• Klipsta Pty Ltd v. Lindsay AlbaneseSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00346 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 16 is unpatentable as obvious over the asserted grounds; claims 1–15, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would be a regular consumer/shopper with a rudimentary knowledge of the use of magnetic clips and a basic understanding of clip construction.” Pet. 13. We find that the ’047 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’047 patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

  • BurdenMixed

    “Petitioner’s mapping of the components of KR ’458’s fastening device is insufficient. Although Petitioner maps the center line of fastening member 115 to the recited second end, Petitioner fails to adequately map the recited first end of the second strap or explain why one of skill in the art would consider the second ferromagnetic member (convex member 117) to be disposed at the first end of the second strap as required by claim 1. that the first end is “upward to connector 117.” Pet. 24. This is not the end of the second strap. As discussed above, the end of the second strap wraps around rectangular ring 210 and is then secured to itself.7 Connector 117 is positioned below the true end of the strap, more in the middle of this segment of the strap. In other words, Petitioner arbitrarily defines the strap as only the portion of hat holder 110 between the center line and connector 117, in contradiction to what KR ’458 actually discloses. Nowhere does Petitioner explain why connector 117 is disposed at the first end of the second strap. Neither does Petitioner explain why we should disregard the true end of the strap, nor why one of skill in the art would consider only a middle portion of the strap to be the second strap. Thus, Petitioner has not satisfied its burden in this regard. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that KR ’458 discloses “a second strap having a first end and a second end, the second strap joined to the first strap,” with “a second ferromagnetic member disposed at the first end of the second strap.” For the foregoing reasons, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence does not support that claim 1 is anticipated by KR ’458.” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The ’047 patent discloses that in addition to being separate straps, the rear strap and the front strap “can be formed from a single piece of material.” Ex. 1001, 3:40–44, 5:24–32, 10:18–25. In particular, Figures 5A–5B of the ’047 patent illustrate rear strap 510 and front strap 520 as being “formed from a single piece of material that is folded approximately in half where a first half can be the rear strap 510 and a second half can be the front strap 520.” Id. at 10:18–21, Figs. 5A–5B. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges “[i]t should be noted that forming the first and second straps from a single piece of material is well within the scope of the claimed invention.” Ex. 1007, 5 (citing the ’047 patent at 3:37–44). Moreover, we note the positions taken by the parties are consistent with the fact that claim second strap are formed from a single folded strap.” Ex. 1001, 14:47–48. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s construction of “the second strap joined to the first strap” to include “a single piece of material.”” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” to include a “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object” is based on function, rather embodiments in the Specification of the ’047 patent. Although strap-style hook 340 of Figures 3A–3C is a flexible component rather than a more rigid component like hook 140 shown in Figures 1A–1C , both can be considered types of hooks. All of the embodiments, whether rigid or flexible, can be considered to have a hook-like structure when serving the function of attaching the hat holder to another object. Petitioner’s proposed construction would render the term “hook” meaningless, as various types of structures could be used to attach the hat holder to another object, that would not reasonably be considered to be a “hook.” For example, a snap, safety pin, ring, or button could be used to attach a hat holder to another object. Petitioner’s identification of different embodiments in the ’047 patent of hook-like structures does not show why one of skill in the art would consider almost any structure to be considered a “hook.” We, therefore, reject Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” as a “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object.” “wherein the first strap and the second strap are configured to retain a” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 10,413,047 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,413,047
• Weatherford U.S., L.P v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00990 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–12 and 14–20 are unpatentable; claims 1–10 and 21–23 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 29–37 are unpatentable, and the motion to amend is denied as to them.