- Geneoscopy, Inc. v. Exact Sciences CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01330 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 4, and 12–19 are unpatentable as obvious under each asserted ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
- Expert testimonyOther
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“embody claims of the ’746 patent, the product has features not covered by the ’746 patent’s claims, some of which are critical unclaimed elements according to Patent Owner. Accordingly, Cologuard is not coextensive with the challenged claims, and no nexus between the product and the challenged claims is shown on this record.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“developed where the patient need not manipulate their fecal sample to portion it, but the law of obviousness does not require an option to be the best option to be obvious. For these reasons, bearing in mind that the ultimate burden here is always on Petitioner, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. We also reject Patent Owner’s argument that only impermissible” slip op. at 60
Patent outcomesUS 11,970,746 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,970,746 - Petitioner v. Intent Iq, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00129 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–152 are unpatentable over the asserted prior-art grounds; the Board also struck Section II of Petitioner’s reply claim-construction brief.
Nonecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,861,260 - Viant Techology LLC v. Intent Iq, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00422 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable based on the asserted obviousness grounds and struck Section II of Petitioner’s reply claim-construction brief.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“Decision issues pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14
- Strike new argumentGranted
“FURTHER ORDERED that Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief is stricken from the record; and” slip op. at 80
Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentableClaim constructioncites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,861,260 - Viant Technology, Inc. v. Intent Iq, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00128 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable based on obviousness grounds and struck Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Baig, Costa, and Zwicky. 5. Analysis of Claims 2–5, 7–9, 12, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26–28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 42, 44, 53, 54–58, 61, 62, 69, 71–80, 83, 84, 86–88, 91, 94, 96, 100, 101, 103, 106, 116–119, 122, 125, 128, 135, 137– 145, 147, 148, 151, and 152 Petitioner argues that the combination of Baig, Costa, and Zwicky teaches the limitations recited in claims 2–5, 7–9, 12, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26–28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 42, 44, 53, 54–58, 61, 62, 69, 71–80, 83, 84, 86–88, 91, 94, 96, 100, 101, 103, 106, 116–119, 122, 125, 128, 135, 137–145, 147, 148, 151, and 152 and that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 28–60; 422Pet. 29–51. Petitioner’s arguments are supported by citations to the prior art and the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Pet. 28–60; 422Pet. 29–51. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, agree with them, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as our own. Patent Owner does not separately address those claims. See PO Resp.; 422PO Resp. Instead, Patent Owner only relies on the arguments discussed above for claim 1. See PO Resp. 13–16; 422PO Resp. 13–16. For the same reason as discussed above in Section II.D.4(b), we do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding the reason to combine the references. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence” slip op. at 50
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted
“F. Sua Sponte Striking Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief Our order allowing post-hearing claim construction briefing stated that “[t]he parties may not address any issues besides claim construction.” Paper 38, 1. Despite that order, Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief addresses obviousness under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. See Pet. Reply Post-hearing Br. 2–3 (Titled: “The Petition’s Obviousness Theory Renders Claims 121 and 146 Obvious Even Under Patent Owner’s Improper Construction.”). Because the section is in violation of our order, we sua sponte strike that section. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.12.” slip op. at 74
Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,861,260 - Viant Techology LLC v. Intent Iq, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00421 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–152 unpatentable over the asserted prior art and struck Section II of Petitioner’s reply claim construction brief.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner has demonstrated by a” slip op. at 50
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“1. “Contracted to Display a TV Ad Petitioner argues that the term means “contracted to display any form” slip op. at 14
- Strike new argumentGranted
“F. Sua Sponte Striking Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief Our order allowing post-hearing claim construction briefing stated that “[t]he parties may not address any issues besides claim construction.” Paper 38, 1. Despite that order, Section II of Petitioner’s Reply Claim Construction Brief addresses obviousness under Patent Owner’s proposed construction. See Pet. Reply Post-hearing Br. 2–3 (Titled: “The Petition’s Obviousness Theory Renders Claims 121 and 146 Obvious Even Under Patent Owner’s Improper Construction.”). Because the section is in violation of our order, we sua sponte strike that section. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.12.” slip op. at 74
