: Obviousness of Claim 1 in view of Shaffer and Hain As discussed above, Petitioner’s analysis addresses how the combined” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 9,843,853 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 9,843,853 - General Motors LLC v. Edward H. NortrupAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2023-00994 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–31 are unpatentable, principally as obvious over Knockeart and Feldman, with dependent claims also held obvious over additional combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“the proposed alternative configuration. See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Also, protecting the privacy of individuals provides further reason for combining Knockeart and Feldman. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–7, 9, 10, 12–21, 25, 26, 29, and 31 would have been obvious over Knockeart and Feldman, that claims 7 and 8 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Simske, that claims 10, 11, and 30 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Whitsell, that claims 22–24 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Boies, and that claims 27 and 28 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Peterson. See supra Parts III.B–III.F. Because these five asserted challenges are dispositive as to all the challenged claims, namely, claims 1–31, we need not reach either the asserted challenge based on Knockeart, Feldman, Boies, and Peterson, or the asserted challenge based on Knockeart, Feldman, and Craine with respect to any of these claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018) (holding that a petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”); Bos. Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (recognizing that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding” and agreeing that the Board has “discretion to decline to decide additional instituted grounds once the petitioner has prevailed on all its challenged claims”). Accordingly, we do not reach Petitioner’s arguments that claim 14 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, Boies, and” slip op. at 80
Patent outcomesUS 10,444,028 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,444,028 - Unified Patents, LLC v. Peter Henrik PedersenAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2023-00029 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 14–17 are unpatentable as obvious over Funk and Law and over Funk and Kamakura.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We are persuaded that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, we adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“the Challenged Claims, identified below, invoke §112 ¶6, Petitioner identifies their function and corresponding structure in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3).” Id. at 11–21. We are not persuaded that any terms from the ’920 patent should be construed as means plus function terms.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“[a] high volume e-mail ‘newspaper’ delivery system.” Ex. 1006, code (57). Funk’s newspaper is created by “manipulat[ing] publicly available information (AP wire service, Reuters, Business Wire, etc.)” and matching that information to a user profile. Id. at 1:49–50. These various inputs (information sources 100) all feed into service processing system 104. Id. at 5:43–44, Fig. 1. In addition, as we discussed above, Funk also discloses third parties that may send information to the customers. See Reply 9. Law’s “information delivery system includes a web server in operative communication with a plurality of recipients and a plurality of senders.” Ex. 1007, code (57). Thus, Law’s web server and Funk’s service processing system both connect multiple information sources to the email system. Law sets out to “improv[e] the collection and dissemination of recipient preferences for messages . . . by collecting recipient preference data and making it available to a plurality of senders for their use in preparing messages intended for a selected recipient.” Id. at 2:26–30. According to Petitioner, “[i]n the Funk-Law combination, Funk’s system would maintain profiles for senders in the Funk combination database, and provide a way for senders to update their profile information, in the same way that Funk already allows customers to have user profiles.” Reply 9–10 (citing Pet. 64, Ex. 1003 ¶ 130, Ex. 1006, 11:29–33). Dr. Houh opines on behalf of Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “enhance Funk such that the Funk combined processors . . . (1) include[] a software application used to receive sender information including sender identification information from senders via the Internet to establish and update sender profiles, and (2) store[] such sender information in the Funk combination database.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 129. According to Dr. Houh, this would have required the application of a known technique, Funk’s sending messages from parties to customers, by incorporating Law’s sender profiles to help keep track of, organize, and identify senders in Funk. Id. ¶ 130. “Funk contemplates a ‘high volume e-mail ‘newspaper’ delivery system’ that parties can use to send emails to customers, but does not provide explicit disclosure on how various parties sending messages would maintain profiles with Funk’s system.