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of skill is uncontested. Patent Owner adopts the level of skill identified by Petitioner as: [at] the time of the alleged invention in 2018, a POSITA[2] would have had a B.S. degree in mechanical or petroleum engineering or a similar technical discipline, with at least five years of experience in oil or gas well drilling, completion, and/or subsurface production operations or in technical support of such operations including at least some experience in unconsolidated formations utilizing sand control methods and means. Also,” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “on embodiments of Yeh with concentric sand screens having nine shunt tubes (six transport tubes and three packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 4A–B) and eccentric sand screens with four shunt tubes (two transport tubes and two packing tubes) (Yeh Figures 8A, 8C). See Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Yet, Petitioner’s reasoning as to why “a higher-pressure shunt tube assembly necessitated greater wall thickness” rests on an unspoken one to one comparison between the shunt tubes of the different systems. See id.; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 291–297 (Petitioner’s declarant comparing possible transport tubes of different pressure regions without considering or addressing any difference in the number of transport tubes). However, the embodiments relied on by Petitioner have different numbers of shunt tubes, and thus the greater wall thickness does not appear to be “necessitated” in the way inferred by Petitioner. Further, Petitioner’s analysis would seem to be most appropriate when comparing two concentric sand screens for different pressure regions, or two eccentric sand screens for different pressure regions. relies on Yeh’s teachings related to a horizontal well bore of 5000 feet for the “concentric screen → crossover tool → eccentric screen” arrangement, as well as, for why the concentric screen needs to be rated for a high pressure. Pet. 32–37, 39, 41–43. Petitioner also refers to these features for why one of skill in the art would combine the teachings of Yeh and Yeh2. Id. at 32. However, on cross-examination, Petitioner’s declarant agreed that it is concentric sand screens having a 6x3 shunt tube design that would provide the noted benefits of being rated for a higher pressure and being more robust (as relied on in the Petition), as compared to eccentric sand screens. Ex. 2013, 42:20–43:8; Sur-reply 4–5. This also exposes another issue with Petitioner’s arguments. Though Petitioner identifies that one of skill in the art would be aware that material choice, wall thickness, and pipe diameter all impact burst pressure of a pipe (Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1017, 24 (Equation (14))), the Petition essentially ignores the fact that the claims do not require a single pipe in isolation. The claims require two shunt tube assemblies, each surrounding a base pipe within a wellbore. It is uncontested that a wellbore provides a confined space for such a system and thus any change in wall thickness of one pipe can result in a significant impact in the function of the other pipes. We find the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant (see, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 290–297) unpersuasive when discussing wall thickness because it focusses on basic considerations of a standalone pipe, without sufficient consideration of the claimed completion assembly with its required pipe and tube structure. PO Resp. 20–26.” slip op. at 17

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “In response to Patent Owner’s argument concerning Yeh’s embodiments relied on in the Petition, Petitioner argues for the first time that Patent Owner’s declarant “conceded, Yeh discloses that both concentric and 47:19–48:21). Petitioner does not provide a citation to Yeh or a citation to where the Petition relies on the same number of shunt tubes between concentric and eccentric screens. The deposition cited by Petitioner discusses Yeh at column 16, lines 26 through 35. However, the Petition does not cite or rely on these teachings of Yeh. Thus, we decline to consider this late argument.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring the petition to identify “with particularity . . . the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Yeh and Yeh2 teaches determining the shunt tube system operating pressures associated with the distal end of the production zone, but also more generally, determining the operating pressures along the entire production zone. With this knowledge of the system operating pressures, Petitioner argues that one of skill in the art would have selected eccentric screens for the distal end of the production zone “at any point at which the slurry pressure dropped below the pressure capacity of the eccentric screen shunt tubes.” Pet. 66 (citing Ex. 1005, 30:16–20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 388). In other words, knowing that the pressure decreases as you approach the toe, Yeh’s low-pressure rated eccentric screens could be used from some point prior to and covering the toe. determined pressure.” PO Resp. 37–38. We disagree. As discussed above, the record supports Petitioner’s position that one of skill in the art would have “understood the need to determine the shunt tube system operating pressure throughout the horizontal wellbore.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 383; see also Pet. 64–65. We find convincing Petitioner’s argument that one of skill with this understanding of the system pressures would select a shunt tube system rated to not only address the distal end, but also to address the needs of the adjacent region, so long as the pressure rating supported such a selection. See Pet. 65–67; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 385–388.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,333,007 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,333,007
