- Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 5 is unpatentable over Gao-2 and over Gao-2 with Goubet; claims 1, 3, 4, and 6–8 were not shown unpatentable on any ground, and substitute claim 17 was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; PO Resp. 5–6. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited 11 This refers to the recitation in clauses 1F and 5F that the “diffusion assembly is disposed between said upper chamber and said lower chamber.” discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 3 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s opinion that the prior art does not render the claims obvious is premised on an interpretation of certain claim limitations that are inconsistent with both parties’ constructions” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 12
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“referring to the same direction as the separation of the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber” (vertically in both Figure 6 of the challenged patent and Figure 1 of Goubet), we turn back now to Petitioner’s discussion of clause 1F, which includes the limitation at issue. There, Petitioner does not discuss why the “diffusion assembly” is allegedly “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber,” but instead, Petitioner discusses why a component of the “diffusion assembly”—the “atomizer assembly”—is allegedly “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber”: Pet. 39. In the end, we need not assess whether the “atomizer assembly” identified by Petitioner is “disposed between” the “upper chamber” and “lower chamber” under the proper construction of that term (which, again, we need not and do not determine here) because the “disposed between” limitation does not involve the “atomizer assembly.” Instead, we find that, by failing to address why the identified “diffusion assembly” is “disposed between” the identified “upper chamber” and “lower chamber,” Petitioner has failed to provide persuasive evidence that Goubet discloses or suggests the “disposed between” limitation. Pet. 38–39 (discussing the claim language “said diffusion assembly is disposed between said upper chamber and said lower chamber” but only discussing the location of the “atomizer assembly”); see 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“In an inter partes review . . . , the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”). For the reasons above, we find, based on the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Goubet discloses or suggests the “disposed between” limitation.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,092,918 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,092,918 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, and 7–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet and anticipated by Gao; proposed substitute claims 20 and 21 are denied as indefinite and lacking written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 6. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Network LLC, 929 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2019). At first glance, the language of the limitation at issue—which, again, recites “the compressed air and the operative fluid mix together in said mixing chamber to form the fluid dispersion”—would seem to require the “fluid dispersion” (under the stipulated construction) to be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” In other words, the language of the limitation alone would seem to support Patent Owner’s proposed construction for the “form the fluid dispersion” limitation. But the claim construction analysis does not end with consideration of the claim language alone. Next, we turn to the Specification. The Federal Circuit has said that the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Here, the discussion in the Specification of precisely the same language as in the limitation at issue strongly supports that “to form a fluid dispersion” in the limitation at issue requires only initial mixing of the compressed air and operative fluid in the mixing chamber, with further “formation” of the ”fluid dispersion” occurring downstream of the mixing chamber: More importantly, the “predetermined amount” of compressed air and the “preselected amount” of the operable fluid are initially mixed together in the mixing chamber 226 to form a fluid dispersion. The diffusion chamber 112" is further structured to facilitate the formation of a plurality of substantially uniform droplets, as defined hereinabove, in the fluid dispersion prior to discharge from the diffusion chamber 112" through discharge port 132. Ex. 1001, 10:62–11:2 (emphasis added) (discussing Figure 6), quoted, in part, at Pet. Reply 6–710; see also Ex. 1001, 5:64–6:4 (same language, except without double primes, in a discussion of Figures 1 and 2). To be sure, certain passages in the Specification could be read to indicate that a “fluid dispersion” must be fully formed in the “mixing chamber.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:11–12 (“More in particular, the suppression chamber 232 receives the fluid dispersion from the mixing chamber 226.”); see also id. at 7:22–33, 11:39–52 (both implying that a “fluid dispersion” is formed in the mixing chamber). But the passage block quoted directly above (and the similar one bridging columns 5 and 6) more directly addresses the issue at hand—i.e., the scope of “form the fluid dispersion”—by using the same” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“As an initial matter, the record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration for allegedly not reviewing the parties’ claim constructions. See Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1046, 115:15–18). Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1. Instead, we read Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also id. at 115:15–18 (“I don’t know if I would even apply claim construction. I applied engineering principles to a document that had been published with the patent office.”).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Although the KSR test is flexible, the Board ‘must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.’”) (citation omitted). Based on the complete record, we agree with Patent Owner that “Petitioner’s asserted motivation boils down to the conclusory statement that given Goubet and Kaiser, ‘it was well known in the field at the time of the invention that droplets of greater uniformity result in uniform droplet evaporation.’” PO Resp. 31 (quoting Pet. 59). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s discussion of the alleged reasons to combine (Pet. 59) is insufficient to support the proposed combination here. See Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. Specifically, we are not persuaded that Kaiser’s teachings—which relate to combustion (Ex. 1014 at 43)—would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to the proposed modifications, which would allegedly “improve the smoothness (i.e., less harsh) of the aroma generated as the oil droplets evaporate in the surrounding airspace.” See Pet. 59 (emphasis added); White Pet. Decl. ¶ 251 (same); see PO Resp. 32 (“Rather, Dr. White merely describes the ability to achieve the effect as in the claimed patent, not why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would look to the field of electrospray injection and combustion in mesoscale power-generation systems, using high-voltage electric fields to generate charged fuel droplets for controlled combustion in catalytic micro-combustors when considering atomization for scents.”). For these reasons, we determine, in light of the complete record, that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had reason to combine Goubet and Kaiser, as proposed. slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 10,583,449 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00705 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–9 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Goubet; proposed substitute claim 21 is denied as indefinite.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not dispute” the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, but Patent Owner “reserves the right to address [the definition] should new issues materialize.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner did not address this issue in the Sur-reply. As noted in the Decision on Institution, Petitioner’s proposed definition appears generally consistent with the record, including the prior art. See Dec. Inst. 8 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579). We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Further, Patent Owner has not argued at trial that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would have understood either the challenged patent or the prior art. In the analysis below, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution, as proposed by Petitioner.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“The record here does not support any sound basis to disregard the entirety of Dr. Micklow’s Declaration, as asserted in Petitioner’s overall argument. See Pet. Reply 1–2. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, in the cited general discussion, Dr. Micklow does not indicate that he applied an incorrect understanding of a claim term. Cf. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (disregarding testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the claim construction”), cited at Pet. Reply 1; see also Pet. Reply 2 (arguing that “Dr. Micklow’s declaration is premised on understandings of claim scope that are inconsistent with the constructions advanced by both of the parties” (emphasis added)). Instead, we read the cited portions of Dr. Micklow’s testimony as clarifying that he was not involved in claim construction at all and that, as stated, he “made [his] opinions based on what [he] read in the patents.” Ex. 1046, 112:11–12; see also Pet. Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1046, 112:4–12, 113:13–20, 115:15–18). Next, we turn to each of the four specific claim terms that Petitioner highlights in its further arguments.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“B. Claim Construction In inter partes reviews, the Board interprets claim language using the same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 10–11; PO Resp. 5. Based on the complete record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Florida Litigation a Joint Claim Construction statement that included stipulated claim constructions and disputed claim constructions for terms in the challenged patent as well as the ’449 patent and the ’918 patent. See Ex. 1018, Exhibit A (Stipulated Claim Constructions), Exhibit B (Disputed Claim Constructions). The parties stipulated to the construction of the terms “fluid dispersion” and “baffle” as recited in the challenged claim. See id., Exhibit A.10 10 When staying the Florida Litigation, the District Court cancelled the scheduled claim construction hearing. See ECF No. 67 (April 8, 2025) (granting joint motion to stay); ECF No. 68 (April 8, 2025) (cancelling the The stipulated construction of “fluid dispersion” merely restates the express definition of “fluid dispersion” from the challenged patent (although the definition is not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 3:8–20. Similarly, the stipulated construction of “baffle” essentially parrots one sentence in the challenged patent (again, not cited or discussed in the parties’ filing). Compare Ex. 1018, Exhibit A, with Ex. 1001, 7:57–59. To the extent necessary, we determine that the complete record supports the parties’ stipulated constructions of “fluid dispersion” and “baffle,” and we apply those constructions below.