- LKQ Corporation / Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc. v. GM Global Technology Operations LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 13, 2020 · IPR2020-00823 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because LKQ did not show a reasonable likelihood that the sole challenged claim was obvious over the Avenir Article and Lau.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“determine that the circular portion, horizontal extensions and shape of the vertical tines contribute to the overall visual impression of the design claimed in the ’105 patent. In light of that, we determine that LKQ has not made a threshold showing that Avenir Article is a single reference that creates basically the same visual impression as the claimed design. High Point Design, 730 F.3d at 1312. We further determine on this record, that the circular portion and horizontal extensions as well as the shape of the vertical tines all contribute to the overall visual impression of the claimed design. In light of that, we conclude that even if a designer of ordinary skill were to have combined the Avenir Article and Lau, the result would not be prior art that accounts for the overall visual appearance of the ’105 design. See High Point Design, 730 F.3d at 1311. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that LKQ has not met its burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claim is unpatentable over the Avenir Article in combination with Lau. III. CONCLUSION LKQ has not demonstrated that that it is more likely than not that the challenged design claim of the ’105 patent is unpatentable based on the challenges presented.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“B. The Designer of Ordinary Skill LKQ contends that: a designer of ordinary skill would be an individual who has at least an undergraduate degree in transportation or automotive design and work experience in the field of transportation or automotive design, or someone who has several years’ work experience in transportation or automotive design. Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 45; Ex. 1004 ¶ 44). GM argues, without citation to evidence, that: [a] designer of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’105 patent would have at least an undergraduate degree in automotive design, or other related industrial design field, with at least two years of relevant practical experience in designing automotive body parts. An increase in experience could compensate for less education, and an increase in education could likewise compensate for less experience. Prelim. Resp. 9. The parties do not identify, and we do not discern, any material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. For purposes of this decision and on the record currently before us, which includes testimony by LKQ’s witnesses, we adopt LKQ’s proposed definition of the ordinary designer. Also, we point out that adopting GM’s definition would not alter the outcome of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“central circular portion and the horizontal extensions shown in the claimed design, as compared to Avenir Article, would be considered de minimis by a designer of ordinary skill in the art. For instance, Mr. Gandy testifies that “a designer of ordinary skill would have been motivated to increase the dimensions of the circular portion of the vehicle grille in order to accommodate a larger emblem in the grille.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 66. This testimony expresses a reason for enlarging the circular portion. It is not, however, persuasive evidence that the larger circle size does not have a significant impact on the overall visual impression of the claimed design. Indeed, the larger central circle and angled horizontal extensions of the claimed design are not, in our view, insignificant or minor aspects of the claim. When compared to Avenir Article, the claimed central ornamental elements work together in the context of the overall design such that the larger circle and the proximal tapered and angled ends of the horizontal extensions present a proportionally larger and dynamic emblematic element relative to the bezel and vertical tines. Although both designs are for a vehicle front grille and include a similar bezel profile and generally show vertical tines, the smaller circle and linear blade-like horizontal extensions in Avenir Article do not look like the larger and proportionally dominating central circular portion and horizontal extensions with angled and tapering proximal ends adjacent the circular portion of the claimed design. Add to this the claimed design having vertical tines with decreasing depth portions adjacent the bezel, and thus the claimed design presents a more muscular and dynamic impression than the straight blade-like horizontal extensions and smaller circular portion in Avenir Article. In light of these differences we are not persuaded that a designer of ordinary skill would have viewed Avenir Article as providing the same visual impression as the claimed design so as to be an appropriate primary reference.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“2. The Asserted Secondary Reference – Lau Even were we to find that Avenir Article was a proper primary reference, which we do not, and that a designer of ordinary skill would have determined that Lau was so related in ornamental appearance to Avenir Article and would suggest the application of those features Avenir Article, the combination still fails to address the conspicuous discrepancies between the designs discussed above. See In re Carter, 673 F.2d 1378, 1380 (CCPA 1982) (“The designs of other references may properly be relied upon for modification of this basic design when the references are ‘“so related that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one would suggest the application of those features to the other.’”).7 LKQ acknowledges that the images in Avenir Article do not reveal the partial tines as shown in the claimed design. Pet. 52. LKQ relies on Lau mostly for its disclosure of a vehicle grille and “partial tines” along the bottom of the grille interposed between the substantially vertical tines. Id. at 52. We reproduce Petitioner’s annotated figures comparing the claimed design, Avenir Article, and Lau, below. 7 Because we determined that Avenir Article was not a sufficient primary reference, we need not make a finding here as to whether a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Avenir Article and Lau. We assume, only for the sake of argument, that the combination is appropriate.” slip op. at 22