• Recor Medical, Inc. / Otsuka Medical Devices Co., Ltd. v. Medtronic Ireland Manufacturing Unlimited Co.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 3, 2025 · IPR2022-00431 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1–3 and 8–12 are unpatentable over the instituted grounds; claim 4 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Federal Circuit (Paper 33), which vacated the original Final Written Decision and remanded the proceeding to the Board. See ReCor Med., Inc. v. Medtronic Ir. Mfg. Unlimited Co., No. 2023-2251, 2025 WL 944511 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) (“the Appeal Decision” or “Appeal Dec.”); see also Paper 41 (copy of the Appeal Decision). The Federal Circuit’s mandate issued on May 5, 2025. See Paper 40. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6, and we issue this Final Written Decision on Remand under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons below, on the complete record, we conclude that Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the unpatentability of claims 1–3 and 8–12 of the challenged patent, and we conclude that Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the unpatentability of claim 4.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia outweighedNot shown unpatentable

    “and Petitioner’s rebuttal evidence. Objective evidence of nonobviousness, when present, must be considered as part of an obviousness inquiry. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Notwithstanding what the teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art, the totality of the evidence submitted, including objective evidence of nonobviousness, may lead to a conclusion that one or more of the challenged claims would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984).” slip op. at 50

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “1. Claims 1–3 and 8–11 Because the obviousness ground based on Levin and Acker is dispositive as to challenged claims 1–3 and 8–11, we need not reach this additional ground as to those claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018) (holding that a petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”); Boston Sci. Scimed, analysis in the appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Appeal Dec. *1–*2 (summarizing grounds at issue on appeal and not discussing anticipation based on Acker). Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (stating that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding,” such as “alternative arguments with respect to claims [the Board] found unpatentable on other grounds”); SK Hynix Inc. v. Netlist, Inc., IPR2017-00692, Paper 25 at 40 (PTAB July 5, 2018) (determining all challenged claims to be unpatentable and not addressing additional grounds). 2. Dependent Claim 4 As to dependent claim 4, in the context of this ground, Petitioner relies on Acker as to the additional limitations in claim 4 in the same manner as relied on in the context of the ground based on Levin and Acker. See Pet. 73 (“The combination teaches this element for the same reasons described in [the obviousness ground based on Levin and Acker], claim 4, with the exception that [one of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated based on his or her knowledge of prior renal denervation work, as noted above.”). Thus, for the same reasons discussed above (see § II.C.3.c), we determine, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 4 would have been obvious based on Acker and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. G. Asserted Obviousness of Claim 12 Based on Acker, the Knowledge of a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art, and Yock Petitioner asserts that claim 12, which depends from independent claim 1, would have been obvious based on Acker, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and Yock. Pet. 12, 75; Pet. Reply 35–36. Patent Owner provides arguments addressing this ground. PO Resp. 57–60; PO” slip op. at 75

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1. Independent Claim 1 Petitioner contends that Acker discloses each limitation of claim 1. Pet. 61–63; Pet. Reply 35. In the “Overview of the Ground” section, Petitioner references its proposed construction of the phrase “configured to” and states that “it is proper to consider whether the prior art is ‘capable of’ performing the recited functions, as opposed to requiring that a designer of a prior art device have actually conceived of the recited functional language.” Pet. 61. Petitioner continues: “If the PTAB agrees that this is the proper approach to claim construction, then Acker also anticipates the claims challenged in this ground.” Id. For the reasons below, we determine, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by Acker. As to element 1d, which includes the phrase “configured to,”16 Petitioner states that Acker is capable of being used to target renal neural fibers outside of the blood vessel to thermally induce modulation of target neural fibers while protecting non-target tissue in the blood vessel wall from thermal injury for the reasons discussed under claim 1, limitation [1d] and in the section entitled “Reasonable Expectation of Success”, beginning on page 37 [of the Petition]. Pet. 62–63 (citing Daft Pet. Decl. ¶ 179) (first bracketed text added by Petitioner). Patent Owner argues that, in the context of this asserted ground based” slip op. at 71

  Patent outcomesUS 8,845,629 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,845,629
• Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00545 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–15, 17, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Neiss or Neiss and Hirasago; claims 7 and 16 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, mechanical engineering (including automotive engineering), civil engineering (transportation systems), physics, or a related field, and at least four years of experience (or the academic equivalent) in the field of transportation systems.” Pet. 2–3. Petitioner contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and vice versa.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1–19, 24–26; Ex. 1004). Patent Owner “does not dispute” Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. We find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s interpretation of column 13, lines 40–44 of the ’161 patent to mean that a route may not have both an ending position or an intermediate position, but will have at least one of these positions. See PO Resp. 21. Patent Owner interprets “typically” in “[t]he route used by the power management device typically includes a starting position . . . , an ending position, . . . , and any intermediate positions between the initial and the final positions” to apply to either “an ending position” or “any intermediate positions” (that is, an intermediate destination) but not to both. We see no grammatical reason to limit “typically” in this manner. Rather, the plain meaning of the quoted sentence suggests that, although not typical, a route may not contain an ending position, be that a final position or an intermediate position.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained adequately how a driver’s previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Rather than explaining how the Schramm-Clapper system would sum efficient speeds, Petitioner merely asserts that “the set speeds for the energy-optimum route’s segments correspond to a plurality of efficient speeds.” Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, makes substantially the same assertion. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 263. But neither Petitioner nor its witness explains adequately how a previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Patent Owner presents persuasive arguments as to why these speeds are not efficient. See PO Resp. 32–33 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 198–204, 208–214). Patent Owner’s contentions are supported by Dr. Hoff’s testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 211–218. Stated differently, although Petitioner explains how the Schramm-Clapper system would select the best summation of calculated energy values required to travel at selected speeds from among Schramm’s routes, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how the selected speeds are efficient speeds. For the foregoing reasons, on this record, Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 or its dependent claims 3 and 6–9 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Schramm and Clapper. Petitioner relies on the same contentions regarding the identical language recited in independent claim 10 (see Pet. 93), and so, for the same reasons, has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 10 or its dependent claims 12, 13, and 15–18 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Schramm and Clapper.” slip op. at 36

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained adequately how a driver’s previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Rather than explaining how the Schramm-Clapper system would sum efficient speeds, Petitioner merely asserts that “the set speeds for the energy-optimum route’s segments correspond to a plurality of efficient speeds.” Pet. 78 (emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Papanikolopoulos, makes substantially the same assertion. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 263. But neither Petitioner nor its witness explains adequately how a previously driven speed or the speed limit is an efficient speed. Patent Owner presents persuasive arguments as to why these speeds are not efficient. See PO Resp. 32–33 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 198–204, 208–214). Patent Owner’s contentions are supported by Dr. Hoff’s testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 211–218. Stated differently, although Petitioner explains how the Schramm-Clapper system would select the best summation of calculated energy values required to travel at selected speeds from among Schramm’s routes, Petitioner has not explained sufficiently how the selected speeds are efficient speeds.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 8,972,161 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,972,161
• Tesla, Inc. v. Iqar Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00543 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8 and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Newstrom’s database was not shown to be remote.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Dr. Morellas’s proposed definition or proffer a definition of its own. See generally PO Resp.; see also Ex. 2007 ¶ 43 (setting forth a substantially similar definition as Dr. Morellas). We find Dr. Morellas’s unopposed definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s assertion that claim 1 requires that a route from the vehicle’s current position to a final destination must be known. See PO Resp. 7. Initially, claim 1 does not recite “destination.” Instead, claim 1 recites only “determining a segment of a vehicle route.” Ex. 1001, 27:44 (emphasis added). Nor does the ’399 patent specification require the interpretation proffered by Patent Owner. Notably, the ’399 patent discloses that the power management device may rely on historical route information to optimize the energy used to travel each segment of a route. Ex. 1001, 17:39–43, 17:64–67. Such reliance on historical data beneficially reduces the amount of required computing power. Id. at 18:5–9. Under this approach, “the location of the vehicle is periodically determined” and “used to determine[] a historical segment corresponding to the