• AT&T Services Inc. / T-Mobile USA, Inc. et al. v. Innovative Sonic Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00991 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted anticipation or obviousness ground for claims 1–11.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner responds that “a person with the 3-year experience proposed by Petitioner would not have the intimate knowledge of the existing standardized cellular system” required to understand “how a proposed change would impact the rest of the system.” Prelim. Resp. 7. But Patent Owner also states that engineers participating in the development of the relevant cellular specifications “would not be expected to be familiar with all relevant aspects of the specifications” given their length and complexity. Id. at 7–8. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above, because we are satisfied that it generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’883 patent and the asserted prior art. To the extent Patent Owner disagrees (see Prelim. Resp. 6–8), it fails to sufficiently explain its contrary position by, for example, providing its own proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner states that “the Board does not need to expressly construe any terms” in this proceeding because “the prior art in this Petition discloses all limitations under any plausible construction.” Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner similarly states that “all terms are entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning.” Prelim. Resp. 21. We agree with the parties that it is not necessary to construe any claim terms or phrases in this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe only those terms that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”) (cleaned up).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “(step 406) discloses the claimed “second request” (Pet. 44–45),9 but Petitioner fails to show that this message discloses a request. See Prelim. Resp. 46–48. Han explains that the dual connection setup response in step 406 is a “dual connection setup request acknowledge (ACK)” message sent in response to “dual connection setup request” received in step 404. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 40–42; accord Pet. 42–44. An acknowledgement is not a request, and Petitioner fails to sufficiently support its contention to the contrary (see Pet. 44–45). According to Petitioner, the acknowledgement message is “a request to change a data path” because the data path is “change[d] . . . based on this message” (id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 42–47; Ex. 1003 ¶ 202)); however, this is faulty reasoning. At most, Petitioner’s argument shows that the acknowledgement is a message “to change a data 9 We note that this is the same message relied upon by Petitioner to teach the claimed “accept message” recited earlier in claim 1. Compare Pet. 44– 45, with id. at 43–44. We need not (and do not) decide whether Petitioner has sufficiently shown that this message discloses two separate claim elements. path,” not that it is a request to do so. In other words, even if Han’s acknowledgement message (in step 406) is a condition precedent to changing the data path, this does not make the message a “request.” Although Dr. Mahon agrees with Petitioner, his analysis mirrors Petitioner’s arguments and suffers from the same deficiencies. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 202– 203; see also Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An expert’s conclusory testimony, unsupported by the documentary evidence, cannot supplant the requirement of anticipatory disclosure in the prior art reference itself.”).” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,736,883
• Alertus Technologies, LLC v. Desktop Alert, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00363 · APJ Andrew L Nalven · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–13 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Although claims 1 and 10 recite slightly different language, both clearly recite a “first triggering step” that precedes two subsequent polling steps. In the case of claim 1, the “first triggering step” precedes the “second step” and “fifth step.” See id. The explicit use of “second” and “fifth” supports limiting the steps to the recited order. See Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A] claim requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires an order of steps.” (cleaned up)).” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) “would have (i) a bachelor’s degree or equivalent in electrical engineering, computer engineering, network engineering, computer science, and/or a related field and (ii) 1-3 years of experience relating to computer and networking systems and/or methods including systems and methods for messaging.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 25–26). Patent Owner does not offer a position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, which appears consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and asserted prior art.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “with Patent Owner that Dillon discloses time-stamps as “alternatives.” Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:36–41). Dillon explains that “[t]he time-stamp . . . may represent the status of the subscriber’s e-mail account in various ways . . . [m]ost commonly, it is an indication of an actual time.” Ex. 1005, 7:19–21. However, Dillon explicitly states that “[a]lternatively, a time-stamp may be a number, such as a version number . . . or it may be a binary indication of whether or not e-mail . . . has been received.” Id. at 7:23–28 (emphasis added). Petitioner has not identified any portion of Dillon that suggests using more than one type of time-stamp in the same process. See generally Pet. 30–36. Dillon’s lack of disclosure of using multiple time-stamps appears consistent with Dillon’s description of the time-stamp as providing “the status of the subscriber’s e-mail account.” Ex. 1005, 7:19–21. Each disclosed alternative — time, version number, or binary indication — provides status information for the same purpose, namely, to indicate “whether or not e-mail for the given e-mail alert service subscriber has been received by the e-mail server 12 at any given time.” Id. at 7:27–29, 9:7–17. Because each of Dillon’s alternatives for a time-stamp serves the same purpose, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Dillon to both add a new polling step requesting a first time-stamp as a Boolean time-stamp and then request a second time-stamp as a version number or time indication. Indeed, Petitioner’s asserted rationale to modify Dillon here is conclusory and fails to explain sufficiently how using a second time-stamp will achieve the asserted benefits of reducing messaging bandwidth or uniquely identifying a particular message. See Pet. 31. Because Dr. Mangione-Smith’s declaration testimony mirrors Petitioner’s argument, his supporting testimony is similarly insufficient. Compare Pet. 31, with Ex. 1003 ¶ 62. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “the Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations”).” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,172,765
• Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00398 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Dill, Vadhri, and Akashika because Dill was not shown to disclose the claimed Integration Tier Limitation.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed formulation of ordinary skill in the art as set forth above, because we are satisfied this formulation generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’196 patent and the asserted prior art. We do not adopt Patent Owner’s annotation to Petitioner’s formulation as requiring knowledge of “mobile wallets” specifically, because we determine knowledge of “mobile payment systems and techniques” per Petitioner’s formulation is tied sufficiently to the claims of the ’196 patent to reflect the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. At the same time, even if we were to include knowledge of “mobile wallets” in our formulation, it would not materially change our Decision as set forth below. That is, we would still determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Dill discloses the Integration Tier Limitation.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyNot reached

    “We need not resolve the parties’ dispute as to whether Dr. Houh qualifies as an ordinarily skilled artisan. Even assuming that Dr. Houh possesses, at a minimum, ordinary skill in the art—as we have done in this Decision—we determine Petitioner still fails to show that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “The Integration Tier Limitation requires no further construction for purposes of this proceeding. See Pet. Reply 7 (“[N]o specific construction is required.”). The claim clearly specifies that the claimed “web services communication mechanisms” must serve as an interface between the integration tier and (1) the claimed mobile wallet application and, separately, (2) “a plurality of different device types over a plurality of different communication channels.” For purposes of this Decision, we assume that this interface may be direct or indirect. See id. at 6 (asserting that “communication channels that interface, even indirectly, with the ‘web services communication mechanisms’ still interface with the ‘web services communication mechanisms’”).” slip op. at 28

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “However, we find that of those four channels (1)–(4), only the first channel (1) is associated with web interface 137 such that it qualifies as a “communication channel,” as required by claim 1. There is no indication in the Dill disclosures cited by Petitioner that any of the other three channels (2)–(4) are associated with web interface 137. For example, Figure 9 of Dill includes a double-headed arrow to illustrate communication between web interface 137 and transfer options module 145, but Figure 9 does not include any arrows to illustrate communication between web interface 137 and any one or more of IVR interface 136, other interfaces 138, agent system 135, or mobile network 115. See Ex. 1005, Fig. 9. In other words, Petitioner fails to show Dill teaches web interface 137 interfaces with any devices over any of channels (2)–(4), as would be required by Petitioner’s mapping. In the Petition, Petitioner never clearly (or persuasively) addresses this requirement of the claim. Petitioner does contend that transfer options module 145 is coupled to various devices via interfaces 136–138 and exchanges transaction information (see Pet. 25–26; see also Pet. Reply 10– 11), but that contention misses the mark. The salient question is whether Dill’s web interface 137 (i.e., the claimed “web services communication mechanisms”) interfaces with the different device types over the channels, not whether transfer options module 145 (i.e., the claimed “integration tier”) does so.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 10,438,196 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,438,196
• Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00399 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Dill, Vadhri, and Akashika because Dill did not teach or render obvious the hardware SIM card and integration tier limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Institution Decision, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of work experience in software development with a basic knowledge of accounting” and “working knowledge of mobile payment systems and techniques,” as Petitioner proposes. Inst. Dec. 9 (quoting Pet. 3–4). We stated that “this definition generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’488 patent and the asserted prior art.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22; Ex. 2001 ¶ 35).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedMixed

    “In addition, Petitioner’s reliance on Dr. Houh’s testimony (see Pet. 23–24) is unavailing. Although Dr. Houh agrees with the arguments in the Petition and includes quotes from the cited portions of Dill and Bykov (see Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 95–97), he provides no additional analysis or explanation beyond what was provided in the Petition. As a result, his testimony suffers the same deficiencies as the Petition. Also, we do not credit his conclusion that Dill includes the requisite disclosure (see id. ¶ 97) because he fails to provide sufficient supporting explanation or evidence (see 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)). Finally, we note that Petitioner misrepresents Dr. Shamos’s testimony by stating that Dr. Shamos “agrees that if a mobile device executes a mobile wallet over a cellular network, the mobile device has a SIM card for the mobile wallet.” Pet. Reply 22 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1022, 29:4–7, 40:9–10). In the cited testimony, Dr. Shamos agrees that mobile devices have SIM cards, but he does not address where a mobile wallet application would be installed. Ex. 1022, 29:4–7, 40:9–10. Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, we determine that Dr. Shamos’s testimony does not support Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 27

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “for the term “hardware SIM card” because the important points are undisputed. In particular, the parties agree that a “hardware SIM card” is a SIM card implemented in hardware rather than software. See Pet. Reply 9 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶ 36); Tr. 40:25–41:2 (Patent Owner’s counsel explaining that the language in its proposed construction was “to differentiate it from a software SIM card”); see also PO Resp. 16, 19 (asserting that the term refers to a specific type of hardware, namely a “chip” or a “smart card”) (citing Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 32–33). The parties also agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have known that a “SIM card” is a component in a mobile device involved in identifying and authenticating a user to a mobile network. See Tr. 30:23–31:3 (Petitioner’s counsel stating “a SIM card, just as known in the art . . . would allow the user to be able to access the mobile network” 10 Each page in Exhibit 2021 includes at least two page numbers. For clarity, we refer to the page number of the exhibit (shown in the bottom right corner), and we have adjusted Patent Owner’s citation accordingly. given “the user’s identification information on it”), 39:24–40:2 (Patent Owner’s counsel stating that “I think everyone is in agreement that the critical aspect of what makes a SIM card a SIM card is that it can authenticate a mobile device to a wireless network”). The evidence supports the parties’ understanding. The word “SIM” is an acronym for “subscriber identity module” (see, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:58–67; Ex. 2021, 5), and the record shows that a SIM is a specific component in a mobile device that is involved in identifying and authenticating a user to a mobile network (see Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 30–31; see also e.g., Ex. 2021, 7 (stating that a SIM’s “primary function” is “to authenticate the subscriber to the network”); Ex. 2025, 3 (describing the SIM)).11 Consequently, we determine that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood a “hardware SIM card” to be a hardware component in a mobile device that is involved in identifying and authenticating a user to a mobile network. We do not need to further construe the term, or determine whether the additional requirements proposed by Patent Owner are appropriate, because Petitioner fails to show that the prior art teaches or suggests the claimed “hardware SIM card,” as explained below. See infra § II.D.2.a (analyzing the parties’ substantive contentions).” slip op. at 13

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dill discloses “a mobile wallet application installed on a hardware SIM card,” as required by element 1.3B. See Pet. 23–24. In particular, even assuming that Dill teaches installing a mobile wallet application somewhere on a mobile device (see Pet. 23),14 Dill does not teach installing it on a hardware SIM card,15 as specifically required by the claim. Petitioner relies upon paragraph 106 of Dill (see Pet. 23), but that paragraph does not disclose this claim limitation (see Ex. 1005 ¶ 106). In relevant part, that paragraph of Dill simply states: 14 Patent Owner disagrees with this premise, arguing that Dill does not disclose a mobile device that includes a mobile wallet application. See PO Resp. 52–56. We need not resolve that dispute because, even assuming Petitioner’s premise (as we have done in this Decision), Petitioner still fails to show that the claims are unpatentable. 