- Asustek Computer, Inc. / Asus Computer International v. Avago Technologies General IP (Singapore) Pte. LtdRehearing grantedPTAB · Mar 8, 2017 · IPR2016-00647 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s request for reconsideration and added institution of the §102 Cioffi challenge to claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“III. CONCLUSIONS For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that our Decision to Institute overlooked or misapprehended the matters discussed in this Decision, and that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to its challenge as to the patentability of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 as being anticipated by Cioffi. The Board has not made a final determination on the patentability of any challenged claims or the construction of any claim terms. Our final decision will be based on the record as fully developed during trial.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Upon review on rehearing, we are persuaded the Petition demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that data and synchronization signals are multiplexed and encoded by MUX & ENCODER 43 in Cioffi’s Figure 3. Multiplexed sub-symbols are passed to modulator 45, which incorporates an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). Based on this understanding of Cioffi, the detailed reading of claims 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, and 19 on Cioffi at Petition pages 35–53, supported by the Lyon Declaration (Ex. 1003), presents a reasonable likelihood of Petitioner prevailing as to this challenge. We, therefore, modify our Decision on Institution to include this challenge.” slip op. at 4
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,430,148 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. MLC Intellectual Property, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Mar 31, 2016 · IPR2015-00504 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing only as to addressing the request’s assertions and otherwise denied rehearing, leaving the denial of institution for claims 1, 9, 10, 12, 30, 42, and 45 over Kitamura in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“II. ANALYSIS When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Dr. Baker goes on to further interpret Kitamura (id. at ¶¶ 75–79), citing additional references (Exs. 1012, 1013), but those additional references do not form part of the obviousness ground, and are not cited in the Petition. We further note Petitioner may rely on expert testimony to interpret patents and printed publications, but may not rely on such testimony as a substitute for a patent or printed publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). We remain persuaded that Dr. Baker does not interpret Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit as requiring the selection of an analog signal, but rather indicates that only as a possible interpretation of Kitamura. As we stated in the Decision, Dr. Baker’s discussion makes clear how the output voltages could be set, but he does not testify that it must employ his discussed methods. Dec. 10.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1003 ¶ 74 (citing Exhibit 1004 at 21:27-31). We were not persuaded that Dr. Baker is testifying as to how the circuit must perform, only how it could perform. 5 Dr. Baker goes on to further interpret Kitamura (id. at ¶¶ 75–79), citing additional references (Exs. 1012, 1013), but those additional references do not form part of the obviousness ground, and are not cited in the Petition. We further note Petitioner may rely on expert testimony to interpret patents and printed publications, but may not rely on such testimony as a substitute for a patent or printed publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). We remain persuaded that Dr. Baker does not interpret Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit as requiring the selection of an analog signal, but rather indicates that only as a possible interpretation of Kitamura. As we stated in the Decision, Dr. Baker’s discussion makes clear how the output voltages could be set, but he does not testify that it must employ his discussed methods. Dec. 10. Petitioner also argues that we mischaracterized what aspects Dr. Baker relied upon in making his assessment. Reh’g Req. 8–9. Petitioner continues that Dr. Baker cites to Kitamura’s explicit disclosure, as well as corroborating his explanation with citations to textbook knowledge, but that we failed to credit the same. Id. at 8. We do not agree. We fully reviewed all of Dr. Baker’s testimony and corroborating citations, but we were not persuaded that Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit must function as Dr. Baker suggests it could function. In other words, we do not doubt Dr. Baker’s facts; we are only unpersuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony states sufficiently that Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit must select among specific analog reference voltages.” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 5,764,571 - Toshiba Corporation v. Optical Devices, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 9, 2016 · IPR2014-01446 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision
Toshiba did not prove claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, and 16 unpatentable over Baird and Yoshimoto, or that combination with the ST Datasheet, which was not established as prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“As we seek to give the term “DSP” its ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, we take into account the Microsoft and IBM dictionary definitions submitted by Optical Devices. We note that each of those dictionaries define a DSP as designed for “high speed” manipulation of data/digital signals. Ex. 2002; Ex. 2003. Optical Devices, however, has not directed our attention to evidence establishing what “high speed” encompasses. We note that one of the submitted dictionary definitions characterizes such digital signal manipulation as “real-time.” Ex. 2003. However, the Specification’s disclosure describes that some embodiments can execute real time digital servo algorithms on a DSP. We determine that Optical Devices has not established persuasively that the broadest reasonable interpretation of a DSP requires “high speed” processing achieving this “real time” feature. Indeed, Patent Owner’s “basic” construction for a DSP does not include a “real time” requirement for “real time” processing. See PO Resp. 10 (providing a minimal definition for a DSP). We are persuaded that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “digital signal processor,” consistent with the Specification, is “an integrated circuit structured and arranged for manipulation of digital signals in accordance with programmed commands, and in a manner that operates faster than a microprocessor.” We do not adopt Optical Devices’ proposal to further characterize further an integrated circuit as “specialized.” We find that proposed modification is superfluous in that our construction describes that the integrated circuit is structured and arranged to achieve a specific function, i.e., manipulation of digital signals and operating faster than a microprocessor.