- Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 14, 2015 · IPR2014-00970 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 14, 15, 19–25, and 27–34 are unpatentable; the Board found other challenged claims not shown unpatentable on the grounds decided.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The difference in the opinions of the two experts is that Dr. Sechen believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have an additional four years of experience, education, or a combination of the two, beyond that proposed by Dr. Alpert. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 7. According to Dr. Alpert, the difference in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art is not material to any dispute over claim construction or patentability in this inter partes review. Id. We accord greater weight to Dr. Alpert’s opinion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art because he has experience in both teaching students and working with engineers in the industry, while Dr. Sechen’s experience is primarily in teaching. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 7, 21 with Ex. 2012 ¶¶ 3, 5. Moreover, based on our review of the ’434 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’434 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Dr. Alpert’s opinion on the level of ordinary skill. Accordingly, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’434 patent would have a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The above disclosure uses the term “operable independently” to describe the data handlers as being discrete and functioning without being physically or logically connected to each other. Based on our review of the ’434 patent, the specification and claim 27 both use the term “operable independently” in the same manner, i.e., to describe a feature of the data handler that is distinct from its data generation feature. We agree with Petitioner, therefore, that when interpreted in the context of the ’434 patent in its entirety, the claim term “operable independently” “merely means that each data handler can operate without influence or control by any of the other data handlers.” Reply 5. The ’434 patent specification uses the term “operable independently” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, and we find no basis for applying the narrower construction advanced by Patent Owner to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we interpret “operable independently” as “operable without influence or control by another.” See Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1278–79.” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Based on the above description in Averbuj, we agree with Patent Owner that Averbuj describes memory interfaces (the alleged data handlers) that are configured to produce address and control signals, and that Averbuj describes producing address and control signals in certain circumstances, e.g., when Averbuj’s sequencer (the alleged control module) specifies writing data in a particular pattern that requires transformation to conform to a particular configuration of a memory module. See PO Resp. 33. We also agree with Petitioner, however, that Averbuj’s memory interfaces are further configured to apply to the memory modules the same address and control signals received from, and produced by, the sequencers for testing (see Reply 15), e.g., when the sequencer sends signals that can be applied, without modification or transformation (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 56), directly to a memory module irrespective of its physical configuration. Thus, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Averbuj’s sequencer meets the limitation of “a control module configured to generate address and control signals for testing the memory devices” as recited in challenged independent claims 1, 20, and 29 of the ’434 patent.” slip op. at 41
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed in Section IV.B.2.e., a petition must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent” (37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2)), and “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response” (37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). We agree with Patent Owner that the Reply does more than merely respond to or rebut arguments made in Patent Owner’s Response; rather, it sets forth a theory that was not presented clearly in the Petition. Patent Owner’s position is supported by the fact that Dr. Sechen, whose skill level is at least (and appears to exceed) that of the ordinary artisan, apparently was unable to envision how Huang and Averbuj could be combined. Further, Dr. Alpert’s second declaration includes, at a minimum, opinions as to the understanding of the ordinary artisan with respect to the teachings of Huang and Averbuj that were not presented in his first declaration. In our judgment, consideration by the Board of the above-noted arguments in the Reply and evidence presented in Dr. Alpert’s second declaration in support thereof would be improper under 37 CFR § 42.23 and unfair to Patent Owner. We have, however, reviewed and considered the arguments in the Petition and evidence therein, and are in agreement with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not provided adequate explanation or evidence to support its contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Huang and Averbuj. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 7–12, 17, 18, 20–25, 27, 28, and 30–35 would have been unpatentable over Huang and Averbuj.” slip op. at 59
Patent outcomesUS 8,001,434 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,001,434 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00134 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied the petitions because Acxiom did not establish standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDenied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed 3 AAA also is listed as a real party-in-interest. Pet. 3. Petitioner, however, provides no argument or evidence as to why it believes that AAA is a real party-ininterest of Petitioner. Thus, we have no basis to ascertain whether Petitioner may above, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show what services, if any, Petitioner provides to Gerber. Therefore, Petitioner does not provide us with evidence sufficient to show that Gerber is a real party-in-interest of Petitioner. Also, the heavily redacted Agreement does not provide us with sufficient evidence regarding the relationship between these entities to show that Gerber is a privy of Petitioner sufficient to support Petitioner’s argument for standing. Thus, we do not have sufficient evidence to show that Petitioner has proper standing to bring this Petition. Therefore, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute a covered business method review of the challenged claims. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,709 (Aug. 14, 2012) (Response to Comment 102) (“Facially improper standing is a basis for denying the petition without proceeding to the merits of the decision.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits base its standing on its relationship with AAA. See Acxiom Corp. v. Phoenix Licensing, LLC, Case CBM2015-00068, slip. op at 4–6 (PTAB Aug. 11, 2015) (Paper 23). 1128 and 1129 to be UNSEALED forty-five (45) days after the entry date of this decision.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,234,184 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00137 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied the petitions because Acxiom did not establish standing to seek covered business method review; it did not reach the merits of the challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied
