- Alivecor, Inc. v. Apple Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jul 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00095 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied AliveCor’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution because the Petterson–Nakada combinations did not teach or suggest the claimed replacement of one user interface with another.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if substantial evidence does not support a factual finding, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Reh’g Req. 8 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c)). Also, 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) sets forth, in relevant part that: rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Our determinations regarding Nakada did not support Petitioner’s argument that Nakada’s “system is returned to the beginning state of the routine, which in the case of Petterson would be FIG. 2B.” Pet. 71; Dec. 39–40. We also stated that “the proposed combination does not address adequately Nakada’s description of powering down its display.” Id. at 40 (citing Pet. 48–50; Prelim. Resp. 25–26; Ex. 1011, Fig. 4). We, thus, determined Petitioner failed to show sufficiently that either Petterson or Nakada teaches or suggests “replacing display of the second user interface with the first user interface.” Dec. 38–41 (citing Pet. 48–50, 68–69, 70–71; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 379, 382; Ex. 1011, Fig. 4). The “totality of the combination” lacked replacing a user interface with any other user interface. Dec. 40–41 (determining “the asserted references neither individually nor combined as proposed would have, ‘in response to detecting that the first criteria are no longer met for a second period of time that is longer than the first period of time, replac[ed] display of the second user interface with the first user interface’”); Reh’g Req. 8 (arguing “the Board overlooked the totality of the combination and Petitioner’s arguments and supporting evidence regarding the modification of Petterson that would have been obvious . . . in view of Nakada”).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“After considering the arguments and cited evidence of the Petition, we determined that Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’533 patent. Paper 7 (“Decision” or “Dec.”). Petitioner subsequently filed a Request for Rehearing. Paper 8 (“Reh’g Req.”). For the reasons stated below, Petitioner has not shown that we abused our discretion in denying the Petition, and thus, Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 2
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,568,533 - Askeladden, L.L.C. v. Ohva, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Mar 15, 2024 · IPR2023-00921 · APJ Amee A Shah · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s rehearing request and instituted IPR of claims 1–4 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing based on the preliminary construction of “transaction data.”
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“institute has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, and the request for rehearing must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its papers. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“Although the ’286 patent distinguishes “account data” from “transaction data” in the embodiment of Figure 11, the “transaction data” is submitted by the user to perform a series of banking transactions after manually entering a PIN code, whereas the “account data” is stored on the server, and the token information is accepted from the smart card’s embedded token, i.e., the output interface of the transaction card. See Ex. 1001, 10:12–18, 10:30–35, 10:40–42, 11:21–22, 11:65–12:4, 12:22–36. Thus, the claimed “transaction data” that is “accepted . . . from an output interface of a transaction card” and “accepted . . . from a transaction card at an input interface of the card reader,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 3, comprises data stored on and read from a card, such as an ID number, password, authentication information, or session information, that can be used to facilitate a transaction. Such claimed “transaction data” is distinct from the “transaction data” described in connection with the Figure 11 embodiment. We therefore do not limit the claimed “transaction data” and instead preliminarily construe that term as encompassing any data involved in a transaction, including account data. As described above, the claimed transaction data must come from the output interface of a transaction card. Should either party believe that a different construction should apply in the instituted trial, it should explain the proposed construction, how the construction is supported by the record, and how the construction affects our unpatentability analysis.” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateInstituted
“The dispute relates to whether the ’030 application describes the claimed “smart telephone” accepting transaction data and executing coded instructions to convert the analog signal to digital data representing transaction data as digital data. See Pet. 14–15, 19–27. In Petitioner’s view, that term is supported only by language added to the “Brief Summary of the Invention” during prosecution of the application resulting in the ’286 patent. Id. at 17. In contrast, argues Petitioner, the corresponding section of the ’030 application instead describes transmitting sound to a PC, not a smart telephone. Id. at 19–26. Patent Owner submits that the ’030 application describes generating sounds from a smart phone and using a “key jack sound pass generator” to communicate sounds. Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner contends that the claim language is supported by disclosure of receiving the audio signal at a microphone port and converting the signal to transaction data. Id. at 16–18. Patent Owner points also to description of direct communication between a “client device” and server. Id. at 19. On the present record, we find that Petitioner, at this stage in the proceeding, has shown sufficiently how it contends that the earliest possible effective filing date for claims 1–4 of the ’286 patent is March, 3, 2015, such that the Cho, Aaron, Carpenter, and de Geer references qualify as prior art. Patent Owner has identified a factual dispute regarding the significance of the ’030 application’s disclosures, and we view that dispute as best resolved through trial.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) provides that one of the “Requirements of Petition” is that “the petition identifies all real parties in interest.” “Whether a non-party is a RPI is a ‘highly fact-dependent question’ and must be considered on a case-by-case basis.” SharkNinja Operating LLC. v. IROBOT Corp., No. IPR2020-00735, 2020 WL 6050687, at *4 (PTAB Oct. 13, 2020) (precedential) (citing Ventex Co. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 148 at 6 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (Paper 148) (precedential) (citing Office Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012))). Here, addressing whether TCH is an unnamed RPI would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315. There is no allegation or evidence that TCH is “barred or estopped from this proceeding or that Petitioner purposefully omitted [TCH] to gain some advantage.” SharkNinja at *4. Rather, Patent Owner argues that for “once again willfully fail[ing] to identify TCH as a real party in interest, . . . the Petition should be denied on that basis.” Prelim. Resp. 7. In other words, Patent Owner contends only that we deny institution because of “the alleged failure of a procedural requirement that can be corrected under our precedent.” SharkNinja at *4. We understand that” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,679,286 - Arconic Technologies LLC v. Novelis Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 2, 2022 · DER2018-00004 · APJ James T Moore · DER · Rehearing
