• Google LLC v. Brodti Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00472 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error, with Yasnovsky added for claims 7, 8, 16, 17, and 20.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art are substantially similar. In light of the record before us, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’898 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Patent Owner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’898 patent and the prior art, particularly experience pertaining to Internet/web interfaces and web-based media. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Neither party argues, nor do we determine, that the outcome of our Decision depends on which party’s definition is selected.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “includ[e] a server and one or more webpages that may be provided by the server for display in a web browser.” Pet. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 13–15). Petitioner argues, and we agree, that the Specification strongly supports this construction (requiring a server and webpage(s)) by describing a “website” as synonymous with a server computer system: “The WWW [(World Wide Web)] service allows a server computer system (i.e., Web server or Web site) to send graphical Web pages or screens of information such as the advertising materials to a remote client computer system 10.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:2 (emphases added); see id. at Fig. 1 (depicting a service engine and webpages as a web server, i.e., website), 3:15–18 (describing Figure 1 as showing “a server of the website” (emphasis added)); Pet. Reply 5; see Ex. 1026 ¶ 13. Petitioner also submits a supporting (and persuasive) contemporaneous technical dictionary definition of “website,” which highlights the distinction between a lay person’s understanding of the term versus that of the relevant artisan. Pet. Reply 5–6. This definition explains that the “common but technically inaccurate” usage of “website” is to mean “Web page,” but the technically correct usage of “website” is to mean “one or more computers that are associated with a fully qualified domain name and make content available on the Web.” Id. (citing Ex. 1028, 402). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Crovella, likewise testifies that “[a] website cannot exist without the server or computer that provides its webpages.” Ex. 1026 ¶ 15; see Ex. 1027, 36:8–20 (Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Myler, agreeing that “it has to be some machine somewhere that’s providing the webpages for the website.”). The limitations of claim 1 also support Petitioner’s position that “website” includes a server and webpage(s). Reply 5. For example, claim 1 recites advertising material for “populat[ing] on one or more websites,” and selected “advertising buy options comprise at least one website of the respective websites.” Ex. 1001, 10:29–51 (emphases added). We find these limitations make the most technical sense where “website” implicates an Internet domain or domain name, such as brodti.com, which itself is a computer system (server) and associated webpage(s) reached via that domain name. This interpretation aligns with testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Myler, in which he states that a “website” describes “a group of webpages at a particular domain (e.g., www.espn.com, www.espn.com/nba, www.espn.com/nfl, www.espn.com/nhl).” Ex. 2009 ¶ 68 (emphasis in italics added). In other words, brodti.com and espn.com are two different websites, with each website having one or more webpages (e.g., www.espn.com/nba, www.espn.com/nfl), and such websites include a server giving life to such webpage(s). slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proffers that placing advertising material “within” web property content means “inserting” an advertisement into particular content. PO Resp. 12. Petitioner responds that “placing . . . within” means what it says, and notes that “[t]he words ‘insert’ or ‘inserting’ appear nowhere in the [Specification].” Pet. Reply 7–8; see id. at 8 (Petitioner arguing that Patent Owner’s expert “admitted that the claim does not specify details regarding how advertising material needs to be placed within web property content.” (citing Ex. 1027, 29:18–24)). Patent Owner replies that the relevant artisan allegedly “would have understood ‘placing . . . within’ to mean ‘inserting into,’” but then submits that whether “placing . . . within” versus “inserting into” is used does not matter because Petitioner allegedly has not demonstrated the obviousness of either. PO Sur-reply 17. As Petitioner observes, “[i]t is unclear if Patent Owner intended any difference in meaning between these two terms.” Pet. Reply 8. Accordingly, based on the complete record before us, we determine that no further construction of this limitation is needed, and “placing A within B” means what it says—“placing A within B.”” slip op. at 20

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “determining” of impression validity feature of limitation 1[h] by disclosing “a ‘single-pixel’ image technique for determining that an impression is valid,” e.g., by using “cookies.” Pet. 42–45. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Crovella, testifies that this “single-pixel” impression tracking technique would have been a “well-known” technique to the relevant artisan, and as described by Error, operates as follows: [A] URL link for a single pixel (or transparent) image file is embedded onto a webpage that is delivered to a web browser. The image is not meant to be viewed and will likely not be visible to the user. After the user’s browser receives the webpage, it uses the embedded URL link to request the single-pixel image from a server. The receipt of that request by the server provides an indication that the user’s web browser actually received and presented the web page to the user. Ex. 1002 ¶ 133 (citing Ex. 1007, 1:36–54, 2:6–21); see id. at ¶¶ 132–139. slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 11,416,898 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,416,898
