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  • Sandisk Corporation v. Netlist, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Dec 14, 2015 · IPR2014-00970 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 14, 15, 19–25, and 27–34 are unpatentable; the Board found other challenged claims not shown unpatentable on the grounds decided.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “The difference in the opinions of the two experts is that Dr. Sechen believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have an additional four years of experience, education, or a combination of the two, beyond that proposed by Dr. Alpert. See Ex. 1009 ¶ 7. According to Dr. Alpert, the difference in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art is not material to any dispute over claim construction or patentability in this inter partes review. Id. We accord greater weight to Dr. Alpert’s opinion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art because he has experience in both teaching students and working with engineers in the industry, while Dr. Sechen’s experience is primarily in teaching. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 7, 21 with Ex. 2012 ¶¶ 3, 5. Moreover, based on our review of the ’434 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’434 patent and cited prior art, we agree with Dr. Alpert’s opinion on the level of ordinary skill. Accordingly, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’434 patent would have a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “The above disclosure uses the term “operable independently” to describe the data handlers as being discrete and functioning without being physically or logically connected to each other. Based on our review of the ’434 patent, the specification and claim 27 both use the term “operable independently” in the same manner, i.e., to describe a feature of the data handler that is distinct from its data generation feature. We agree with Petitioner, therefore, that when interpreted in the context of the ’434 patent in its entirety, the claim term “operable independently” “merely means that each data handler can operate without influence or control by any of the other data handlers.” Reply 5. The ’434 patent specification uses the term “operable independently” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, and we find no basis for applying the narrower construction advanced by Patent Owner to any of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we interpret “operable independently” as “operable without influence or control by another.” See Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1278–79.” slip op. at 19

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Based on the above description in Averbuj, we agree with Patent Owner that Averbuj describes memory interfaces (the alleged data handlers) that are configured to produce address and control signals, and that Averbuj describes producing address and control signals in certain circumstances, e.g., when Averbuj’s sequencer (the alleged control module) specifies writing data in a particular pattern that requires transformation to conform to a particular configuration of a memory module. See PO Resp. 33. We also agree with Petitioner, however, that Averbuj’s memory interfaces are further configured to apply to the memory modules the same address and control signals received from, and produced by, the sequencers for testing (see Reply 15), e.g., when the sequencer sends signals that can be applied, without modification or transformation (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 56), directly to a memory module irrespective of its physical configuration. Thus, Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Averbuj’s sequencer meets the limitation of “a control module configured to generate address and control signals for testing the memory devices” as recited in challenged independent claims 1, 20, and 29 of the ’434 patent.” slip op. at 41

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “As discussed in Section IV.B.2.e., a petition must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing law, rules, and precedent” (37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2)), and “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response” (37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b)). We agree with Patent Owner that the Reply does more than merely respond to or rebut arguments made in Patent Owner’s Response; rather, it sets forth a theory that was not presented clearly in the Petition. Patent Owner’s position is supported by the fact that Dr. Sechen, whose skill level is at least (and appears to exceed) that of the ordinary artisan, apparently was unable to envision how Huang and Averbuj could be combined. Further, Dr. Alpert’s second declaration includes, at a minimum, opinions as to the understanding of the ordinary artisan with respect to the teachings of Huang and Averbuj that were not presented in his first declaration. In our judgment, consideration by the Board of the above-noted arguments in the Reply and evidence presented in Dr. Alpert’s second declaration in support thereof would be improper under 37 CFR § 42.23 and unfair to Patent Owner. We have, however, reviewed and considered the arguments in the Petition and evidence therein, and are in agreement with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not provided adequate explanation or evidence to support its contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Huang and Averbuj. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 7–12, 17, 18, 20–25, 27, 28, and 30–35 would have been unpatentable over Huang and Averbuj.” slip op. at 59

    Patent outcomesUS 8,001,434 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,001,434
  • PTAB · Dec 7, 2015 · IPR2015-01438 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Order

    The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the proceeding before deciding whether to institute review of claims 1–3 and 8–12.