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Optical Devices asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical or Electrical Engineering and at least two years of experience in control systems technology.” PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶¶ 9–11) (emphasis added). Based on our consideration of the record, we find that the evidence as a whole supports Toshiba’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we adopt Toshiba’s statement of the ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“that Toshiba has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Baird inherently discloses a DSP configured to determine a FES and a TES from digital signals received by the SCP. In particular, Toshiba’s primary contention with respect to inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Baird must determine a FES and TES in order for the SCP to operate focus and tracking control loops. Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 81). However, neither Toshiba nor Toshiba’s declarant, Dr. Zech, provides any explanation why that is true. When asked for an explanation during his deposition, Dr. Zech responded in a manner that relied upon a probability that Baird’s SCP determines FES and TES. For example, the following is an excerpt from Dr. Zech’s deposition: Q Can you explain to me why it is your opinion that it is inherent that a servo control processor in Baird determines a focus error signal and a tracking error signal? A Well, because the way he designed it, it does. And I can’t imagine why somebody, an engineer at Cirrus Logic, would swim against the current and come up with something entirely new. The chip surely would not sell. I know that from pretty broad experience in sales and marketing. Once you tell me optical disk drive -- I’ve explained to you the statistics of it -- 99 percent plus are probably using continuous composite servoing. When you use continuous composite servoing, you need to have a tracking error and a focus error signal. So it’s not much of a leap for me to conclude that that’s what’s going on here. Ex. 2001, 151, 3–20 (emphases added). Dr. Zech’s deposition testimony describes what functions and systems optical disk drives “are probably using” and that “it’s not much of a leap” for him to conclude what is occuring in Baird with respect to whether error signals are determined Id.; See MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (inherency is not to be established by probabilities or possibilities). Moreover, both in his declaration and at the deposition, Dr. Zech bases his opinion regarding that issue on assumptions unsupported by evidence. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide 77 Fed. Reg. 48, 756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. . . . Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little to no weight.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we do not afford Dr. Zech’s unsupported opinions persuasive weight.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Having considered the arguments and evidence, we are not persuaded that Toshiba has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Baird inherently discloses a DSP configured to determine a FES and a TES from digital signals received by the SCP. In particular, Toshiba’s primary contention with respect to inherency is that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Baird must determine a FES and TES in order for the SCP to operate focus and tracking control loops. Pet. Reply 14 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 81). However, neither Toshiba nor Toshiba’s declarant, Dr. Zech, provides any explanation why that is true. When asked for an explanation during his deposition, Dr. Zech responded in a manner that relied upon a probability that Baird’s SCP determines FES and TES. For example, the following is an excerpt from Dr. Zech’s deposition: Q Can you explain to me why it is your opinion that it is inherent that a servo control processor in Baird determines a focus error signal and a tracking error signal? A Well, because the way he designed it, it does. And I can’t imagine why somebody, an engineer at Cirrus Logic, would swim against the current and come up with something entirely new. The chip surely would not sell. I know that from pretty broad experience in sales and marketing. Once you tell me optical disk drive -- I’ve explained to you the statistics of it -- 99 percent plus are probably using continuous composite servoing. When you use continuous composite servoing, you need to have a tracking error and a focus error signal. So it’s not much of a leap for me to conclude that that’s what’s going on here. Ex. 2001, 151, 3–20 (emphases added). Dr. Zech’s deposition testimony describes what functions and systems optical disk drives “are probably using” and that “it’s not much of a leap” for him to conclude what is occuring in Baird with respect to whether error signals are determined Id.; See MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (inherency is not to be established by probabilities or possibilities). Moreover, both in his declaration and at the deposition, Dr. Zech bases his opinion regarding that issue on assumptions unsupported by evidence. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide 77 Fed. Reg. 48, 756, 48,763 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. . . . Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little to no weight.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we do not afford Dr. Zech’s unsupported opinions persuasive weight.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,196,979 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,196,979 - PTAB · Mar 8, 2016 · IPR2014-01441 · APJ James B Arpin · IPR · Final written decision
