- PTAB · Sep 29, 2022 · IPR2022-00986 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 based on the same grounds as IPR2021-01443 and granted Zhuhai CosMX Battery Co., Ltd.’s motion to join that proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“deny institution based on Petitioner’s refusal to enter a Sotera-style stipulation in the related CosMX litigation. Prelim. Resp. 1, 3–4; see Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A) (“Sotera”). A June 2022 Memorandum from the Director states, “Consistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., . . . the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“six non-exclusive Fintiv factors. Fintiv I at 6. Recognizing that “there is some overlap among these factors” and that “[s]ome facts may be relevant to more than one factor,” the Board “takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id.; see also Interim Procedure at 3 (providing “binding agency guidance” regarding how the Board’s discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and the Fintiv factors apply to “sample fact patterns”). After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence in light of the Fintiv factors and the Interim Procedure, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition as explained further below.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the record as a whole and for the same reasons as stated in the institution decision in the 1443 IPR, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. See 1443 IPR, Paper 16 at 14‒35 (PTAB Apr. 8, 2022).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Here, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder requests no more than the statute allows. Petitioner represents that “the Petition asserts the same grounds and relies on the same evidence for unpatentability” as presented in the 1443 IPR. Mot. 7. Furthermore, Petitioner agrees that, if joined to the 1443 IPR, Petitioner will take a secondary “understudy” role and will not request any changes to the trial schedule. Mot. 4, 7–8. Petitioner states that it will assume a primary role only if the petitioner in the 1443 IPR ceases its participation. Mot. 8.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,350,019 - PTAB · Sep 29, 2022 · IPR2022-00985 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–11 on the grounds instituted in IPR2021-01441 and joined Zhuhai CosMX Battery Co., Ltd. to that proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“In assessing whether to exercise such discretion, the Board weighs the six non-exclusive Fintiv factors. Fintiv I at 6. Recognizing that “there is some overlap among these factors” and that “[s]ome facts may be relevant to more than one factor,” the Board “takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id.; see also Interim Procedure at 3 (providing “binding agency guidance” regarding how the Board’s discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and the Fintiv factors apply to “sample fact patterns”). After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence in light of the Fintiv factors and the Interim Procedure, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny the Petition as explained further below.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the record as a whole and for the same reasons as stated in the institution decision in the 1441 IPR, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. See 1441 IPR, Paper 16 at 11‒49 (PTAB Apr. 8, 2022).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Here, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder requests no more than the statute allows. Petitioner represents that “the Petition asserts the same grounds and relies on the same evidence for unpatentability” as presented in the 1441 IPR. Mot. 7. Furthermore, Petitioner agrees that, if joined to the 1441 IPR, Petitioner will take a secondary “understudy” role and will not request any changes to the trial schedule. Mot. 4, 7–8. Petitioner states that it will assume a primary role only if the petitioner in the 1441 IPR ceases its participation. Mot. 8. Patent Owner states that, if the Board grants institution, then “Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s Joinder Motion.” Prelim. Resp. 1. The petitioner in the 1441 IPR has not opposed Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. See Mot. 8 (stating that the petitioner in the 1441 IPR has not provided its position about whether it would oppose the motion). We find that Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is timely under 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). After considering the unopposed motion, we are persuaded that joinder is appropriate and will have little to no impact on the timing, cost, or presentation of the trial on the instituted grounds. In consideration of the foregoing, and in the manner set forth in the following Order, the Motion for Joinder is granted.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,077,035 - PTAB · Sep 29, 2022 · IPR2022-00984 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 on the same §103 grounds as IPR2021-01440 and granted Zhuhai CosMX Battery Co., Ltd.’s motion to join that proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022) (“Interim Procedure”),6 3 (footnote omitted; citing Sotera). In other words, under the Interim Procedure, a petitioner may avoid discretionary denial of the petition based on a parallel district court litigation by providing a Sotera-style stipulation. The Interim Procedure does not, however, make a Sotera-style stipulation a prerequisite for institution. Under our informative precedent, an inter partes review may be instituted despite the absence of a Sotera-style stipulation. Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Grp.-Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 12 n.5 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (informative) (“Sand Revolution”) (instituting inter partes review notwithstanding the absence of a stipulation not pursue any ground that could have been reasonably raised in an inter partes review). Thus, exercising our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) merely because Petitioner has not entered a Sotera-style stipulation would be inappropriate in this case.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“related CosMX litigation. We decline to speculate on how the district court would rule on a stay, if one were requested. Sand Revolution at 7 (declining to predict whether or not the district court would grant a stay, if requested); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv II”) (explaining that factor 1 generally “does not weigh for or against discretionary denial” when neither party has requested a stay). Accordingly, this factor is neutral.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the record as a whole and for the same reasons as stated in the institution decision in the 1440 IPR, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. See 1440 IPR, Paper 17 at 14‒34 (PTAB Apr. 8, 2022).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Here, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder requests no more than the statute allows. Petitioner represents that “the Petition asserts the same grounds and relies on the same evidence for unpatentability” as presented in the 1440 IPR. Mot. 7. Furthermore, Petitioner agrees that, if joined to the 1440 IPR, Petitioner will take a secondary “understudy” role and will not request any changes to the trial schedule. Mot. 4, 7–8. Petitioner states that it will assume a primary role only if the petitioner in the 1440 IPR ceases its participation. Mot. 8.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,691,446 - PTAB · Jul 6, 2022 · IPR2022-00686 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–20 based on the same grounds as the Google IPR and granted Ecobee’s motion to join that proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. 42.108(a) (2021).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“The Petition asserts the same unpatentability grounds on which we instituted review in the Google IPR. See Mot. 1, 4–5. Petitioner presents “the same arguments and the same grounds raised in the existing Google IPR (i.e., challenges the same claims of the same patent, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art submitted in the granted Google Petition).” Id. at 4. Indeed, the Petition is nearly a “carbon copy” of the petition filed by the petitioner in the Google IPR. See id. Thus, this inter partes review does not present any ground or matter not already at issue in the Google IPR. If joinder is granted, Petitioner anticipates participating in the proceeding in a limited capacity absent termination of the Google IPR petitioner as a party. Mot. 1–2; see also id. at 6–8. Petitioner states that it Google ceases to participate in the instituted IPR.” Id. at 1. Because Petitioner expects to participate only in a limited capacity, Petitioner submits that “the proposed joinder will not unduly complicate the Google IPR nor adversely impact its schedule. As such, the requested joinder will promote judicial efficiency in determining the patentability of the ‘567 patent without prejudice to Patent Owner.” Id. at 1–2. Petitioner further indicates that Google does not oppose the request joinder. Id. at 2. Patent Owner did not file an opposition to the motion for joinder. We agree with Petitioner that joinder with the Google IPR is appropriate under the circumstances. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 8,019,567 - Trienda Holdings, L.L.C. v. Desgagné, Brown Et Associés Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · May 20, 2022 · IPR2021-01295 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Adverse judgment
Adverse judgment was entered against the Patent Owner on claims 1–15 after it abandoned the contest; the Board did not decide the merits.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Our rules provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) (2021). Moreover, pursuant to our rules, “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” Id. § 42.73(b)(4). We consider Patent Owner’s statement that it will not further participate in this proceeding to constitute an abandonment of the contest, and, therefore, a request for judgment against it, which we grant. Also, “[a] patent applicant or owner is precluded from taking action inconsistent with the adverse judgment, including obtaining in any patent: (i) A claim that is not patentably distinct from a finally refused or canceled claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3). Although we instituted a trial, we have not yet decided the merits of this proceeding. Accordingly, we enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), and terminate the trial pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,570,276 - Parhelion, Inc. v. Streamlight, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Aug 31, 2020 · PGR2020-00062 · APJ Wesley B Derrick · PGR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Streamlight and cancelled all challenged claims, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10–12, 15, 16, 18, 20–24, 26–28, and 31, on the Patent Owner’s request.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Cancellation or disclaimer of one or more claims such that the patent owner has no remaining claim in the trial suffices as a request for adverse judgment. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). The Board is permitted to enter adverse judgment at any time in a proceeding, including prior to an institution decision. Cf. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) permits the Board to enter an adverse judgment when a patent owner cancels all claims at issue after an IPR petition has been filed, but before an institution decision.”).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,378,702 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Nucurrent, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 7, 2020 · IPR2019-00861 · APJ Wesley B Derrick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Samsung’s rehearing request and instituted review on all challenged claims and all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“in an unusual place in time. As noted, the Petition was filed (March 22, 2019), and the Preliminary Response submitted (June 26, 2019), before promulgation of our 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update (July 16, 2019). At the time of filing, Petitioner could not have known of the guidance set forth in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update concerning multiple petitions. Although Petitioner “could, in theory, have filed a single petition including all of its grounds within the page limits,” Petitioner, acting on the guidance available to it at the time of filing, “determined that filing two separate IPR petitions allowed each asserted ground of unpatentability to be presented in a more clear and comprehensive manner.” Req. 4. Thereafter, the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update issued on the same day as our conference call to discuss the parties’ requests for additional briefing (July 16, 2019), and these concurrent events would not have allowed the parties time to review and apply the guidance in a manner that would have permitted them to tailor their requests for additional briefing or their filing strategy to accommodate the newly-issued guidance. In the subsequent briefing by both parties, the impact of the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, although discussed briefly, was not the primary focus. See generally Reply; Sur-Reply. This is understandable, given the breadth of the complex estoppel issues raised in this case as well as the contemporaneous issuance of the guidance in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update. Thus, on account of the timing of the Petition filed in this case relative to other events, and based on the reasoning presented by Petitioner in the Request, which we discuss in more detail below, we are persuaded that we should reconsider whether to allow institution of inter partes review based on the arguments presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- Parallel petitionsInstitutedInstituted
“review, addresses Lee-based grounds rooted in anticipation (and obviousness over Lee and secondary references). IPR2019-00859, Paper 1. The petition in IPR2019-00861 addresses Partovi-based grounds rooted in obviousness. IPR2019-00861, Paper 1. In the Request, Petitioner argues that there is “almost no overlap” between the Partovi-based Petition in this case and Petitioner’s Lee-based petition in IPR2019-00859 (Req. 3), noting that “all grounds of the instant Petition rely on Partovi as the primary reference while the ’859 proceeding grounds rely on Lee as the primary reference” (id. at 2). In support, Petitioner provides a table depicting the various grounds presented in the two cases, and the differences between the two. Id. at 3. Petitioner also argues that “Partovi’s teachings are not redundant of Lee’s” because the references “disclose the claimed features of the ’046 patent in different ways.” Id. More particularly, Petitioner explains that “Lee is generally focused on an inductor structure” while “Partovi contains a more complete and clear disclosure of methods and circuitry for operating inductors,” which is important because the “dependent claims involve additional circuitry used in an inductor’s operation.” Id. at 4. Although Petitioner acknowledges that it “could, in theory, have filed a single petition including all of its grounds within the page limits,” Petitioner contends that “doing so would have resulted in a reduction in the thoroughness and completeness of the analysis presented due to the large number of challenged claims.” Id. Specifically, Petitioner argues that “NuCurrent chose to assert 98 claims from four patents against Samsung in a parallel district court litigation” and that Petitioner had to file two petitions in order to address “the sheer number of claims at issue.” Id. at 5. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s arguments concerning the differences between the petitions, and Petitioner’s reasons for presenting its arguments in two petitions, as it did, merit reconsideration of our denial of institution. The differences between the petitions in this instance, as explained by Petitioner, support its position that there is a need for the Partovi reference to distinctly address certain limitations of the dependent claims. The number of claims asserted against Petitioner in corresponding litigation, as well, is a factor enumerated in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update as a circumstance in which more than one petition may be necessary. 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, 26 (“circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary” include “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation”). We note again that although Patent Owner was authorized to file a ten-page response to Petitioner’s Request (Dec. 5), in which it could have addressed, inter alia, Petitioner’s arguments about the differences between these Petitions or the number of claims at issue, Patent Owner did not file a response to the Request, leaving Petitioner’s contentions regarding rehearing undisputed on the present record.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)InstitutedInstituted