15 As noted above, a “hardware SIM card” is a hardware component in a mobile device that is involved in identifying and authenticating a user to a mobile network. See supra § II.C.1 (addressing meaning of term). It should also be appreciated that the methods described above may be performed by hardware components or may be embodied in sequences of machine-executable instructions, which may be used to cause a machine such as a general-purpose or special-purpose processor or logic circuits programmed with the instructions to perform the methods. These machine-executable instructions may be stored on one or more machine readable mediums, such as CD-ROMs or other type of optical disks, floppy diskettes, ROMs, RAMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, magnetic or optical cards, flash memory, or other types of machine-readable mediums suitable for storing electronic instructions. Alternatively, the methods may be performed by a combination of hardware and software. Ex. 1005 ¶ 106 (emphases added). This teaches storing instructions on “other types of machine-readable mediums,” but it fails to teach storing instructions on a hardware SIM card, much less storing Dill’s mobile wallet application there. In short, Dill is silent with respect to this issue, and silence is not disclosure. Notably, Petitioner does not contend (or show) that a mobile wallet application installed on a mobile device would necessarily be installed on a hardware SIM card. See Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 95–97. Indeed, the record indicates that a mobile wallet application installed on a mobile device could instead be installed on a different component. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 7:1–3, 9:33–35 (identifying device memory as alternate component); Ex. 2021, 5 (describing SIM as the “smaller of two computer chips inside a GSM mobile handset”); cf. Pet. Reply 9 (distinguishing between hardware SIM cards and software ones). Thus, Petitioner fails to show that this claim limitation is inherent in Dill. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that inherency requires a showing that “the limitation at issue necessarily must be present”).” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 9,208,488 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,208,488
• Aylo Freesites Ltd. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.Instituted
  PTAB · Apr 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00146 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3–5, 7–11, 13–20, and 22–27 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the obviousness grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Our inquiry begins and ends with the first test pertaining to the field of the endeavor. Patent Owner is correct that the ’555 patent is in the field of video streaming over the internet with shifting of streaming content based on network conditions. See Ex. 1001, 1:31–34. Similarly, Ogdon discloses shifting presentation content that is transmitted over the internet based on network conditions. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 1:9–15. The only potential discrepancy appears to be whether Ogdon’s disclosed presentation content can include streaming video. And Ogdon discloses an example where a presentation version may include “real time or animated video.” Id. at 2:61– 66; see also infra § II.D.3.a (discussing Ogdon’s disclosure of video presentations). We find that Ogdon’s disclosure of transmitting real-time video as part of a presentation is the same as video streaming. Thus, we conclude that Ogdon is analogous art because it is in the same field of endeavor as the ’555 patent. slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Ogdon and Allen to yield this limitation. Ogdon teaches different quality versions of a presentation that may include video (see, e.g., Ex. 1004, 2:8–10, 2:30–66, 13:47–49, 22:44– 47, 24:55), and Allen expressly teaches encoding the same content at bitrates of 56 kbps, 300 kbps, and 600 kbps (see, e.g., Ex. 1005, 12:1–5). Based on these teachings, Petitioner shows sufficiently, on this record, that it would have been obvious to encode streaming video into low, medium, and high quality streams. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68–70. We also are sufficiently persuaded on this record that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined Allen with Ogdon to enable streaming video presentations for a variety of different available bandwidths. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex. 1004, code (57). In particular, Ogdon’s teaching of retrieving alternatively sized presentations based on transmission data rates supports Petitioner’s proposed combination with Allen’s teaching of encoding video at different bitrates. See Ex. 1004, code (57) (stating that a greater-sized presentation for a “higher transmission rate” has “corresponding enhanced quality of presentation” compared to a reduced-sized version for a “low transmission data rate”), 22:44–47 (stating that “as the expected amount of time for retrieving one or more presentation elements lengthens, . . . better presentation quality presentation elements may be retrieved (e.g., the presentation quality may be enhanced from limited or no animation to full animation)”). And Petitioner establishes sufficiently that an ordinarily skilled artisan reasonably would have expected success in making the combination, particularly given that Ogdon already contemplates alternative presentations for different transmission rates. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68, 70; Ex. 1004, code (57). Patent Owner’s arguments are directed to Ogdon alone and do not account for Petitioner’s proposed modification based on Allen.3 Such arguments do not show nonobviousness where Petitioner’s obviousness ground is based on a combination of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Furthermore, to the extent Patent Owner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been motivated to modify Ogdon as proposed, it fails to sufficiently explain this contention. For example, we do not read Ogdon to indicate that its presentation versions must be wholly different types of presentation materials, i.e., presentations in different languages or presentations tailored for different audiences. We also do not agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 20–22) that Ogdon fails to teach or suggest video streaming for the same reasons discussed above.