The Board canceled claims 48, 50–53, and 60–69, but denied entry of substitute claims 70–84 for inadequate written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“(1) cancellation of challenged claims 48, 50–53, and 60–69 of the ’681 patent and (2) entry of substitute claims 70–84. Mot. 1, 25; see supra Section I.D. As the moving party, Patent Owner bears the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the relief requested. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Entry of proposed amendments is not automatic, but occurs only upon the patent owner having met the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 and demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, the patentability of the proposed substitute claims. Nike, 2016 WL 537609, at *3–*5 (“[T]he Board did not err by placing the burden on [Patent Owner] to establish patentability over the prior art of [Patent Owner]’s proposed substitute claims.”); see Idle Free, Case IPR2012-00027, slip op. at 7–8 (Paper 26).” slip op. at 31
- ScopeDecided for patent owner
“A patent owner may not seek to broaden a challenged claim in any respect, in the name of responding to an alleged ground of unpatentability. A proper substitute claim under 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(i) must only narrow the scope of the challenged claim it replaces. Similarly, under 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(ii), a substitute claim may not enlarge the scope of the challenged claim it replaces by eliminating any feature. Idle Free, Case IPR2012-00027, slip op. at 5 (Paper 26). As noted above, in its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner proposes independent claim 70 as a substitute for independent claim 48, independent claim 75 as a substitute for independent claim 60, and independent claim 80 as a substitute for claim 65. Mot. 2–7. Each substitute claim includes all of the limitations of the corresponding challenged claim, for which it is a substitute, and only adds additional limitations. No limitations are removed. In its Opposition, Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s assertion that the proposed substitute claims do not enlarge the scope of the cancelled, challenged claims of the ’681 patent. Opp. 1, 11. The substitute dependent claims are similarly narrowed by the limitations added to the independent claims, from which they depend. Consequently, the proposed substitute claims do not enlarge the scope of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 33
- 112 supportDenied
“partes review must set forth “[t]he support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended,” and “[t]he support in an earlier-filed disclosure for each claim for which benefit of the filing date of the earlier filed disclosure is sought.” In Nichia, “[t]he Board also explained that merely indicating where each claim limitation individually described in the original disclosure may be insufficient to demonstrate support for the claimed subject matter as a whole.” Case IPR2012-00005, slip op. at 4 (Paper 27) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the Board recognized that the proposed substitute claims need not be described “in haec verba” in the original disclosure in order to satisfy the written description requirement. However, should the claim language does not appear in ipsis verbis in the original disclosure, a mere citation to the original disclosure without any explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter as a whole may be similarly inadequate. Id. (emphasis in original). Whether a patent claim is supported by an adequate written description is a question of fact. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“strongest evidence for construing the term “optical gain” comes from the Specification itself, which clearly defines the term. [The claims] are part of a fully integrated written instrument, consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For that reason, claims must be read in view of the specification . . . . [T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added); In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (any broadest reasonable construction must be consistent with the specification, and claim language should be read in light of the specification). Given the plain language of the claims, in particular the emphasis on “optical”; the testimony of the parties’ declarants, and the clear definition of the Specification, we are not persuaded here by Patent Owner’s argument that all disclosed embodiments should be embraced by our construction. “It is not necessary that each claim read on every embodiment.” Baran v. Med. Device Techs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Broadcom Corp.” slip op. at 27
Claim constructioncites Phillips - Google, Inc. v. Michael MeiresonneAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 20, 2016 · IPR2014-01188 · APJ Glenn J Perry · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Hill and Finseth because their combined teachings and the motivation to combine outweigh the objective evidence.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part
“Exhibits 2005 and 2009 are articles that include statements from Mr. Gomes, a Google employee. Thus, the Gomes statements are potentially hearsay within hearsay. See F.R.E. 805. Meiresonne correctly notes, however, that the Gomes statements are made by a Google employee offered against Google. Meiresonne Oppos. 4–5. Therefore, the Gomes statements are not hearsay under F.R.E. 801(d)(2). Nevertheless, even if the Gomes statements do not constitute hearsay, we agree with Google that the articles themselves are being offered by Meiresonne to prove the truth of the matter asserted in those exhibits. As such, they are hearsay, and Meiresonne has not pointed to any hearsay exception that would apply to the articles under the circumstances. We therefore exclude Exhibits 2005 and 2009.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 405 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). Dr. Bederson testifies that he believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or related field, and approximately one year of experience in web site design.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 27. Dr. Jacobs agrees. Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 17–18. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’096 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’096 patent and cited prior art, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in computer science or a related field (or equivalent work experience) and at least one year of experience with web site design, and apply this level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“combination, the elements disclosed in Hill and Finseth would operate in known ways to achieve predictable results. See Pet. 19; Reply 4; Ex. 1011 ¶ 59. Additionally, based on the record presented, we do not see any reason why incorporating Finseth’s preview feature into the arrangement of Hill would have achieved an unexpected result or would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of skill of an ordinarily skilled artisan. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, 421; Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161–62 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Google’s arguments as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Hill and Finseth are supported by the disclosures of the references themselves, as well as the testimony of Dr. Bederson,5 and are persuasive. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417–18 (requiring “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” based on the combined teachings of the references) (quotation omitted)). 5 We are not persuaded by Meiresonne’s arguments regarding Dr. Bederson’s testimony. See Resp. 14–16. As Petitioner points out, Dr. Bederson testified regarding reasons to combine the references in his declaration. See Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 59–61. Meiresonne’s questions during cross-examination, to which Dr. Bederson responded that he had no “opinion,” were directed to specific aspects of Hill, not the general combination that Dr. Bederson describes in his declaration. See Ex. 2014, 37:24–38:21. Dr. Bederson also corrected his testimony later during cross-examination and explained why adding Finseth’s preview functionality would have improved the “user experience.” Id. at 38:24–39:15.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“not consider Finseth’s teachings as a whole. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that in an obviousness analysis, “the prior art must be considered as a whole for what it teaches”). Although it is true that Finseth describes the descriptive text of the time as “cursory, if not cryptic,” Finseth describes an express benefit to using a graphical preview of the contents of the linked web pages—namely, that more information is available to the user. See Pet. 19–20; Reply 9–11; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 60–61; Ex. 1007, 1:54–63 (“Such review or perusal of some summary form of a web page, even if cursory, provides a significant amount of information as the form in which graphical information is presented often indicates to a significant degree its content.”), 2:27–34 (the graphical preview “greatly enhances the ability to review search engine results”), 3:11–14 (the graphical preview “provide[s] quicker review of search engine results”), 8:30–32 (“more convenient perusal or review of the results of the Internet search or other URL listing”), 10:31–63 (“By providing the visual index method of the present invention, vast amounts of graphical data can be perused by a user much faster than by previously available methods or means.”); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (evidence of a motivation to combine prior art references “may flow from the prior art references themselves”). Thus, Finseth would have suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the graphical view is better than the descriptive text of the time, but does not suggest that the descriptive text should be abandoned wholesale. In the end, both sources—the descriptive text and the graphical preview—provide information useful to the user; the only difference is that one is more useful than the other. We are persuaded by Google’s argument that in its proposed combination, the elements disclosed in Hill and Finseth would operate in known ways to achieve predictable results. See Pet. 19; Reply 4; Ex. 1011 ¶ 59. Additionally, based on the record presented, we do not see any reason why incorporating Finseth’s preview feature into the arrangement of Hill would have achieved an unexpected result or would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of skill of an ordinarily skilled artisan. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, 421; Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161–62 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Google’s arguments as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Hill and Finseth are supported by the disclosures of the references themselves, as well as the testimony of Dr. Bederson,5 and are persuasive. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417–18 (requiring “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” based on the combined teachings of the references) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,156,096 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,156,096 - Sure-Fire Electrical Corporation v. Yongjiang Yin And Shenzhen El Lighting Co. Ltd.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jun 1, 2015 · IPR2014-01448 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted for claims 1 and 7 under § 103 over He and Korodi, and denied for the He and Currie ground.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“Therefore, we conclude that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute an inter partes review based the combination of He and Currie. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on this ground. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, on rehearing, based on our review of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the combination of He and Korodi. Therefore, we modify our Decision to institute an inter partes review of claims 1 and 7 for obviousness over He and Korodi. We determine, however, that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute review on the asserted ground based on He and Currie, and rehearing is denied as to that ground. At this stage in the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims, including the claim construction.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi. Specifically, we determine, based on the current record, Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings. “‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious simply to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord as taught by Korodi. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102. We additionally are persuaded, on the record before us, that the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. at 417. Indeed, we credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results. Ex. 1008 ¶ 103.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“Based on the record before us, we are persuaded Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi. Specifically, we determine, based on the current record, Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings. “‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious simply to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord as taught by Korodi. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102. We additionally are persuaded, on the record before us, that the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. at 417. Indeed, we credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results. Ex. 1008 ¶ 103. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we are persuaded the combination of He and Korodi is a proper combination.” slip op. at 10