• Motorola Mobility LLC / Google LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00038 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 10–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Chin; the Board did not find them anticipated by Chin or Whitehorn.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . (‘POSITA’) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field plus at least two years of work or post-graduate experience in image capture, image processing, image display, user interfaces, or a related field. Additional education could offset a lesser amount of experience and vice versa. Pet. 16. Patent Owner accepts Petitioner’s definition. See PO Resp. 25. We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’842 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We agree with Petitioner that claim construction is unnecessary. As demonstrated in the analysis provided below addressing this claim limitation in view of the prior art, we need not explicitly construe “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Similarly, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve the controversy between the parties.” slip op. at 9

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments relying on Kennametal are belated. A “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019)6 at II.I. Thus, we need not consider Petitioner’s belated argument raised for the first time in the Reply. In any event, we agree that Kenneametal is inapplicable for the purpose of supplying a claim limitation missing from Chin’s disclosure. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Kennametal does not stand for the proposition that a reference missing a limitation can anticipate a claim if a skilled artisan viewing the reference would ‘at once envisage’ the missing limitation.”). Chin’s disclosure is silent regarding what is or is not displayed on first display 51 when images are displayed on second display 52 in self-photographing mode, and similarly silent regarding what is or is not 6 Available at www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trial-practice-guide. displayed on second display 52 when images are displayed on first display 51 in outward-facing mode. See generally Ex. 1004.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the theory of inherency was not raised in the Petition and is therefore waived. Compare Pet. 29–33, with Pet. Reply 11–15. In any event, we also agree that Petitioner’s speculation regarding the disclosure of Chin is insufficient to support a theory of inherency. See Pet. Reply 11–15. As explained above, Chin’s disclosure is silent regarding what is or is not displayed on first display 51 when images are displayed on second display 52 in self-photographing mode, and similarly silent regarding what is or is not displayed on second display 52 when images are displayed on first display 51 in outward-facing mode. See Ex. 1004. Speculation regarding the possibilities and probabilities of what is displayed on first display 51 in self-photographing mode, and what is displayed on second display 52 in outward-facing mode are insufficient to establish inherency. See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d at 745. For the forgoing reasons and based on the entire record developed during trial, the preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s showing that Chin discloses “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different.” Accordingly, based on the entire record developed during trial the preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s showing that Chin anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,836,842 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,836,842
• Motorola Mobility LLC / Google LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00040 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6–9 as anticipated or obvious over the asserted references, and claim 5 as obvious over Yook or Yook in view of Purcell.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument because the Petition presents argument and evidence that substantively demonstrates, with clarity and particularity, how and why each reference discloses, teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the displaying element recited in limitation 1[B]. We agree with Petitioner that “Patent Owner neglects to address the actual substance of the Petition, which clearly addresses this limitation with respect to each reference.” Reply 1–2. The Petition addresses in detail how each asserted reference discloses displaying two applications on two separate displays in accordance with the displaying element, by presenting multiple annotated figures from Yook, Lee, Aguilar, and Purcell. Pet. 27–30, 47–50, 62–63, 77–78. The Petition also cites and quotes the accompanying descriptions for the annotated figures from each prior art reference as well as explanatory expert opinion testimony from Dr. Rodriguez. Id. (citing Rodriguez Decl. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–74, 119–122, 149–150, 182–183; Yook Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47, 51, 58, 96–101, Figs. 4b, 4d, 5; Lee Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 48–53, Figs. 4, 6, 9, 10; Aguilar Ex. 1006, 7:1–7, Figs. 5–5d; Purcell Ex. 1007 ¶ 16, Fig. 2). We provide detailed examples below of how the Petition maps Yook and Lee onto the displaying element of limitation 1[B] in compliance with the particularity requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Although we do not provide detailed examples directed to Aguilar and Purcell, we find the Petition maps Aguilar and Purcell onto the displaying element of limitation 1[B] in compliance with the particularity requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4).” slip op. at 14

