• Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Gosecure, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 12, 2026 · IPR2025-00070 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–7, and 9–21 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2 and 8 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted art did not meet their construed limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “III. ANALYSIS LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL A. Petitioner explains the applicable level of skill in the art as follows: As of June 24, 2010, a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would be a person having a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, as well as two years of industry experience and who would have had a working knowledge of software security analysis, and dynamic malware analysis. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 8 (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See Ex. 2031 ¶¶ 15–16. We adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’872 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We begin with the claim language in view of the Specification, which weighs heavily against Patent Owner’s position that we should rewrite “computer system” as narrowly referring to a “computing device.” PO Resp. 24. As Petitioner notes, the ’872 patent’s Specification uses “computer system” to refer to a wide range of equipment, from a component of a computing device, to a whole computing device, to a collection of computing devices. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:5–8, 11:15–18, 16:50–55). In one example, the Specification refers to “one or more other computer systems (e.g., protected network devices 136).” Ex. 1001, 18:52–53. Thus, the Specification lists “protected network devices 136” as only an example of “other computer systems,” demonstrating that “computer systems” refers to things other than protected network devices. Although Patent Owner may be correct that this passage more than a single computing device,” we find that other disclosures in the ’872 patent do. Specifically, the Specification uses the language “distributed computer system” when referring to numerous components, including “protected network devices” and an “IDS/IPS system.” Ex. 1001, 3:26–28; Reply 10. In addition to showing that a “computer system” is not limited to a single computing device, this conveys that a “computer system” according to the ’872 patent can include an IDS/IPS.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Based on our review of the complete record, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to be more persuasive. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s argument and evidence that capturing detailed information like Goel’s activity sources, activity targets, and association was recognized as enhancing threat analysis. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 79); see PO Resp. 55–59; Sur-Reply 15–17. Additionally, contrary to Patent Owner’s suggestion, we find that the Petition does not propose incorporating Goel’s kernel hooks into Capalik’s system. See Pet. 41–46. Patent Owner contends that the Petition’s reference to modifying Capalik by “adding lines of code” suggests implementing the code disclosed in Goel include kernel hooks. Id. Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s assertion otherwise, this is an unpersuasive bodily incorporation argument, as the Petition never says an ordinarily skilled artisan would have used the exact lines of code from Goel in Capalik. Rather, the Petition says that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had sufficient skill to implement straightforward code modifications to identify activity sources, targets, and associations: a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood that modifying Capalik’s system (e.g., Linux-based) to additionally monitor, identify, and store each individual activity of an attack including “activity sources, activity targets, and associations” would have required straightforward modifications to programs/code instructions, which would have been well-within the skillset of a [person of ordinary skill in the art]. Pet. 46. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not explain how an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Capalik without using kernel hooks. Sur-Reply 17. But Patent Owner does not cite any evidence to counter Dr. Jakobsson’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had the skill to apply Goel’s general teaching of identifying sources, targets, and associations to Capalik’s system. Ex. 1003 ¶ 182. On the whole, the evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position that the combination would have required substantially increased detection risk. Moreover, even if the combination would have somewhat increased detection risk, Petitioner persuades us that an ordinarily skilled artisan still would have had reason to combine the references teachings. Patent Owner’s allegations of increased detection risk do not negate the undisputed evidence that the combination would have provided the advantage of improved threat analysis. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 175–182). Ultimately, Patent Owner’s that activity logging be undetectable.” PO Resp. 56 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 6). This exaggerates Capalik’s disclosure. Although the cited paragraph suggests that certain systems unfortunately may be detectable by some users, it does not convey that it is a requirement for the system to be categorically undetectable. See Ex. 1004 ¶ 6.8 In sum, Petitioner persuades us by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have been obvious to modify Capalik “to identify and store unauthorized activities including the activity source, activity target, and association of each activity.” Pet. 41–46; PO Resp. 55–59; Reply 20–22; Sur-Reply 15–17.” slip op. at 47