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the present record, we find that the secondary considerations findings from the ITC Investigation do not undermine the sufficiency of Petitioner’s obviousness showing at this stage.5 We note that Patent Owner “bears the burden of production with respect to evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness.” ZUP, LLC v. Nash Mfg., Inc., 896 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018). At this stage, Patent Owner merely references the findings of the ITC rather than adducing evidence of objective indica of nonobviousness in the first instance and attempting to establish a nexus to the invention of the ’555 patent. Further, Petitioner has adduced at least some evidence that the allegedly unique features of the Move Media Player were known in Ogdon, which tends to undermine the ITC’s nexus analysis. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 14:46–49, 22:48–63. We also disagree with Patent 5 Patent Owner also argues that Dr. Houh’s testimony is unreliable because he failed to consider evidence of secondary considerations from the ITC Investigation. Prelim. Resp. 42–43. We decline to discount Dr. Houh’s testimony on this basis. Regardless of whether Dr. Houh addressed secondary considerations, we find his testimony relevant at this stage to our consideration of (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; and (3) the level of skill in the art. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Owner (Prelim. Resp. 41–42) that Ogdon does not disclose streaming video for the same reasons mentioned above. See supra §§ II.D.1, II.D.3.a. For these reasons, we find that the evidence of secondary considerations in the present record does not undermine Petitioner’s showing for purposes of institution. We also decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution based on Petitioner’s alleged failure to address secondary considerations. Patent Owner will have the opportunity at trial to produce evidence related to secondary considerations of nonobviousness.” slip op. at 30

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Claim 18 recites, inter alia, “at least one storage device configured to store live event video, the live event video encoded at a plurality of different bit rates creating a plurality of streams including at least a low quality stream and a high quality stream.” Ex. 1001, 20:45–49. Claim 18 additionally recites that “the low quality stream and the high quality stream each encod[e] the same portion of the live event video.” Id. at 20:50–53. Petitioner cites Ogdon’s discussion of storing different versions of a presentation. See Pet. 17–19. Patent Owner argues that Ogdon fails to teach multiple copies of the same video encoded at different bitrates, as required by the claim. Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 60). Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Ogdon alone discloses storing the same portion of live event video as a low quality stream and a high quality stream. Although we preliminarily agree that Ogdon teaches the use of video as a version of a presentation, we do not agree that Ogdon alone discloses storing multiple copies of the same video. Specifically, Ogdon describes storing different versions of a presentation, rather than multiple copies of the same video.9 See Ex. 1004, code (57), 2:30–66, 13:47–49, 22:44–47, 24:55, claim 9. For these reasons, Petitioner does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing that Ogdon discloses claim 18. Petitioner’s analysis for claim 19, which depends from claim 18, is likewise deficient.” slip op. at 39

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,469,555
• Aylo Freesites Ltd. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00147 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that any claim was obvious over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “to either: (1) “a B.S. degree in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree) and two years of experience in networking or streaming media,” or (2) “a M.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree).” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). At this stage, Patent Owner “disputes Petitioner’s definition,” but does not explain what it disputes. Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that it comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’156 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms or phrases for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner fails to provide a sufficient basis for that contention. See Pet. 20– 21; PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that inherency requires a showing that “the limitation at issue necessarily must be present”). Moreover, Petitioner does not contend that Ogdon suggests (or renders obvious) element 1[A][3]. See Pet. 19–21. Further, even if the Petition could be read as including such a contention, we would preliminarily find, on this record, that Ogdon does not suggest storing multiple copies of the same video encoded at different bitrates, and that Petitioner fails to provide any rationale to support a theory that element 1[A][3] would have been obvious over Ogdon alone.11 In other words, even if an ordinarily skilled artisan could have modified Ogdon to store multiple copies of the same video encoded at different bitrates, Petitioner does not provide any rationale to support a contention that an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to implement Ogdon in this 11 The Board instituted inter partes review in other proceedings in which Petitioner contends that claim limitations including some of the same subject matter are taught or suggested by a combination of Ogdon and WO 02/075482 A2 (Allen). E.g., IPR2024-00044, Paper 1 at 21–24. There is no tension between this Decision and those other decisions because Petitioner’s contentions in those other proceedings are based on materially different arguments and evidence. manner. See, e.g., Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”) (citing InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to show a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail on its contention that Ogdon discloses “the video server stores multiple different copies of the video encoded at different bit rates as multiple sets of streamlets,” as required by claim 1. Ex. 1001, 13:58–61 (element 1[A][3]). Consequently, Petitioner does not show that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Ogdon.” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,757,156
• Aylo Freesites Ltd. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00048 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–8, and 10–21 were obvious over either asserted ground.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to either: (1) “a B.S. degree in computer science or electrical engineering streaming media,” or (2) “a M.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree).” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 51). At this stage, Patent Owner “disputes Petitioner’s definition,” but does not explain what it disputes. Prelim. Resp. 2. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that it comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’772 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner does not propose any express claim constructions, but acknowledges that the claims have been construed in the ITC Investigation. Pet. 12–13. At this stage, “Patent Owner does not propose that the Board construe any claims.” Prelim. Resp. 2. We determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim terms or phrases for purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “video (id. at Abs., 2:30–61, 13:47–49, 24:55), and one passage specifically states that one presentation includes “video” while another includes “graphic slides” (id. at 2:61–66). Ogdon references “full animation” and “limited or no animation” (as an example of a “better presentation quality” element that may be retrieved when there is sufficient time to retrieve the data) (id. at 22:44–47), but it fails to disclose that these “animations” are different copies of the same video. Finally, one of Ogdon’s claims recites “a first video portion” and “a different second video portion that corresponds in content with said first video portion,” where the “first and second video portions have substantially different expected data transmission rates.” Id. at claim 9 (emphasis added). However, Petitioner does not sufficiently show that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood this (i.e., two videos with corresponding content) to teach two copies of the same video encoded at different bitrates. Dr. Houh’s testimony on this point is conclusory, and thus, we give it little weight. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 65; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); cf. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 61 n.9, 70–72 (Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Jeffay, reaching contrary conclusion given other disclosures in Ogdon). To the extent Petitioner seeks to rely on an inherent disclosure, Petitioner fails to provide a sufficient basis for that contention. See Pet. 21– 22; PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that inherency requires a showing that “the limitation at issue necessarily must be present”). Moreover, Petitioner does not contend that Ogdon suggests (or renders obvious) element 1[A][2]. See Pet. 20–22. Further, even if the Petition could be read as including such a contention, we would preliminarily find, on this record, that Ogdon does not suggest storing multiple copies of the same video encoded at different bitrates, and that element 1[A][2] would have been obvious over Ogdon alone.10 In other words, even if an ordinarily skilled artisan could have modified Ogdon to store multiple copies of the same video encoded at different bitrates, Petitioner does not provide any rationale to support a contention that an ordinary artisan would have been motivated to implement Ogdon in this manner. See, e.g., Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”) (citing InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).” slip op. at 19

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,868,772
• Aylo Freesites Ltd. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.Institution denied
  PTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00047 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Institution

  Institution was denied for claims 1–8, 10, and 12–16 because neither the Ogdon ground nor the Ogdon–Shteyn–Chou ground showed a reasonable likelihood of success.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having reviewed the parties’ papers and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood it will prevail in establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “to either: (1) “a B.S. degree in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree) and two years of experience in networking or streaming media,” or (2) “a M.S. in computer science or electrical engineering (or comparable degree).” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). At this stage, Patent Owner “disputes Petitioner’s definition,” but does not explain what it disputes. Prelim. Resp. 1. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that it comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’564 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “video (id. at Abs., 2:30–61, 13:47–49, 24:55), and one passage specifically states that one presentation includes “video” while another includes “graphic slides” (id. at 2:61–66). Ogdon references “full animation” and “limited or no animation” (as an example of a “better presentation quality” element that may be retrieved when there is sufficient time to retrieve the data) (id. at 22:44–47), but it fails to disclose that these “animations” are different copies of the same video. Finally, one of Ogdon’s claims recites “a first video portion” and “a different second video portion that corresponds in content with said first video portion,” where the “first and second video portions have substantially different expected data transmission rates.” Id. at claim 9 (emphasis added). However, Petitioner does not sufficiently show that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood this (i.e., two videos with corresponding content) to teach two copies of the same video encoded at different bitrates. Dr. Houh’s testimony on this point is conclusory, and thus, we give it little weight. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 65; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); cf. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 61 n.9, 70–72 (Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Jeffay, reaching contrary conclusion given other disclosures in Ogdon).” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “However, Ogdon never describes two copies of the same video presentation. It also does not refer to creating two copies of identical content (video or otherwise) that are encoded differently. As a result, although we preliminarily agree that Ogdon’s presentation teaches the claimed “video”,9 we do not agree that Ogdon teaches storing multiple copies of the same video, as required by element 1[A][3].” slip op. at 18

  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,407,564
• Apple Inc. v. LBT IP I LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2023 · IPR2020-01189 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Remand

  Claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 were not shown unpatentable because Sakamoto discloses only two battery power thresholds, which do not meet the construed multitude limitation.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “threshold values” includes GPS signal level thresholds, we start with the words of claim 8. Claim 8 recites a “battery power level monitor” that (1) “measures a power level of the charging unit” and (2) “adjusts a power level applied to location tracking circuitry responsive to one or more signal levels.” Claim 8 further recites that “the power level compris[es] a multitude of threshold values determined by a user or system administrator.” The remainder of claim 8 states the purpose of the “multitude of threshold values,” which is “to intermittently activate or deactivate the location tracking circuitry to conserve power of the charging unit in response to the estimated charge level of the charging unit.” The natural reading of these recitations is that the “power level” associated with the “multitude of threshold values” is the battery power level that is (1) measured by the battery power level monitor and (2) adjusted by the battery power level monitor and applied to location tracking circuitry. We also note that the claim language already incorporates a limitation directed to “signal levels” insofar as the battery power level monitor “adjusts a power level applied to location tracking circuitry responsive to one or more signal levels” (emphasis added). As such, the limitation “one or more signal levels” is recited separately from the limitation “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Given “[t]he general presumption that different terms have different meanings,” Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012), we ascribe different meanings to the recited “signal levels” and “power level.”” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “the battery power thresholds between (1) high and normal sensitivity positioning modes and (2) normal sensitivity positioning mode and turning off power to the GPS receiver) and Sakamoto’s two GPS signal level thresholds (i.e., K1 and K2) for teaching “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Pet. 50–51; Pet. Reply 16–18. As discussed above, however, “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values” refers to battery power level thresholds. See supra § II.C.2. We also determine above that signal level threshold values are not within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” See id. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Sakamoto’s GPS signal level thresholds K1 and K2 teach the recited power level threshold values. Although Petitioner is correct that “Sakamoto uses the same modes with both sets of thresholds” and that both sets of thresholds might ultimately relate to conserving battery power (see Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–29)), we are not persuaded that these different types of thresholds are interchangeable within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” This is particularly true given that Petitioner already relies on Sakamoto’s GPS signal level thresholds K1 and K2 for teaching another aspect of claim 8, i.e., “responsive to one or more signal levels.” See Pet. 49–50. For these reasons, Petitioner has only established that Sakamoto teaches two battery power level thresholds within the scope of “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values.” Because two threshold values are not a “multitude” (see supra § II.C.1), we find that Petitioner has not established that Sakamoto teaches “the power level comprising a multitude of threshold values,” as recited in claim 8. Thus, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 8 would have been obvious over Sakamoto. 3. Claims 10, 13, and 15 Claims 10, 13, and 15 each depend from claim 8. Ex. 1001, 17:4–10, 17:23–25, 17:29–33. Petitioner’s analysis for these claims does not cure the deficiencies discussed above with respect to claim 8. See Pet. 54–55. Thus, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claims 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over Sakamoto.” slip op. at 31