Patent outcomesUS 7,861,260 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,861,260 - Geneoscopy, Inc. v. Exact Sciences CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00459 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over each of the six asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Here, as in our Institution Decision, we do not discern a significant difference between the parties’ respective proposed definitions beyond the number of years of experience after obtaining a doctoral degree. Compare Pet. 12, with Prelim. Resp. 47, and Resp. 19–20; see also DI 7–8. Under either proposed definition, the ordinarily skilled artisan would have been very highly skilled and educated. For purposes of this Final Decision, we maintain that Patent Owner’s definition appears to be reasonable (and it falls between Petitioner’s two definitions asserted in the reexamination request and in the Petition). Further, Patent Owner’s proposed definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’781 patent itself, for example, Vilkin’s authors are a group of medical doctors and an editor of the journal is a PhD, Joost Louwagie, the named inventor of the ’781 patent, holds a PhD in Biochemistry, and the authors of Itzkowitz are medical doctors and PhDs. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see Ex. 1005, 3 (list of authors); Ex. 1016 (Dr. Louwagie profile); Ex. 1055; see also generally Reply (Petitioner did not contest our similar determination at Institution). Therefore, we adopt and use Patent Owner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, set forth above. C.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that no claim construction is necessary in this proceeding. See generally Pet. Similarly, Patent Owner states that it “does not believe that claim construction is necessary to resolve patentability” in this proceeding. Resp. 21. “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with the parties that no construction of any claim term is necessary for purposes of our Final Decision. D.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyOther
“Pet. 12. In support of these grounds for unpatentability, Petitioner relies on, inter alia, the 1st and 2nd Declarations of Duncan Whitney, PhD. Ex. 1002; Ex. 1080. In support of its positions, Patent Owner relies on, inter alia, the 1st and 2nd Declarations of Vadim Backman, PhD, and the Declaration of Peter Wood. Ex. 2001; Ex. 2022; Ex. 2023.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“We have no reasonable doubt that aspects of the Cologuard product practice the invention of the ’781 patent’s claims 1 and 3, which are most generally directed to steps of collecting two portions of a fecal sample at home, and combining a respective buffer stabilizer/preservative with each of the two portions for claim 1, and then processing those fecal samples by testing for blood and nucleic acids (e.g., DNA) for claim 3. These appear to be nearly the most basic steps for using the Cologuard kit. See generally Ex. 2032. And, these steps do illustrate a certain ease of use and consumerfriendliness that may be a contributing factor in Cologuard’s success. See, e.g., Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 140–142, 155, 158–159, 170–171.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 11,634,781 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,634,781 - Apple Inc. v. Willow Laboratories, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00296 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, 8, 10–13, 15, 17, 19–21, 23–26, and 28 are unpatentable as obvious over Abdul-Hafiz and Raley, or over Abdul-Hafiz, Raley, and Secker.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“appear to be that Patent Owner specifies that the POSITA’s knowledge and experience may include optical sensors and that the POSITA may have a degree emphasizing software. We do not deem these differences material, particularly because the optical sensors and technologies at issue are those used in physiological monitoring technologies. Moreover, both parties agree that the POSITA would have a working knowledge of physiological monitoring technologies. Ex. 1003 ¶ 22; Ex. 2079 ¶ 37. Nonetheless, we find the additional specificity of Patent Owner’s definition to be helpful. Also, Patent Owner’s definition appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’911 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the POSITA. We note, however, that we would reach the same outcome under either definition of the POSITA. See also PO Resp. 12 (Patent Owner asserting “under any proposed level of skill, the claims’ patentability is confirmed for at least the reasons set forth below.”).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Kenny’s explanation finds support in Raley, and we find his explanation credible. Ex. 1079 ¶¶ 9–11. We agree that Raley’s opening 26 has a vertical depth. In order for emitters 21, 22, 23, 24 to be flush with opening 26 as depicted in Raley’s Figure 3 (see PO Resp. 17–18 (arguing that LEDs are flush with opening 26)), the opening must have a depth to accommodate the thickness of the emitters. We further agree that opening 26 is within a solid body, namely interconnect cable 20. We also agree that, in view of the structure and function of Raley’s probe 40 and interconnect cable segment 20, a POSITA would have understood opening 26 is designed to receive the emitters therein. Given that Raley’s interconnect cable segment 20 includes opening 26 that is designed to receive emitters 21, 22, 23, 24 therein, Petitioner has persuaded us that Raley’s LEDs are recessed into a cavity under both the plain and ordinary meaning of “cavity” and Petitioner’s construction from the Delaware Litigation.” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“testimony regarding a POSITA’s understanding of Figure 11B of Abdul-Hafiz. Ex. 2079 ¶¶ 87–88. More pertinent to claim construction, however, is a POSITA’s understanding of the claim term in view of the Specification. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“As we stated in Vitronics, the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Circ. 1996))). In this regard, Petitioner points to Dr. Madisetti’s Rebuttal Expert Report, which was submitted on behalf of Patent Owner in the Delaware Litigation, where, upon reviewing the Specification of the ’911 patent for written description support for the claims, Dr. Madisetti testifies that “[a] POSITA would have known that the detection surface area of a given detector is essentially the entire surface area of the detector.” Ex. 1082 ¶ 912. During oral argument, Patent Owner attempts to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between this testimony and Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Tr. 34:20–36:12. In particular, Patent Owner asserts that, according to the ’911 patent Specification, the entire surface of the light-detecting side of the detector is the area that light reaches because there is “nothing blocking the entire area of the of the light-detecting side of the detector from receiving light.” Id. at 35:12–13. Patent Owner’s assertion, however, ignores EMI shield grid 2444 and foil 2450 that are placed on and at least partly cover the light-detecting side of the detector. Ex. 1001, 13:38–53, Fig. 24. Accordingly, we find Dr. Madisetti’s testimony regarding a POSITA’s understanding of the Petitioner’s construction, and we adopt Petitioner’s construction of “a detection surface area of the at least one detector” as the surface area of the light-detecting side of the detector.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“reasons against it in the Sur-reply, we are persuaded that a POSITA would have found it obvious to modify Abdul-Hafiz’s aperture to have an area smaller than the detection surface area to prevent optical noise sources such as ambient light and piped light reaching the detector. We disagree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not explain why a POSITA would have made Abdul-Hafiz’s aperture smaller than the detection surface area. Preventing optical noise sources explains why a POSITA would have made Abdul-Hafiz’s aperture smaller than the detection surface area because making the area of the aperture smaller than the detection surface area helps prevent optical noise sources from reaching the detector. Even if Abdul-Hafiz’s low noise housing 400 and fixed shield 1005 mitigate optical motivation to make something better. See Dystar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that an implicit motivation to combine exists . . . when the ‘improvement’ is technology-independent and the combination of references results in a product or process that is more desirable, for example because it is stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient.”). Adding an additional protection against optical noise by limiting the diameter of Abdul-Hafiz’s aperture would have enhanced the optical noise mitigation of the low noise housing and fixed shield. Moreover, apart from Abdul-Hafiz, Petitioner does not identify in the prior art an opening having a smaller area than a detection surface area. Petitioner, however, identifies a known relationship between the size of the opening relative to the detection surface area and preventing optical noise from ambient light and piped light. Pet. 50 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 3, 33); Reply 11–12 (citing Ex. 1011, 96–97, Fig. 6.6; Ex. 1079 ¶¶ 30–32; Ex. 1080 ¶ 73; Ex. 1081, 12:51–63, 14:19–47, 14:28–47). When one parameter is known to influence a specific result, such as the size of the opening relative to the detection surface area preventing optical noise, discovering the optimum value of the parameter is generally obvious. See In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (Fed. Cir. 1980) (“Discovery of an optimum value of a result effective variable in a known process is ordinarily within the skill of the art.” (citing In re Antoine, 559 F.2d 618 (CCPA 1977); In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454 (CCPA 1955))). Furthermore, we agree with Petitioner that the proposed modification to Abdul-Hafiz, namely reducing the area of the aperture to be smaller than the detection surface area, is simple and that a” slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 10,984,911 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,984,911 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 11, 2025 · IPR2023-01055 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claim 12 unpatentable over Grotmol and Hickman and denied the motion to amend because proposed substitute claims 21–29 were unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Director Review and remanding for further proceedings. Paper 49 (“Acting Director’s Decision” or “DR Dec.”). That Decision states agreement “that the Board’s analysis of claim 12 did not make separate factual findings.” DR Dec. 2. The Decision instructs us on remand “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to claim 12 and as to proposed substitute claim 21” and “[r]egardless of the Board’s disposition on remand, the Board should explain more fully its findings as to claim 12 and proposed substitute claim 21.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Written Decision regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally DR Req. Upon consideration of the full record including the arguments in Patent Owner’s Request for Director Review, we maintain that determination here. More specifically, considering the subject matter of the ’344 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for an ordinary level of skill, except we decline to adopt “at least” as that language is vague and open-ended. See 2024 Final Dec. 10–11. Accordingly, with that exception, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“the differences as compared to claim 1, including those findings and determinations set forth in a section of the 2024 Final Written Decision titled “Overview—Claims 6, 11, and 12” (id. at 65–67) and in the sections titled “Claim 12” and “Conclusion—Claims 6, 11, and 12” (id. at 83–86). Further, based on the complete record now before us, including Patent Owner’s Request for Director Review, for the reasons given in our 2024 Final Written Decision and our additional reasons given herein, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Grotmol and Hickman combination teaches the limitations of claim 12.