§ 103 obviousness - Louisiana-Pacific Corporation v. Huber Engineered Woods LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 5, 2020 · IPR2019-00919 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable: APA does not disclose the claimed panel-joint sealant, and the proposed combinations fail to establish the required limitations or motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic, 815 F.3d at 1363 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). slip op. at 32
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“In our Decision to Institute, we determined that a POSITA “would have had a degree in civil engineering, building, material, wood science, or other degree, if such other degree required coursework or experience in the pertinent technology and two years of industry experience or equivalent therein.” Inst. Dec. 14. We further determined, “Additional education, such as an advanced degree, could offset less work experience, and additional work experience could offset less education or coursework.” Id. Patent Owner adopts the level of a POSITA set forth in our Decision to Institute. PO Resp. 13 (“HEW adopts the Board’s definition of a POSA.”). Petitioner does not address our definition in its Reply. See generally Pet. Reply. We maintain the level of a POSITA that we provided in our Decision to Institute.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. Claim 11 Independent claim 11 recites the step of “positioning” wall panels, where each panel comprises a “barrier layer.” Ex. 1001, 22:49–63. The claim further requires the separate step of “fastening” each panel assembly to a building structure. Id. As a matter of logic, the panels cannot be fastened onto the structure until they have first been positioned. See Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research In Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398– 99 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A] claim ‘requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires’ an order of steps.”). Accordingly, claim 11’s step of “positioning at least two wall panel assemblies” occurs before the step of “fastening each panel assembly to the structure.” Id.; see also Ex. 1001, 3:59–61, Fig. 10 (depicting a flow diagram of the steps included in the manufacture of a panel for roof or wall sheathing). Furthermore, because the “positioning” step of the claim requires each of its panels to have “a barrier layer secured to the outer surface of each panel,” it logically follows that the panels have barrier layers before the panels are fastened to the structure. For the foregoing reason, we interpret claim 11 to require the “adjacent structural wall panels” to each have a “barrier layer secured to the outer surface of each panel” before the panels are fastened to the structure, and before the joint between the edges of the adjacent panels are sealed.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Despite the disagreement between Patent Owner and Petitioner regarding the meaning of the claimed “barrier layer secured to the outer surface of each panel,” construing this claim phrase is not necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (internal citation omitted)). Rather, we determine that the only claim that requires construction is method claim 11.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 9,546,479 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,546,479 - American National Manufacturing Inc v. Sleep Number Corporation F/K/A Select Comfort CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 24, 2020 · IPR2019-00500 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied ANM’s rehearing request, but amended the Final Written Decision to clarify that the declarants testified the products “read on” the claims.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. THE REQUEST FOR REHEARING In pertinent part, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence. Moreover, “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusOther
“copying and nexus is consistent with ANM’s position that neither Dr. Abraham nor Dr. Edwards states an opinion as to infringement. Dr. Edwards’s testimony explains his analysis of several versions of ANM’s source code and comparison with the claims of the ’154 patent, concluding that “at least Version 1.8, Version 1.97, and Version 2.0 of ANM’s source code read on the software-related limitations of claims 1–19 of the ‘154 Patent and claims 1–18 of the ‘747 Patent.” Ex. 2029 ¶ 41. Dr. Abraham performed a physical review of various ANM air controllers, and determined “that ANM’s products sold with Gen 3 Arco and Gen 3 Koge air controllers read on the claimed mechanical related elements of (i.e. structural components of) the ‘154 and ‘747 Patents.” Ex. 2027 ¶ 29. Thus, Dr. Abraham and Dr. Edwards testimony is more accurately that ANM’s software and air controllers “read on” on the claims of the ’154 patent.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“Substitute Claims Proposed in the Amendment 23–41 Substitute Claims: Motion to Amend Granted 23–25, 30–31, 38–41 Substitute Claims: Motion to Amend Denied 27, 28, 32–37 Substitute Claims: Not Reached 26, 29” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,737,154 - American National Manufacturing Inc v. Sleep Number Corporation F/K/A Select Comfort CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Sep 24, 2020 · IPR2019-00497 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Rehearing