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 9,527,094 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 9,527,094 - Solaris Oilfield Site Services Operating, LLC / Solaris Oilfield Site Services Personnel, LLC v. Masaba, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01179 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–25 are unpatentable under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Waldner, Dynatek, and additional references; the Board cancelled all challenged claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Also, to the extent Masaba relies on extrinsic expert testimony, we note that Masaba’s expert cites absolutely no support for his understanding of the claims, much less explains why we should adopt his understanding over the plain and ordinary meaning of “conveying aggregate” and “moving aggregate.” See Ex. 2004 ¶ 34. Absent supporting citations, such extrinsic testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. As such, we reject the notion that Waldner’s discharge chute member 242 is not a conveyor “for conveying aggregate” or “for moving aggregate,” as required by claim elements 1[h] and 1[i].” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We disagree that Dr. Durham does not possess the necessary level of skill in the art to qualify as an expert in this case. Looking at the specification of the ’689 patent and the prior art of record, we think Masaba sets the bar too high. We acknowledge that one of ordinary skill in the art should have some education and/or experience in the mechanical art of conveying aggregate materials, but we do not think opining on the ’689 patent and asserted prior art necessarily requires that person to have the amount of education and experience that Masaba advocates. The ’689 patent relates generally to an “aggregate transferring system for receiving aggregate from a vehicle and elevating the aggregate to a higher vertical level for deposit into, for example, a silo.” Ex. 1001, 1:15– 18. And, as described in the ’689 patent and discussed later, the transferring system is an assembly of known types of conveyors, such as a belly-dump truck conveyor, a bucket elevator, and an articulated belt conveyor, for transferring the aggregate horizontally and vertically from a belly-dump truck to the discharge point, such as a silo. Without doubt, Dr. Durham has enough education and experience to reliably opine on the combination of known parts.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction needed
“We reject this argument for several reasons. First, nowhere does the plain language of the claims specify how the aggregate is conveyed or moved from the conveyor extension assembly’s inlet to its outlet, be it passively by means of gravity or actively by means of a conveyor belt. Instead, the claims simply use those verbs according to their plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to transfer or deliver” or “to cause to go or pass” from one place to another. See Ex. 3001, 253 (defining “convey”), 760 (defining “move”).10 Second, the specification of the ’689 patent similarly uses these terms in a plain and ordinary sense, without ever attributing to them some sort of special meaning. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:9–12 (“The apparatus 10 is suitable for performing the transfer of aggregate from 10 We reference the original pagination of the dictionary in which these definitions appear. one location to another, such as, for example, from a vehicle carrying the aggregate to a silo 1 for storing the aggregate.”). The ’689 patent specification also makes clear that active conveyance of the aggregate is an option and not a requirement of the claimed invention, stating that the conveyor extension assembly “may further include a conveyor belt 150.” Ex. 1001, 10:60–66 (emphasis added). Limiting claim elements 1[h] and 1[i] to a device “for actively conveying” or “for actively moving aggregate” would improperly import limitations from the specification into the claims. Thus, based on the intrinsic evidence, we determine that claim elements 1h and 1k are properly construed to encompass passive and/or active movement of the aggregate via the conveyor extension assembly.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached
“Owner asserts” that two claim terms—“unloader structure” and “trailer structure”—should be construed as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Solaris submits an express construction detailing the corresponding structure in the specification for performing the recited function of the claimed unloader and trailer structures. See id. at 24–25. Only in disputing Solaris’s Ground 3 does Masaba advocate that the claim term “trailer structure” should be construed under § 112(f), and then only in conjunction with dependent claims 3 and 21. See PO Resp. 58. As such, we address Masaba’s proposed construction in our analysis of Ground 3. We now turn to Solaris’s grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 11,780,689 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,780,689 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · PGR2025-00002 · APJ Frederick C Laney · PGR · Adverse judgment
