- CMS Cepcor Ltd. / CMS Cepcor Americas LLC v. Sandvik Intellectual Property ABNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 16, 2026 · IPR2024-01381 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 were not shown unpatentable because Polinski and Piepho do not teach the claimed tapered region extending from the shaft’s second end, and Petitioner did not establish adequate motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) relating to the ’090 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a related field, and at least 2 years of experience with industrial equipment design and development.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Petitioner further contends that one of ordinary skill “may also have a combination of more formal education and less work experience or a combination of less/different formal education and more work experience.” Id. In the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not object to the defined level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Pet. 3). appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’090 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“challenge, the crux of the parties’ dispute revolves around the limitation in claim 1 of “an axial region of the shaft body extending from the second end and being tapered relative to a longitudinal axis of the shaft.” We agree with for the tapered axial region and that starting point would be the extremity of the shaft not an undefined point in the “end region.” Because Patent Owner proposes a construction of “end” that would have general application to all claim terms including the first end of the shaft, the second end of the shaft, and the sleeve end, and that construction has no bearing on the issues we address below, we do not reach Patent Owner’s proposed general construction of “end” by itself. We determine that no other claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above in our claim construction analysis, apart from the issue of the general construction of “end,” we determine that this limitation uppermost extremity of the shaft. Because neither Polinski nor Piepho disclose a tapered axial region starting at the uppermost extremity of the shaft, we find that Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Polinksi and Piepho discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner
“This paragraph discusses “accurate alignment” in connection with joint 21, not tapered end 25. Ex. 1018, 3:23–35. The paragraph subsequently states that both joint 21 and end 25 are tapered but that shaft end 25 may alternatively be cylindrical. Id. We also find nothing in this paragraph supporting Petitioner’s assertion that alignment “is notoriously more difficult with purely cylindrical shafting” (Pet. 16–17). In order to support its position, Petitioner improperly conflates separate statements in this paragraph of Piepho, i.e., joint 21 provides accurate alignment, joint 21 is tapered, and end 25 is tapered. Petitioner makes an unsupported logical leap that the result of these three statements is that tapered end 25 provides accurate alignment. However, Petitioner fails to reconcile this argument with the final sentence in this paragraph that shaft end 25 may also be cylindrical as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 “is an external view of another embodiment of” Piepho’s shaft. Ex. 1018, 2:49–50. In Figure 4, joint 21 has the same tapered configuration as shown in Figure 3 but end 25 is not tapered. Based on our review of Piepho’s Figures 3 and 4, we find that Piepho’s reference to “accurate alignment” refers to joint 21 and not to tapered end 25 as Petitioner alleges. Because Mr. Smith’s testimony (Ex. 1002, 59) essentially parrots the Petition on this point and is inconsistent with our finding, his testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. For the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has not established that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to would teach this claim limitation.8 Because Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Polinski and Piepho teaches limitation 1b or an adequate motivation to combine, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is obvious over Polinski, Piepho, and Harless.” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 11,014,090 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,014,090 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01047 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–44 on all presented challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that FreightCar would prevail on at least one claim based on Hart, the 1906 Cyclopedia, and Wong.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–44 of the ’515 patent on all presented challenges. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2024) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars.” Pet. 29; Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner, however, disagrees that the experience should include designing or analyzing “similar vehicles.” Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage, for the reasons below, limiting the ordinary skill in the art to “at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars” does not affect our analysis of the parties’ dispute or our determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill to determine whether review should be instituted. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge of rail cars would not.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 35). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge of rail cars would not.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 35). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“to further support the upper, outboard end of the slope sheet with a crosswise, L-shaped beam as in Wong,” and one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do so, because of “the benefits of reinforcing the slope sheet at its upper end, where its connection with another structure creates a stress concentration.” Pet. 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 108). Petitioner points to Hart’s transverse beam b3 and argues that it suggests using a transverse beam like Wong if Hart is modified so that upper beam b3 no longer supports the slope sheet. Id. (citing Ex. 1008, Fig. 1). Petitioner also argues that the references are in the same field and that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 63–64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 108; Ex. 1008, Fig. 1). Based on the preliminary record, Petitioner shows that its proposed combination of Hart, the 1906 Cyclopedia, and Wong teaches or suggests the above-quoted limitations of claim 24 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those references in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 19