Denied ANM’s rehearing request, but amended the Final Written Decision to clarify that the declarants testified that products read on the claims, not that they infringed.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. THE REQUEST FOR REHEARING In pertinent part, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) states: The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence. Moreover, “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“copying and nexus is consistent with ANM’s position that neither Dr. Abraham nor Dr. Edwards states an opinion as to infringement. Dr. Edwards’s testimony explains his analysis of several versions of ANM’s source code and comparison with the claims of the ’747 patent, concluding that “at least Version 1.8, Version 1.97, and Version 2.0 of ANM’s source code read on the software-related limitations of claims 1–19 of the ‘154 Patent and claims 1–18 of the ‘747 Patent.” Ex. 2029 ¶ 41. Dr. Abraham performed a physical review of various ANM air controllers, and determined “that ANM’s products sold with Gen 3 Arco and Gen 3 Koge air controllers read on the claimed mechanical related elements of (i.e. structural components of) the ‘154 and ‘747 Patents.” Ex. 2027 ¶ 29. Thus, Dr. Abraham and Dr. Edwards testimony is more accurately that ANM’s software and air controllers “read on” on the claims of the ’747 patent.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,769,747 - Nuna Baby Essentials, Inc. / Nuna International B.V. v. Britax Child Safety, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 2, 2020 · IPR2019-00663 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 12, 14–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious over Yamazaki and Washimi; claims 3–11, 13, and 17 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Nuna Baby argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art has “a Bachelor’s Degree in Mechanical Engineering or a related subject and two or more years of experience working with child safety seats . . . [l]ess work experience may be compensated for by a higher level of education, such as a Master’s Degree, and vice versa.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 23). Britax’s definition is mostly similar, “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or other similar subjects and either a Master’s degree in mechanical engineering, or two or more years of experience in the field of child safety seats.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 28). Britax explains that “for individuals with different educational backgrounds, a person could still be of ordinary skill in the art provided that person’s additional experience compensates for any differences in that person’s education.” Id. (citing Ex. 2010 ¶ 29). We do not find a significant difference in these definitions proposed by the parties for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Both definitions allow for an undergraduate or higher professional degree and alternatively a reasonable period of time and work experience in the field of child safety seats. For purposes of this decision and on the record currently before us, we adopt Britax’s proposed definition. We emphasize that adopting Nuna Baby’s definition would not alter the outcome of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“B. Untensioned configuration Nuna Baby proposes that the term, “untensioned configuration,” as recited in claim 1, “must be construed to mean ‘a not fully tensioned configuration.’” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 29). Britax contends that this term should simply be given its plain and ordinary meaning which “is clear not only to a person of ordinary skill in the art but also to a lay person.” PO Resp. 21–2 (citing 2010 ¶ 47). This term is not reasonably in dispute, nor does any part of our Decision turn on a specific construction of this term. We find the claim language clear on its face and therefore agree with Britax that “untensioned configuration” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning—that is, not tensioned, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMotivation not foundMixed
“lack of sufficient tension on seatbelts securing child seats in vehicles was a problem and that “[l]oose installation errors are common.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 40 (citing Ex. 1010, 14). Based on this testimony, Nuna Baby argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to improve Yamazaki and looked to Washimi because it teaches that tensioning both lap and shoulder belts reduces the likelihood that the lap belt will loosen. Pet. 10 ‒- 11 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 38; Ex. 1003 ¶ 41). Mr. Bowman explains that Washimi expressly describes the benefit of tensioning both lap and shoulder belts so “‘the webbing 60 will not follow the tilting movement of the seat main body 20, thus preventing the lap webbing 66 from becoming loose.’” Ex. 1003 ¶ 41 (quoting Ex. 1012 ¶ 38). Mr. Bowman’s testimony on these points is mostly unrebutted on this record. See, e.g., Ex. 2010 ¶ 81 (Dr. Kent asserting that “Bowman seem[s] to disregard or ignore that the tightening mechanism 11 disclosed in Yamazaki is attached to the seat base that is configured only to receive a child seat.”). We find Mr. Bowman’s testimony credible, namely that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that child safety seats, such as “Yamazaki’s child seat and tensioning mechanism were ready for improvement because even as late as 2009, the industry regarded tightly securing a child seat to a car to be a common source of error.” Id. ¶ 42 (citing Ex. 1010, 14, 26). In addition, Mr. Bowman points to probative evidence in Washimi explaining that securing both lap and shoulder belts provides for a more secure attachment of the child safety seat. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 38). For the reasons articulated by Mr. Bowman, we are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art “[i]n view of the ‘interrelated teachings’ of Yamazaki and Washimi, the effects of the demands known to the design community, and the background knowledge possessed by a [person having ordinary skill in the art] it would have been obvious to modify Yamazaki’s system to include Washimi’s belt configuration for the tensioning mechanism.” Id. ¶ 43. On the full record now before us, we are persuaded that Nuna Baby has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that all the limitations of claim 1 are disclosed in the combination of Yamazaki and Washimi. We weigh this evidence of obviousness against Britax’s evidence of secondary considerations of non-obviousness, infra, before reaching our final determination as to patentability.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner
“Our comparison of the independent claims to the description of the Frontier® 90 and Frontier® CLICKTIGHT child seats in the product user guides is more consistent with Britax’s assertions. Claim 1, for example, recites a child seat and various structures such as “a seat base defining a seat portion and backrest portion.” Ex. 1001, 14:31–33. Claim 1 provides functional and structural limitations explaining how the child seat is secured by a seat belt “positioned around at least one of the front side of the backrest portion.” Id. at 14:43–44. As components of the child seat, claim 1 further recites specific limitations that pertain to the “CLICKTIGHT” features, starting with “a tensioning mechanism attached to the backrest portion of the seat base.” Id. at 14:49–50. The independent claims are mostly similar and all recite elements of a “child seat,” as a whole, including the tensioning mechanism and its features of capturing and securing both the lap and shoulder belts of a vehicle seat “to secure the child seat to the car in a tensioned configuration.” Id. at 14:59–60. Thus, the claims do not recite simply a component of a child seat but mostly the product as a whole, and so we do not find Nuna Baby’s argument that the claims mainly recite a component of the child seat products persuasive. Reply 21–22 (citing Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373). In addition, it is a reasonably simple comparison to read the claims in conjunction with the user guides for the Frontier® 90 and Frontier® CLICKTIGHT child seats to which Britax refers. For example, a comparison of page 10 of the Frontier 90 user guide describing installation of the child seat, including the “CLICKTIGHT” feature for securing both lap and shoulder belts, tracks right along with the child seat and tensioning mechanism as recited in claim 1.11 We acknowledge that neither Britax nor Dr. Kent have undertaken an exemplary comparison of the claims and products as Nuna Baby argues. See Reply 21 (Nuna Baby arguing that “[n]either PO nor its expert address the numerous limitations of any of the independent claims in narrative or claim chart form”). However, the claims are reasonably straightforward and descriptive and the product user guides are quite clear as to the relevant corresponding structure and function of the commercial products. We determine that Britax has shown sufficiently in this proceeding that the Frontier® 90 and Frontier® CLICKTIGHT child seats are sufficiently coextensive with the claims to be entitled to a presumption of nexus. To the extent we determine that Britax has met their burden to show sufficiently a presumption of nexus, as discussed below, this is in some ways inconsequential because, as explained below, we do not determine that the weak evidence of praise and long-felt need outweighs the substantial evidence of non-obviousness, including Yamazaki and Washimi.” slip op. at 58
Patent outcomesUS 9,187,016 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,187,016 - LKQ Corporation / Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc. v. GM Global Technology Operations LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 10, 2020 · PGR2020-00020 · APJ Christopher G Paulraj · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that the sole design claim was more likely than not unpatentable under the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“A post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine, for the reasons set forth below, that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the challenged claim is unpatentable based on the grounds presented. Therefore, we do not institute a post-grant review of that claim.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. The Designer of Ordinary Skill Petitioner contends that: a designer of ordinary skill would be an individual who has at least an undergraduate degree in transportation or automotive design and work experience in the field of transportation design, or someone who has several years’ work experience in the field of transportation or automotive design. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–42; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 35–42). Patent Owner argues, without citation to evidence, that: [a] designer of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’099 Patent would have at least an undergraduate degree in automotive design, or other related industrial design field, with at least two years of relevant practical experience in designing automotive body parts. An increase in experience could compensate for less education, and an increase in education could likewise compensate for less experience. Prelim. Resp. 10. The parties do not identify, and we do not discern, any material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. For purposes of this decision and on the record currently before us, which includes testimony by Petitioner’s declarants, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinary designer. Also, we point out that adopting Patent Owner’s definition would not alter the outcome of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“November 13, 2018, we apply the same claim construction standard used in district courts. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b) (2019). Generally in the context of a design patent, an illustration, rather than a verbal description, is the better representation of the claimed design. “As the Supreme Court has recognized, a design is better represented by an illustration ‘than it could be by any description and a description would probably not be intelligible without the illustration.’” Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14, (1886)). Although preferably a design patent claim is not construed by providing a detailed verbal description, it may be “helpful to point out . . . various features of the claimed design as they relate to the . . . prior art.” Id. at 679–80; cf. High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (remanding to the district court, in part, for a “verbal description of the claimed design to evoke a visual image consonant with that design”). Here, the overall visual appearance of the vehicle grille bezel design shown in Figures 1–5 of the ’099 design is clearly exemplified in the drawings. In other words, the elements and features of the ’099 design which contribute to the overall appearance of the design are readily discernable and apparent to any observer. We determine that the best description of the ornamental features of the ’099 design comes from the drawings themselves. Accordingly, we determine that no articulated verbal description is necessary to describe the overall ornamental nature of the ’099 design. Nonetheless, we have taken into account Petitioner’s verbal description of the design in our analysis, but agree with Patent Owner’s contention that Petitioner’s verbal description is an incomplete description of the actual design. Although we do not undertake a specific verbal construction, we acknowledge in our following analyses the relevant design characteristics of the ’099 design, including key similarities and distinctions in comparison to the prior art. See MRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter Mfg., LLP, 747 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Affirming that a verbal claim construction was unnecessary, the Federal Circuit explained that “the district court did not err by failing to provide an express verbal description of the claimed design; rather, it described the claimed design in the context of comparing it to the prior art.”).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“particular, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s analysis is deficient insofar as it fails to sufficiently consider the claimed design from the side perspective as shown in Figure 3 of the ’099 patent. The only photograph that Petitioner relies upon to show how the grille bezel of the 2014 Buick Enclave allegedly meets the claimed design from the side does not adequately show the features depicted in Figure 3. Petitioner provides a side-by-side comparison of Figure 3 of the ’099 Patent with the 2014 Buick Enclave, as reproduced below. The image above is offered by Petitioner to compare Figure 3 of Exhibit 1001 to page 1 of Exhibit 1007 to allegedly show that “the bezel is horizontally convexly curved, and the bottom of the u-shaped portion is forward of the substantially horizontal portion.” Pet. 44–45 (color in original). However, that photograph shows more of the front than the side of the grille bezel. It is not clear from the comparison photograph provided whether “the bottom of the u-shaped portion is forward of the substantially horizontal portion,” as required by Petitioner’s own textual claim construction. It is also not clear from the photograph that the “short, downward-pointing diagonal bezel segment at each end” as described in Petitioner’s textual construction extends backward from the “horizontal top portion” to meet the top end of the “substantially u-shaped bottom portion.” Petitioner does not explain why the ordinary observer would not have considered these features from the side perspective in determining the overall visual impression created by the claimed design. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner impermissibly ignores the full three-dimensionality of the claimed design.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness - Intex Recreation Corp. v. Bestway (USA), Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 22, 2020 · IPR2019-00454 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 are unpatentable under §103 based on Yuan and Metzger, and independently based on Yuan and Reed; contingent Grounds 2, 3, 4, and 6 are moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Neither party presents a detailed evidentiary showing of factors typically considered in determining the level of ordinary skill. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill “would have had either: (1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or an equivalent field; or (2) an associate’s degree in mechanical engineering, or an equivalent field, and two years of practical experience in inflatable product design.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 27). The cited paragraph from Mr. Kuchel’s Declaration merely repeats Petitioner’s conclusion. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Kuchel provide any analysis of the factors typically considered in determining the level of ordinary skill. Mr. Kuchel’s conclusory opinion on this issue is entitled to some, but little, probative weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“We have considered the testimony of Dr. Abraham and give it no probative weight on the issue of claim construction. There is no support in the claims, written description of the Specification, or prosecution history to support Dr. Abraham’s testimony concerning “inhibited air flow” or a temporary pressure differential between chambers when the claimed air-bed is both inflated and being used. A court should discount any expert testimony “that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution history, in other words, with the written record of the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318; see also SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating that expert testimony, in particular, is less litigation and thus can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence”) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318). We find that Dr. Abraham’s testimony is clearly at odds with the intrinsic evidence as discussed above.” slip op. at 21
