- Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co. Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · May 19, 2026 · IPR2025-01327 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Throughtek on claims 1–19 after finding it abandoned the contest by failing to file mandatory notices or respond to the show-cause order.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“The Order to Show Cause explained that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” Paper 8, 3. The Order to Show Cause also explained that failure to participate in a proceeding, such as failure to file mandatory notices as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8, may be considered abandonment of the contest and result in adverse judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Id. (citing Cellpak, Inc. v. Mambate USA Inc., IPR2021-00007, Paper 4 at 2 (PTAB Mar. 23, 2021)). The Order to Show Cause gave Patent Owner ten calendar days to show cause why adverse judgment should not be entered against it. Id. Patent Owner did not respond to the Order to Show Cause. More than ten calendar days have elapsed since the date the Order to Show Cause was entered, and Patent Owner has not filed mandatory notices. In view of Patent Owner’s failure to file mandatory notices within the specified time period, we determine that Patent Owner has abandoned the contest. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), we construe Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest as a request for adverse judgment. Under these circumstances, we determine that entry of judgment against Patent Owner is appropriate.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 9,727,655 - PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00687 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and 10–18 over all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandInstituted
“Paper 34, 1 (requesting “Director Review of the Director’s August 22, 2025 Decision Referring the Petition to the Board (‘Referral Decision’)”). Patent Owner argued that institution of IPR2025-00687 and IPR2025-00688 “should be discretionarily denied.” Id. at 5. Petitioner opposed. Paper 37. The Director granted review and found that “granting institution of two petitions that each challenge the same claims of the ’370 patent and ’218 patent 2” was an “abuse[] of discretion.” Paper 40, 1. The Director remanded the cases “to the Board panel to determine which of the two petitions challenging each of the ’370 and ’218 patents to institute.” Id. at 3. Pursuant to the Director’s instruction that we choose only one of the two petitions challenging the ’370 patent to institute, and for the reasons set forth below, we choose to institute review of the ’370 patent in this Petition, and not in IPR2025-00688.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) and § 315(b). See, e.g., Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019)” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “[does] not, at this time, contend that any term requires construction,” and instead, states that “[a]ll terms have been accorded their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 212–215). Patent Owner asserts that it “does not presently propose any constructions,” but discusses the Board’s claim construction in IPR2020- 00834, Paper 18, 7–8. Prelim. Resp. 7. Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any claim term expressly.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,933,370 - PTAB · Feb 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00717 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board instituted IPR of claims 1–4 and 6–26 on all six asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedOther
“The Director granted Director Review, finding that the panel “abused its discretion in granting institution of two petitions that each challenge the same claims” of the ’218 patent. Paper 39, 2. The Director vacated the DI and remanded the case “to the Board panel to determine which of the two petitions” to institute. Id. at 4.” slip op. at 4
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“On November 4, 2025, we instituted inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 35 (“DI”). In the DI, we noted that “Petitioner filed an explanation regarding the necessity of multiple petitions,” and “Patent Owner d[id] not challenge that multiple petitions are necessary” in the Preliminary Response. Paper 23, 3 n.3.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Therefore, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all the grounds raised in this Petition.3” slip op. at 4
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] would have at least a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related field of study with at least two years of experience implementing pollution control in power generation plants for natural gas, coal, and/or industrial waste incineration.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 48–51). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’218 patent and prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,926,218 - Axion Biosystems, Inc. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-01467 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8 and 11–15 were not shown unpatentable over Xu-752 and Jones because the proposed combination did not establish obvious millisecond time resolution.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) as of May 2009 “would have had a B.S. in electrical/mechanical/biomedical engineering or biological science, or a related field, and approximately 2 years of relevant experience or equivalent study in systems and methods for bioanalysis of cells.