current location.” Id. at 18:30–33 (emphasis added). If the vehicle has moved into a new route segment, the historical data is queried to determine the most efficient speed to travel for the current segment. Id. at 18:39–56. Thus, the ’399 patent explicitly discloses calculating and applying power to a vehicle based on the route segment in which the vehicle is currently traveling. See id. at 18:64–67 (“The flowchart shown in FIG. 5 illustrates a continuous process, in which the power management device can determine a probable optimal speed as the current segment changes (e.g., as the vehicle moves).”), Fig. 5. Furthermore, the ’399 patent explains that “[t]he route used by the power management device typically includes a starting position . . . , an ending position, . . . , and any intermediate positions between the initial and the final positions.” Id. at 14:6–10 (emphasis added). Notably, the ’399 patent sometimes refers to the “entire route,” indicating that use of “route” in the claims does not necessarily mean the entire route. Indeed, the ’399 patent explains that, “[i]n some variations, the entire route (or the entire predicted route) may be divided up into N segments” and “[i]n some variations, probable optimal speeds may be identified for the entire route.” Ex. 1001, 14:38–39, 19:1–2 (emphases added). This strongly suggests that, in some other variations, the entire route is not divided into segments and optimal speeds are not identified for the entire route, further indicating that the recited “route” is not the entire path the vehicle will take. Therefore, we find that the ’399 patent contemplates routes that, although not typical, do not include an ending position. Moreover, to the extent a destination is required, the ’399 patent discloses that the destination can be derived based on the vehicle’s location or driving history, and there can be multiple “likely destinations” and the system can “continuously infer the vehicle’s destination” and the probable destination “may constantly change to revise the destination” while the vehicle is traveling along the route. Ex. 1001, 12:16–59. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, neither the claim language nor the specification of the ’399 patent requires the route be predetermined or extend from the vehicle’s current position to a final destination.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “have been obvious in view of Hongo, Obradovich, and Niki. Pet. 4–62. In support of its showing, Petitioner relies upon the Morellas Declaration. Id. (citing Ex. 1003). We have reviewed the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record and determine that, for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9–12, 15, 16, 19, and 20 would have been obvious in view of Hongo, Obradovich, and Niki and that Petitioner has set forth reasoning with rational underpinning why it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of these references.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “limiting, Hongo and Niki support Petitioner’s contentions. We determine that Petitioner sets forth reasoning with rational underpinning as to why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Hongo and Niki. See, e.g., Pet. 21–23 (arguing that the modification “would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success” and “Niki’s teachings and/or suggestions improve vehicle control in the Hongo vehicle”).” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 10,882,399 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,882,399
• Apple Inc. v. Masimo CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00290 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 11–17, 21, 22, 27, 28, 32, 34, 36, 37, and 42–44 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 18–20 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In our Institution Decision, we deemed the differences in the parties’ proposals not material due to their substantial overlap, adopted Patent Owner’s proposal for purposes of that Decision, noted that the outcome of the Decision would not change if we adopted Petitioner’s proposal, and instructed the parties to “explain the differences and their relevance to the patentability issues in this case, and state whether any issue in the case turns on those differences” if either party continued to propose differing proposals during trial. Inst. Dec. 10–11. After institution, neither party has explained the materiality of the differences in their proposals or argued that any issues in this case turn on those differences. Based on our review of the parties’ proposals, we find Patent Owner’s proposal consistent with the level of skill exemplified by the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’223 patent. Accordingly, we apply Patent Owner’s proposal in our analysis in this Decision. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (“[T]he prior art itself” may reflect an appropriate level of the ordinary level of skill in the art. (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). The outcome of this Decision would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “persuasive and reject Patent Owner’s argument that we should construe the limitation as requiring the absence of one parameter from the display prior to the replacement and the absence of the other parameter after the replacement. We do not view either requirement proposed by Patent Owner as justified based on our review of the claims, specification, and prosecution history.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Naghavi, Hochstedler, and Burnes discloses all of the limitations of claim 1 and that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the references in the manner Petitioner proposes with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 9–30. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Naghavi, Hochstedler, and Burnes.” slip op. at 58

