- PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · PGR2025-00059 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted post-grant review of claims 1–4 on all four asserted grounds, finding a sufficient preliminary showing of obviousness and lack of enablement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“V. CONCLUSION Petitioner has, at this stage, established that it will more likely than not prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. This determination is, however, based on a preliminary record and is not final on any issues of patentability. We will make a final determination on the patentability of the challenged claims, as necessary and applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, based on a fully developed record through trial. VI. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) post grant review of claims 1–4 of the ’233 patent is hereby instituted on the grounds set forth in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; and” slip op. at 40
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not proffer a description of a POSA. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this decision, on the record at this time, we find that Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record, and apply it herein. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We invite the parties to further address the definition of a POSA during trial should they find it necessary.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“In addition, the opinion stated in the Pomper Declaration that “the term of ‘low molecular weight’ is well accepted in the chemical arts” and the declarant “recognize[s] that low molecular weight compounds would have a molecular weight of typically from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons” is offered by a co-inventor. We, as factfinder, have discretion to weigh the credibility of expert witnesses and to give each item of evidence such weight as appropriate. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). In this case, we find that the published references on metabolites do not support the opinion. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1368 (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”) US-121, of which Dr. Pomper is lead inventor, also uses the term “low molecular weight”—without further characterization of the term—and is uninformative as to the meaning of the term. See Ex. 1006, ¶ 12. In addition, Patent Owner’s definition does not appear to apply to all compounds claimed in US-121.5” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“limited to Patent Owner’s proposed “from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons.” The cited evidence relied on in the Pomper Declaration to define “low molecular weight” as a term well accepted in the chemical arts relates to metabolomics and metabolites. See Ex. 1002, 169, (specifically, ¶ 17 of Dr. Pomper’s declaration). Patent Owner admits that Dr. Pomper’s testimony is about molecules that differ from the claimed imaging and radiotherapeutic agents targeting FAP-α, but argues that the testimony is still relevant for purposes of explanation. Prelim Resp. 21. While it may be relevant, the testimony is not persuasive in light of the Specification. We find the uncontested fact that several of the B moieties alone—without the A moiety or L linker—specifically identified in the ’233 patent fall outside of Patent Owner’s proposed definition persuasive, as we normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes examples disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting proposed claim interpretation that would exclude disclosed examples in the specification). The cases cited by Patent Owner supporting that a claim term may be construed to exclude embodiments where the prosecution history supports such construction are factually distinguishable from the instant case as they regard instances of specific prosecution history disclaimer, clear prosecution disavowal, or relate to a specific definition of the terms in the Specification for the term being construed. Here, “low molecular weight” is not defined in the Specification, but, as Petitioner argues (see Pet. 21–25) is characterized as “demonstrat[ing] faster pharmacokinetics and a higher specific signal within clinically convenient times after administration” and that it “can be synthesized in radiolabeled form more easily.” Ex.1001, 13:33–50, 14:56– 16:14, 17:9–20. We are persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Zeglis, Petitioner’s declarant, that compounds weighing over 1500 Da may share those same behaviors, along with certain identified B moieties disclosed as embodiments. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 83.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,115,233 - PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00054 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–16 on all four grounds, finding at least one claim more likely than not unpatentable based on obviousness, indefiniteness, or lack of written description.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in a post-grant review. We institute a post-grant review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 321, if unrebutted, shows that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the petition is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324. On the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’781 patent is unpatentable under a presented ground. See generally Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of post-grant review. Our reasoning is discussed below.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“STANDING Petitioner states that it certifies that: (1) the ’781 patent is available for post grant review because its earliest claimed effective filing date is October 9, 2018, and the patent issued less than nine months ago, on December 3, 2024; and (2) Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting a post grant review on the grounds in this petition. Pet. 5. This is sufficient. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(note)(A)–(B), § 321; 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(a). Patent Owner does not contest standing. See generally Prelim. Resp. B. REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner states that “[t]he real parties-in-interest are Petitioner Straumann USA, LLC and its affiliates Institut Straumann AG and JJGC Indústria e Comércio de Materiais Dentários S.A.