- PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00153 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–30 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 8, 15, and 22 are obvious over Ferro, Oyobe, Donnelly, Letendre, and Seelig.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“motivated and found it obvious to modify Ferro-Oyobe-Donnelly to include Letendre’s graphical slider on the charge level bar graph of the GUI as a third portion, where the operator moves the slider to specify a desired charge.” Pet. 60 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 235). Petitioner contends that Ferro- Donnelly already reflects a system with a GUI on a touchscreen for depicting state of charge and modifying that GUI to add a slider for specifying the state of charge is expressly motivated by Letendre’s indication that “it is essential that the driver be able to limit any draw down so travel is not affected.” Id. (citing Ex. 1007, 19). Letendre also describes its GUI with the slider as “a control that the driver sets according to driving needs.” Id. at 59 (citing Ex. 1007, 19). Ferro’s express description of an input/output device for managing charging preferences and Letendre’s express description of a GUI for setting charging parameters suggest using Letendre’s GUI with Ferro’s system. Id. at 60–61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 236). Petitioner also argues that its proposed combination constitutes “applying a known technique ([Letendre’s] slider . . .) to a known device ([Donnelly’s] vehicle GUI showing a charge bar graphic) ready for improvement to yield predictable results of easily allowing a user to choose a desired level of charge.” Id. at 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 237). Petitioner also contends that “[s]liders on GUIs were known to make inputting information easier, and thus [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would have been motivated to include a slider on the bar graph.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 237). An ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully combine Letendre’s slider in the GUI suggested by Ferro-Donnelly because that GUI already enabled setting charging preferences including “amount of charge” (i.e., minimum and maximum). Id. at 61–62 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 123; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 238–239).” slip op. at 25
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“impermissibly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to avoid the word count limit. Prelim. Resp. 56–59. Patent Owner contends that the Andrews declaration is “over twice as long as the Petition at 214 pages” with a substantive portion containing “an incredible 29,831 words.” Id. at 57. Patent Owner contends that “the only way to potentially understand the Petitioner’s proposed unpatentability challenges is to wade through the 29,831 words of the Andrews Declaration.” Id. Patent Owner also complains that Andrews supports his testimony relating to Petitioner’s first challenge by citing “thirty-seven (37) additional references in addition to Ferro, Oyobe, Donnelly, Letendre, and Seelig.” Id. We discern no violation of Rule 42.6(a)(3). To the contrary, that Mr. Andrews’s supports his extensive explanations of his opinions with citations to dozens of pieces of objective evidence, is a feature, not a bug of his testimony. Mr. Andrews, and Petitioner by extension, leave virtually none of the substance of his testimony unsupported by objective evidence, a practice that we applaud.” slip op. at 28
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,631,987 - PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00152 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6, and 11 are obvious over Sutardja, Donnelly, and Letendre.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to incorporate Donnelly’s GUI into Sutardja’s display to more easily and conveniently communicate Sutardja’s state of charge information to a user in a graphical format. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 242; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–159. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to combine Donnelly’s GUI depicting a bar graph indicating the charged and uncharged capacity of a vehicle battery into Sutardja according to well-known methods that would have yielded predictable results. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 160). Petitioner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully combine Donnelly’s GUI as it relates to the state of charge into Sutardja’s vehicle, which already processed information about the state of charge of its battery and included a display showing charging parameters. Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 242, 243, Ex. 1003 ¶ 161).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“includes “at least” a bar graph as shown in Figure 7. Id. at 4. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s “proposed construction should be rejected” because it “would wrongly import embodiments from the specification.” Prelim. Resp. 20–21. Patent Owner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would recognize that the “unitary charge indicator is not limited to a bar graph representation.” Id. at 21. We discern no dispute over the meaning of “unitary vehicle charge indicator” because Petitioner does not argue that the term is “limited” to the embodiment shown in Figure 7, only that the term “at least includes” that embodiment. Patent Owner does not contend otherwise.” slip op. at 8