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “Instead, Patent Owner chose to raise an entirely new theory of patentability. Sur-Reply 3–13; Tr. 28:8–20. Patent Owner’s new theory is based on a claim construction that construes claim 1 of the ’756 patent as “recit[ing] a specific order of steps that must be performed in the order written.” Id. at 3–4. “Because of this order, the [displaying element] must occur after both (two) ‘selecting’ steps,” and Patent Owner contends none of the prior art references asserted in the Petition “meets the order required by claim 1.” Id. at 4. We will not consider Patent Owner’s new theory of patentability raised for the first time in its Sur-Reply. See Apple Inc. v. e-Watch, Inc., IPR2015-00412, Paper 50, 44 (PTAB May 6, 2016) (“‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean embark in a new direction with a new approach”); see also Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl’ns S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (argument raised for the first time in the reply brief, which could have been raised in the opening brief, is waived). Patent Owner should have raised its “specific order of steps” argument in the Response. By failing to do so, Patent Owner has waived the argument. Id.” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Third, we are further persuaded by Dr. Surati’s testimony that the wave shape visual indicator depicted in Figures 10A–C of the ’756 patent indicates that a user can do something, but not necessarily what that something is (e.g., minimizing or maximizing). Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1012, 200:1–6). It is telling that Dr. Surati testified that only through repeated use and exposure would a user recognize a relationship between a wave shape and the functions of maximizing or minimizing an application. Id. (citing Ex. 1012, 197:13–199:22). We are also persuaded by Dr. Rodriguez’s testimony regarding the teachings of Yook: Yook therefore teaches giving users the ability to transition a split-screen application back into full screen mode. Further, a POSITA would have understood that this ability would undoubtedly be implemented in the form of a visual indicator, which, from the 2000s to today, is the industry’s universal method of alerting a user to an accessible function. . . . Ex. 1003 ¶ 107 (emphasis added); For claim 5, Yook discloses many different types of “icons” that are used to receive user gesture inputs. See, e.g., Figs. 1, 4e, 5a, 5c, 5d, 6, 7a, 7b, 7c, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. Examples of these icons are displayed below: Id. ¶ 108; and A POSITA would have understood that Yook’s icons can have a wave shape because the shape taken by a visual indicator, or icon, is merely a matter of common and routine design choice. Indeed, the shape of an icon does not affect its function or how a gesture input is received. Id. ¶ 109 (emphasis added). In short, we are persuaded Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that a displayed visual indicator that “has a wave shape” is a design choice not affecting the function of the visual indicator, and a visual indicator that “has a wave shape” would have been an obvious design choice to a POSITA in view of Yook.” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. We adopt the parties’ agreed level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’756 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 9,134,756 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,134,756
• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00186 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under § 103 over Chang and Jin; the Board found the combination disclosed the claimed isolation portion and supported the challenged claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp; Sur-reply. In light of the complete trial record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’104 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’104 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under Phillips, we give claim terms “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 23. And, Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally PO Resp. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that an express claim construction is not necessary for us to render a decision in this matter, we do not construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed

    “edge and offers little explanation of why the skilled artisan would apply Jin’s gap- T isolation region to both of Feldmann’s polysilicon and tunnel oxide layers. As noted above, Petitioner states that the skilled artisan would have included Jin’s gap-T isolation region in order to prevent shorting. Pet. 25. Petitioner’s reasoning is questionable—supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Banerjee. Dr. Banerjee’s testimony offers no more evidentiary support than provided in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶ 113, with Pet. 25. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” Magnum Oil, 829 F.3d at 1380. We acknowledge Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that the combination of Jin’s gap-T isolation region would prevent shorting and that extending the tunnel oxide layer the edge “could trap impurities and create negative fixed oxide charges, which could then create a p-type inversion in the n-type base substrate, leading to a leakage path to the p-type emitter on the front of the solar cell” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 113 (emphasis added)) but are not convinced by his equivocal testimony. Notably too, neither Jin nor Feldmann discuss issues relating to trapped impurities and Petitioner, as well as Dr. Banerjee, fail to direct our attention to any record evidence to support their contentions. Rather, we are persuaded by Dr. Peckerar’s testimony that as a general rule in semiconductor process technology, a bare silicon surface should not be left unpassivated after processing. Elemental silicon is highly chemically reactive. As such, the bare surface is a “magnet” for defects and contamination. Leaving the tunnel oxide in place across the entire substrate backside would reduce this problem. Ex. 2001 ¶ 142. Dr. Peckerar further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to avoid shorting and