“Rehearing, on this record, we do not agree that proceeding to trial would be an inefficient use of Board resources. The number of Patent Owner’s patents that are being challenged is not a reason to deny institution. “[R]ecogniz[ing] the potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents,” the Board has enumerated factors that guide its discretion as to whether to deny institution under § 314(a), “especially as to ‘follow-on’ petitions challenging the same patent as challenged previously in an IPR . . . proceeding.” Trial Practice Guide Update 9 (August 2018) (quoting General Plastic, slip op. 16–17). Although a multiplicity of grounds relying on a number of principal references addressed in a number of separate petitions may raise concerns regarding fairness in some instances, we find no such concerns here, for largely the same reasons articulated above with respect to our disposition of the Request for Rehearing. In these circumstances, as discussed above, we are not persuaded that defending against both challenges is unfair, abusive, or unduly burdensome for Patent Owner. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Veveo, Inc., IPR2019-00237, Paper 15 at 14–15 (PTAB Jul. 5, 2019) (instituting inter partes review on two petitions addressing the same patent).” slip op. at 29
- BurdenInstitutedInstituted
“and 28, we discern no deficiency in Petitioner’s characterization of the cited references and the knowledge in the art, or in Petitioner’s assertions as to the reasonable inferences an ordinary artisan would have made from those references, to the extent the ground relies on AC current and voltage and the inherent characteristics of inductors for the limitation “wherein when an electrical current is propagated within at least the first conductor layer, a magnetic flux is generated within the inductor when a change occurs in at least one of a frequency, a magnitude, or a waveform shape of the propagated electrical current.” Because this showing is sufficient to demonstrate teaching of this claim element was in the prior art as alleged, we need not reach Petitioner’s alternative reasoning grounded on changes in the duty cycle as to frequency and waveform shape meeting this particular claim limitation. Thus, based on the information presented at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of independent claims 1 and 28 as obvious over Partovi in view of Chiang.” slip op. at 44
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,300,046 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Nucurrent, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 7, 2020 · IPR2019-00860 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Samsung’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1–8, 10, 12, 13, 15–22, and 24–30 on every asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s arguments concerning the differences between the Petitions, and Petitioner’s reasons for presenting its arguments in two Petitions, as it did, merit reconsideration of our denial of institution. The differences between the Petitions in this instance, as explained by Petitioner, evince a need for the Partovi reference to distinctly address certain limitations of the dependent claims. The number of claims asserted against Petitioner in corresponding litigation, as well, is a factor enumerated in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update as a circumstance in which more than one petition may be necessary. 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, 26 (“circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary” include “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation”). We note again that although Patent Owner was authorized to file a ten-page response to Petitioner’s Request (Dec. 5), in which it could have addressed, inter alia, Petitioner’s arguments about the differences between these Petitions or the number of claims at issue, Patent Owner did not file a response to the Request, leaving Petitioner’s contentions regarding rehearing undisputed on the present record.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“Rehearing, on this record, we do not agree that proceeding to trial would be an inefficient use of Board resources. We also do not agree that the number of Patent Owner’s patents that are being challenged is a reason to deny institution. “[R]ecogniz[ing] the potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents,” the Board has enumerated factors that guide its discretion as to whether to deny institution under § 314(a), “especially as to ‘follow-on’ petitions challenging the same patent as challenged previously in an IPR . . . proceeding.” Trial Practice Guide Update 9 (August 2018) (quoting General Plastic, slip op. 16–17). Although a multiplicity of grounds relying on a number of principal references addressed in a number of separate petitions may raise concerns regarding fairness in some instances, we find no such concerns here, for largely the same reasons articulated above with respect to our disposition of the Request for Rehearing. In these circumstances, as we have already discussed above, we are not persuaded that defending against both challenges is unfair, abusive, or unduly burdensome for Patent Owner. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Veveo, Inc., IPR2019-00237, Paper 15 at 14–15 (PTAB Jul. 5, 2019) (instituting inter partes review on two petitions addressing the same patent).” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2019)). Under Phillips, claim terms are generally afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning,” read “in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner does not propose a construction for any of the limitations of the claims. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 37). Patent Owner also declines to address the construction of the claims. See generally Prelim. Resp. We decline to construe any claim term of the ’960 patent because it is not necessary to do so in reaching our decision that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons set forth above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’960 patent. Thus, we institute an inter partes review. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that an inter partes review is instituted on each of the grounds asserted in the Petition; and” slip op. at 49
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,680,960 - Incyte Corporation v. Concert Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Apr 9, 2018 · IPR2017-01256 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Incyte’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1–15 on Ground 3, finding it had applied overly restrictive standards for lead compound analysis and combining references.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), the request for rehearing must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Having considered the Request for Rehearing, the current record, and our Decision denying institution, we are persuaded that we applied an overly restrictive standard for the lead compound analysis and for the reason to combine the cited references. See Reh’g Req. 2–12. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and concurrently issue a decision granting institution on Ground 3. Paper 14.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Having considered the Request for Rehearing, the current record, and our Decision denying institution, we are persuaded that we applied an overly restrictive standard for the lead compound analysis and for the reason to combine the cited references. See Reh’g Req. 2–12. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing and concurrently issue a decision granting institution on Ground 3. Paper 14.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,249,149 - Amneal Pharmaceuticals, LLC v. Purdue Pharma L.P., The P.F. Laboratories, Inc., And Purdue Pharmaceuticals L.P.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 8, 2017 · IPR2016-01027 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over McGinity, Joshi, and Palermo.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“DISCUSSION A. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art for the ’976 patent would have “a degree in one or more fields of medicine, chemical engineering, chemistry, pharmaceutical science, polymer chemistry, pharmaceutics, pharmaceutical technology, pharmacokinetics, and/or pharmacology, and/or a number of years of industry training or experience in one or more of those fields.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex.1009 ¶ 17). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art. PO Resp. 26. We, therefore, apply that skill level in our analysis, with the understanding that the level of skill is also reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“The Specification teaches the following: The term “sustained release” is defined for purposes of the present invention as the release of the opioid analgesic from the oral dosage form at such a rate that blood (e.g., plasma) concentrations (levels) are maintained within the therapeutic range but below toxic levels over an extended period of time, e.g., from about 12 to about 24 hours as compared to an immediate release product. Preferably the sustained release is sufficient to provide a twice-a-day or a once-a-day formulation. Ex. 1001, 4:56–64. The use of “e.g.” in the above definition for “sustained release” plainly indicates that a 12 to about 24 hour time period is exemplary. Thus, we decline to limit the claim term as Patent Owner would have us do. Rather, we construe “extended release” as “release of the opioid analgesic from the oral dosage form at a rate such that blood (e.g., plasma) concentrations (levels) are maintained within the therapeutic range but below toxic levels over a period of time longer than that of an immediate release of the opioid analgesic.”” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. Claim 1 is drawn to a dosage form—a composition. Patent Owner does not point out how the recitation of “abuse deterrent” in the preamble modifies the structurally complete dosage form recited in the body of claim 1. See Catalina Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A] preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’”) (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed.Cir.1997)). We conclude, therefore, that the term “abuse deterrent” is a goal of the invention, that is, it is merely a statement of intended use that is not entitled to patentable weight.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner
“iv. “core matrix” The parties agree that the broadest reasonable construction of “core matrix” is “a blended mixture having: (a) PEO having a molecular weight of from about 300,000 to about 5,000,000 daltons, (b) magnesium stearate, and (c) oxycodone or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt of oxycodone.” Ex. 3001. We adopt that agreed-upon construction for purposes of this Decision. v.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 9,060,976 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,060,976
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.