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Director Review and remanding for further proceedings. Paper 49 (“Acting Director’s Decision” or “DR Dec.”). That Decision states agreement “that the Board’s analysis of claim 12 did not make separate factual findings.” DR Dec. 2. The Decision instructs us on remand “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to claim 12 and as to proposed substitute claim 21” and “[r]egardless of the Board’s disposition on remand, the Board should explain more fully its findings as to claim 12 and proposed substitute claim 21.” Id.” slip op. at 3
Patent outcomesUS 11,238,344 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,238,344 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 3, 2025 · IPR2023-01173 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10, 11, 25, 27, and 30 are unpatentable under § 103 over Grotmol, Grotmol and Hickman, or Grotmol and Hoffman.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with two to three years of work experience in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with a focus in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 41). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Jason Janet. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner “adopts” Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 5. We also adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim is construed using the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 5; PO Resp. 9. We determine that no claim terms require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability. See Sections II.D–II.F.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s arguments are unavailing. Grotmol teaches that a user may train a robot to learn “simple” and “complex” tasks. Ex. 1005, 24:17– 23. The evidence of record indicates that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to use different trainers “to train behaviors involving different levels of complexity in order to take advantage of the varying skills and knowledge of trainers.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 341. Thus, based on Grotmol’s teaching that a robot can learn both simple and complex tasks, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a specific reason for different users to train Grotmol’s robot for different behaviors, namely, to benefit from the users’ varying skills and knowledge. Pet. 25; Ex. 1003 ¶ 341; Ex. 1005, 24:17–23. Grotmol also teaches that a user may train a robot “using a gamepad (or other input device . . . ).” Ex. 1005, 26:9–13; see id. at 33:18–21. The evidence of record indicates that “switching users would be as simple as handing off a gamepad or other remote device used for controlling the robot from one user to another.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 73. Neither Patent Owner nor its declarant, Dr. Eli Saber, explains specifically why handing Grotmol’s gamepad to a different user would have created “complexities of combining the mixed knowledge into a single knowledgebase” or required “identifying each user to store particular learned operations and preferences in portions of the knowledgebase for user-specific autonomous operations.” See PO Resp. 14–15; PO Sur-reply 9; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 128–130. Thus, based on Grotmol’s teaching of using a gamepad to train a robot, it would have been simple and straightforward for different users to train Grotmol’s robot for different behaviors. Ex. 1005, 26:9–13, 33:18–21; Ex. 1010 ¶ 73.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“4. Reason to Combine Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the cited teachings of Grotmol and Hickman. Pet. 27–30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 159–166). We agree with Petitioner’s rationale. Specifically, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Grotmol and Hickman so that Grotmol’s robots share training sets using Hickman’s shared robot knowledgebase. Id. at 30; Ex. 1003 ¶ 166. Doing so would have been obvious because Grotmol teaches sharing training sets between robots, and Hickman’s shared robot knowledgebase would facilitate wider and faster sharing of Grotmol’s training sets. Pet. 27–29; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 160–161, 164; Ex. 1005, 33:27–32; Ex. 1007, 1:38–41, 5:41–46, 11:31–41. In addition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in using Hickman’s shared robot knowledgebase with Grotmol’s robot because Hickman’s shared robot knowledgebase would “not interfere” with Grotmol’s robot. Pet. 30; Ex. 1003 ¶ 166.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,055,583 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,055,583 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2023-01055 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 6–8, and 10–18 are unpatentable; cancellation of claims 4, 5, and 9 is granted, and proposed substitute claims 21–29 are unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyOther
“Accordingly, we maintain our determination at the institution stage” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“f) Conclusion—Proposed Substitute Claim 21 For the reasons given, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a” slip op. at 111
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“g) Conclusion—Disclaimed Claim 1 For the reasons given above and the reasons presented by Petitioner,” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“4. Claim 6 Claim 6 depends from claim 3 and recites the following:” slip op. at 73
Patent outcomesUS 11,238,344 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,238,344
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.