    RulingsOther
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted

      “they have settled their disputes regarding the ’104 patent. Paper 7, 2. The parties further represent that there are numerous related matters in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that have been dismissed with prejudice or stayed pending final determination of two related inter partes reviews involving U.S. Patent No. 7,550,870 B2 (“the ’870 patent”). Id. at 3. Based on the joint requests filed by the parties in the two proceedings involving the ’870 patent, those cases have been terminated. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Cyber Switching Patents, LLC, Cases IPR2015-00690 & IPR2015-00725 (PTAB Dec. 7, 2015) (Paper 33 in each proceeding). Lastly, the parties do not represent that the ’104 patent is involved in any other proceedings before the Office. See generally id. at 2–4. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding without rendering any further decisions. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,672,104
  • PTAB · Nov 25, 2015 · IPR2015-01289 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 15, and 21 were anticipated by Perry or obvious over Hochstein and Perry.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesOther

      “means-plus-function format. Both parties also agree that the recited function is “detecting an incorrect functioning of the converter or of the semiconductor light source connected thereto” (claim 1) and “detecting a defective converter or semiconductor light source connected thereto” (claim 15). The parties, however, disagree on whether the structure should refer to a Zener diode, or a Zener diode Z60 or Zener diode Z70, specifically. See Prelim. Resp. 19 (“Philips disagrees with [Petitioner’s] construction insofar as it requires a generic zener diode.”). We agree with the parties that the “detection means” is a Zener diode that performs the recited function. But we do not agree, at this time, that the diode must be the Z60 or Z70 diode, arranged as indicted in the drawings of the ’458 patent. Nor do we find that the Zener diode must be arranged to detect minimum and maximum voltages, because the recited function specifically defines the function of the Zener diode and its equivalents. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (the structure of a means-plus-function term is construed to “cover the corresponding structure . . . described in the specification and equivalents thereof”) (emphasis added). Therefore, we construe the “detection means” as a Zener diode that performs the recited function, according to the claim language of the appropriate claim.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “Second, Petitioner failed to show that a Zener diode (or its equivalent) performs the recited function. We agree with Patent Owner that failure circuit 70 does not contain a Zener diode. Prelim. Resp. 28. We also find that Petitioner did not explain how failure circuit 70 is an equivalent to a Zener diode. Neither the Petition nor the cited passages of the Dr. Tingler’s Declaration allude to a Zener diode or its equivalent in describing the contention that Perry discloses the “detection means” limitation. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its contention that the challenged claims are unpatentable as anticipated by Perry.” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “First, the Petition did not show how the construed claim (as presented in the Petition) renders unpatentable the challenged claims in view of the prior art. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (b)(4). Although the Petitioner proposed a Zener diode as the structure corresponding to the “detection means,” it presented an analysis of the prior art relying on a different position, i.e., that a transistor and a Zener diode are the corresponding structure of the “detection means.” Petitioner does not explain these different positions or how the applied construction of “a transistor and a Zener diode” is supported by the specification. Second, Petitioner failed to show that a Zener diode (or its equivalent) performs the recited function. We agree with Patent Owner that failure circuit 70 does not contain a Zener diode. Prelim. Resp. 28. We also find that Petitioner did not explain how failure circuit 70 is an equivalent to a Zener diode. Neither the Petition nor the cited passages of the Dr. Tingler’s Declaration allude to a Zener diode or its equivalent in describing the contention that Perry discloses the “detection means” limitation.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “claims 1, 15, and 21. Pet. 1735. Petitioner relies exclusively on Perry, however, as disclosing the “detection means.” Pet. 4345. The Petition cites for support the Declaration of Dr. Tingler. Id. (citing Ex. 1005, ¶¶ 119–121). Petitioner’s position with regard to the obviousness ground is the same as its anticipation contention that Perry discloses the “detection means.” Further, the Dr. Tingler Declaration passages relied upon for the “detection means” in the obviousness ground repeat the same analysis provided for the anticipation ground. Patent Owner has persuaded us that Petitioner’s obviousness contention relies on the same evidence of “detection means” proffered with respect to the anticipation ground. We determined above that Petitioner did not show that Perry discloses a “detection means.” Further, we find that Petitioner has not shown that Perry teaches or suggests the “detection means,” as we have construed the term. Consequently, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in its contention that the challenged claims are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Hochstein and Perry.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 6,147,458
  • PTAB · Nov 24, 2015 · IPR2014-01119 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5–8, and 10–17 were held unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5–8, 10–13, and 17 as anticipated by Ahn, and claims 14–16 as obvious over Ahn, Flesher, and Oakhill.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for petitioner