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23–25). Patent Owner adopts this definition for purposes of this proceeding. PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 19). We find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’508 patent and in the prior art of record. Accordingly, we apply Petitioner’s definition in this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“As used herein, “impedance measurement at millisecond time resolution” refers to the ability to perform a series of at least two consecutive impedance measurements within milliseconds of one another for each and every well of the system where each well is associated with an electrode array for impedance measurement. In each instance the time between two consecutive impedance measurements are less than 300 milliseconds from one another. Id. at 10:8–15. There does not appear to be any dispute as to the definitional nature of the first sentence in the passage above. That is, the parties agree that millisecond time resolution should be construed to mean: “the time between two consecutive impedance measurements for each and every well being evaluated in the claimed apparatus or system.” PO Resp. 15 (proposing construction); Pet. Reply. 23 (“Axion also agrees that the term ‘millisecond time resolution’ is ‘the time between two consecutive impedance measurements for each and every well being evaluated in the claimed apparatus or system.’”). The parties also agree that we do not need to determine whether the time interval between two consecutive impedance measurements is less than 300 milliseconds, as set forth in the definition portion of the specification, or whether it can be met by some other time interval, as suggested by other portions of the specification. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 23:49–55 (explaining that “[i]n some embodiments 500 millisecond time resolution is sufficient”), 24:37–39 (similar); PO Resp. 15 (arguing that “the distinction between 300 milliseconds and 500 milliseconds is immaterial to the dispute in this IPR because Jones teaches a 1.5 second update period, thus at least three times longer than the 500 milliseconds formulation”); Pet. Reply 23–24 (section headed “[Petitioner] Agrees That, In This IPR, The 300 Versus 500 Milliseconds Distinction is Immaterial To Addressing the Unpatentability of the Challenged Claims”), see also, Pet. Reply 24–26 (asserting that the claims are indefinite because it is not clear whether they require a 300 or a 500 millisecond time interval, but arguing that “the claims’ unpatentability can be determined without resolving the 300 versus 500 milliseconds indefiniteness issue”). We agree with the parties that “millisecond time resolution” should be construed to mean: “the time between two consecutive impedance measurements for each and every well being evaluated in the claimed apparatus or system.” PO Resp. 15; Pet. Reply. 23. We further agree that resolution of this case does not require that we determine whether the period between two consecutive impedance measurements is less than 300 or less than 500 milliseconds because Petitioner has not carried its burden under either time interval.” slip op. at 7
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1003 ¶ 179. But Dr. Kim does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statements. The notion that one can reduce the time between measurements by, e.g., reducing the number of frequencies measured, has intuitive appeal and appears mathematically correct. However, the absence of technical reasoning and supporting evidence diminishes the persuasiveness of Dr. Kim’s testimony that the POSA would made such modifications to reduce the time between measurements. Dr. Kim does provide some technical reasoning in connection with his discussion of eliminating all reference channels as a way to get the time resolution down to the levels required by, e.g., claim 14, which recites a millisecond time resolution of “less than 5 milliseconds.” See e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 172 (“A POSA seeking to study biological cell phenomena occurring on the order of a few milliseconds would have recognized that after measuring the reference network channels at the start, the reference network channels would not need measured again for some time, e.g., because temperature and other drift factors do not change appreciably on a millisecond time scale.”). However, even if we were to credit this testimony, Dr. Kim still lacks support and reasoning for the selection of the other parameters in his noreference-channel calculations. See, e.g., id. ¶ 173 (positing, but not providing technical reasoning for using, a no-reference-channel impedance system with 16 wells, a single 10kHz measurement frequency, and 16 daughter boards that measure simultaneously rather than sequentially).” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Given that Jones’s only exemplified embodiment targets a 1.5 second update period, that Jones does not suggest reducing the update period, and that much of Jones’s focus is on benefits other than speed of measurement, Jones’s impedance analyzer seems an unlikely choice for a POSA seeking to take measurements having millisecond time resolution. Put another way, we find no persuasive non-hindsight reason that supports Petitioner’s assertion that the POSA would have sought to apply Jones’s impedance analyzer to Xu-752’s system in order to take measurements in millisecond time resolution.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,906,508 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,906,508 - PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 11,835,421 - PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2025-01078 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–22, and 24–30, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. at 2. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1011, 5:18–21. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’371 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes “a person having at least a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or computer engineering, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field and at least two years of relevant experience in electronic gaming technology.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 22–26). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See Prelim. Resp. 13–14 (“Evolution does not set forth an alternative level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art”). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which comports with the teachings of the ’371 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “a first selected position . . . to have an increased payout . . . greater than a first non-selected payout.” See Pet. 25–27, 30, 35, 36. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Pet. 35–36 (“had the first selected position not been randomly selected, the player would only be eligible for the basic payout”). Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,756,371 - PTAB · Dec 17, 2025 · IPR2025-01072 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–3, 5–11, 13–19, and 21–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates claims 1, 9, and 17.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” Sur-reply 2. We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1001, 5:16–17. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’014 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Reference is prior artInstituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “first payout . . . wherein the first payout is higher.” See Pet. 32–36. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a first payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a second payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Id. at 35. Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,011,014 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01073 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5, 7–12, 14–18, and 20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kido anticipates at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Moreover, a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“At this juncture in the proceeding, and based on the current record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “payout,” as claimed, should be limited to “the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered.” We recognize, as Patent Owner points out, that the examples provided in the Specification are listed in odds format. See id. at 2. The Specification, however, also states that “[a]ny suitable payouts can be used in some embodiments.” Ex. 1005, 5:13–17. This language suggests a broader interpretation of “payout” beyond just payout odds and we therefore decline to import the wager limitation into the claim term. Although the ’024 patent generally describes payouts in terms of odds, like 49:1, the intrinsic record lacks clear evidence necessary to limit the claims as Patent Owner proposes.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Based on the evidence before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that Kido’s accumulated jackpot paid when landing on a star mark reads on the claimed “first payout . . . wherein the first payout is higher.” See Pet. 33–35. As explained above, the current record does not support limiting the term “payout” to just the amount a player will win in relation to the amount wagered. As Petitioner notes, a first payout that receives Kido’s accumulated Prog bonus payout is necessarily higher than a second payout that does not receive the Prog bonus. Pet. 35. Further, Kido even describes its bonus routines and jackpots as payouts. Kido describes, for example, that “[w]hen the privilege unit 113 obtains the win information from the special game value award mark win determining unit 112, it awards, as a payout, the game value stored in the accumulated game value memory 117” and it describes the “jackpot (JP) amount” as “a special payout.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 119, 129. Patent Owner next contends that Kido does not disclose a first payout that is “for the spin of the roulette wheel.” Prelim. Resp. 29. Patent Owner’s argument is premised on the cumulative nature of Kido’s Prog bonus – it builds with every spin of the roulette wheel until won. Id. (“Each time the wheel is spun, 0.5% of the amount wagered is added to the progressive jackpot, and thus, the jackpot’s value reflects multiple spins of the roulette wheel.”). Thus, according to Patent Owner, the value of the jackpot is determined using multiple spins of the roulette wheel and is not “for a spin of the roulette wheel” as claimed.” Id. at 30. The claims, however, only require a first payout that is higher than a second payout. Nothing prohibits the higher payout from accumulating from prior spins of the roulette wheel because, when it is actually won, it will be for that last spin of the roulette wheel. Ex. 1005, 8:35–36 (“indicating that the first player is to be paid at the first payout for the spin of the roulette wheel”). Regardless of how Kido’s Prog bonus accumulated, it is paid for a spin of the roulette wheel – at that juncture Kido discloses each claim element. Anticipation occurs when a prior art reference discloses every element of a patent claim at a point in time, as Kido does with a single spin of the roulette wheel that pays the Prog bonus. As persuasively explained by Petitioner, “the steps of Figure 12 (including A13) occur within a single round of roulette, for a single spin of the roulette wheel, until the routine ‘returns to the step of A1 and is transited to a next game.’” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1007 ¶ 233).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,629,024 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-01327 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Schwan-Lee and Schwan-Lee-Strickland obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’655 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent, and two years of work experience with network devices and communication technologies. EX1003, ¶¶17–19. Additional education might compensate for less experience, and vice versa. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–19).