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“e) Conclusion Regarding the Term Air-Chamber Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim. The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (cited with approval in Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316). We conclude that a person of ordinary skill, with the level of education and experience stated in Section II.B.1 of this Decision, would understand from the claims and Specification that the term an air-chamber, as used in the claims of the ’866 patent, means an area of an air-bed that can be filled with, and can retain, air. Based on the evidence discussed above, this is the construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention.” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“In claim 1, the claim language itself defines specifically what it means by the recited “concave” relationship with the words following the phrase “that is” (see Ex. 3003, 2, 3).12 The claim itself thus defines the “concave” relationship to mean “the outer surface of the peripheral auxiliary air-chamber [B1] extends beyond the bottom sheet [3] of lower main air-chamber [B2].” Ex. 1001, 4:29–31 (emphasis and reference numerals added).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 7,269,866 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,269,866 - In-Depth Geophysical, Inc. / In-Depth Compressive Seismic, Inc. v. Conocophillips CompanyRehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 30, 2020 · IPR2019-00849 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left institution denied for claims 1–6 because Petitioner did not show Li was a printed publication.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“On request for rehearing, the burden of showing a decision on whether to institute trial should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). For reasons discussed below, we decline to modify the Decision. Thus, Petitioner’s Request is denied.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“It is Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate at the institution stage a reasonable likelihood that a reference is a printed publication by a preponderance of the evidence. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”). Petitioner presented no additional evidence supporting its contentions, for example from someone familiar with the publication of Li or the referenced web pages, or even an explanation by Petitioner or a declarant that provided a countervailing argument to the SEG process and procedure for publication outlined by Dr. Aminzadeh in his Declaration. Instead, Petitioner simply points to purported “publication dates,” with no substantive explanation or fact witness corroboration. Req. Reh’g (citing Ex. 1020, Ex. 1021, Ex. 1026, Ex. 1030).” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“It is Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate at the institution stage a reasonable likelihood that a reference is a printed publication by a preponderance of the evidence. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”). Petitioner presented no additional evidence supporting its contentions, for example from someone familiar with the publication of Li or the referenced web pages, or even an explanation by Petitioner or a declarant that provided a countervailing argument to the SEG process and procedure for publication outlined by Dr. Aminzadeh in his Declaration. Instead, Petitioner simply points to purported “publication dates,” with no substantive explanation or fact witness corroboration. Req. Reh’g (citing Ex. 1020, Ex. 1021, Ex. 1026, Ex. 1030). Although documents indicating a publication date of 1 September 2012 may have relevance, absent additional evidence explaining the origin and meaning of that date as to public accessibility, on the record before us, the date alone fails to show a reasonable likelihood that Li was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it. This is especially true in the face of Dr. Aminzadeh’s unrebutted testimony as to SEG’s regular practices surrounding the acceptance and dissemination of SEG conference papers. While his testimony may not speak directly to a date of public accessibility for Li itself, it is relevant, uncontroverted, and probative of accessibility to SEG papers in general, given the bare “1 September 2012” date relied on by Petitioner.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Petitioner to the extent that Dr. Aminzadeh did not attest to personal knowledge of the Li paper. Dr. Aminzadeh however provided a credible explanation of the process for authoring and presenting papers at the SEG (Society of Exploration Geophysicists) conference. Dr. Aminzadeh is a member and co-author of SEG papers, as well as a former President of SEG. Ex. 2007 ¶ 3. In our Decision, we explained that [w]e give weight to Dr. Aminzadeh’s testimony because it articulates a reasonable and unrebutted explanation for the September 2012 date listed by Researchgate exhibit. Dr. Aminzadeh’s testimony also persuasively explains how and why the dissemination and first public availability of Li would have most likely not occurred prior to the SEG 2012 Annual Meeting from November 4-9, 2012. Dec. 12. We also stated in our Decision that dissemination “of Li would have most likely not occurred prior to the SEG 2012 Annual Meeting” (id.) because, for one reason, Dr. Aminzadeh’s unrebutted testimony is that “[a]uthors submit papers to the SEG several months before the SEG conference. The papers are kept confidential by the SEG at that time.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 4. Although Dr. Aminzadeh does not testify specifically to knowledge of the Li reference, Petitioner has not explained persuasively why this indicates that Dr. Aminzadeh’s testimony as to the SEG confidentiality practices and paper dissemination, as set forth in his Declaration, is inaccurate or misleading.” slip op. at 5