- Strike new argumentDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Petitioner violates Rule 42.6(a)(3) by impermissibly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to avoid the word count limit. Prelim. Resp. 46–49. Patent Owner contends that the Andrews declaration is “over 140 pages” with a substantive portion containing “multiples of the allotted 14000 words” to a petition. Id. at 47. Patent Owner contends that “the only way to potentially understand the Petitioner’s proposed unpatentability challenges is to wade through the extraneous pages cited within the Andrews Declaration.” Id. Patent Owner also complains that Andrews supports his testimony relating to Petitioner’s first challenge by citing “many additional references in addition to references actually ‘relied upon’ by Petitioner.” Id. at 47–48. We discern no violation of Rule 42.6(a)(3). To the contrary, that Mr. Andrews’s supports his extensive explanations of his opinions with citations to dozens of pieces of objective evidence, is a feature, not a bug of his testimony. Mr. Andrews, and Petitioner by extension, leave virtually none of the substance of his testimony unsupported by objective evidence, a practice that we applaud.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,990,788 - Klipsta Pty Ltd v. Lindsay AlbaneseInstitutedPTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00346 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by KR ’458.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’047 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would be a regular consumer/shopper with a rudimentary knowledge of the use of magnetic clips and a basic understanding of clip construction.” Pet. 13. We find, for purposes of this Decision, that the ’047 Patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’047 Patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The ’047 Patent discloses that in addition to being separate straps, the rear strap and the front strap “can be formed from a single piece of material.” Ex. 1001, 3:40–44, 5:24–32, 10: 18–25. In particular, Figures 5A–5B of the ’047 Patent illustrate rear strap 510 and front strap 520 as being “formed from a single piece of material that is folded approximately in half where a first half can be the rear strap 510 and a second half can be the front strap 520.” Id. at 10:18–21, Figs. 5A–5B. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges “[i]t should be noted that forming the first and second straps from a single piece of material is well within the scope of the claimed invention.” Ex. 1007, 5 (citing the ’047 Patent at 3:37–44). Moreover, we note the positions taken by the parties are consistent with the fact that claim 13, which depends from claim 1, recites “wherein the first strap and the second strap are formed from a single folded strap.” Ex. 1001, 14:47–48. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s construction of “the second strap joined to the first strap” to include “a single piece of material.”” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The ’047 Patent discloses that the hook is used to attach the hat holder to another object. Ex. 1001, 8:31–33. In reference to Figures 3A–3C, the ’047 Patent discloses that “the hook 340 is formed from a strap of flexible material. The flexible material can be, for example, nylon, leather or leatherette. The hook 340 can be formed from the same material as the front or rear straps 310 and 320, respectively.” Id. at 8:26–31, Figs. 3A–3C; see also id. at 6:58–7:3. This disclosure is indicative that the term “hook” can be a strap in contrast to a structure that is typically regarded as being a hook, as shown in Figures 1A–1C, 2A–2C, 4A–4B, 6A–6B, 7, 8 of the ’047 Patent. Additionally, we note that consistent with the above disclosure, claim 10, which depends from claim 1, recites “wherein the hook is [a] flexible strap having a closure.” Ex. 1001, 14:41–42. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” to include “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object.”” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,413,047 - PTAB · May 19, 2025 · IPR2025-00032 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10, 19, and 28 are obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“At least because of the material differences in Ferro compared to Hafner ’174 and the reliance on Donnelly and Letendre, which were not before the Office, we find that the same or substantially the same art was not previously presented to the Office.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“We disagree with Patent Owner. It is true that Oyobe focuses on alerting a vehicle user to a low state of charge by raising a physical indicator on the exterior of the vehicle (i.e., the “informing apparatus 102) when the battery is low. Ex. 1005 ¶ 40. Oyobe explains: even in such a case where the vehicle user exit from the vehicle without checking the SOC of main battery B on the console panel, informing apparatus 102 disposed at a location where it can easily be seen outside the vehicle by the vehicle user allows the vehicle user to easily recognize the necessity of charging main battery B. Id. However, Oyobe’s focus on raising a physical indicator on the vehicle as a reminder does not detract from Oyobe’s unambiguous disclosure that its vehicle also includes position detecting apparatus 108 that uses wireless communication to “sense that the vehicle is parked at the location where charging equipment is installed.” Id. ¶ 142. Oyobe’s ability to sense whether a vehicle is parked next to a charger allows Oyobe’s system to remind the user to charge the battery by raising low battery indicator 102 while the vehicle is located next to a charger but not “where charging cannot be performed.” Id. ¶¶ 143–145. Accordingly, regardless of the reason that Oyobe provides for including its vehicle position detecting apparatus, Oyobe undeniably describes a vehicle sensor that can provide “information indicative of a presence of an electric vehicle in a parking space” near a charging station. And, we find that Petitioner has sufficiently explained why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to use Oyobe’s sensor in Ferro’s electric vehicle to “advantageously allows a user to instruct charging without exiting the vehicle and physically interacting with a charging station.” Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–152).” slip op. at 20
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Third, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner violates Rule 42.6(a)(3) by improperly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to establish that Oyobe teaches sensing the presence of a vehicle in a “parking space” as recited in limitation 1e. Prelim. Resp. 42–43 (citing Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 178–181)). Patent Owner contends that Mr. Andrews’s citation of four references that are not expressly cited in the Petition, Exhibits 1018, 1053, 1057, and 1059, implicitly demonstrates that the Petition incorporates arguments by reference. Id. Not only do we find Petitioner’s reliance on Mr. Andrews’s testimony to be persuasive, but we also find that Mr. Andrews’s citations to Exhibits 1018, 1053, 1057, and 1059 provide strong support for his testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand that Oyobe teaches that its vehicle is in a parking space when Oyobe’s apparatus 108 detects that “the vehicle is parked” near charging equipment. Far from improperly incorporating arguments by reference, we find Mr. Andrews’s citation to objective evidence to support his opinions on how an ordinarily skilled artisan would read Oyobe’s disclosure to be preferred and highly persuasive.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,563,338 - Google LLC v. Ecofactor, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · May 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00097 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Hildebrand alone or with Shah.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner further identifies that Shah similarly teaches calculating operational efficiency values for an HVAC system and using these values “to monitor the integrity of the thermal system.” Id. at 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1006, 4:63–5:10). Petitioner matches these and other teachings in combination with Hildebrand to each of the limitations of claim 1. Id. at 17– 10:32–36, 11:59–61, 12:2–20, Fig. 1; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 61–140). Petitioner also provides an extensive discussion of the reasons to combine Shah with the system of Hildebrand, such as to avoid being limited, like Hildebrand, to comparisons of system efficiencies between time periods with the same outside temperature. Id. at 19; see also id. at 18–24. We have reviewed the Petition and supporting evidence and determine that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable over Hildebrand alone or in combination with Shah.3” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We construe the claims in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). No terms need to be expressly construed at this time.” slip op. at 5
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,835,394 - PTAB · Mar 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01239 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of all challenged claims, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Lefebvre and Chua.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aDenied
“The primary basis for Patent Owner’s argument is the fact that the ’111 patent has been subject to previous inter partes reviews filed by other parties.2 Id. at 14–19. A related fact—not fully addressed by Patent Owner—is that Patent Owner has staggered-in-time its suits alleging infringement of the ’111 patent against different parties. Patent Owner sued Cisco Systems in July 2022, but waited a year to separately file suit against Juniper Networks and Petitioner. IPR2023-00554, Ex. 1010; IPR2024- 00037, Paper 2. Patent Owner was not obligated to sue Petitioner at the same time that it sued Cisco Systems. Similarly, Petitioner was under no obligation to request to join Cisco System’s earlier filed inter partes review. See Prelim. Resp. 16. Rather, as acknowledged by Patent Owner, Petitioner waited to file the present inter partes review until the last day allowed under statute. Id. at 15, 17. Based on the circumstances before us, we do not agree with Patent Owner that it would be appropriate to enforce a deadline on Petitioner that is earlier than the deadline outlined by statute. See id. at 16.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner also provides an extensive discussion of the reasons to combine Chua with the system of Lefebvre, such as due “to Chua’s more detailed teachings regarding actions an SDN controller takes in response to information from security-related services like DPI.