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 130. Dr. Houh further opines that “in the combination of Funk and Law, Funk’s system would maintain profiles for sending parties in the Funk combination database, and provide a way for senders to update their profile information, in the same way that Funk already allows customers to have user profiles that the users may update in Funk’s system.” Id. As such, we are persuaded that this modification would have been obvious in light of Law’s teachings. Patent Owner contends that “[t]here is no need in Funk for multiple sender profiles since it uses a single sender, and there is no motivation in Funk or Law to combine Law’s multiple sender profiles application with Funk’s system that only uses a single sender.” PO Resp. 36. We must, however, be mindful of the Supreme Court’s statement that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). Petitioner’s asserted modification would allow the existing information sources in Funk to target the impact of their information in a manner similar to the screening provided to users of Funk’s system. Petitioner provides a sufficient rationale to support its assertions that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to add this functionality to Funk’s system. We are persuaded that Petitioner is correct in asserting that the asserted modification would only require the application of a known method to achieve a predictable result. Pet. 63–65. slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 6,965,920 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,965,920 - Arthrex, Inc. v. P Tech, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2023 · IPR2022-01043 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, and 18–20 are anticipated by Fumex, and the remaining claims are held unpatentable on obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“After considering the above factors and Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, for purposes of our Institution Decision, we defined a person of ordinary skill in the art as someone having a medical degree and at least two years of experience performing surgeries with implantable medical devices, such as suture anchors. Inst. Dec. 10. Patent Owner and its expert Dr. Pedowitz agree with our analysis in the Institution Decision, and employ our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 16; Ex. 2001 (Pedowitz Decl.) ¶ 21. After institution, Petitioner did not dispute our definition. See generally Reply. Accordingly, and for the reasons discussed in our Institution Decision, we maintain our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as someone having a medical degree and at least two years of experience performing surgeries with implantable medical devices, such as suture anchors. See Inst. Dec. 8–10.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In the absence of any meaningful claim construction analysis of this term from the parties, and because we find that for purposes of resolving the disputes at issue in this Decision, a construction of “passage” is unnecessary, we decline to construe this term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“In sum, the Specification and prosecution history use the terms “knotless” and “knot” in ways consistent with their known meanings in the art. “[T]o deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of a claim term to one of skill in the art, the patentee must, with some language, indicate a clear intent to do so in the patent.” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d at 1373. The Specification and prosecution history are devoid of any clear intention to deviate from the so-called “legacy” meaning of “knotless,” as admittedly used in the context of “knotless suture anchors.” We see nothing in the intrinsic record that supports Patent Owner’s argument that it “coined” a different meaning for this term in connection with the claimed fasteners. We agree with Petitioner that “it strains logic that [inventor] Dr. Bonutti would include ‘knotless’ within a lengthy list of characteristics that a fastener could take on—and without any further explanation, definition, or stated benefits—if he intended ‘that it wasn’t the way the term might commonly have been used at that time.’” Reply 5–6 (quoting Ex. 1018 (Pedowitz Depo. Tr.), 20:15–22); see also Ex. 1018 (Pedowitz Depo. Tr.), 24:6–26:1, 27:12–18 (Dr. Pedowitz unable to identify any other portions of the Specification that use or define the term “knotless”), 27:19–24 (admitting that the Specification does not identify any benefits of a “knotless fastener” (per Patent Owner’s proposed construction)).” slip op. at 23
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“In accordance with our construction of the term “knotless” fastener, we agree with Petitioner that because Fumex’s sleeve can be retained in place without tying a knot at the site where it is secured in place, Fumex discloses a “knotless” fastener as recited in claims 19 and 20. See Pet. 37– 38; Ex. 1002 (Jordan Decl.) ¶¶ 111–15. We adopt Petitioner and Dr. Jordan’s reasoning as our own. See id. We note that Patent Owner does not dispute that a knot is not tied in connection with securing Fumex’s fastener.20 See, e.g., Sur-reply 21 (arguing that “Fumex’s bone anchor retains the anchor in place in bone – not by tying a knot – but by forming a knot by pulling on one or both strands of the suture”). Instead, Patent Owner’s argument for why Fumex fails to teach a “knotless” fastener is based on its proposed claim construction. See PO Resp. 20 (“Fumex does not disclose a flexible hollow fastener that is ‘knotless’ as Patent Owner and Dr. Pedowitz have construed this term in this Proceeding.”); Sur-reply 1 (“It is undisputed that the claim construction of a ‘knotless’ fastener will decide this case.”), 23 (“If Patent Owner’s construction of “knotless” fastener is adopted, then claims 19 and 20 of the 20 In this regard, although Dr. Jordan referred to a “bigger knot” when discussing Fumex, he did not describe Fumex as requiring tying of a knot. See Ex. 2002 (Jordan Depo. Tr.), 19:21–20:8. Our construction requires elimination of knot-tying; it does not encompass the elimination of any structure that could be considered a “knot” in the general sense of the word. See Reply 21 n.6; Tr. 16:10–17:10. ‘453 Patent are not anticipated by Fumex, which fails to disclose a knotless fastener.”); see also Reply 21 (asserting that “Patent Owner has not disputed that Fumex meets Petitioner’s proposed construction of ‘knotless.’”). Because we reject Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “knotless” (see supra Section II.C.2), Patent Owner’s argument that Fumex fails to teach a “knotless” fastener is unavailing. In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Fumex anticipates claims 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, and 18–20.” slip op. at 45
Patent outcomesUS 9,814,453 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,814,453
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.