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,132,515 - PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00747 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Buttiker was not prior art, so Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 5, 6, 9, or 10 were unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“establish a reasonable likelihood of proving that any of the challenged claims would have been obvious because all of the challenges rely on Buttiker for specific limitations, and Buttiker is not prior art to the challenged claims of the ’271 patent. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“When claiming the benefit of priority to a provisional application, the provisional application must provide written description support for the claims in question. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (referring to “an invention 10 Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s arguments on this point in its Preliminary Reply. See Prelim. Reply 2–4. disclosed in the manner provided by section 112(a)”); see also New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]o be afforded the priority date of the provisional application, . . . the written description of the provisional must adequately support the claims of the non-provisional application.”). Patent Owner argues that the ’688 provisional application supports claims 5, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’271 patent because they describe the method of controlling the pumps and thermal modulators to achieve selected temperatures upstream of the brewing chamber and creating a resulting solvent used to infuse a solute, creating an infused beverage. See Prelim. Sur-reply 3–4 (citing Prelim. Resp. 16–18, 35–37; Ex. 1012, 12–15). Patent Owner also refers to Figure 2 of the ’688 provisional application, which discloses the device that performs the method described in the application. See id. at 4–5. With one exception that we address immediately below, Petitioner does not contest these assertions or argue that the ’688 provisional application fails to disclose the subject matter claimed in claims 5, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’271 patent. See Pet. 18–20; Prelim. Reply 2–4. Based on our review of the record, the ’688 provisional application provides adequate written description support for the challenged claims of the ’271 patent.11 See Ex. 1012, 11–15 (describing Figure 2 of the ’688 provisional application and related methods), Fig. 2.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference not prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for patent owner
“only qualify as prior art under section 102(a)(1) because section 102(a)(2) does not apply to purely foreign patent publications like Buttiker. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (describing scope of prior art as including “a patent issued under section 151” (addressing issued U.S. patents) and “an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b)” (addressing published U.S. applications)); MPEP § 2152 (“The documents upon which a prior art rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) may be based are U.S. patent documents only.”).10 Under section 102(a)(1), Buttiker may be prior art if it “was patented [or] described in a printed publication . . . before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). Buttiker published after the ’688 provisional application was filed, but before the other applications to which the ’271 patent claims priority were filed. See Ex. 1010, 1; Ex. 1001, code (60). Accordingly, whether the ’271 patent claims at issue here have adequate support in the ’688 provisional application determines whether Buttiker is prior art to those claims because Buttiker’s publication predates later applications to which the ’271 patent claims priority.” slip op. at 12
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“When claiming the benefit of priority to a provisional application, the provisional application must provide written description support for the claims in question. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (referring to “an invention 10 Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s arguments on this point in its Preliminary Reply. See Prelim. Reply 2–4. disclosed in the manner provided by section 112(a)”); see also New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]o be afforded the priority date of the provisional application, . . . the written description of the provisional must adequately support the claims of the non-provisional application.”). Patent Owner argues that the ’688 provisional application supports claims 5, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’271 patent because they describe the method of controlling the pumps and thermal modulators to achieve selected temperatures upstream of the brewing chamber and creating a resulting solvent used to infuse a solute, creating an infused beverage. See Prelim. Sur-reply 3–4 (citing Prelim. Resp. 16–18, 35–37; Ex. 1012, 12–15). Patent Owner also refers to Figure 2 of the ’688 provisional application, which discloses the device that performs the method described in the application. See id. at 4–5. With one exception that we address immediately below, Petitioner does not contest these assertions or argue that the ’688 provisional application fails to disclose the subject matter claimed in claims 5, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’271 patent. See Pet. 18–20; Prelim. Reply 2–4. Based on our review of the record, the ’688 provisional application provides adequate written description support for the challenged claims of the ’271 patent.11 See Ex. 1012, 11–15 (describing Figure 2 of the ’688 provisional application and related methods), Fig. 2.” slip op. at 12
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,957,271 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00705 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 7–9 and 11 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering, chemical engineering, or a similar engineering field, with at least two years of work experience in fluid dynamics or fluid systems engineering; or (2) a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering, chemical engineering, or a similar engineering field, with at least one year of work experience in fluid dynamics or fluid systems engineering.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Although a final conclusion of obviousness must be supported by findings and analysis establishing a reason to combine or modify the known elements as proposed, the analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner “fails to explain how Zeng’s noise reduction head 20 and inner cover 30, designed for a different atomizer configuration, could be integrated into Sevy’s system without changing the principles of Sevy’s operation.” Prelim. Resp. 13–14; see also id. at 16 (arguing that “Zeng’s components are not mere drop-in replacements”). Although the relied-upon structures from Zeng are, of course, disclosed in that reference as part of another atomizer, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). “Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. As to the alleged change in the principle of operation, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why Sevy’s principle of operation would change with the proposed combination, which replaces Sevy’s alleged “silencer assembly” with similar teachings of Zeng.” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,527,094 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 4, and 7–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12–13; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Motivation foundInstituted