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner raises no objection and itself identifies “Smart Denture Conversions, LLC is the real party-in-interest.” Paper 4, 2; see generally Prelim. Resp. C.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 42. And, as set forth above, Patent Owner asserts that, for the sake of its present arguments, it matters not which of the two proposed definitions we use for this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 21. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’781 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This issue may be further developed at trial by the parties, if desired. C.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court thus, by default, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner indicates that None of the claim terms of claims 1–16 need to be construed to determine the patentability issues presented in this petition. The petition applies the ordinary meaning of the claim language as it would be understood by a POSA after reading the ’781 patent. Ex. 1002, ¶130. Petitioner will propose a construction if Patent Owner argues or the Board determines that one is required for any term. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1002). And, Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction at this point. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not expressly construe any claim terms; however, this position is preliminary and we may change it based on the fully developed record at trial.8 D.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,156,781 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00956 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in an inter partes review. We institute an inter partes review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’992 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“These two proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan share many consistencies, for example, the types of degrees and experience such a person would have had, but differ in the number of years of experience. Petitioner proposes the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had at least five years of experience and Patent Owner proposes at least three years (which would necessarily include five years, too). Patent Owner also proposes that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have consulted a dentist, oral surgeon, prosthodontist, or periodontist with experience in dental implants and prosthetics. At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 40. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’992 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This parties may further developed this issue at trial, if desired. C.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board interprets claim terms in an inter partes review using the same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Here, the first claim limitation at issue is broad, i.e., different thread pattern/profile between a definite and a temporary screw, and the Specification’s and priority applications’ disclosure is narrow and specific, asymmetric buttress style threads in a temporary screw and symmetrical threads in a definite screw (are different). Any apparent predictability in or maturity of the relevant field here must be contrasted with the fact that the Specification, considering the ’992 patent itself or any of the identified priority applications, never once even discusses the (claimed) concept of specifically differing the thread style between a temporary and a definitive screw. Any differences in thread style are not called out by the disclosure, but are described and can be discerned only in relation to the respective threads’ functionality, i.e., Fig. 75’s temporary screw 190 has buttress-style threading so it can be pulled out rather than unscrewed from the abutment; Fig. 9’s definitive screw 75 has male threads that fill the female threads of the abutment 8 for a secure permanent engagement. Ex. 1001, 15:23–30, 21:25–44, 23:3–36; Ex. 1012, 97–98, Figs. 9, 75. And, although it is possible for a single disclosed species to provide written description support for a claimed genus, “a sufficient description of a genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350; see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That does not appear to be the case here—the present record does not support that the described asymmetrical buttress, serrated style of different temporary screw threading (relative to that of the definitive screw and regardless of the direction of the threads for rotation) is sufficiently representative of the genus’s “different” thread patterns/profiles. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 (a buttress style thread does not function the same as a buttress reverse or 75º joint profile or rounded, or trapezoidal thread).” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,937,992 - PTAB · Nov 3, 2025 · IPR2025-00827 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7–14, 16–19, 22–26, and 28–32, finding a reasonable likelihood that Renisch anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but, on this record, are not persuaded. We recognize that Dr. Sonka provides a different opinion than Petitioner and Dr. Rosen. Dr. Sonka testifies that in his opinion “the distinctions between Renisch and claim 1 go beyond terminology.” Ex. 2014 ¶ 79. At this stage, in the absence of a full record, we need not record, it appears that Renisch discloses the elements of limitation [1(c)] at paragraphs 26–31, where it discloses obtaining a scanned 3D image of a fuller anatomy, i.e., a segmentation map, and then using a segmentation unit (76) to define the boundaries of anatomical structures of interest within that fuller anatomy, i.e., creating a plurality of segmentation masks, using a library, models, clustering, edge detection, region growing, neural networks, and/or an atlas of normal anatomical structures, and then identifying hot spots of interest within those anatomical structures of interest, and identifying organs with lesions and those without. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26–31. Based on the record before us and the specific disclosures in Renisch, as discussed in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has met the “reasonable likelihood” standard necessary to institute an inter partes review proceeding. Although we address only Ground A and claims 1 and 10 herein for the purposes of institution, as noted above, we will address all asserted grounds and challenged claims in any final decision.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We do not perceive a need to construe any claim limitation at this time. This, however, does not preclude the parties from arguing proposed constructions of the claims during trial. Indeed, the parties are hereby given notice that any disputed claim construction, in general, should be addressed at trial and, if so, should be addressed clearly in a designated section of briefing rather than relegated to arguments on the merits of patentability. Claim construction, if necessary, will be determined at the close of the evidentiary record and after any hearing. slip op. at 15