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “proposed combination based on the argument that a POSITA would have been motivated to switch the layout responsive to a parameter value changing. Pet. 11–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 35–40, 47–52). For example, we agree with Petitioner that a motivation exists to change the layouts to “best suit the condition of [the] patient” because Naghavi expressly describes an “interactive and dynamic” GUI that “may automatically detect changes in health status . . . and automatically react and rearrange the available options to best suit the condition” of the patient. Ex. 1005 ¶ 63. The supporting expert testimony persuasively relies on this aspect of Naghavi when concluding that “such a change in the severity of a parameter can indicate a change in the patient’s health that may require close monitoring” and a POSITA “would have been motivated to implement this approach of the combination in order to achieve” Naghavi’s objectives. Ex. 1003 ¶ 48 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 63); see also Pet. Reply 23 (“[T]he rearrangement of parameters, as already suggested by Naghavi and implemented according to Hochstedler, advantageously ensures an easy-to-use user interface, e.g., by highlighting information that has changed to warrant user attention.” (citing Pet. 13–14; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 42–43)); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 42–43.” slip op. at 51

  Patent outcomesUS 8,190,223 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,190,223
• Apple Inc. v. Masimo CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00290 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 11–17, 19, 21, 22, 27, 28, 32, 34, 36, 37, and 42–44 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4, 18, and 20 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In our Institution Decision, we deemed the differences in the parties’ proposals not material due to their substantial overlap, adopted Patent Owner’s proposal for purposes of that Decision, noted that the outcome of the Decision would not change if we adopted Petitioner’s proposal, and instructed the parties to “explain the differences and their relevance to the patentability issues in this case, and state whether any issue in the case turns on those differences” if either party continued to propose differing proposals during trial. Inst. Dec. 10–11. After institution, neither party has explained the materiality of the differences in their proposals or argued that any issues in this case turn on those differences. Based on our review of the parties’ proposals, we find Patent Owner’s proposal consistent with the level of skill exemplified by the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’223 patent. Accordingly, we apply Patent Owner’s proposal in our analysis in this Decision. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (“[T]he prior art itself” may reflect an appropriate level of the ordinary level of skill in the art. (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). The outcome of this Decision would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for petitioner
  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “preponderance of the evidence that the combination of Naghavi, Hochstedler, and Burnes discloses all of the limitations in claim 1. b. Motivation to Combine After summarizing its proposed combination, Petitioner provides a number of reasons for combining the references. Pet. 9–17. Petitioner breaks its motivation to combine arguments into three separate categories that we address below. See id. at 13–17. Patent Owner raises a number of arguments in support of its contention that “a POSITA would not have been motivated to combine the references to replace a measured value of one parameter with the measured value of another parameter,” which we address in the context of Petitioner’s arguments below. See PO Resp. 44–57. Many of Patent Owner’s arguments rely on Patent Owner’s proposed claim constructions for “replaced” and “measured value,” which we do not adopt for the reasons discussed above. For example, the first sentence in Patent Owner’s argument contends that “Naghavi, Hochstedler and Burnes do not disclose using the same screen area to display two currently measured parameters,” but we do not read the claims as requiring the display of “two currently measured parameters” consistent with Patent Owner’s construction for “measured values.” See id. at 44 (citing Ex. 2042 ¶ 125). Such arguments lack weight given that we have rejected their premise, and although Patent Owner’s arguments are suffused with references to its claim constructions, we attempt to identify where Patent Owner does not rely on those constructions in our analysis below.” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 8,190,223 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,190,223
• Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00034 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 and 17–20 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 14–16 are not shown unpatentable because the cited art does not teach logic configured to determine concurrent failure probability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We decline to adopt Patent Owner’s implicit construction that would require “selecting an entity pair from” all of the entity pairs of “said plurality of transport entities.” Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments addressing the claim language, the plain language of claim 1 does not require the selection to be from all of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined. The plain language of claim 1 also does not preclude the selection to be from a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined. Rather, dependent claim 9, through its dependence on claims 1 and 4, explicitly allows for the selection to be from a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities. Patent Owner’s arguments advocate for the importation of limitations from the ’821 Patent Specification into the claim––namely the disclosure that all entity pairs of transport entities examined in step 220 of Figure 2 are input to the entity pair selection step 230. See PO Sur-reply 4. It is well settled that it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. Accordingly, we construe “selecting an entity pair from said plurality of transport entities based at least upon said overall cost” according to its plain meaning, the scope of which includes selecting an entity pair from all or a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not construe “working entity” and “protection entity” in order to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Other Claim Terms and Phrases As demonstrated in our analysis below, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve the controversy before us. See, e.g., Realtime, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Patent Owner Response.” PO Resp. 25. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is supported by declaration testimony and is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’821 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the entire record and after having considered Petitioner’s citations to Doshi, Guichard, and Dr. Houh’s testimony (Ex. 1003) as well as Patent Owner’s citations to Doshi, Guichard and Mr. Gomez’s testimony, we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Doshi with Guichard’s teachings of reoptimization of a LSP path triggered by an network change. See Pet. 20–22, 40–45; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he results of the combination would have been predictable and there would have been a reasonable expectation of success since Doshi and Guichard both address the same technology.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65). According to Petitioner, “a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in reoptimizing Doshi’s LSP pair selection because Guichard provides significant implementation details, including when to trigger reoptimization evaluations and how to ‘avoid network instabilities.’” Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1006, 5). Petitioner asserts that a reasonable expectation of success is evidenced by other skilled artisans that reoptimized similar systems. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1009, 136; Ex. 1010, 1; Ex. 1023, 34; Ex. 1034 ¶¶ 27–33, claim 19; Ex. 1035 ¶ 24). In support, Petitioner contends that “the combination would be within a POSITA’s skillset since Doshi already sets forth the calculation and selection techniques that would be utilized during the reoptimization evaluation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65). According to Petitioner, “since Doshi is already ‘monitoring and updating . . . network topology’ . . . event-based reoptimization evaluation per Guichard, would be directly applicable.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 270–281).” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 8,830,821 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,830,821
• Cisco Systems, Inc. / Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 22, 2024 · IPR2023-00402 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 and 17–20 are unpatentable over the Doshi and Guichard grounds; claims 14–16 were not shown unpatentable over Doshi, Guichard, and Xu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “require “selecting an entity pair from” all of the entity pairs of “said plurality of transport entities.” Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments addressing the claim language, the plain language of claim 1 does not require the selection to be from all of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined. The plain language of claim 1 also does not preclude the selection to be from a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined. Rather, dependent claim 9, through its dependence on claims 1 and 4, explicitly allows for the selection to be from a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities. Patent Owner’s arguments advocate for the importation of limitations from the ’821 Patent Specification into the claim––namely the disclosure that all entity pairs of transport entities examined in step 220 of Figure 2 are input to the entity pair selection step 230. See PO Sur-reply 4. It is well settled that it is improper to read an extraneous limitation into a claim from the specification. See e.g., Commark Comm’s Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). An extraneous limitation is “a limitation read into a claim from the specification wholly apart from any need to interpret what the patentee meant by particular words or phrases in the claim.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 849 F.2d at 1433. Accordingly, we construe “selecting an entity pair from said plurality of transport entities based at least upon said overall cost” according to its plain meaning, the scope of which includes selecting an entity pair from all or a subset of the entity pairs of the plurality of transport entities for which an overall cost has been determined.