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner

    “arguments and evidence, we determine that Patent Owner fails to sufficiently show a nexus between any of its objective indicia evidence and the claimed invention. See Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The patentee bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists”). A showing of sufficient nexus is required to establish that the evidence relied upon traces its basis to a novel element in the claim, not to something in the prior art. Institut Pasteur & Universite Pierre Et Marie Curie v. Focarino, 738 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Objective evidence that results from something that is not “both claimed and novel in the claim” lacks a nexus to the merits of the invention. In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted). Thus, establishing nexus involves a showing that novel elements in the claim, not prior-art elements, account for the objective evidence of nonobviousness. Id. As discussed above, Petitioner shows that Capalik teaches all limitations of claim 1. Petitioner persuades us that none of claim 1’s elements individually nor any combination thereof is novel over Capalik’s disclosure. Accordingly, claim 1 is not novel over Capalik, which disproves Patent Owner’s assertion of nexus. PO Resp. 73–76. Moreover, even if claim 1 were novel, Patent Owner otherwise fails to show nexus for its commercial success, praise, or copying assertions. Patent Owner’s evidence does not show that Petitioner’s commercial product embodies claim 1. For example, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “failed to analyze any meaningful detail regarding” how the Falcon Platform allegedly meets limitation 1(d). Reply 28–29. In particular, Patent Owner has not sufficiently addressed limitation 1(d) with the following argument: “1[D] The Falcon Platform transmitted to other computer systems” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 9,954,872 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,954,872
• Everstar Merchandise Co., Ltd. v. Willis Electric Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 18, 2025 · PGR2019-00056 · APJ Stacey G White · PGR · Remand

  Claims 2–7, 9–19, 21–25, 27, 30, 31, and 33 are unpatentable as obvious; Petitioner did not prove claims 8, 20, 26, 28, 29, and 32 unpatentable.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandMixed

    “The Federal Circuit found that “[t]he factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan,” concluding “[n]othing more is required to establish a motivation to combine.” Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4. The Federal Circuit observed that “Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1,” and accordingly, “reverse[d] the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate[d] the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent,” remanding to us for further proceedings. Id. at 4–5. With those instructions in mind, we review the Petitioner’s allegations regarding claims 2–33.” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “F. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the First Final Written Decision, we determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have (1) at least two years of experience in the design of decorative lighting, or (2) at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field, and a basic familiarity with circuits used in decorative lighting.” Paper 40, 12. We see no reason to depart from that earlier determination.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties agree that we do not need to construe any claim terms. Pet. 8–9; PO Resp. 16–17. We likewise agree. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner did not dispute that the combined teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose each limitation of claim 1. Patent Owner, however, did dispute Petitioner’s proposed reasons for combining Kumada and Debladis ’120, and argues that Debladis ’120 is not analogous art. PO Resp. 36–61. The Federal Circuit stated that substantial evidence only supports the conclusion that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120. The factual record and Willis’s concession on appeal conclusively establish that the cost of copper was a known problem in the art, Debladis ’120 (and Kumada) helped address that issue, and Willis has not disputed that combining the teachings of Kumada and Debladis ’120 was within the skill of an ordinary artisan. Nothing more is required to establish a motivation to combine. Given that Willis has conceded that the combination of Kumada and Debladis ’120 disclose all the limitations in claim 1, we reverse the Board’s patentability determination as to that claim and vacate the Board’s judgment as to the remaining claims of the ’037 patent. Everstar II, 2025 WL 1501940, 4 (internal citations omitted). The Federal Circuit further noted Patent Owner’s secondary considerations arguments as to claim 1 and stated [t]he cited evidence consists only of a temporal connection between the introduction of Willis’s invention and the UL 588 standards, and deposition testimony of a single witness who seemingly disclaimed any connection between the two. This is not sufficient to rescue a claim as to secondary considerations. Id. at 4, n. 5 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ruled that claim 1 would have been obvious over Kumada and Debladis ’120. 6. Analysis of Independent Claim 33” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,222,037 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,222,037
• Siemens Mobility, Inc. / Ground Transportation Systems USA Inc. et al. v. Metrom Rail, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00468 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable; claims 17–20 are not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to prove the asserted grounds by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “PO Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 37) (emphases added). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s approach expansively includes anyone working on collision avoidance and does not acknowledge that the railroad industry specifically is resistant to change and innovation. Id. (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 40). Accordingly, Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art also would be characterized as “reluctant to innovate, a characteristic of this industry.” Id. at 5.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “Id. (citing Ex. 2016, 1–6; Ex. 2019, 1–4; Ex. 1054, 125:20–141:7). Petitioner argues that “Dr. Cooklev’s analysis is legally insufficient because he assumed that any product that met a claim was in fact coextensive with it, regardless of whether it had additional features,” “boil[ing] coextensiveness down to infringement.” Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1051, 117:5–10). Petitioner contends that Patent Owner’s only evidence that unclaimed features are irrelevant to AURA’s success is Dr. Cooklev’s conclusion, which is factually insufficient as it is based entirely on conversations with Messrs. Gunther and Marchi, without independent analysis. Id. (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 41).” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Id. (citing Ex. 2016, 1–6; Ex. 2019, 1–4; Ex. 1054, 125:20–141:7). Petitioner argues that “Dr. Cooklev’s analysis is legally insufficient because he assumed that any product that met a claim was in fact coextensive with it, regardless of whether it had additional features,” “boil[ing] coextensiveness down to infringement.” Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1051, 117:5–10). Petitioner contends that Patent Owner’s only evidence that unclaimed features are irrelevant to AURA’s success is Dr. Cooklev’s conclusion, which is factually insufficient as it is based entirely on conversations with Messrs. Gunther and Marchi, without independent analysis. Id. (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 41).” slip op. at 26