      “proposes a construction of “step” based on an explicit definition in the specification — “non-helical shaped segments of the described coils.” Ex. 1001, 3:8–10. Pet. 12. We adopt this construction.” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Ahn’s “contact-preventing ends” appear to be substantially coaxial with the longitudinal axis of the coil bodies that terminate at opposed axial ends which are generally perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the coil. Linear segments (see base of coil 100 shown in Ahn Fig. 1a) of the coil spring accommodate interconnections by lacing wire (shown in Ahn Fig. 2a and 2b). Id. Transition segments (visible in Ahn Fig. 4d) connect coil ends with the “contact-preventing ends.” Pet. 14. Given these disclosures, we find that Ahn anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “We agree with Ace that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include a linear segment in the upper end of the coil disclosed in Ahn to facilitate a connection with lacing wire at the upper end of the coil – either in addition to, or in place of the linear segments already present in the Ahn coil. Pet. 43. Coils connected by lacing wires in that location were taught by Flesher to be both stable and “a common practice.” Ex. 1007, 1:13–26. A person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to connect the coils disclosed in Ahn at their ends to improve stability and form a matrix of interconnected coils in accordance with standard practice in the art. Coils so connected are nothing more than a predictable variation of the coils disclosed in Ahn. Accordingly, this limitation would have been obvious in view of Ahn alone, and/or in combination with Flesher. The preponderance of evidence establishes that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Ahn and Flesher.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Claims 14–16 Dependent claim 14 states a range of spring height of 140 mm to 190 mm. Thus, the Oakhill range falls within the claimed range. Claim 15 depends from claim 14 and further requires that the “step” is substantially coaxial with the longitudinal axis of the coil body. As with claim 11, Ace has shown that this limitation is met by Ahn.” slip op. at 19

    Patent outcomesUS 7,404,223 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 7,404,223
  • PTAB · Nov 20, 2015 · IPR2015-01188 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 2, 7, 10, 14, and 18 were obvious over Schieve and AAPA.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition, Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we conclude Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We, therefore, deny the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “FIG. 1 is an example graphical representation of a typical memory map 100 in a computer (e.g., an IBM compatible personal computer, any Intel central processing unit (CPU) -based machine, or similar computing devices). Memory 100 is generally divided into two areas: conventional memory 110 and upper memory 120. Conventional memory 110 comprises a random access memory (RAM) 112 address space that is set aside for use by operating systems and application programs. Conventional memory 110 is, for example, located in the 0 to 9FFFFh (Where “h” indicates hexadecimal notation) address range of memory 100. Upper memory 120 is used by the computer hardWare. Upper memory 120 is, for example, located in the AOOOOh to FFFFFh address range of memory 100. The first 128 kilo bytes (“K”) of upper memory 120 addresses are generally used for video memory 122. The remaining upper memory addresses (e. g., 0000h to 100000h or the end of memory) are set aside for read only memory (ROM) 130. Ex. 1001, 2:45–63. We understand from this passage that “conventional memory” referred only to lower memory and not to upper memory. While we agree with Petitioner that video RAM and other kinds of RAM were conventional in the sense that they were known and used, we are not persuaded that the term “conventional memory” should be construed to include video RAM. The Specification clearly identifies what was meant by “conventional memory.” We therefore adopt Patent Owner’s construction. For purposes of this decision, “conventional memory” refers to the basic 640K of memory available for running DOS programs.” slip op. at 6

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “In accordance with our construction of “conventional memory,” we agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Schieve’s teaching to a PHOSITA is to utilize video RAM, and not conventional memory, for running a decompressed diagnostic routine. Schieve’s Figure 2 is reproduced below (with annotation). Schieve describes Figure 2 as a partial block diagram of a PC architecture. Ex. 1002, 4:39–40. Video RAM 232 is shown in Figure 2 in a subsystem separate from memory subsystem 220. As discussed above, the ’013 patent itself, in Figure 1 (Prior Art), demonstrates that “conventional memory” (RAM 112) is separate and distinct from “video memory” (video memory 122). Accordingly, this limitation of claim 10 is not met by Schieve.” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 5,836,013
  • PTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00134 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution

    The Board denied the petitions because Acxiom did not establish standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDenied

      “authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed 3 AAA also is listed as a real party-in-interest. Pet. 3. Petitioner, however, provides no argument or evidence as to why it believes that AAA is a real party-ininterest of Petitioner. Thus, we have no basis to ascertain whether Petitioner may above, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show what services, if any, Petitioner provides to Gerber. Therefore, Petitioner does not provide us with evidence sufficient to show that Gerber is a real party-in-interest of Petitioner. Also, the heavily redacted Agreement does not provide us with sufficient evidence regarding the relationship between these entities to show that Gerber is a privy of Petitioner sufficient to support Petitioner’s argument for standing. Thus, we do not have sufficient evidence to show that Petitioner has proper standing to bring this Petition. Therefore, we deny Petitioner’s request to institute a covered business method review of the challenged claims. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,709 (Aug. 14, 2012) (Response to Comment 102) (“Facially improper standing is a basis for denying the petition without proceeding to the merits of the decision.”).” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits base its standing on its relationship with AAA. See Acxiom Corp. v. Phoenix Licensing, LLC, Case CBM2015-00068, slip. op at 4–6 (PTAB Aug. 11, 2015) (Paper 23). 1128 and 1129 to be UNSEALED forty-five (45) days after the entry date of this decision.” slip op. at 6

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,234,184
  • PTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00137 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution

    The Board denied the petitions because Acxiom did not establish standing to seek covered business method review; it did not reach the merits of the challenged claims.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDenied

      “authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Denied

      “Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied rpiInstitution denied

      “their real parties-in-interest or privies that have been sued or charged with infringement of a “covered business method patent,” which does not include patents for “technological inventions.” AIA §§ 18(a)(1)(B), 18(d)(1); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302. Of key importance in this case is the requirement that “a person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged with infringement under that patent.” AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (emphases added); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). Regarding this requirement, Petitioner does not allege that it has been charged with or sued for infringement, but instead contends that its” slip op. at 3

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,890,366
  • PTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00139 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Acxiom did not show it had standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied

      “authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,860,744
  • PTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00138 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Acxiom did not establish standing as a real party in interest or privy of an entity sued for infringement.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied

      “authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”). As Patent Owner points out, “the Petition does not supply the demand for indemnification, Acxiom’s response, or any correspondence regarding indemnification.” Prelim. Resp. 4; cf. General Electric Co. v. Transdata, Inc., Case IPR2014-01380, slip op. at 7–8 (PTAB Apr. 15, 2015) (Paper 34) (an agreement to indemnify as to a specific lawsuit was sufficient evidence of privity). Similarly, the Williamson Declaration does not provide any details as to the purported demand for indemnity nor does it inform us of Petitioner’s view as to the merits of any such demand for indemnity. Nor does Mr. Williamson testify as to whether the Agreement was in force at the relevant time. Thus, Petitioner has not provided evidence sufficient to show that it has an obligation to indemnify Gerber or any other entity that may have been sued for infringement.3 Also, as discussed” slip op. at 5

    • ExcludeDenied

      “Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits base its standing on its relationship with AAA. See Acxiom Corp. v. Phoenix Licensing, LLC, Case CBM2015-00068, slip. op at 4–6 (PTAB Aug. 11, 2015) (Paper 23). 1128 and 1129 to be UNSEALED forty-five (45) days after the entry date of this decision.” slip op. at 6

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 8,738,435
  • PTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · CBM2015-00136 · APJ Stacey G White · CBM · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not establish standing to seek covered business method review, failing to show it was a real party-in-interest or privy of a sued entity.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiInstitution denied

      “authority with respect to the defense, settlement, or compromise of any such claim.” Id. As to the Declaration, Brian Williamson, Senior Account Executive for Acxiom’s Gerber Account, declares that it is his “understanding that Gerber sent Acxiom notice of a demand for indemnification for costs and potential liabilities arising from the [patent infringement suits involving the subject patents] referencing the indemnification provision in the Services and Data Agreement.” Ex. 1128 ¶¶ 2, 6. We do not find this evidence to be sufficient to show that Petitioner has standing to bring this Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (stating that it is Petitioner’s burden to “demonstrate that the patent for which review is sought is a covered business method patent, and that the petitioner meets the eligibility requirements of § 42.302.”).” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Motion to exclude, deniedDenied

      “Default Protective Order and moves to seal Exhibits 1128 and 1129, as confidential pursuant to the Default Protective Order. Paper 5, 1. These Exhibits, however, are cited extensively in the Decision. Confidential information relied upon in a decision to grant or deny a request to institute ordinarily will be made public. Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,760 (Aug. 14, 2012). We are not persuaded that there is sufficient reason to depart from that principle. Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion to Seal is denied. Accordingly, we order Exhibits” slip op. at 6

    Discretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 7,856,375
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