leakage. In particular, he testifies that the manner by which charge is transported through a tunnel oxide can be controlled by adjusting manufacturing parameters such as time, temperature, thickness, and ambient impurities. A POSITA would plainly have adjusted these parameters to ensure that the tunnel oxide operates as intended (i.e., minimizes recombinant losses while transporting charge carriers to the backside of the solar cell) while avoiding undesirable leakage current. Because unwanted leakage charge can be avoided via other means during manufacture, there would have been no reason to reduce the physical extent of the tunnel oxide. Ex. 2001 ¶ 152 (referring to Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 149–151). Moreover, Dr. Peckerar testifies that “Dr. Banerjee also appears to be arguing that incorporation of impurities into the oxide will produce a MOSFET-like structure, with the contaminated oxide acting as a MOS gate leading to enhanced leakage,” but, for that to occur, “the source and drain areas would need to be of the same type.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Here however, “the tunnel oxide layer is located between an n-type polysilicon layer and p-type frontside emitter layer” so “[n]o MOSFET-like structure can form because the source and drain are of different types.” Ex. 2001” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only through hindsight. “The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made.” Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on a combination of elements disclosed in the prior art, the [Petitioner] must articulate the basis on which it concludes that it would have been obvious to make the claimed invention.” Id. Impermissible hindsight is inferred when the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art that would motivate one (with no knowledge of the claimed invention) to make the proposed combination has not been explained. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 9,722,104 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,722,104
• Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01451 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable: Larson did not establish the claimed detection in a single sample volume, and the asserted obviousness combinations did not cure the deficiencies.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR proceeding, PO does not contest Petitioner’s description of qualifications for a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) set forth [above].” PO Resp. 23. In view of the above, and because Petitioner’s uncontested description of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’921 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSA for purposes of this Decision, except that we replace the phrase “at least a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection” with “around a year of experience in quantitative and/or dPCR and fluorescence-based analyte detection.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added).13” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We begin with “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim,” which can be “highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In this case, claim 1 recites that the claimed assay is “capable of unambiguously detecting the presence or absence of each of said at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, in a single sample volume, . . . wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample 15 In this regard, we note that Petitioner’s claim construction position is not predicated on the collection of droplets being reconstituted into its original, pre-partition form prior to amplification; rather, the droplets remain compartmentalized from each other in the PCR thermal cycling tube. Tr. 65:21–66:9 (Petitioner’s counsel explaining that the droplets do not combine in the PCR thermal cycling tube but, rather, are “suspended in an immiscible fluid and analyzed en masse”). indicates that the first instance of single sample volume, i.e., the single sample volume in which the presence or absence of each M analytes are to be detected, is the antecedent basis for the second instance of “single sample volume,” i.e., the single sample volume in which the analytes are amplified. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, the single sample volume in which amplification takes places must be the same single sample volume in which the presence or absence of analytes are to be detected. We are not persuaded that, when accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, a single sample volume divided into a collection of droplets would be considered the “same” single sample volume prior to its partition.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “With respect to the limitation, “wherein the analytes are amplified in the single sample volume,” Petitioner asserts that “Larson discloses PCR assays that amplify target polynucleotide in a single sample volume, specifically a portion of the reaction mixture that is subsequently partitioned into droplets.” Pet. 31 (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the amplification of the analytes in Larson occurs in the droplets. Larson ¶¶ 6–7 (explaining that “[d]igital PCR (dPCR) is an alternative quantitation method in which dilute sample are divided into many separate reactions” and that “[t]he template is amplified in the droplet for detection”) (emphasis added). Because the claims require that amplification of the analytes be in the same sample volume in which the at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, is unambiguously detected, and because the pre-partition single sample volume is not the same single sample volume as the collection of droplets after partition under our claim construction set forth above, we find Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that claims 1–10 and 13–19 are anticipated by Larson.17 Tr. 68:12–69:14 (Petitioner’s counsel” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Although we agree with Petitioner that Larson contemplates scenarios in which droplets may contain more than one target molecule and does not require the exclusion of such multiple occupancy droplets in all embodiments, we are nevertheless not persuaded Petitioner has shown, based on a preponderance of evidence, that Larson renders obvious an assay capable of unambiguously detecting, in such multiple occupancy droplets, the presence or absence of each of at least M analytes, in any combination of presence or absence, when M is greater than F and F is at least 2.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 11,827,921 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,827,921
• Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Willow Blossom Holdco LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 18, 2026 · IPR2024-01296 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–46 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Chang, Fang, Yuen, Khalil, Park, and Chen.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that before the effective filing date of the claimed invention a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment” and that “[m]ore education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s cited testimony supports Petitioner’s assertion.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “[parent application to the application that matured into the ’380 patent], the Examiner construed the term ‘self-contained, in-bra wearable device’ to mean ‘complete, or having all that is needed, in itself’ and is capable of being worn in a bra.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1005, 2290) (emphasis omitted). According to Petitioner, “PO did not dispute this construction, and Petitioner applies it herein.” Id. Petitioner also states that “[o]ther terms of the Challenged Claims should receive their plain and ordinary meaning, and no formal claim constructions are necessary in this proceeding because ‘claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Id. (citing Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 69–70). Again, because Patent Owner did not file a Response, we exercise our discretion and look to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response. We note that in the Preliminary Response Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of this Preliminary Response, no claim terms require construction to resolve the prior art grounds raised in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 19. According to specific construction, any such terms should be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning in light of the specification.” Id. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). There are no claim terms in controversy. Accordingly, we need not construe any terms for our analysis.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner contends (Pet. 17) that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to implement Chang’s breast pump device as suggested by Fang” to achieve four benefits: (1) “to facilitate convenient cleaning and maintenance” (Pet. 19 (citing Ex, 1003 ¶ 102)); (2) “to facilitate more rapid assembly and disassembly (e.g., during use)” (id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 105)); (3) “as a particularly effective and suitable option to generate negative” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “a breast pump device having “a diaphragm pump that generates negative air pressure.” Pet. 33; see also id. at 38. Petitioner explains Chang’s pump “generates suction by cyclical compression and decompression of a conduit or flex-tube, and expressly notes that other configurations were known and suitable.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 25, 28, 68, 79, 84–86). Chang, however, does not mention, specifically, that Chang’s pump is a “diaphragm” pump. We note, however, that this claim clause does not state or require any specific type of pump. It merely requires a “pump.” Clause 1[e]/29[e], discussed below, however, does require a “diaphragm” pump. Petitioner here merely lays the foundation for this later clause by asserting that “Fang provides a straightforward suggestion of a diaphragm pump including a diaphragm housing component formed in a wall of the pump housing.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 24–25, Fig. 7; Ex. 1003 ¶ 97). Thus, Petitioner asserts, Fang teaches “an ‘air pump’ in pneumatic connection with the diaphragm that serves to generate negative air pressure,” and Chang teaches “the location of pump components (e.g., ‘motor’ [46]).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 72, 80, Fig, 6A; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 19, 24). Petitioner then asserts that “the ‘air pump’ components of the combined device are positioned within the pump housing,” and the air pump is powered by Chang’s rechargeable battery. Id. (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 72, 80).” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 11,413,380 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,413,380
• Intel Corporation / Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Advanced Cluster Systems, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 are obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). Obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17– 18 (1966). A party who petitions the Board for a determination of obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). We assess Petitioner’s evidence and argument according to the above- referenced obviousness standard. We determine that the Petition satisfies the reasonable likelihood of prevailing standard under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We begin our analysis with a discussion of the Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref references. slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claims 1 and 30 of the ’034 patent, a limitation we need not construe to decide the institution question. Id. at 13; Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner contends that “no claim construction is required” to address the Petition’s asserted deficiencies. Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner also contends, however, that the Petition relies on a “novel claim construction” of limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1]—“second [third] hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores”—to support Petitioner’s obviousness argument. Id. at 11–12.8 Patent Owner challenges the Petition’s reliance on “single core processors on different chips,” such as the Power3 single-core processors of the Symmetric Multi- Processor (“SMP”) configuration disclosed in the RS6000 reference, as a disclosure of limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1]. Id. Patent Owner contends that such single-core processors on different chips do not satisfy limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1] because the ’034 patent “claims only multicore processors.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–27). Petitioner responds in part as follows: To the extent PO is implicitly arguing that RS6000’s “four, eight, twelve, or sixteen 375 MHz 630FP 64-bit processors” do not teach the recited “cores,” Patent Owner’s argument excludes embodiments described in the ’034 patent’s specification. The ’034 patent describes “[p]rocessor cores [as] generally independent microprocessors.” Ex.1001, 5:14–15. Patent Owner’s attempt to exclude RS6000 from the scope of the claims 8 Pursuant to the Board’s Order on Related Matter Updates (Paper 14), the parties filed the September 26, 2025 Claim Construction Order entered in the co-pending District Court litigation in this proceeding. Ex. 1085. The District Court Claim Construction Order did not construe the claim phrase “hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores.” Id. patent where the processor has independent microprocessors. Patent Owner’s attempt to distinguish RS6000’s Symmetric MultiProcessor as a “configuration” (Paper 8, 24) also fails because a “Symmetric MultiProcessor configuration” is no different than the ’034 patent’s description of a configuration of independent microprocessors. Id. Paper 9, 30.9 It is apparent there is a dispute over the plain meaning of Limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1], “a second [third] hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores,” recited in the independent claims.10 The parties are ordered to propose and support a particularized plain meaning or other construction of Limitations [1.4.1], [1.5.1], and [30.1.2] in their briefs. The parties are ordered to analyze the relevant claim language and cite to the specification and prosecution history in support of their claim construction, where applicable, with particular attention to the description of a hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores in the ’034 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:11–37, 7:14–36, 9:50–10:3.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artInstituted

    “Motivation to Combine and Analogous Art The Petition offers several motivations to combine Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref in the manner claimed in the ’034 patent with a reasonable expectation of success, which we find sufficient on the present record. The Petition first asserts that Menon and Trefethen are analogous prior art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex.1001, 1:14–15; Ex.1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition points out that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition also contends that: Accordingly, Menon and Trefethen together represent a combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex.1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success” slip op. at 20

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,570,034
• Advancell Pty Ltd. v. Sciencons As And Artbio, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · PGR2025-00040 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35–38 on all petition grounds, finding it more likely than not that Hassfjell-Hoff anticipates at least claim 1.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’437 patent is eligible for post-grant review and that it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’437 patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all challenged claims of the ’437 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 of the ’437 patent. Ex. 2001; Prelim. Resp. 43. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and the Office’s public records, we find that the disclaimer of claims 10 and 34 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claims 10 and 34 as having never been part of the ’437 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claims 10 and 34 are outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–9, 11–33, and 35– 38, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted

    “Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’437 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review review of the ’437 patent. See Paper 3. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’437 patent and is responsible for defending the ’437 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, radiopharmaceutical chemistry, nuclear medicine, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1019 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 12,249,437
• Apple Inc. v. Ferid AllaniInstitution denied