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,632,193 - Baker Hughes, A GE Company, LLC / Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC v. Packers Plus Energy Services, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Mar 11, 2020 · IPR2016-00650 · APJ Carl M Defranco Jr · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Baker Hughes’s rehearing request, leaving intact its decision that claims 14 and 17–26 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over the Thomson-Echols grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing of a Board decision has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), the rehearing request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“version of Thomson’s Figure 3 (Ex. 1002, 10) to show how Thomson’s configuration of sliding sleeves and packers meets the limitations of the challenged claims. See, e.g., Pet. 25–26, 26, 34, 39 (depicting various annotations of Thomson’s Figure 3). Importantly, each of Baker Hughes’s annotations of Figure 3 depicts a cement casing as part of its proposed modification of the Thomson system. See id. Elsewhere, Baker Hughes relies expressly on Thomson’s cement casing in mapping “Thomson’s retrievable packers” to the claimed set of packers—“Compression of the packing elements causes them to extrude out to fill and seal the annulus between the tubing string and the casing, as in the above excerpt of Figure 3.” Id. at 39 (emphasis added); see also Ex. 1006 ¶ 71 (Baker Hughes’s expert testifying that “[a]s the packing elements [of Thomson] compress, they extrude outward to fill the annulus between the tubing string and the casing to seal against fluid flow past the packer”) (emphasis added). But, while repeatedly relying on Thomson’s Figure 3 in support of its obviousness theories, Baker Hughes fails to explain why a skilled artisan would have removed or ignored the casing shown in Thomson’s Figure 3 in favor of using an open wellbore. That clear and unequivocal omission by Baker Hughes was critical to our finding of a lack of a reason to combine Thomson and Echols. Thus, we are not persuaded that we misapprehended Baker Hughes’s obviousness contentions, which relied expressly on Thompson’s casing as shown in Thomson’s Figure 3.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedNot reached
“now modifes its reason for why a skilled artisan would have added injection points to Thomson’s system—“getting stimulation fluid into the annulus in a longer zone takes less time when there are more openings through which fluid can be injected into the annulus . . . a longer zone of like diameter has a greater volume, which plainly can be filled more quickly with more injection points.” Reh’g Req. 6 (emphasis added). This argument, advanced by Baker Hughes for the first time as a reason to add Echol’s sleeves to Thomson’s system, is directed to improving the efficiency by which Thomson’s system operates. That Baker Hughes’s argument is new is shown by the simple fact that Baker Hughes fails to identify the place where this argument was previously made in its Petition or Reply. See id. Indeed, as expressed in the Petition and Reply, the reason given for adding injection points to Thomson’s system was “to provide additional fractures . . . to improve porosity and thus production from the formation.” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 79); Reply 1 (same). Nowhere in either of those papers does Baker Hughes mention efficiency in filling the annulus as a reason to modify Thomson. Thus, we could not have misunderstood or overlooked an argument not previously made, nor must we consider this new argument on rehearing. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The request must specifically identify . . . the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”).” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,907,936 - Facebook, Inc. / Instagram, LLC v. Search And Social Media Partners, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 2, 2020 · IPR2018-01622 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 6, 14, 21, and 27 are unpatentable as obvious over Bezos and Pasquali under § 103(a).
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The parties’ descriptions of a person of ordinary skill in the art overlap significantly as both encompass a person having at least a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science or software engineering or a Bachelor of Science degree in a technical field requiring computer science or software engineering courses and two years of related technical experience, with related experience including web-based and Internet technologies. Any differences are not material to the analysis in this Decision. On the record before us, we are persuaded to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill because it is consistent with the problems and solutions in the prior art of record. We also consider the level of skill implied by the disclosures of the prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of skill in the art). However, our conclusions and analysis herein do not turn on which definition is selected and would be the same under Patent Owner’s level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Our reading of the ’176 Patent indicates that “real-time” is consistent with Petitioner’s interpretation—namely, that “real-time” means “the ability to provide current or up-to-date information” between an end user and a subscriber, or even between one subscriber and another subscriber. This is borne out by a plain reading of the auction embodiment in the ’176 Patent, which describes a dynamically changing image where “[a] UAML-enabled Internet auction listing displays real-time information, such as the current high bid, even though the web page itself is static.” Ex. 1001, 14:12–14 (emphasis added). In the auction embodiment, where subscribers submit bids for an auction item, the express example of displayed “real-time information” is “the current high bid.” Id. (emphasis added). Also, where the ’176 Patent discusses retrieving the “current high bid field” from the database record in the auction listings database, the Specification explains that “[a]fter a higher bid has been submitted (time 2), the value of the current high bid field changes and a new image 1814 is created and replaces the old image 1813.” Id. at 20:60–63. Also, for the “iTicker” embodiment, the ’176 Patent states “iTicker provider inputs headlines and URLs to be associated with these headlines into the iTicker provider record 5305, which can be maintained and updated as often as the iTicker provider wishes so as to keep the content fresh.” Id. at 31:45–49 (emphasis added). Thus, the description for the embodiments in the ’176 Patent relate most explicitly, not to data transmission speed or immediacy, but to the repeated cycle of providing, and then updating, an old bid, news, or information with a new more current bid, news, or information. See id. at 20:67–21:4 (Describing regarding Figure 17, “each image 1702 serving as a variable real-time indicator is hosted on the UET Company’s servers 