  • Strike new argumentDenied

    “Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike Exhibit 1060 and portions of Petitioner’s Reply is denied.” slip op. at 78

  Patent outcomesUS 9,043,131 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,043,131
• Keysight Technologies, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2023 · IPR2022-01097 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–13, and 15–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 14 were not shown unpatentable because Sourcefire did not disclose the claimed responsive updating of an existing packet flow log entry.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not address this issue, and neither side argues that it might affect the patentability analysis or otherwise change the outcome. Thus, as 2 Sourcefire 3D System User Guide, Ver. 4.10, Mar. 16, 2011 (Ex. 1004). 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2015/0207809 A1 (Ex. 1029). we did at institution, we apply Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan, as we find it consistent with the ’917 patent and the asserted prior art. B.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “1. Threat Identifier and Threat Indicator Patent Owner identifies two terms that were construed in the ITC investigation involving the ’917 patent based on constructions agreed upon by the parties. PO Resp. 9. First, the parties in the ITC investigation agreed that “threat identifier” means “information that identifies one or more network threats.” Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 2004, 3). Second, the parties further agreed that “threat indicator” means “information that indicates a resource associated with a network threat,” “[f]or example, network addresses, ports, FQDNs, URLs, URIs, the type of threat, geographic information, anonymous proxies, actors, or the like.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 2004, 3). Patent Owner asserts that these constructions should be used in this proceeding. Id. at 12. Petitioner does not dispute these constructions, and we adopt them.4” slip op. at 12

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted

    “Before we get to claim construction, we exclude Ex. 2018 as untimely because Patent Owner had the testimony before it filed the Response and was plainly aware of it, as it was alluded to in the Response. See PO Resp. 10; Mot. to Exclude Opp. 2 (admitting that the trial finished before the Response was filed and that Patent Owner filed other testimony excerpts with the Response). However, the exclusion is of little consequence because we find that the testimony would be devoid of probative value. Dr. Rubin is not a fact witness and has not been offered as an expert in this case. Patent Owner cites the testimony in an effort to show that Petitioner is taking inconsistent positions, but we fail to see how Petitioner’s conduct bears on the meaning of “flow” in the ’917 patent.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyDecided for petitioner