After Patent Owner disclaimed claims 1–78, the Board granted its motion for adverse judgment and terminated the post-grant review.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” which includes “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). See Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“there is no claim remaining for trial . . . when, as here, all of the challenged claims have been cancelled”). Thus, actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include cancellation of patent claims such that a party has no remaining claim in the trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Because Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,134,952 - Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00636 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim; the Board did not reach the four other instituted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the full record, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed level of skill is reasonable and consistent with the ’786 patent and the asserted prior art. Thus, for these reasons, we adopt Petitioner’s level of skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Based on the full record, we maintain that it is unnecessary to explicitly construe “athletic positioning” because its meaning is already captured in the claim through the recitation of the relationship between the various slopes of the sole that provide “athletic positioning” of the foot. See Ex. 1001, 44:2–14. The recitations of a “first slope,” “second slope,” “third slope,” and “reference slope” translate into the relative heights proposed in adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it incorporates the specification’s consistent descriptions of “athletic positioning” in terms of relative heights and slopes. For example, one embodiment of an “athletic positioning shape” is where “the heel platform may be 10 to 30 mm higher” than “the toe cup and/or the ball of foot cup.” [Ex. 1001], 13:38–45. Another embodiment discloses “an athletic positioning sole that includes an overall geometric shape” including “the heel of the sole [at] a particular height (e.g., h1, which may be 1’s to 10’s of mm) that slopes at an angle (e.g., Ø1) to the toe on the inside edge of the sole” which “may have a height of zero to a few millimeters.” Id., 17:54–62. PO Resp. 29. However, we find Patent Owner’s contention regarding particular heights and specific angles attempts to import limitations from the Specification into claims. Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). Based on the full record, we determine that express claim construction of “athletic positioning” is not necessary to resolve the present dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“8. Conclusion for Ground 1 We have considered all of the arguments and evidence adduced at trial. For the reasons explained, we find Petitioner has persuasively demonstrated that Kim teaches or suggests all limitations of claims 1–8. We also find that the value of Patent Owner’s objective evidence of non-obviousness is weak in comparison to the evidence regarding the prior art under the first three Graham factors. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–8 of the ’786 patent would have been obvious over Kim.” slip op. at 39
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Based on the full record, we determine that Patent Owner fails to show nexus between the claimed invention and the asserted objective indicia of nonobviousness. PO Resp. 70–78; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Other than asserting that “the requisite nexus exists here” (PO Resp. 71), and citing to the Declaration testimony of Mr. Markison (id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 322)), the Patent Owner response does not provide an analysis of Patent Owner’s product with respect to the claims of the ’768 patent, and thus does not demonstrate nexus. To the extent Patent Owner references Mr. Markison’s testimony, Mr. Markison’s testimony consists solely of the statement that Patent Owner “sells and markets golf and baseball shoes that embody the claims of the ’786 patent” with reference to an exhibit from district court litigation. See Ex. 2008 ¶ 322 (citing Ex. 2014). We find Patent Owner’s reliance on Mr. Markison’s testimony to be insufficient to establish a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Thus, Patent Owner is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of nexus, because Patent Owner has not shown that the asserted evidence is tied to a specific product that is the disclosed and claimed invention. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Patent Owner also does not provide any evidence that the asserted” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 10,674,786 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,674,786 - Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00640 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, 9–15, and 17 are unpatentable: claims 10, 11, 15, and 17 over Won, and claims 1–5, 7, 9, and 12–14 over Won and Talarico ’911.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes.” Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). According to Petitioner, “the claims are obvious in view of any reasonable definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Id. at 21. For institution, we preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 4. “For purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 13 (citing Pet. 17–18). Patent Owner contends that its declarant Mr. Markison “far exceeds the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art” and, because he is registered as a patent attorney and licensed as an attorney, “can offer good faith and objective opinions on the issues in this proceeding.” Id. at 13–14 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 11–13, 17–30, 42–44). Based on the full record, we maintain and affirm that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes.” Pet. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 30); Inst. Dec. 9; Ex. 1002 ¶ 30; Ex. 2008 ¶ 44.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner notes that, although claim 1 recites a heel platform made of a “first material” and a forefoot platform made of a “second material,” the first and second materials can be the same based on Patent Owner’s apparent interpretation in related litigation. Pet. 27 n.1 (citing Ex. 1012, 30–44). Petitioner applies Patent Owner’s apparent interpretation to the challenges of this proceeding “[w]ithout conceding alternative arguments.” Id. At institution, we were persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments and adopted a construction that the “first” and “second” materials are “different in some manner.” Inst. Dec. 7–8. Patent Owner responds that we should maintain the same construction and disputes Petitioner’s evidence that the “first” and “second” materials can be the same material. PO Resp. 15–19 (citing Pet. 27 n.1; Inst. Dec. 8, 12–13; Ex. 1012, Ex. E, 38, 52; Ex. 2014, 15). Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner should not be allowed to present new arguments or evidence in reply. Id. at 19–21. Petitioner replies that interpreting “first” and “second” materials to be different materials contradicts the plain language of the claims, the Specification, and Patent Owner’s infringement contentions. Pet. Reply 1–5 (citing Pet. 27 n.1; Prelim. Resp. 16–17; PO Resp. 16–18; Ex. 1001, 10:9– 19, 17:52–54, 21:64–22:4, 27:47–51, Figs. 43, 49, claims 1, 6; Ex. 1023, 47:1–48:1, 215:6–217:12, 224:13–225:19; Ex. 1025, 319; Ex. 1026). Patent Owner replies that Petitioner presents new arguments and evidence in reply. PO Sur-reply 5–9 (citing Pet. 27 n.1; Inst. Dec. 13; PO Resp. 16–21; Pet. Reply 1–3, 14 n.1; Paper 19). Patent Owner also argues that, even if Petitioner’s asserted new arguments and evidence are considered, they fail to support an interpretation of “first” and “second” Resp. 16–17; Pet. Reply 1–3; Ex. 1001, 17:50–54, 27:50–54, Figs. 43, 93; Ex. 1023, 215:6–217:12; Ex. 2014, 19–22)” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“4. Other Terms Based on the full record, express interpretation of other terms is not necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 13
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedMixed
“Patent Owner does not satisfy its “burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Evidence of how the inventor viewed claim terms can be useful in considering claim interpretation, and, thus, we agree with Petitioner that the exhibit is relevant. For the reasons stated below, however, we do not need to rely on the exhibit. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibit 1024 is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 6
Patent outcomesUS 11,510,456 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,510,456 - Under Armour, Inc. v. Athalonz, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00637 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim; the Board did not reach the Dufour–Kim and Rubin–Kim grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Under Armour proposes that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had— (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree related to industrial or product design and at least two years’ experience designing or developing athletic shoes; or (2) at least five years designing or developing athletic shoes. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). Athalonz responds that “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 23 (citing Pet. 11). There being no dispute, we see no reason to depart from Under Armour’s proposed definition of the level of skill in the art, as it appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’291 patent..” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“outside edge” of the shoe. Ex. 1001, 43:23–28. Athalonz construes those terms to mean “the edges of the portion of the shoe where the foot sits” and that such construction is consistent with how one skilled in the art “would understand those terms in light of the specification.” PO Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 85, 90–91). Athalonz explains that “[i]n light of the specification, the ‘inside’ and ‘outside edges’ in the claims do not refer to the edges of the exterior of the shoe.” Id. (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 90–91). Under Armour does not dispute Athalonz’s proposed construction of “inside edge” and “outside edge” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 10; Pet. Reply 1. And, from our review of the record, Athalonz’s proposed construction appears consistent with the plain language of the claims and the specification. Thus, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“unnecessary to explicitly construe “athletic positioning shape” because its meaning is already captured in the claim through the recitation of the relationship between the various heights and slopes of the sole that define the “athletic positioning shape.” See Ex. 1001, 43:21–35. Those recitations translate into the relative heights proposed in Athalonz’s construction. Nonetheless, Athalonz contends that we should adopt its proposed construction because it incorporates the specification’s consistent descriptions of “athletic positioning” in terms of relative heights and slopes. For example, one embodiment of an “athletic positioning shape” is where “the heel platform may be 10 to 30 mm higher” than “the toe cup and/or the ball of foot cup.” [Ex. 1001], 13:3–8. Another embodiment discloses “an athletic positioning sole that includes an overall geometric shape” including “the heel of the sole [at] a particular height (e.g., h1, which may be 1’s to 10’s of mm) that slopes at an angle (e.g., Ø1) to the toe on the inside edge of the sole” which “may have a height of zero to a few millimeters.” Id., 10:11–16. PO Resp. 27–28. We find, however, that Athalonz’s proposed construction regarding particular heights and angles is nothing more than an attempt to improperly import limitations from the specification into claims. Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”). In sum, we determine that express claim construction of “athletic positioning shape” is not necessary to resolve the present dispute. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. Reply 6–10. In support, we credit the declaration testimony of Under Armour’s expert that one of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that the shape and orientation of the sole (i.e., the platform on which an athlete stands) in relation to the ground is what determines if the foot is placed in an athletic position when in use” and that “[c]leats serve to provide traction, not athletic positioning.” Id. at 8 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 15). We also agree with Under Armour’s expert that one of ordinary skill in the art “would [] understand that because the cleats’ height does not contribute to the athletic positioning shape when in use on soft ground (the surface on which golf is played), it would not be included in the measurement of the claimed first, second, and third heights.” Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1022 ¶ 16). We find the testimony of Under Armour’s expert to be credible and supported by the trial record. For instance, the ’291 patent specification itself distinguishes between the “sole” and “cleats” of the shoe as separate components. Ex. 1001, 1:59–61. Similarly, Kim describes the sole and cleats as distinct components of a shoe, illustrating the industry’s understanding of these terms. Ex. 1022 ¶ 14; see also Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 9, 14, 15, 30, claim 1 (describing that the spikes, in Kim, “protrude” or “extend” from the “outsole” and are located below the outsole’s “lower surface.”). We also note that Athalonz’s inclusion of the height of Kim’s cleats in measuring the claimed “heights” appears to be inconsistent with its own litigation position in the parallel district court action. See Pet. Reply 9–10. In particular, as Under Armour notes, “Athalonz did not include the height of the cleats in the measurement of the claimed heights” in accusing Under Armour’s shoes that have cleats of infringement. Id. (citing Ex. 1025, 51, 55–56, 61–62 (Athalonz’s infringement contentions regarding claim limitations [1.6] and [1.9])). To the extent Athalonz asserts that its “infringement contentions are extrinsic evidence that should be afforded little weight” (PO Sur-Reply 12), we disagree. While Athalonz’s infringement contentions may indeed be extrinsic evidence, we nevertheless find they provide an indication of Athalonz’s understanding and application of the claims. As such, we find that Athalonz’s infringement contentions, together with the plain language of the claims, the specification, and the credible testimony of Under Armour’s expert, fully supports Under Armour’s assertion that one of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant time frame “would understand that the claimed first, second, and third heights would be measured with respect to the bottom of the sole, not with respect to the bottom of the cleats.” Pet. Reply 14; see also Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–24 (Under Armour’s expert confirming same).” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 11,013,291 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,013,291 - PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00152 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6, and 11 are obvious over Sutardja, Donnelly, and Letendre.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to incorporate Donnelly’s GUI into Sutardja’s display to more easily and conveniently communicate Sutardja’s state of charge information to a user in a graphical format. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 242; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–159. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to combine Donnelly’s GUI depicting a bar graph indicating the charged and uncharged capacity of a vehicle battery into Sutardja according to well-known methods that would have yielded predictable results. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 160). Petitioner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully combine Donnelly’s GUI as it relates to the state of charge into Sutardja’s vehicle, which already processed information about the state of charge of its battery and included a display showing charging parameters. Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 242, 243, Ex. 1003 ¶ 161).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“includes “at least” a bar graph as shown in Figure 7. Id. at 4. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s “proposed construction should be rejected” because it “would wrongly import embodiments from the specification.” Prelim. Resp. 20–21. Patent Owner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would recognize that the “unitary charge indicator is not limited to a bar graph representation.” Id. at 21. We discern no dispute over the meaning of “unitary vehicle charge indicator” because Petitioner does not argue that the term is “limited” to the embodiment shown in Figure 7, only that the term “at least includes” that embodiment. Patent Owner does not contend otherwise.” slip op. at 8