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 102); see also, e.g., id. at 24–26 (discussing reasons to combine). Petitioner also provides a detailed discussion of how the combined teachings of Lefebvre and Chua teach the method steps of claim 1. Id. at 32–39; see also Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 115–136. We have reviewed the Petition and supporting evidence and determine that the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 unpatentable over the combination of Lefebvre and Chua.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,652,111 - PTAB · Feb 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00996 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 13–18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. The art or arguments presented in the Petition are not “substantially the same” as those previously presented to the Office when there are differences between them that are material to the Office’s prior consideration of the art and arguments. Wolfspeed, Inc. v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., IPR2022-00761, Paper 13 at 7–8 (Vidal Mar. 30, 2023).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner contends that: [A] person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree or higher in electrical engineering, at least 3 years of experience designing or researching electronic circuits, and familiarity with power electronics and inductive power transfer circuits. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this preliminary response, Patent Owner adopts the Petitioner’s proposal.” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and “[h]ere, given the remarkable overlap between the preferred embodiment of the ’461 patent and the prior art/predictable combinations articulated in Grounds 1A–3, Petitioners submit that no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving the controversy in this proceeding.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner states that, “[t]o simplify the issues before the Board, Patent Owner has not asserted any claim constructions in this preliminary response and adopts the Petitioner’s position that ‘[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.’” Prelim. Resp. 17 (quoting Pet. 8). On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this preliminary stage of the proceeding, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Patent Owner does not cite to evidence, such as expert testimony, to support its implied argument that Olson’s measured current is “fundamentally different” from the current received by the primary coil. See Prelim. Resp. 31–32. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Woods, on the other hand, testifies, inter alia, that “[t]he ‘[c]urrent measured by current measure block 226 is used in the calculation of power, which as depicted in FIG. 14, measures the ‘power in’ provided to transmit block 214/primary coil 54.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 37 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 74–75, Fig. 14) (first alteration added); see also, e.g., id. ¶ 42 (Dr. Woods testifying that the measured current to the power supply “is the current driving the external antenna 52, via the transmit block 214 and to the primary coil 54.” (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 74–75, 112, Fig. 14)). Paragraph 75 of Olson, cited in support of that testimony, provides: “The power in is gauged by the power generated by charging unit 50 and is determined by multiplying the voltage of the internal voltage of charging unit 50, e.g., the voltage of a battery or batteries internal to charging unit 50, by the current driving external antenna 52.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 75 (emphasis added). We note that external antenna 52 includes primary coil 54. See, e.g., Fig. 14. Dr. Woods’ testimony is, at this stage, unrebutted. Patent Owner also argues that “Petitioner fails to provide any evidence regarding the function of Olson’s microprocessor 212 in relation to measuring input power,” and that, “[w]hile Olson describes a power calculation in paragraph [0075], Olson does not describe this power calculation as performed by microprocessor 212.” Prelim. Resp. 32 (citing Pet. 16; Ex. 1004 ¶ 72) (first alteration added). At this preliminary stage of the proceeding, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the microprocessor. Although Patent Owner does not bear the burden to show patentability, we observe that Patent Owner does not suggest that there is another component in Olson’s external charging device that might perform the admittedly-disclosed power calculation. See Prelim. Resp. 32–33. Dr. Woods testifies that microprocessor 212 receives the measured current and the input voltage of the charging device, and, from those values, calculates power in. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 71–78, Fig. 14); see also Ex. 1004 ¶ 74, Fig. 14 (Olson stating that “[c]urrent measured by current measure block 226 is used in the calculation of power in along with the voltage of batteries 160,” and Figure 14 depicting the signal from measure block 226 as an input to microprocessor 212). Dr. Woods’ testimony is, at this stage, unrebutted.” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,626,461 - PTAB · Feb 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00995 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 8, and 10–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. The art or arguments presented in the Petition are not “substantially the same” as those previously presented to the Office when there are differences between them that are material to the Office’s prior consideration of the art and arguments. Wolfspeed, Inc. v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., IPR2022-00761, Paper 13 at 7–8 (Vidal Mar. 30, 2023).