    “Before we get to claim construction, we exclude Ex. 2018 as untimely because Patent Owner had the testimony before it filed the Response and was plainly aware of it, as it was alluded to in the Response. See PO Resp. 10; Mot. to Exclude Opp. 2 (admitting that the trial finished before the Response was filed and that Patent Owner filed other testimony excerpts with the Response). However, the exclusion is of little consequence because we find that the testimony would be devoid of probative value. Dr. Rubin is not a fact witness and has not been offered as an expert in this case. Patent Owner cites the testimony in an effort to show that Petitioner is taking inconsistent positions, but we fail to see how Petitioner’s conduct bears on the meaning of “flow” in the ’917 patent.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 10,193,917 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,193,917
• Infineon Technologies AG v. Amatech Group LimitedSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 1, 2023 · IPR2022-00951 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, and 8–10 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3 and 11 were not shown unpatentable, and claim 7 was not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification currently before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For purposes of our Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art as “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar field, and 1–2 years of experience researching and developing antennas used in RFID applications.” See Pet. 8. In addition, we note that we agree with Patent Owner’s statement that the distinction between the parties’ proposals is not material to any dispute before us and we find that our determinations would be the same under either definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We are not persuaded that Dr. van der Weide’s cited testimony is of a nature that should lead us to give his testimony no weight. We note that Patent Owner did not move to strike or exclude Dr. van der Weide’s testimony. When considering credibility and weight of evidence below, we consider Dr. van der Weide’s testimony as a whole as well as all other evidence of record and accord it the appropriate weight.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “provide an express construction of the full breadth of a claim term. “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). As such, we proceed in line with Federal Circuit case law, which “prescribes—deciding only the issues necessary to resolve the dispute before it.” Nichia Corp. v. DSS, Inc., No. 2022-1704, 2023 WL 7211097, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 2023) (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The Federal Circuit has long recognized that “[c]laim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope” and that claim construction may be required in an obviousness context “when the meaning or scope of technical terms and words of art is unclear and in dispute and requires resolution in order to determine obviousness.” U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In order to determine whether Petitioner’s obviousness grounds meet their required burden of proof, we need not expressly state the full scope of this claim term. Thus, we are within our authority to proffer a construction that determines the scope of a claim term in a manner sufficient to determine whether the asserted art teaches the claim. In other words, there may be other ways to meet the disputed limitation, but for the purposes of our Decision, it is proper to expressly determine a claim term’s scope only as much as is required to resolve the disputed issues before us.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “the invention(s), but rather as examples of some of the embodiments.” Id. at 25:65–26:1; see also id. at 6:18–20 (embodiments “should be construed as illustrative rather than limiting”), 5:22–24 (“non-limiting example”). The Federal Circuit has noted that “[e]mbodiments in the specification—even if there is only one embodiment—cannot limit the scope of the claims absent the patentee’s ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’” Apple Inc. v. Wi-LAN Inc., 25 F.4th 960, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Hill- Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). After reviewing the complete record, we see no such manifest exclusion or restriction in the ’240 patent specification. We decline Patent Owner’s request to limit the claims to the described single-frequency embodiments. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. We need not provide further express construction of this claim language for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 9,165,240 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,165,240
• Kiosoft Technologies, LLC / Techtrex, Inc. v. Payrange Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 14, 2022 · PGR2021-00093 · APJ Ken B Barrett · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–10, 14, 15, and 18–25 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 7, 11–13, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner contends: A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”)] at the time of the earliest claimed filing date of the ’614 Patent would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Information Technology, or a related/equivalent field and at least 3 years of academic or industry experience in electronic payment systems. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 5–6). Patent Owner affirmatively states that it does not dispute Petitioner’s asserted educational background of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed number of years of experience, instead contending that “the claims are patentable regardless of the number of years of work experience a POSA would have had.” Id. (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 49–58). Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “construction disputes to find that Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof.” PO Resp. 8. Patent Owner goes on to state its agreement with Petitioner’s proposed construction for the “identifying” limitation (id. at 9) and indicate its disagreement with certain of Petitioner’s proposals (id. at 9–14). Patent Owner confirmed at the oral argument that no claim term needs to be construed to reach a dispositive issue. Tr. 33:23–34:5. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes.” slip op. at 11