- Strike new argumentDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Petitioner violates Rule 42.6(a)(3) by impermissibly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to avoid the word count limit. Prelim. Resp. 46–49. Patent Owner contends that the Andrews declaration is “over 140 pages” with a substantive portion containing “multiples of the allotted 14000 words” to a petition. Id. at 47. Patent Owner contends that “the only way to potentially understand the Petitioner’s proposed unpatentability challenges is to wade through the extraneous pages cited within the Andrews Declaration.” Id. Patent Owner also complains that Andrews supports his testimony relating to Petitioner’s first challenge by citing “many additional references in addition to references actually ‘relied upon’ by Petitioner.” Id. at 47–48. We discern no violation of Rule 42.6(a)(3). To the contrary, that Mr. Andrews’s supports his extensive explanations of his opinions with citations to dozens of pieces of objective evidence, is a feature, not a bug of his testimony. Mr. Andrews, and Petitioner by extension, leave virtually none of the substance of his testimony unsupported by objective evidence, a practice that we applaud.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,990,788 - Trove Brands, LLC v. Camelbak Products, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00155 · APJ James A Worth · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, or 19 were unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018).1 For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of claims 1, 3–9, 11–17, and 19 of the ’187 patent is unpatentable based on the grounds set forth in the Petition, and we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or equivalent coursework, and a year or more of experience in designing, prototyping, and/or manufacturing fluid containers or similar products. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Petitioner asserts that more work experience may substitute for a lower level of education, and vice versa. Id. Patent Owner admittedly sets forth “a similar, though slightly different, level of ordinary skill”: a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or the equivalent coursework and approximately one year of experience with liquid-containing devices, with more work experience substituting for less education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex.2001 ¶¶ 60–64). Patent Owner discerns no material difference between the definitions provided by the parties for purposes of the Board’s decision on whether to institute this proceeding. Id. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill as being consistent with the prior art, although our conclusion on whether to institute would be unchanged under either definition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“The failure to use the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Williamson v. Citrix Online, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The presumption can be overcome and § 112 ¶ 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to “recite[ ] sufficiently definite structure” or else recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. “Construing a means-plus-function claim term is a two-step process.” Id. at 1351. “The [tribunal] must first identify the claimed function.” Id. “Then, the [tribunal] must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. There may be multiple claimed functions, each with disclosed corresponding structure. See id. at 1351–52.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We are persuaded by Patent Owner that the term “automatically” in “to automatically disengage the first and second catch structures” means that it is not just the force applied by the user that disengages the first and second catch structures, but also the bias of the mouthpiece that helps to disengage the first and second catch structures. In the first instance, we agree with Patent Owner that the claim itself recites that, upon actuation, the mouthpiece assembly is “release[d]” to “move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Ex. 1001, 21:59–64. This meaning is supported by the Specification which states: “In some examples, the mouthpiece assembly is biased toward the dispensing configuration and thus moves automatically under its bias upon release by the user-release mechanism.” Ex. 1001, 1:64–67. We further agree with Patent Owner that the plain and ordinary meaning of “automatic” is that the user operation alone is not responsible for the action. For example, in one dictionary cited by Petitioner, “automatic” is defined as “2: having a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism.” See Ex. 2007, 1.11 The district court construction is consistent therewith. The district court identified two functions, the first of which is the same as that of the ’028 patent, i.e., “Automatically disengaging the first and second catch structures upon actuation of the user release mechanism and thereby releasing the mouthpiece assembly to move via its bias from the stowed configuration to the dispensing configuration.” See Section II.C.1, supra. In discussing that function, the district court states: “While a user may impart force upon user engagement portion 260 to release the mouthpiece, the bias of the mouthpiece towards the dispensing configuration causes the mouthpiece to move automatically, satisfying the requirements of Claim 1.” Ex. 2002, 16. We conclude that the term “automatically” in “adapted to” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,684,187
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.