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The ’655 patent Specification states that: The topology data table 21 of the online server 20 is mainly recorded with a link data 49 between each of the P2P devices 41– 46 within the P2P device community. The link data 49 refers to the connection relationship between the P2P devices 41–46, which includes, but is not limited to, the connection structure, connection data and/or locations of connection. Ex. 1001, 4:51–57. On this preliminary record, we agree with Petitioner that the term “link data” is a “connection relationship between the P2P devices.” This meaning is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term within the context of the claim, that is, “link data” means data on the links (connections) between each of the P2P devices, where the Specification provides a more fulsome meaning that the term includes, at least, “the connection structure, connection data and/or locations of connection.” See id. at 4:55–57. We invite the parties to provide additional briefing on the construction of this term during trial.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Lee discloses that the P2P overlay is generated with the overlay generation unit 220 that generates the P2P overlay by analyzing information regarding “the corresponding application service, the peer, and the network,” where the network information “may include a network topology, a maximum bandwidth, a current network usage, [and] a transmission delay time, and the like.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 54. We determine that this disclosure provides support for Mr. Lett’s testimony that “Lee describes techniques for changing an overlay in response to changing network characteristics,” which could be beneficial. Ex. 1003 ¶ 48. Accordingly, on this preliminary record, we find this evidence is sufficient to support a rationale to combine Schwan and Lee. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious.”).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,727,655 - Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-01052 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 7–12, and 17–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–6 and 13–16 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted Watanabe combinations were unsupported.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–38). Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute and applies Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. PO Resp. 6. We find that Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’832 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Thus, we apply Petitioner’s proposal in our analysis.” slip op. at 13
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we construed “determin[ing] a viewing window for the visual content as a function of progress through the progress length” as “requiring determining a viewing window for different times of the video.” Inst. Dec. 21. Neither party disputes this construction. PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 1–7. We maintain this same construction.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Thomason are in the same field of endeavor. Thomason describes a camera and method for correctly orientating pictures from the camera. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1, 2 29–40, Figs. 3a–3b. In particular, Thomason is interested in rotating and cropping images to reduce the effect of poor orientation. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2, 34, 36). Pacurariu likewise describes aligning and resizing/cropping of a captured image to correct poor orientation. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 3, 45–56, Figs. 5A–5C. The preponderance of the evidence also supports that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the Pacurariu’s teachings with Thomason to predictably improve Thomason. Thomason teaches correct rotation of video data and makes use of rotation sensor to correct rotated images. Pet. 19–21 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–77). Pacurariu similarly uses sensors and measures tilt angle of the camera. Id at 21–22 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 51–52, Fig. 6; Ex. 1002 ¶ 78). Pacurariu further teaches that its tilt data angle can be stored for each “video frame.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 52). Petitioner, with support from credible testimony of Dr. Katsaggelos, explains how the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu could be successfully combined. Id. at 23 (citing, for example, Ex. 1002 ¶ 81). A person of ordinary skill in the art could have known that Thomason’s system could be improved by saving rotation data for each video frame and correcting images on a frame-by-frame basis. Id. at 23–24. The testimony of Dr. Katsaggelos is credible in this regard. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 80–81. Petitioner and Dr. Katsaggelos explain the references’ teachings and, based on these teachings, assert that a person having skill in the art would have had reason to combine with reasonable expectation of success based on those teachings. Reason to combine may properly come from the references themselves. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (explaining reason to combine may come from “interrelated teachings of multiple patents”). Based on the evidence presented, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Thomason and Pacurariu with a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 76–81, 89–92; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 4, 8–9, 27, 29, 35; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26, 41, 46, 51–52, 55–57, Figs. 6, 7.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner
“evaluating nexus between the claimed invention and objective evidence of nonobviousness, also referred to as secondary considerations. Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33 at 33 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020) (precedential). We first consider whether Patent Owner has demonstrated “that its products are coextensive (or nearly coextensive) with the challenged claims,” resulting in a rebuttable presumption of nexus. Id. at 33. If not, that “does not end the inquiry into secondary considerations”; “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Id. (quoting Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373–75).” slip op. at 62
Patent outcomesUS 11,336,832 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,336,832
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.