1703. This image file is overwritten with a new image at the same file location each time the information it portrays changes.” (emphasis added)). As set forth above, the description of Figure 53 relied upon by Patent Owner is consistent with Petitioner’s proposed construction and at least encompasses that construction. To the extent Patent Owner relies on the other portion of the ’176 Patent Specification describing “‘instant messenger software’” (PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1001, 26:52–55)) that portion relates to a real-time connection, rather than providing real-time information. For the aforementioned reasons, as well as for the reasons given by Petitioner, we determine that Petitioner’s proposal, i.e., that the term “real-time” “simply refers to the ability to provide current or up-to-date information” (Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 79)) is the broadest reasonable interpretation of “real-time.” Nonetheless, as discussed below (see infra II.D), we determine that Petitioner also has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are obvious over the combination of Bezos and Pasquali under Patent Owner’s proposed construction that the term “real-time newsfeed or ticker” pertains to the timing regarding the transmission of information, including at least between the content provider end user and the service provider servers, which make the information available for distribution to respective newsfeeds and/or tickers subscribing users via the claimed newsfeed or ticker when such users are online. PO Resp. 15. With respect to that construction, we use Patent Owner’s ordinary meaning set forth in the dictionary (Tr. 87:6–21), i.e., that “real-time” means an “[i]mmediate response by a computer.” Ex. 2008.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Although Patent Owner asserts that a broadest reasonable interpretation is needed for the entire phrase “real-time newsfeed[s] or ticker[s]” to resolve a dispute in this proceeding, Patent Owner does not provide a proposed construction for the term “newsfeed,” or “ticker.” The auction embodiment in the ’176 Patent describes that an image corresponding to a bid “serv[es] as a variable real-time indicator.” Ex. 1001, 20:52 (emphasis added), Fig. 17. The “iTicker” embodiment in the ’176 Patent is directed to scrolling “Newsfeed Headlines” as opposed to auction bids. See id. at Figs. 53–54 (Figure 53 (step 5310) expressly states that “iTicker headlines display in scrolling form.”). We disagree that the terms “newsfeed” and “ticker” need to be construed expressly. Patent Owner does not dispute that the primary reference teaches “newsfeed[s] or ticker[s].” Furthermore, as discussed below in Section II.D.3.a, the prior art teaches expressly the examples described in the ’176 Patent Specification. Accordingly, we need not make further determinations regarding an express construction for those terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Pasquali similarly addresses the concept of presenting changing, i.e. dynamically changing information, e.g., “news” or “stocks” as a dynamic window module sub-component of a static webpage. See Ex. 1004, 8:57–65 (describing that “any type of content may be manifested within module 118” including “dynamic content such as from a content feed (e.g., a news fee[d], a stock ticker feed, etc.),” which may be “displayed and/or manifested”), 9:52–53 (Referring to Figure 2A, Pasquali explains that “screen image 200 is that of a WWW browser client screen and . . .window modules 202 arranged in table fashion.”). Additionally, according to Pasquali, within the browser window, the window modules display content including “a dynamic news feed display window.” Id. at 10:25. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument contrasting the ’176 Patent and Pasquali (PO Resp, 22–23, PO Sur-Reply 19–21), both the ’176 Patent and Pasquali are directed to internet and web browser services and more specifically browser structures and functionality pertaining to the distribution and receipt of information between providers and subscribers. Ex. 1001, 1:35–55; Ex. 1004, (57). In addition to being broadly related as browser and internet related inventions, we determine that Pasquali’s window modules 202 displayed in a static web-browser page image 200 providing changing and updated information to a subscriber is a similar endeavor, and in the same field as the ’176 Patent which provides a web-browser window structure that supplies dynamic information about changing auction bids in content screen 1702 in the context of static web-brower client screen 1701. For example, both Pasquali and the ’176 Patent explain that given the dynamic window module structure, new information can be displayed even as the static hosting browser client page remains static. Compare, e.g., Ex. 1004, 8:46–56, with Ex. 1001, 20:33–39, 20:58–65. Even if Pasquali and the ’176 Patent could be considered not to be in the same field of endeavor, we determine that Pasquali’s solution of presenting dynamic updated information in a window module within a static website would have been considered by one of ordinary skill in the art attempting to present new and updated information, e.g., auction bids, to a subscriber within a static web browser window. See In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659 (“If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection.”). Patent Owner asserts that Pasquali’s dynamic window is not reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by the Patentee because “Pasquali does not provide static content in its dynamic window, but rather in a window that is not dynamically updated.” PO Resp. 23 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:46–65, 10:17–32, Figs. 2B, 5A; Ex. 2036, 62:10–63:9, 67:26–68:18, 69:10–70:17). Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, however, Pasquali addresses the same type of information i.e., “news” or “stocks.” See Ex. 1004, 8:57–65, 9:30–34, 10:25.10 We agree with Petitioner that Bezos and Pasquali describe analogous,” slip op. at 47
Patent outcomesUS 8,719,176 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,719,176
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.