- Burden
“With regard to the asserted ground of unpatentability of claims 1 and 7 for obviousness over He and Currie, Petitioner does not explain adequately the relative strengths or weaknesses of this ground and the grounds on which we have instituted. See Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Constellation Tech. LLC, Case IPR2014-01180, slip op. at 29–30 (PTAB Feb. 8, 2015) (Paper 8). The Currie reference has a filing date of September 24, 2004 and an issuance date of October 17, 2006. Thus, the Currie reference would not be prior art if Patent Owner were successful in establishing a conception date “at least as early as April 2004” and diligence from conception to reduction to practice. See Prelim. Resp. 11. Accordingly, the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing do not apply to the combination of He and Currie. Therefore, we conclude that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute an inter partes review based the combination of He and Currie. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on this ground.” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,671,279 - PTAB · May 12, 2015 · IPR2014-00242 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Final written decision
The Board canceled claims 1–3, 5, and 6 and denied substitute claims 7–11 because the Patent Owner failed to establish written-description support for claim 10 and patentability over prior art for claims 7–9 and 11.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“Unlike examination, entry of the proposed substitute claims in an inter partes review is not automatic. As the moving party, Patent Owner must establish that it is entitled to the requested relief. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner bears the burden to show, inter alia, that a reasonable number of substitute claims is proposed, there is no broadening of scope, the proposed claims are supported adequately by the written description of the application as filed originally, and the proposed claims are patentable over the prior art. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.121; Idle Free Sys. Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., Case IPR2012-00027, slip op. at 5–6 (PTAB June 11, 2013) (Paper 26) (“Idle Free”). We address each of these requirements in turn.” slip op. at 10
- 112 supportDenied
“its Motion to Amend to set forth “[t]he support in the original disclosure of the patent for each claim that is added or amended,” and “[t]he support in an earlier-filed disclosure for each claim for which benefit of the filing date of the earlier filed disclosure is sought.” The test for written description support is “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The purpose of the written description requirement is to convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).” slip op. at 12
- ScopeDecided for patent owner
“2. No Broadening of Scope Proposed substitute claims in an inter partes review “may not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(2)(ii). In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner proposes claim 7 as a substitute for claim 1, claim 8 as a substitute for claim 2, claim 9 as a substitute for claim 3, claim 10 as a substitute for claim 5, and claim 11 as a substitute for claim 6. Mot. 1–5. Each claim includes all of the limitations of the corresponding challenged claim for which it is a substitute, and adds additional limitations. Id. No limitations from the challenged claims were deleted in the proposed substitute claims. Patent Owner asserts that the proposed substitute claims do not enlarge the scope of the claims of the ’047 patent. See Mot. 1. Petitioner does not dispute this assertion (“patent owner’s proposed substitute claims . . . add ancillary features”). Opp. 1. We are persuaded that each of the proposed substitute claims does not enlarge the scope of each of the challenged patent claims it intends to replace.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In the Decision to Institute, we determined that no explicit construction was necessary for any of the claim terms beyond their ordinary and customary meanings. Dec. to Inst. 8–9. Neither party has challenged that determination, and based on the record adduced during trial, we see no reason to provide an express construction for any term. For the proposed substitute claims, Patent Owner states that: Like the terms in the original claims, all of [the newly added claim terms in the proposed substitute claims] are simple [claim terms] whose ordinary meaning applies and for which no construction is required, with the possible exception of “member” and “group.” As explained in the specification (Ex. 1) at 3:2–4, “The present invention comprises a method . . . for allowing on-line communications with members of a group of recipients for whom the invention has been implemented.” In the context of proposed independent claim [7], the claimed invention requires that “said first computer system storing information about said plurality of members in a database.” Thus, in the context of the proposed amended claims[,] a “group” is a group of a plurality of members for whom the first computer system has stored information in a database. Mot. 7. Petitioner does not propose alternative constructions for the claim terms “member” or “group.” We cannot discern how the constructions proffered by Patent Owner add any clarity to the terms “member” and “group,” which are simple and commonly understood terms. We decline to provide an express construction for either “member” or “group.”” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites AlicePatents in suitUS 8,499,047 - PTAB · Oct 7, 2013 · IPR2013-00076 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion, terminated the proceeding after settlement, and did not issue a final written decision on patentability.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A decision by the Board to institute a trial was entered on July 22, 2013.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“to a settlement. On October 1, 2013, the Board authorized the parties to file a Joint Request To Terminate and a Joint Request to File the Settlement as Business Confidential under 37 C.F.R. 42.74(c). Paper No. 18. On October 2, 2013 the parties filed a Joint Motion Terminate And To Seal, Paper No. 19. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. With their Motion To Terminate and Seal the parties also filed a copy of a written settlement agreement. Paper No. 19, Ex. A.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,799,084
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.