“their real parties-in-interest or privies that have been sued or charged with infringement of a “covered business method patent,” which does not include patents for “technological inventions.” AIA §§ 18(a)(1)(B), 18(d)(1); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302. Of key importance in this case is the requirement that “a person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphases added); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Regarding this requirement, Petitioner does not allege that it has been charged with or sued for infringement, but instead contends that its” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,890,366 - Acxiom And Gerber v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00139 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Acxiom did not show it had standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,860,744 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00138 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Acxiom did not establish standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed” slip op. at 5
- ExcludeDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits base its standing on its relationship with AAA. See Acxiom Corp. v. Phoenix Licensing, LLC, Case CBM2015-00068, slip. op at 4–6 (PTAB Aug. 11, 2015) (Paper 23). 1128 and 1129 to be UNSEALED forty-five (45) days after the entry date of this decision.” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,738,435 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00136 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not establish standing to seek covered business method review, failing to show it was a real party-in-interest or privy of a sued entity.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,856,375 - Acxiom Corporation / Gerber Life Insurance Company et al. v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00135 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Acxiom did not show that Gerber was its real party in interest or privy, leaving Acxiom without CBM standing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDenied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,999,938 - Acxiom Corporation v. Phoenix Licensing, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00140 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution because Acxiom did not establish standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied
“authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 5,987,434 - Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited / Fujitsu Semiconductor America, Inc. et al. v. Zond, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 3, 2015 · IPR2014-00828 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 30–37, 39, and 40 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over Iwamura, Angelbeck, and Pinsley, with Wells or Lovelock added for specified dependent claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Zond’s expert, Dr. Larry D. Hartsough, also testifies that, in the context of the ’779 patent, one with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood that a plasma includes charged particles (ions and electrons), as well as neutral atoms—namely, ground state atoms, excited atoms, and metastable atoms—because not every atom is ionized. Ex. 1223, 42:9–43:17. We observe that the ’779 patent uses the term “plasma” in accordance with its ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one with ordinary skill in the art. For instance, the Specification of the ’779 patent states that “[a] plasma is a collection of charged particles that move in random directions,” and further explains that a plasma also includes excited and metastable atoms. Ex. 1201, 1:7–8, 8:43–48. We are cognizant that, in an ideal situation, a plasma can be fully ionized, which contains only charged particles (ions and electrons). Ex. 1223, 42:9–43:17. Based on the evidence before us, we construe the claim term “plasma” as “a collection of ions, electrons, ground state atoms, excited atoms, and metastable atoms,” consistent with the term’s ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the Specification of the ’779 patent.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelOther
“teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1262. We also recognize that prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480 (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)); Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1259–1262. Notwithstanding that Dr. Hartsough provides a definition of “a person of ordinary skill in the 10 art” in the context of the ’779 patent,5 we are mindful that the level of ordinary skill in the art also is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the evidence in this record, we credit Dr. Kortshagen’s testimony (Ex. 1221 ¶¶ 39–46, 58–59) that magnets, such as those disclosed in Pinsley and Angelbeck, generate a magnetic field that substantially traps electrons in a plasma apparatus. Notably, the Admitted Prior Art (Figure 1 of the ’779 patent) discloses a plasma sputtering apparatus, having magnets that generate a magnetic field to trap electrons. Ex. 1201, 3:9–18 (“The magnetic field 132 is shaped to trap and concentrate secondary electrons proximate to the target surface.”). Dr. Hartsough acknowledges that, since the mid-1970s, using magnets for trapping electrons in magnetron sputtering systems was well-known in the art. Ex. 1223, 20:13–21:1. Both Dr. Kortshagen’s testimony (Ex. 1221 ¶¶ 39–46, 58–59) and Dr. Hartsough’s cross-examination testimony (Ex. 1223, 123:4–13) are consistent with the prior art of record, including the Admitted Prior Art, which recognizes a magnetic field is strongest at the poles of the magnet and weakest in the region at the center between the poles (Ex. 1201, 3:12–13). As discussed above, the prior art of record clearly shows that it was well-known in the art at the time of the invention to use magnets in a plasma apparatus for trapping electrons. Based on the prior art of record, we agree with Dr. Kortshagen that “the use of magnets and their corresponding magnetic fields to trap electrons . . . was already known in the prior art,” at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1221 ¶ 37.