The Board denied Arconic’s rehearing request, leaving in place denial of institution because it had not shown sufficiently corroborated prior conception for derivation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing an abuse of discretion, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“documents cited by Petitioner for each of the six steps of claim 22 and explained why they were insufficient to corroborate Mr. Marinelli’s testimony. Id. at 16–22. We concluded that “[s]ubstantial evidence does not support Petitioner’s assertion that its inventors conceived of the inventions allegedly communicated to Respondent’s inventors (i.e., the six-step processes of each of Respondent’s claims)” and denied institution of a derivation proceeding. Id. at 23.” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“[w]e are not informed as to which of Mr. Marinelli, Mr. Dennis, and Mr. Shoemaker conceived what portions of the invention of claim 22 or how the three individuals jointly conceived of the recited process. Petitioner provides no explanation as to what the contributions of each individual were (other than that they were all “involved” in the development of the A951 process), the circumstances surrounding those contributions, or even when conception occurred. Indeed, Mr. Marinelli testifies that Petitioner began development of chromium-free aluminum pretreatments that provided the same performance characteristics of a chromate conversion coating in 1992 and that the development work spanned “the next two decades,” but does not explain when during that time he conceived of the process of claim 22 with Mr. Dennis and Mr. Shoemaker. Again, there is no meaningful information provided about what work was done by whom or the circumstances under which the claimed invention was conceived, other than a general assertion that it was Petitioner undertaking the work.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“a trial, a party may file a motion to expunge confidential information from the record.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.56. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 21–22, available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (“Trial Practice Guide”), provides: Confidential information that is subject to a protective order ordinarily would become public 45 days after denial of a petition to institute a trial or 45 days after final judgment in a trial. There is an expectation that information will be made public where the existence of the information is referred to in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute a review or is identified in a final written decision following a trial. A party seeking to maintain the confidentiality of information, however, may file a motion to” slip op. at 13
NonePatents in suitUS 11,807,942 - Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. / Husky Injection Molding Systems, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00439 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place its discretionary denial of institution under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“applied the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics. Inst. Dec. 8–20. The two-part framework is: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. In applying the two-part framework, we considered several nonexclusive factors, including:” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,457,437 - Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. / Husky Injection Molding Systems, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00438 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Husky’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the petition relied on art or arguments previously presented to the Office.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). In that respect, section 325(d) provides that the Director may elect not to institute a proceeding if the challenge to the patent is based on matters previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 7 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”).” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,214,312 - Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. / Husky Injection Molding Systems, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00437 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Husky’s rehearing request, leaving in place the discretionary denial of institution under § 325(d) across the related proceedings.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for patent owner
“In evaluating the parties’ contentions concerning section 325(d), we applied the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics. Inst. Dec. 8–20. The two-part framework is: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. In applying the two-part framework, we considered several nonexclusive factors, including: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (“Becton, Dickinson”). After review of factors (a), (b), and (d), we determined that the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, and addressed factors (c), (e), and (f) as to whether Petitioner demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Further, we note that Petitioner argued that discretionary denial was unwarranted under § 325(d) in its Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. See e.g., Paper 17, 1–6. These arguments focused on Colloud and did not mention The US Standard. See id. We could not have abused our discretion by overlooking an argument that discretionary denial was unwarranted based on the inclusion of The US Standard, when Petitioner did not make such an argument in its Reply.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,214,311 - Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. / Husky Injection Molding Systems, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00436 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Husky’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art or arguments had previously been presented.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“applied the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics. Inst. Dec. 8–20. The two-part framework is: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. In applying the two-part framework, we considered several nonexclusive factors, including:” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,266,299 - Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. / Husky Injection Molding Systems, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00435 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place the discretionary denial of institution under § 325(d) because the rehearing request showed no abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“unreasonable judgement in weighing the Becton, Dickinson[] factors underlying Advanced Bionics’[s] framework and thus abuse its discretion.” Req. Reh’g. 1. We have considered all of Petitioner’s allegations of error, but are not persuaded that we abused our discretion by denying institution pursuant to section 325(d). The alleged errors amount to no more than mere disagreement with our weighing of the Becton, Dickinson factors in the Advanced Bionics’s framework. Mere disagreement is not a proper basis for rehearing.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“applied the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics. Inst. Dec. 8–20. The two-part framework is: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. In applying the two-part framework, we considered several nonexclusive factors, including:” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,023,345 - Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. / Husky Injection Molding Systems, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00434 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Husky’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“applied the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics. Inst. Dec. 8–20. The two-part framework is: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. In applying the two-part framework, we considered several nonexclusive factors, including:” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,738,409 - Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. / Husky Injection Molding Systems, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Jan 7, 2021 · IPR2020-00429 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Husky’s rehearing request, leaving in place the § 325(d) denial of institution based on previously presented art or arguments.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for patent owner
“Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph) (“Becton, Dickinson”). After review of factors (a), (b), and (d), we determined that the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, and addressed factors (c), (e), and (f) as to whether Petitioner demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,033,168
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.