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00856 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–19 were obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). We determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of challenged claims 1–19 of the ’877 patent. Accordingly, the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill at the pertinent time “would be a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a closely related discipline and two years of relevant professional experience in software engineering or a similar field.” Prelim. Resp. 10. We adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Bederson. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–33, 37–39. Although Patent Owner has proposed a slightly different statement for the level of ordinary skill in the art, Patent Owner does not explain why Petitioner’s proposal is incorrect. We find Petitioner’s proposed level presents a better statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it requires experience with web-based information systems and Patent Owner’s proposal does not. As noted above, the ’877 patent relates to a method for accessing information sources and services on the Web. Ex. 1001, 2:4–12. Further, Petitioner’s proposal appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). B.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We need not resolve the above-identified dispute, because a different aspect of “beforehand locally stored” is determinative. Read in context, “beforehand locally stored” in both limitations 1(a)(2) and 12(a) refer back to the “preliminary search” action recited in limitation 1(a)(1) and in limitation 12(a) itself, respectively. Thus, we construe “beforehand locally stored” to mean that the selection pages must already be stored within the communication device when the user begins the preliminary search, regardless of whether it was the user or an automated process that downloaded the selection pages to the communication device. This understanding stems from a plain reading of the claim language and does not leave room for reasonable doubt otherwise. Petitioner does not present any reason why the claims do not require the selection pages to have already been stored in the communication device when a user begins the preliminary search. C.” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “of the language in these limitations is that the selection pages must be beforehand locally stored, where beforehand is assessed at the time of starting a preliminary search. Based on this construction, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Rossman discloses limitation 1(a)(2) and limitation 12(a), even for institution purposes. Petitioner identifies Rossmann’s cards as the claimed selection pages of claims 1 and 12. Pet. 18–19. Rossmann’s cards, however, are not beforehand locally stored on the communication device at the time a user begins a preliminary search for information. Rather, on the record before us, at the time of starting a search for information, the user must request a connection to a server device at a desired host site, which request results in the server device at the host site sending one or more decks each including a plurality of cards to the user’s mobile device. Ex. 1004, 6:26–29; 7:22–27; 7:56–66. Thus, Rossmann’s cards are not beforehand locally stored at the time the user commences a preliminary search. Petitioner’s reliance on Himmel and on King do not make up for this deficiency.” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,271,877
• Advancell Pty Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · PGR2025-00029 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–6 and 8–20 on all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “After reviewing the parties’ briefs and supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Hassfjell-Hoff discloses each element of claim 1. As such, Petitioner’s argument and evidence as set forth above and further discussed below, sufficiently shows that it is more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by Hassfjell-Hoff, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, also addressed below.” slip op. at 16

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Here, Patentee Sciencons AS filed a statutory disclaimer of claim 7 of the ’603 patent. Ex. 2001. Based on our review of Exhibit 2001 and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office public records, we find that the disclaimer of claim 7 complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Accordingly, we treat claim 7 as having never been part of the ’603 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“This court has interpreted the term ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because post-grant review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, claim 7 is outside the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claims 1–6 and 8– 20, the remaining challenged claims that have not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 7

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted

    “Sciencons AS also states that ARTBIO, Inc. is responsible for defending the ’603 patent in this proceeding and requests that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption for this proceeding.2 Paper 4, 1; Paper 7, 1. ARTBIO, Inc. has signed powers of attorney appointing the same practitioners that were appointed by Sciencons AS to transact all business associated with the instant post-grant review proceeding of the ’603 patent. See Papers 3, 4, 7, 8. To date, no objection has been raised to Patent Owner’s request. Given Sciencons AS’s representation that ARTBIO, Inc. is currently the exclusive licensee of the ’603 patent and is responsible for defending the ’603 patent, we grant Sciencons AS’s unopposed request that ARTBIO, Inc. be included in the caption. For convenience we refer to Sciencons AS and the purported exclusive licensee ARTBIO, Inc. collectively as “Patent Owner.” As stated supra, to the extent any party disputes ARTBIO, Inc.’s right to participate in this proceeding or to be included in the caption, the party shall request authorization to brief the issue within 10 business days of this Decision.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, chemical engineering, physics, nuclear chemistry, radiochemistry, or materials science, or a comparable field of study, plus approximately two to three years of professional experience with radioisotope generators, or other relevant industry experience” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 1017 ¶ 27). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposed definition.” slip op. at 10

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 12,125,603

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.