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’204 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’204 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey–Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“different from the resonant frequency of the inductive couple.” Ex. 1001, 21:16–20. The Specification then states the following: “Preferably the transmission frequency is selected to lie within one of the near-linear regions 6, 8 [of Figure 6b] where the slope of the frequency-amplitude graph is less steep.” Id. at 21:20–23; see also id. at 21:56–59 (“Referring back to FIG. 6b, the frequency of transmission is selected to be in the approximately linear region 8 of the curve between a lower frequency value of fL and an upper frequency value of fU.”9); Pet. 8 (citing the same).” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,083,204 - PTAB · Jan 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01162 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 9–13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on claims 1 and 9 over Butler and Jianan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of challenged claims 1–7, 9–13, and 15. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner “does not challenge” Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, but “reserves the right to provide an alternative definition . . . if IPR is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes constructions for any claim terms. See Pet. 12; Prelim. Resp. 2. Based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“On the current record, Petitioner adequately explains the reasons to combine Butler with Jianan to arrive at the first two alternative devices. The discussion on the reasons to combine Butler and Jianan spans over nine pages of the Petition, with approximately twenty paragraphs of the Giachetti Declaration supporting that discussion. See Pet. 13–22; Giachetti Decl. ¶¶ 78–98. Patent Owner selects one statement from Petitioner’s discussion and asserts that that single statement is inadequate. Moreover, Patent Owner relies on mere conclusory attorney argument as to the alleged technical issues that would have been identified by one of ordinary skill in the art. See Elbit Sys., 881 F.3d at 1359. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to modify Butler and Jianan as proposed and that the articulated reasoning is supported by rational underpinning, at least as to the first two alternative devices (as discussed above).” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,903,546 - PTAB · Jan 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01151 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of challenged claims 1–18. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner “does not challenge” Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, but “reserves the right to provide an alternative definition . . . if IPR is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes constructions for any claim terms. See Pet. 13; Prelim. Resp. 2. Based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner adequately explains the reasons to combine Dimbylow and Howes. The discussion on these issues spans eight pages of the Petition, with approximately nine paragraphs of the Giachetti Declaration supporting that discussion. In contrast, Patent Owner relies on mere conclusory attorney argument as to the Petition’s alleged failings. See Elbit Sys., 881 F.3d at 1359. Moreover, the relied-upon prior art need not expressly teach or suggest the proposed combination and also need not identify modified components as a “problem.” See KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 418 (discussing how the obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ”). Second, Patent Owner argues that because Dimbylow discloses a hand vacuum and Howes discloses an upright vacuum with no attachable cleaning tool, “there is no evidence a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have looked to Howes to fill in alleged gaps in Dimbylow.” Prelim. Resp. 14–15. On the current record, this argument does not identify a deficiency in Petitioner’s position. As an initial matter, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why the overall form factor of the devices in the relied-upon prior art—i.e., a hand vacuum versus upright vacuum—would impact the motivation to combine when the aspects relied on from Howes relate more narrowly to structures allowing opening of dust collection units (a problem common to both hand vacuums and uprights). See, e.g., Pet. 18 (discussing why one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been particularly motivated to look at similar references (including cyclonic vacuum-cleaner references having the same assignee, Dyson) that teach mechanisms to release a similar component (door catch) on a similar device (dirt collection chamber) to accomplish a similar goal (hygienic and convenient bin emptying)” (citing Giachetti Decl. ¶ 84)); see also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481–82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming rejection of a laptop computer hinge as obvious over hinged cabinets, piano lids, etc., because the “problem is not unique to portable computers”). Patent Owner’s conclusory statement that “no evidence” has been presented does not address Petitioner’s positions.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,910,984
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.