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Here, GlobalFoundries relies upon Angelbeck and Pinsley to show that generating a magnetic field to trap electrons in a plasma apparatus was well-known in the art at the time of the invention. Pet. 47–49, 52, 54–55. Indeed, both Angelbeck and Pinsley teach the use of a magnet to generate a magnetic field for increasing the efficiency of exciting atoms in a plasma apparatus. Ex. 1205, 2:43–48; Ex. 1206, 1:36–41. Zond’s expert, Dr. Hartsough, also acknowledges that, since the mid-1970s, using magnets for trapping electrons in magnetron sputtering systems was well-known in the art. Ex. 1223, 20:13–21:1. Moreover, the Admitted Prior Art (Figure 1 of the ’779 patent) discloses a plasma sputtering apparatus, having magnets that generates magnetic field to trap electrons. Ex. 1201, 3:9–18 (“The magnetic field 132 is shaped to trap and concentrate secondary electrons proximate to the target surface.”). Given the evidence before us, we agree with Dr. Kortshagen that one with ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated, in view of Angelbeck and Pinsley, to use a magnet with Iwamura’s pre-excitation unit and first plasma generation unit—which are located proximate to the ground 30 state atoms source (gas supply 20)—for generating a magnetic field to trap electrons, in order to increase the efficiency of excitation of ground state atoms. Ex. 1202 ¶¶ 120, 140–41. We credit Dr. Kortshagen’s testimony, as it is consistent with the disclosures of Angelbeck and Pinsley, and other prior art of record. Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions and the evidence in this entire record, we determine that GlobalFoundries has demonstrated that combining the technical disclosures of Iwamura, Angelbeck, and Pinsley is merely a predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). Therefore, GlobalFoundries has provided an articulated reason with rational underpinnings for modifying Iwamura in view of Angelbeck and Pinsley. X-ray radiation” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 6,805,779 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,805,779 - Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited / Fujitsu Semiconductor America, Inc. et al. v. Zond, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 3, 2015 · IPR2014-00917 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7, 9, 20, 21, 38, and 44 are unpatentable under § 103(a) over the specified combinations of Iwamura, Angelbeck, and Pinsley with Gruber or Wells.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). In that regard, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1262. We also recognize that prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480 (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)); Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1259–1262. Notwithstanding 10 that Dr. Hartsough provides a definition of “a person of ordinary skill in the art” in the context of the ’779 patent,6 we are mindful that the level of ordinary skill in the art also is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“context of the ’779 patent, one with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood that a plasma includes charged particles (ions and electrons), as well as neutral atoms—namely, ground state atoms, excited atoms, and metastable atoms—because not every atom is ionized. Ex. 1419, 42:9–43:17. We observe that the ’779 patent uses the term “plasma” in accordance with its ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one with ordinary skill in the art. For instance, the Specification of the ’779 patent states that “[a] plasma is a collection of charged particles that move in random directions,” and further explains that a plasma also includes excited and metastable atoms. Ex. 1401, 1:7–8, 8:43–48. We are cognizant that, in an ideal situation, a plasma can be fully ionized, which contains only charged particles (ions and electrons). Ex. 1419, 42:9–43:17. 9 Based on the evidence before us, we construe the claim term “plasma” as “a collection of ions, electrons, ground state atoms, excited atoms, and metastable atoms,” consistent with the term’s ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the Specification of the ’779 patent.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Here, GlobalFoundries relies upon Angelbeck and Pinsley to show that generating a magnetic field to trap electrons in a plasma apparatus was well-known in the art at the time of the invention. Pet. 44–47. Indeed, both Angelbeck and Pinsley teach the use of a magnet to generate a magnetic field for increasing the efficiency of exciting atoms in a plasma apparatus. Ex. 1405, 2:43–48; Ex. 1406, 1:36–41. Zond’s expert, Dr. Hartsough, also acknowledges that, since the mid-1970s, using magnets for trapping electrons in magnetron sputtering systems was well-known in the art. Ex. 1419, 20:13–21:1. Moreover, the Admitted Prior Art (Figure 1 of the ’779 patent) discloses a plasma sputtering apparatus, having magnets that generates magnetic field to trap electrons. Ex. 1401, 3:9–18 (“The magnetic field 132 is shaped to trap and concentrate secondary electrons proximate to the target surface.”). Given the evidence before us, we agree with Dr. Kortshagen that one with ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated, in view of Angelbeck and Pinsley, to use a magnet with Iwamura’s pre-excitation unit and first plasma generation unit—which are located proximate to the ground state atoms source (gas supply 20)—for generating a magnetic field to trap electrons, in order to increase the efficiency of excitation of ground state atoms. Ex. 1402 ¶ 139. We credit Dr. Kortshagen’s testimony, as it is 34 consistent with the disclosures of Angelbeck and Pinsley, and other prior art of record. Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions and the evidence in this entire record, we determine that GlobalFoundries has demonstrated that combining the technical disclosures of Iwamura, Angelbeck, and Pinsley is merely a predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). Therefore, GlobalFoundries has provided an articulated reason with rational underpinnings for modifying Iwamura in view of Angelbeck and Pinsley. Trapping electrons and ions” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 6,805,779 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,805,779
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