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

    “All of the claimed method steps of claim 1 occur “at the mobile device” (element 1.1), and the method includes a step of enabling user interaction with the user interface to complete the vending transaction (element 1.9). Id. at 46:61–65, 47:24–28. Claim 1 does not recite completing the purchase. The ’614 patent describes a commercial transaction completed at the payment accepting unit (i.e. the vending machine), not at the mobile device. Ex. 1001, 7:15–19; see also id. at 16:46–50; 17:57–59; 19:17–20; 19:35–38. We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that the claimed method does not require completing or conducting the transaction, but only enabling the completion of the transaction. On this complete record, we are persuaded that the elements block quoted above recite the concept of identifying a merchant and enabling completion of a purchase from the merchant. See Pet. 20 (arguing that the claimed method “is no less abstract than a customer noticing a store, making a purchase, and receiving a receipt.”); Pet. Reply 5 (arguing that the claim describes “nothing more than a customer noticing and identifying a store amongst multiple stores based on the unique visual image of that store, entering the store and communicating with the merchant, making a purchase, and receiving a receipt—all while using conventional tools.”). In particular, claim 1 recites a step for identifying a merchant based on its advertised presence—identifying a nearby vending machine that is available to accept payment from a mobile payment application, with that identifying involving the broadcasting of predefined radio messages.8 Claim 1 also recites steps for enabling completion of a purchase from the merchant— establishing a communication connection between the user’s device and the vending machine; displaying an interface that allows a user to select a vending machine, to trigger payment for the vending transaction, and to enable the completion of the transaction; and updating the user interface after receiving information from the vending machine regarding the transaction (which, as indicated by dependent claim 3, may be information indicating that the vending transaction was completed). Our slight revision of the abstract idea from what we previously stated in our Institution Decision does not impact the patentability analysis. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 17

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptMixed

    “As discussed above, the Specification indicates that the short-range communication between the vending machine and mobile device can be not only conventional technologies such as Bluetooth, near-field communication (NFC), and radio frequency identification (RFID), but also could be “any wired or wireless technology that could be used to communicate a small distance (approximately a hundred feet or closer) that is known.” Ex. 1001, 9:57–67. The Specification ties that technology to the “broadcast” in claim 1 (id. at 47:2–5). For example, the Specification explains that “[e]ach adapter module 100 [of the vending machine] advertises its presence by broadcasting signals (advertising broadcast signals) to mobile devices in the zones 102, 104, 106.” Id. at 10:43–45. “The outermost range is the Bluetooth range 106 . . . [and] is the area in which the adapter module 100 is able to broadcast its presence.” Id. at 18:29–33. Further, Dr. Shamos testified that the Bluetooth protocol requires that two devices wishing to interact with each other identify themselves to each other. Ex. 1030, 102:3– 24. Dr. Shamos also testified that the Low prior art reference discloses that a vending machine identifies itself to the user. Id. at 100:9–20; see Ex. 1007, 2:25–28 (Low stating that, “in some embodiments, multiple machines may send their unique identifiers, such that the user is able to select one or more machines to purchase from.”). Thus, the abstract idea of identifying a merchant is implemented by nothing more than well-known, routine, and conventional wireless communications.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 10,891,614 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,891,614
• Kiosoft Technologies, LLC / Techtrex, Inc. v. Payrange Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 26, 2022 · PGR2021-00077 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · PGR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable under § 101; claims 2–27 were not shown unpatentable because the other challenges were deficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person having ordinary skill in the art would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related/equivalent field and at least four years of work experience in identity, transaction, and telecommunication solutions.” slip op. at 12

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “As can be seen from claim 1 above, all of the claimed method steps occur “at the mobile device” and the final step is to enable completion of a cashless transaction. Claim 1 does not recite completing the purchase. The ’833 patent describes that any commercial transaction is completed at the automatic retail machine, not at the mobile device. Ex. 1001, 11:5–9; see also id. at 21:4–11, 22:18–20, 23:53–61, 30:25–27. We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that the claimed method does not require completing or conducting the transaction, but only enabling the completion of the transaction. On this complete record, we are persuaded that the elements italicized above recite the concept of obtaining authorization for a purchase and enabling completion of a cashless transaction, prior to user selection of any items or services. See Pet. 22–23 (arguing that the claimed method “is effectively no different than a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and when the customer decides on the item, completing the purchase”); Pet. Reply 5–6 (arguing that the claim recites “obtaining payment authorization and performing a financial transaction, the same as a person entering a store, the store checking the customer’s available credit (or calling a bank to do so) and, when the customer decides on the item, allowing the purchase”). In particular, claim 1 recites steps for obtaining authorization prior to user selection of any items or services — steps of identifying the automatic retail machine, obtaining a request from the electronic payment device, sending the request to a server, and obtaining from the server an authorization grant. Claim 1 also recites steps for enabling the completion of a purchase (i.e., cashless transaction) — detecting a trigger condition and sending the authorization grant to the electronic payment device. Our slight revision of the abstract idea from what we previously stated in our Institution Decision does not impact the patentability analysis. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 18