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“Compliance with the Particularity Requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) Patent Owner asserts that the Petition fails to meet the particularity requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). Prelim. Resp. 18–26. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner’s excessive internal cross-referencing impermissibly forces the Board and Patent Owner to piece together scattered portions of the Petition (and exhibits).” Id. at 26. Patent Owner concludes that “the Petition fails to adequately map the references to the claim elements with particularity.” Id. We disagree. Using claims 1 and 10 as an example, Petitioner asserts: Claim 10 recites a “system for automatically processing 3D images” that is substantively identical to the “method for automatically processing 3D images” recited in claim 1, addressed above. Whereas claim 1 (the method claim) recites a series of steps, each performed “by a processor,” claim 10 (the system claim) recites a “processor” with stored instructions that perform the same steps recited in claim 1. Similarly, dependent claims 11–14, 16, and 26 are substantively identical to dependent claims 2–5, 7, and 19. Pet. 41–42. Claims 1 and 10 contain similar elements and limitations. Petitioner’s reference, for example, in the Petition’s analysis of claim 10, back to the analysis of claim 1 concerning nearly identical elements and limitations (id. at 42) is a matter of efficiency and is sufficiently clear for us to determine the basis for Petitioner’s challenges. We determine that the Petition does not violate the statutory requirement for particularity.” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“We have considered Patent Owner’s arguments, but, on this record, are not persuaded. We recognize that Dr. Sonka provides a different opinion than Petitioner and Dr. Rosen. Dr. Sonka testifies that in his opinion “the distinctions between Renisch and claim 1 go beyond terminology.” Ex. 2014 ¶ 79. At this stage, in the absence of a full record, we need not record, it appears that Renisch discloses the elements of limitation [1(c)] at paragraphs 26–31, where it discloses obtaining a scanned 3D image of a fuller anatomy, i.e., a segmentation map, and then using a segmentation unit (76) to define the boundaries of anatomical structures of interest within that fuller anatomy, i.e., creating a plurality of segmentation masks, using a library, models, clustering, edge detection, region growing, neural networks, and/or an atlas of normal anatomical structures, and then identifying hot spots of interest within those anatomical structures of interest, and identifying organs with lesions and those without. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26–31. Based on the record before us and the specific disclosures in Renisch, as discussed in this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has met the “reasonable likelihood” standard necessary to institute an inter partes review proceeding. Although we address only Ground A and claims 1 and 10 herein for the purposes of institution, as noted above, we will address all asserted grounds and challenged claims in any final decision.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,941,817 - PTAB · Oct 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00918 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–11 on all asserted grounds and granted Canadian Solar’s motion for joinder in IPR2025-00007.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We instituted review of claims 1–11 of the ’104 patent in IPR2025-00007 after a review of all arguments and evidence presented by the parties, including Patent Owner’s arguments in its preliminary response. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision in IPR2025-00007, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one claim of the ’104 patent is unpatentable. Thus, we find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Patent Owner did not file an opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Upon consideration of Petitioner’s arguments, we are persuaded that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the proceeding in IPR2025-00007. Petitioner’s agreement to accept an “understudy” role and to not actively participate in IPR2025-00007 unless the current petitioner ceases to participate will limit any potential impact on the trial schedule and will avoid increasing the costs or complexity of the proceeding. Therefore, joinder of 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. Petitioner to IPR2025-00007 will further the goals of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’104 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’104 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11
Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,722,104 - PTAB · Oct 29, 2025 · IPR2025-00917 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable, and granted Canadian Solar’s motion for joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We instituted review of claims 1–17 of the ’009 patent in IPR2025-00006 after a review of all arguments and evidence presented by the parties, including Patent Owner’s arguments in its preliminary response. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision in IPR2025-00006, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one claim of the ’009 patent is unpatentable. Thus, we find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Patent Owner did not file an opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. Upon consideration of Petitioner’s arguments, we are persuaded that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the proceeding in IPR2025-00006. Petitioner’s agreement to accept an “understudy” role and to not 8 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. actively participate in IPR2025-00006 unless the current petitioner ceases to participate will limit any potential impact on the trial schedule and will avoid increasing the costs or complexity of the proceeding. Therefore, joinder of Petitioner to IPR2025-00006 will further the goals of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’009 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’009 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 25. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11
Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,230,009 - PTAB · Oct 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00524 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–20 on all grounds in the Petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, the Board “may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless … the information presented in the petition … and any response … shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons we explain below, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’118 patent.” slip op. at 2
Nonecites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 12,015,118 - PTAB · Oct 16, 2025 · IPR2025-00776 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 9, 11, 32–58, 60–62, and 64–67 on all remaining petition grounds, after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 9 is unpatentable over Thomas and Faucette.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 9, 11, 32–58, 60–62, and 64–67 of the ’802 patent is unpatentable, and we on the Grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Settled expectationsOther
“Patent Owner also filed a Request with the Acting Director of the USPTO seeking discretionary denial of institution of inter partes review (Paper 6, the “Request”). Petitioner subsequently filed a brief opposing Patent Owner’s Request (Paper 8). On September 3, 2025, the Acting Director denied Patent Owner’s Request for discretionary denial of institution of inter partes review and referred the case to the panel for an institution decision on the merits (Paper 11).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill would have an M.D. or a Ph.D. degree in virology, immunology, and vaccinology, and at least 3 years of experience in one or more of the research, design, development, and testing of antiviral vaccines. Pet. 17. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill may be part of a multidisciplinary team having such experience. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 81). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill asserted by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party requests construction of any claim terms. Petitioner asserts that all claim terms should be given their ordinary and customary meaning, and Patent Owner does not disagree. See Pet. 17. Accordingly, we find, for the purposes of this Decision, that no terms of the challenged claims requires construction beyond the ordinary and customary meaning of the terms, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13; see also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. construes claims only to the extent necessary to resolve a dispute).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,730,802 - PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00685 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–23 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the claims are obvious over Wei and Liu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Summary Based upon the record as presently developed, we conclude that Petitioner has met its burden of showing a reasonable likelihood of showing at trial that at least claim 1 of the ’370 patent is obvious over the cited prior art. Because we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success at trial in showing that at least one claim is unpatentable on at least one of the stated Grounds, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’370 patent, based on all of the remaining grounds identified in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 44
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“appears to be generally consistent with the level of skill presented in the cited prior art. See generally, e.g., Exs. 1005–1008; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, at this point we reject the portion of Petitioner’s proposed definition that includes having “access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience,” as not reflecting the individual level of skill of a given skilled artisan. See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that “[t]he person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art. The actual inventor’s skill is not determinative”) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Consequently, and for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition as defining a person of ordinary skill in the art as a person who would have had “a Ph.D. in immunology, molecular biology, cellular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar experience, and would further have had at least five years of experience with antibodies and antibody engineering.”” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Petitioner states that no term of the challenged claims requires construction to resolve the challenges in this Petition. Pet. 32. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s assertion. See generally Prelim. Resp. We find, for the purposes of this Decision, that no terms of the challenged claims require construction beyond the ordinary and customary meaning of the terms, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“We find, based upon the present record and for the purposes of this Decision, that Petitioner has sufficiently established that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Wei and Liu to determine the activity and suitability of Liu’s humanized anti- EGFR antibodies in an ADC. We acknowledge that Liu is silent regarding the pH selectivity or tissue preference of its binding affinity, but Patent Owner points to no prior art reference that would have informed a skilled artisan upon this point or that would have discouraged a person of ordinary skill in the art from combining the references. See fn.7, supra. And, even if a skilled artisan might have recognized that Liu’s humanized cetuximab might have been potentially problematic if it failed to show pH-selective activity like Wei’s Y104D, the mere fact that some disadvantage may come with an advantage when combining prior art does not foreclose their combination under § 103. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). In the instance of Liu’s humanized anti-EGFR antibody, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that its advantages (enhanced activity against tumor cells compared to chimeric cetuximab, thus requiring smaller dosages) could balance or outweigh its possible disadvantages (e.g., possible activity against non-tumor cells). Furthermore, it is in the nature of scientific research to continue to try new substitutions in drug therapy, even if a promising candidate has been discovered. As the Supreme Court stated in KSR: When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103. 550 U.S. at 421.” slip op. at 39
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,792,370 - Gettattle, Inc. v. Afterwords, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00677 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–7, 10, 13, 16, 18, and 19 on all four anticipation grounds because the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to determine whether to institute trial in an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’811 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ORDINARY LEVEL OF SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends: As of the effective priority date of the ‘811 patent, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field at the time would be familiar with the pre-existing point of sale and network-based technologies as above, for example in Section I.D. above as well as the “BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION” portion of the ‘811 patent specification. Ex. 1001, col. 1, l. 21 – col. 5, l. 10. This person would include someone who has, through education or practical experience, at least 2-3 years of experience in software engineering, such as the development of data sets, database management, and networking integration for dynamic content generation and network-based distribution. Pet. 10. Patent Owner states, “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Petition, p. 10.” Prelim. Resp. 14. We accept and use Petitioner’s proposed, and unopposed, definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. It appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’811 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). C.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“The claim language does little to identify any meaning of “point-of- sale interface.” Looking to the ’811 patent’s written description, it never uses the term “point-of-sale interface,” but it states “moder[n] Point-of-Sale (POS) systems . . . capture rich details around their customers’ purchasing activity.” Ex. 1001, 1:52–54. The Specification further states that “[t]he transaction data may be stored locally to a point-of-sale (“POS”) device or to a remote location, such as a cloud service provider.” Id. at 2:23–25. Regarding the associated term “interface,” the written description states, “[i]n general, as used herein, an interface is a component of computer executable instructions stored in a tangible, non-transitory medium and executed by processor 12 to present a display of information related to the interface allowing someone to view and/or interact with the presented information.” Id. at 4:32–37. We are pointed to and find nothing in the ’811 patent’s prosecution history that sheds any further light on the meaning of this language. See Pet. 12–14; Prelim. Resp. 12–13; Ex. 1003. Based on the intrinsic record, we find that the ’811 patent describes a point-of-sale as being local to a transaction, e.g., a sale/purchase of a product” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this point in the proceeding, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the recited survey module must be autonomous, self-contained, or a web-container package. As discussed above, we preliminarily interpret this term to mean software code for displaying a survey question. We find no support in the current record to add to this definition any additional requirements related to autonomy, self-containment, or a web-based context for the survey module. The Petition (at 19) points to Douglas as teaching the claimed survey module, i.e., in Douglas, software sent to the customer for taking a product survey on the display of the customer’s computer device. Douglas teaches, in response to a customer providing a survey trigger (e.g., purchase data signals), a survey generator creates a transaction-specific survey (e.g., “Was the item you found too expensive?”) and transmits it to the customer’s device (e.g., a mobile phone with a touchscreen); the survey is interactive; and the customer touches or clicks their device’s screen to respond to the survey questions. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 34–35. Moreover, Douglas also discloses that its survey “interact[s] with the customer using one or more software applications on customer device 106,” which may be, e.g., a computer or mobile phone, further, “[t]he one or more software applications may be provided by survey system 101, or merchant 107, or a third party,” and finally, “[t]he one or more software applications may be web-based applications and/or native mobile applications installed on the customer device 106.” Id. ¶¶ 18–20; see also Prelim. Resp. 35 (conceding as much). Thus, Douglas appears to disclose a survey system where a survey server responds to a triggering survey token created by a merchant and sent by a customer, that connects the customer with a particular purchase, by creating a purchase-specific survey question and sending it to a customer’s electronic device, where the survey question is displayed on a web-browser by software, and the customer’s survey answers may then spur the system to generate and follow up with additional questions. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 18–20, 27–29, 33–39. This appears to include the claimed survey module at issue. As for Patent Owner’s argument that the recited survey module must” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,430,811
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.