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “III. CONCLUSION Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over Sakamoto; (2) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over the combination of Sakamoto and AAPA; or (3) the subject matter of claims 8, 10, 13, and 15 would have been obvious over the combination of Sakamoto and Hayasaka.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 8,497,774 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,497,774
• Cerebras Systems Inc. v. Rex Computing, IncNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 11, 2023 · IPR2022-00741 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 because the cited combinations failed to teach required router retention, scratchpad memory, or optimal square-versus-linear tile assignment limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the time the ’975 patent was filed. Pet. 6. Relying upon the Conte Declaration, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related subject matter, plus at least two years of professional experience in the field of microprocessor design or a similar field . . . and more experience would compensate for less formal education, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–30). Patent Owner applies this 2 Patent Owner does not identify any secondary considerations to be considered. assessment in its Response. Resp. 8. Based on the fully developed record, we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner because it is supported by the Conte Declaration and is consistent with the ’975 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We determine that no constructions are required for the above-disputed terms. slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “above-described manner to store data. But Dr. Conte’s direct testimony does not address other statements in the ’975 patent specification that describe the scratchpad memory as an alternative to a cache. See Ex. 1001, 8:27–33 (“each of the cores includes a scratchpad memory . . . . As a result, conventional L-level caches may not be used in the architecture 299 because the scratchpad memories . . . provide data storage”); see also id. at 3:21–4:35 (describing drawbacks of prior art architectures that rely on caches), 5:14–20 (stating that each core may include a scratchpad memory instead of a cache). As Dr. Bagherzadeh stated, “Dr. Conte never reconciled [his] opinion with the ’975 Patent’s disclosure, which, as I described, connects the concept of using a scratchpad memory to a cache-less architecture.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 92 (citing Ex. 1001 Fig. 3). Dr. Conte’s deposition testimony did not clarify this issue, stating that the issue of cacheless architecture was “disconnected” from whether a microprocessor has a scratchpad. Ex. 2002, 40:10–15. The ’975 patent specification’s description of a scratchpad memory module as an alternative to cache memory is evidence that an ordinary artisan, upon reading the entirety of the ’975 patent, would not have considered the scope of the claimed scratchpad memory to include a cache memory. Dr. Conte has relied upon the ’975 patent specification for general properties seemingly common to both caches and scratchpad memory, but has not explained why the ’975 patent specification’s statements distinguishing a scratchpad memory from a cache should not limit the scope of the claimed “scratchpad memory.” As a result, Dr. Conte’s testimony does not significantly assist in construing “scratchpad memory” in any manner relevant to the pertinent issue; i.e., whether it may be taught by a prior art cache memory.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “data “occurs in the router’s input buffer” (Pet. Reply 10 (emphasis added)), but Petitioner does not support this assertion with analysis or evidence. To the contrary, Petitioner has clarified that the “input” on which words wait is “the input of the processor,” not the router. Pet. Reply 12. Claim 1 requires that a router must be operable to retain such data (limitation [1g]), and that the processor cores are distinct from the routers (limitation [1a]). Thus, to the extent that MIT2002 teaches data waiting at the input of the processor, Petitioner has not pointed to evidence or reasoning persuasively showing that the claimed router is operable to retain a data packet, even if a buffer at the input of the processor is able to do so. Instead, Petitioner primarily relies on our preliminary determination, and on Patent Owner’s lack of argument to the contrary. Id. at 11–12. Neither of these act to satisfy Petitioner’s burden to show that MIT2002, in combination with the other applied references, teaches a router operable to retain data packets in the event of a traffic condition. Consequently, we are not persuaded that retention of data in the Raw system occurs at the router’s input buffer. For the above described reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of evidence that the combined teachings of the applied references of this ground teach or suggest the “each router is operable to retain a data packet in the event of a traffic condition” limitation of [1g]. Accordingly, Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 10,355,975 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,355,975

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.