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not construe “working entity” and “protection entity” in order to resolve the controversy before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Other Claim Terms and Phrases As demonstrated in our analysis below, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve the controversy before us. See, e.g., Realtime, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill for purposes of this Patent Owner Response.” PO Resp. 25. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is supported by declaration testimony and is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’821 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the entire record and after having considered Petitioner’s citations to Doshi, Guichard, and Dr. Houh’s testimony (Ex. 1003) as well as Patent Owner’s citations to Doshi, Guichard and Mr. Gomez’s testimony, we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Doshi with Guichard’s teachings of reoptimization of a LSP path triggered by an network change. See Pet. 20–22, 40–45; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner asserts that “[t]he results of the combination would have been predictable and there would have been a reasonable expectation of success since Doshi and Guichard both address the same technology.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65). According to Petitioner, “a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in reoptimizing Doshi’s LSP pair selection because Guichard provides significant implementation details, including when to trigger reoptimization evaluations and how to ‘avoid network instabilities.’” Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1006, 5). Petitioner asserts that a reasonable expectation of success is evidenced by other skilled artisans that reoptimized similar systems. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1009, 136; Ex. 1010, 1; Ex. 1023, 34; Ex. 1034 ¶¶ 27–33, claim 19; Ex. 1035 ¶ 24). In support, Petitioner contends that “the combination would be within a POSITA’s skillset since Doshi already sets forth the calculation and selection techniques that would be utilized during the reoptimization evaluation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65). According to Petitioner, “since Doshi is already ‘monitoring and updating . . . network topology’ . . . event-based reoptimization evaluation per Guichard, would be directly applicable.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–65; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 270–281).” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 8,830,821 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,830,821
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Orckit CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2024 · IPR2023-00714 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–16, 18–22, and 24–26 are unpatentable as obvious over Vink and Patrick, with or without AAPA; claims 6, 17, and 23 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent training, or approximately two years of experience working in the field of information technology and networking . . . . Lack of professional experience can be substituted by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–60). “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 19. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions addressed in the ’904 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner argues “that ‘subscriber lines’ should be construed as ‘communication lines to users of subscription-based network services.’” Id. Petitioner does not dispute this construction directly, but rather argues that no construction is necessary. Reply 6. We determine that no terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Here however, we have found that it was known to connect LANs to external networks. See Ex. 1014, 6:23–28, Fig. 1; Ex. 1015, 1:6–9; Ex. 1016, 1:22–25; Ex. 1017, 1:7–11. We further agree with Petitioner’s uncontested point that “[t]echniques to further allow the communication system to access external networks by connecting the master to an external network were well-known in the art, as evidenced by Patrick and/or AAPA.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–88). The Petition focusses on combining the “communication systems” of Vink, Patrick and/or AAPA, as opposed to relying on a particular type of LAN. Thus, in contrast to Forest Lab’ys, we determine that the general or “generic” benefit of providing “access to a wider array of information,” where it was already known to provide external network access (e.g., the internet) to LANs,5 does provide a motivation to combine Vink and Patrick, with or without AAPA. See Intel Corp. v. Pact XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“There is a motivation to combine when a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.’” (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 417)).” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner also argues that Vink “teaches against” hierarchical addressing because “doing so would eliminate the purported advantages associated with using a non-hierarchical system.” PO Resp. 36 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 69 (Patent Owner’s declarant making the same statement)). Patent Owner does not further discuss the reasoning behind this statement, identify the “purported advantages,” or even identify the relevant disclosure relied on in Vink. We decline to speculate as to Patent Owner’s position in this regard. We further note that “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 6,680,904 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,680,904

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.