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded. Patent Owner’s arguments rest on the alleged novelty of the abstract idea itself, not the “specific limitation beyond the judicial exception,” i.e., the additional elements. “[A] claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90. “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (emphasis added). Patent Owner and Dr. Shamos do not identify, and we cannot find, anything in the claim suggesting that the mobile device, server, or automated retail device (i.e., the additional elements) are more than generic components. Indeed, the ’833 patent’s specification demonstrates that these elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional to the industry. Ex. 1001, 2:23–29, 37–42, 3:25–38 (explaining that Offer “teaches permitting the cashless utilization of a vending machines via a communications service, such as a cellular telephone;” Khan teaches an application on a user’s “personal trusted device” used to effectuate cashless purchases; and Carlson teaches “a system and a method for using a portable consumer device such as a mobile phone for payments and the like,” the method including prompting a user to select, from his mobile device, a product for purchase at a vending machine, after/if the user is authorized to make the purchase, and sending an authorization response to the vending machine from a “remote payment server”).” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “At the institution stage, we determined that no claim term required explicit construction. Inst. Dec. 35–37. Petitioner does not challenge our determination or otherwise advance its claim constructions in its Reply. See generally Pet. Reply. Patent Owner does not advance any explicit claim construction. PO Resp. 7–13. Regarding the identifying limitation, Patent Owner indicates that it is “undisputed between the parties that the claims require automatically determining the identity of the specific automatic retail machine based on an electronic transmission received from an electronic payment device of that automatic retail machine.” Id. at 7–8 (emphasis in original, citing Ex. 2018, 3; Ex. 2016 ¶ 68). Patent Owner submits that Petitioner’s constructions for each of the obtaining, authorization, and payment limitations should be rejected “for lacking accordance with the plain meaning of the claim in view of the specification” or “ignor[ing] the plain meaning of the term.” Id. at 9, 12, 13. As to the detecting limitation, Patent Owner argues that certain prior art asserted in the grounds in the Petition fails to teach the term as construed. Id. at 9. We determine that we need not expressly construe these claim terms” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,719,833 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,719,833
• Cloudflare, Inc. / Splunk Inc. v. Sable Networks, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 18, 2022 · IPR2022-00228 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 9–13, 19–24, 29–33, and 39–44 are unpatentable under §103; claims 17, 18, 37, and 38 are not shown unpatentable over Yung alone.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to “an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or comparable subject” and “3–5 years of academic or industry experience in computer networking or comparable industry experience.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 27). In the Institution Decision, we adopted this articulation of the level of ordinary skill. Inst. Dec. 15. At trial, neither party disputed our preliminary finding. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply. We remain persuaded that this articulation of the level of skill in the art is supported by the ’593 patent, the asserted prior art, and Dr. Jeffay’s testimony. See Inst. Dec. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 27). Accordingly, we determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or comparable subject and 3–5 years of academic or industry experience in computer networking or comparable industry experience.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. Means-plus-function limitations Petitioner contends the challenged claims include means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, and for each, Petitioner identifies a construction for use in this proceeding. Pet. 11– 14.12 Petitioner submits that no other terms require construction for purposes of this proceeding. Id. at 12. In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the identified limitations are means-plus-function limitations. Inst. Dec. 16 (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”)). We also stated that we were persuaded that Petitioner had correctly identified the recited functions and the components in the Specification that perform those functions. Id. at 16– 17. As a result, we preliminarily adopted the following constructions: Limitation” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “Instead, Patent Owner points to the Specification, but this also fails to support Patent Owner’s contention. Although claims are read in view of the Specification (Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315), they are not limited to the embodiments disclosed in it (id. at 1323). Patent Owner identifies (and we perceive) no passage in the Specification that could be read as redefining this claim phrase or disavowing part of its scope. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In fact, the passages cited by Patent Owner are directed to the handling of a single flow, and none expressly indicates that an identical method must be used for each flow processed. See Ex. 1001, 6:25–31, 7:51–52, 8:12–17. Thus, we determine that the Specification does not justify importing the limitation proposed by Patent Owner into the claims. Accordingly, having reviewed the intrinsic record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that claims 9 and 29 require computing a badness factor for each flow or all flows; rather, this claim limitation may be satisfied by computing a badness factor for a single flow.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “3. Other constructions The parties do not propose constructions for any other terms or phrases. See Pet. 11–14; PO Resp. Based on the record before us, we do not find it necessary to provide express claim constructions for any other terms or phrases. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,243,593 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,243,593
• Cloudflare, Inc. / Splunk Inc. v. Sable Networks, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 18, 2022 · IPR2021-00909 · APJ Juliet Mitchell Dirba · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3, 9–13, 19–24, 29–33, and 39–44 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 17, 18, 37, and 38 were not shown unpatentable over Yung.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to “an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or comparable subject” and “3–5 years of academic or industry experience in computer networking or comparable industry experience.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 27). In the Institution Decision, we adopted this articulation of the level of ordinary skill. Inst. Dec. 15. At trial, neither party disputed our preliminary finding. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply. We remain persuaded that this articulation of the level of skill in the art is supported by the ’593 patent, the asserted prior art, and Dr. Jeffay’s testimony. See Inst. Dec. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 27). Accordingly, we determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to an undergraduate degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering, computer science, or comparable subject and 3–5 years of academic or industry experience in computer networking or comparable industry experience.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “1. Means-plus-function limitations Petitioner contends the challenged claims include means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, and for each, Petitioner identifies a construction for use in this proceeding. Pet. 11– 14.12 Petitioner submits that no other terms require construction for purposes of this proceeding. Id. at 12. In the Institution Decision, we agreed with Petitioner that the identified limitations are means-plus-function limitations. Inst. Dec. 16 (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”)). We also stated that we were persuaded that Petitioner had correctly identified the recited functions and the components in the Specification that perform those functions. Id. at 16– 17. As a result, we preliminarily adopted the following constructions: Limitation” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner

    “In particular, claim 9 recites a method for processing a flow that includes computing a badness factor for the flow. Ex. 1001, 11:63–8. Patent Owner identifies (and we perceive) no limitation that requires a badness factor to be computed for each flow. Inst. Dec. 44 (addressing substantially similar argument presented in preliminary response); see also Ex. 1001, 13:32–44 (claim 29). During trial, Patent Owner neither responds to this analysis nor points to a claim limitation that allegedly includes this requirement. Instead, Patent Owner points to the Specification, but this also fails to support Patent Owner’s contention. Although claims are read in view of the Specification (Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315), they are not limited to the embodiments disclosed in it (id. at 1323). Patent Owner identifies (and we perceive) no passage in the Specification that could be read as redefining this claim phrase or disavowing part of its scope. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In fact, the passages cited by Patent Owner are directed to the handling of a single flow, and none expressly indicates that an identical method must be used for each flow processed. See Ex. 1001, 6:25–31, 7:51–52, 8:12–17. Thus, we determine that the Specification does not justify importing the limitation proposed by Patent Owner into the claims. Accordingly, having reviewed the intrinsic record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that claims 9 and 29 require computing a badness factor for each flow or all flows; rather, this claim limitation may be satisfied by computing a badness factor for a single flow.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we are persuaded that Copeland discloses this limitation. Copeland analyzes a flow’s statistics (including start time, end time, number of bytes, and number of packets) “to determine if the flow appears to be legitimate traffic or possible suspicious activity” and computes a concern index for the flow if it appears suspicious. E.g., Ex. 1007, 3:31–35, 7:38–67, 16:36–17:5. We find that Copeland’s concern index qualifies as a “badness factor for the flow . . . [that] provides an indication of whether the flow is exhibiting undesirable behavior,” as required by claim 9. E.g., Ex. 1007, 3:31–40, 4:30–33, Fig. 1 (identifying “‘bad’ flow(s)”). As Dr. Jeffay explains, an ordinary artisan would have understood that suspicious activity (such as a probe or network attack) is undesirable behavior. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 211–212. We also find that Copeland teaches computing a concern index “based at least partially upon the set of behavioral statistics” because, for example, it uses the number of packets to compute the concern index. Ex. 1007, 7:64–67, Fig. 6 (setting concern index to number of packets); see also Ex. 1003 ¶ 213.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,243,593 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,243,593
• Koninklijke Philips N.V. / Philips North America LLC v. Fitbit, IncSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 15, 2022 · IPR2021-00505 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 9–11, 16, 25, and 28 are unpatentable under § 102 as anticipated; claims 3–8, 12–15, 26, and 29 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which expands the range of experience indefinitely without an upper bound. Dec. 7. Neither party provides substantive argument as to why its proposed level of skill is correct. Pet. 9; PO Resp. 2–3. We, however, are not persuaded that there is a material difference between the parties’ proposals. Based on this record, we apply the level of skill laid out in our Institution Decision (omitting the open-ended phrases “at least”) because it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we find for the purpose of this Decision and based on the record before us, that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time would have a Bachelor’s Degree in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and two years of experience in personal monitoring systems. We note, however, that our determinations on patentability would not change if we accepted Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In our Institution Decision, we discerned a need to construe the term “activity points.” Dec. 8–11. There, we determined for the purposes of that Decision that “activity points” is broad enough to “include[] measures such as steps taken by the user, number of minutes the user has been active, or measures of energy expenditure such as a number of calories burned.” Id. at 11 (alteration in original). Patent Owner asserts that “the Board need not expressly construe this term to confirm the patentability of the challenged claims.” PO Resp. 4. Patent Owner, however, does not point out any error in our construction and based upon our review of the record, we are persuaded that our prior construction is correct and maintain our prior findings regarding the proper construction of activity points. Dec. 8–11. No other terms require express construction at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”).” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find Petitioner’s arguments to be persuasive. The ’377 states that its device may “include one or more motion sensors.” Ex. 1001, 2:52–53. The subject patent further notes that “exemplary motion sensors which include, for example, one or more accelerometers.” Id. at 3:6–8. Indeed, Patent Owner points out that its “PO’s Response explained how the specification of the ’377 patent makes clear that a single claimed ‘sensor’ may include one or more sensing instruments.” Sur-Reply 2 (citing PO Resp. 7–12) (emphasis added). We find that the ’377 patent claims are not limited to a configuration in which multiple accelerometers would compose a single motion sensor. The ’377 patent specification explains that motion sensors may have one accelerometer and that the claimed device may have more than one motion sensor. See Ex. 1001, 2:38–46, 3:6–9. In addition, we are not persuaded that claim 1 requires “multiple different types of sensors.” See PO Resp. 8. While it is true that dependent claims 3–7 require specific types of sensors this does not limit the scope of the independent claims. Claims 1 and 25 recite that the plurality of sensors “generate sensor data which is representative of activity of the user.” Ex. 1001, 43:33–34, 46:3–4. Claim 10 recites that the plurality of sensors “generate sensor data which is representative of ambulatory activities of the user.” Id. at 44:10– 12. As such, we are persuaded that the claim language allows the use of any set of sensors that generates the requisite data (and includes the requisite “at least” one tri-axial accelerometer or three accelerometers as will be discussed below).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As such, Petitioner fails to establish why one of ordinary skill would have believed such a substitution to be desirable or in what way such a substitution would have been an improvement over Damen. Our inquiry into whether a sufficient motivation has been articulated by Petitioner is a flexible, but factual inquiry where we must determine whether sufficient evidence and argument have been presented to establish that one of ordinary skill in the art would have made such a modification. See Fleming v. Cirrus Design Corp., 28 F.4th 1214, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The Federal Circuit “has recognized that an obviousness showing ‘does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation for the current invention.’” Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int'l Ltd., 923 F.3d 1051, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Petitioner, however, still has a burden to establish a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would combine the prior art references. In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016). It is not sufficient to merely show that a person of ordinary skill “could have made but [rather, Petitioner must establish that a person of ordinary skill in the art] would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). That is the missing element in Petitioner’s contentions. Petitioner has not articulated sufficiently a rationale for modifying Damen to replace its three accelerometers with a tri-axial accelerometer. Claims 11 and 16 depend from claim 10 and the arguments and evidence presented for these claims do not address the shortcoming as to motivation to combine we note in reference to claim 10. Thus, Petitioner has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 10, 11, and 16 would have been obvious over Kroll and Damen.” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 8,868,377 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,868,377

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.