“On the current record, this argument does not identify a deficiency in Petitioner’s position as to clauses 1C and 1D. Patent Owner implies that the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D require functionality recited elsewhere in the claim—namely, forming a “fluid dispersion” (Prelim. Resp. 4)—but Patent Owner does not adequately present evidence supporting this implied claim construction. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). Instead, Patent Owner cites to the entirety of claim 1 in support of these implied functional requirements. See Prelim. Resp. 4. Stated differently, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why any particular component (or collection of components) must perform the function of forming the “fluid dispersion” recited in clause 1G. Moreover, even assuming as correct Patent Owner’s assertion that Sevy “requires downstream separation,” Patent Owner has not explained why such a 8 In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner appears to use different terms for the same concept: “downstream separation”; “post-formation correction”; and “post-atomization correction.” See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 3 (“downstream separation”), 4 (“post-formation correction”), 5–6 (“post-atomization correction”). In any response, Patent Owner should clarify the scope of these terms. requirement would fall outside of the scope of claim 1. See Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘[A]ttorney argument is not evidence’ and cannot rebut other admitted evidence.” (quoting Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017))). On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Sevy discloses or suggests the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1 and 3–8 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 As Paper 7 in this proceeding, Patent Owner mistakenly filed the Preliminary Response in a related proceeding. one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears generally consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Patent Owner does not argue at this stage of the proceedings that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, as revised above.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“At this stage of the proceeding, the record on the analogous art issue is incomplete. Petitioner seems to take the position that Kaiser is in the same “field” (Pet. 47), but Petitioner does not fully address the issue of analogous art. Although Petitioner was not required to anticipate this argument with its initial filing (see Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharma., Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023)), Petitioner may wish to address this issue as appropriate in future briefing. We will consider the full record on this issue, if necessary, as part of our analysis in any final written decision. On the current record and in view of our decision to institute based on other grounds, we reach no conclusion as to whether Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Goubet and Kaiser as proposed.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,092,918 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00294 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable; proposed substitute claims 21–24 are also unpatentable, so the contingent motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“appear to be that Patent Owner specifies that the POSA’s knowledge and experience may include optical sensors and that the POSA may have a degree emphasizing software. We do not deem these differences material, particularly because the optical sensors and technologies at issue are those used in physiological monitoring technologies and both parties agree that the POSA would have a working knowledge of physiological monitoring technologies. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; PO Resp. 11. We find the additional specificity of Patent Owner’s definition to be helpful. In addition, Patent Owner’s definition appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’507 patent. Accordingly, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art. (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). We note that we would reach the same outcome under either definition of the POSA. Cf., PO Resp. 12 (asserting that Petitioner’s proposed definition is “flawed” but also asserting that “patentability is confirmed” “[r]egardless of the level of skill”).” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1007, 1528. The dispute between the parties focuses on whether D’Angelo was made available to attendees of the IEEE EMBS conference identified in this header and, if so, what effect that has.16 Accordingly, we begin our analysis by considering the conference.” slip op. at 42
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“understood Mendelson to disclose averaging signals. We do not find in Mendelson any discussion of summing or averaging signals. See generally Ex. 1011, 912–915. Our inability to find a teaching of averaging in Mendelson is consistent with the testimony of Drs. Kenny and Duckworth. Dr. Kenny testifies that “there is simply no disclosure in Mendelson itself of any summing or averaging of collected signals.” Ex. 1083 ¶ 23. And in his deposition, Dr. Duckworth was unable to identify any express disclosure of averaging in Mendelson. See Ex. 1087, 103:9–114:11 (confirming that certain aspects of his declaration testimony relating to averaging of signals are not discussed in Mendelson). Accordingly, Mendelson, standing alone, does not support that the POSA would have understood Mendelson’s Sensor Module to have output averaged signals” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“the PDA to read out ‘data that’s been stored’ (i.e., previously measured physiological data) even after the Receiver Module’s battery had died” because Mendelson’s Receiver Module lacks “a microSD card or other nonvolatile storage from which measured data could be ‘read out’ after its battery has died.” PO Resp. 37; see also Ex. 2037 ¶ 147 (testimony of Dr. Duckworth confirming that Mendelson’s system could not store data that could be read out after its battery died). Accordingly, Patent Owner argues the POSA “would not have been motivated to modify Mendelson’s Receiver Module to draw power from the PDA as proposed because doing so would not allow the PDA to ‘read out’ the previously ‘measured physiological data’ after the Receiver Module’s battery died.” PO Resp. 39.” slip op. at 60
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,736,507 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01492 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–9 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner fails to establish that Coccia discloses “a resulting solvent valve” as required by claim 1 and as alleged in the Petition. See Pet. 35–42. 4. Conclusion Based on our review of the current record, Petitioner does not establish a reasonable likelihood of proving that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Coccia and Anson. The remaining challenged claims, claims 2–9, all ultimately depend from claim 1. See Ex. 1001, 18:42–19:48. Petitioner’s obviousness challenges to claims 2–9 build on its analysis for claim 1. See Pet. 10, 43–70, 79–86. Accordingly, for the same reasons we discuss above in the context of claim 1, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood in prevailing on its challenge to any of the dependent claims.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Elekta Inc., 46 F.4th 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). “The patent’s purpose can also be informative.” Id.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“cites the specification for support, but that argument largely misses the point and elides the claim requirements tied to the resulting solvent valve. See Pet. 35; Prelim. Reply 4. Patent Owner agrees with the general proposition that “a resulting solvent valve” means one or more resulting solvent valves. See Prelim. Resp. 10 (acknowledging that “two duplicative resulting solvent valves having the three positions” could each qualify as “a resulting valve”); Prelim. Sur-reply 4–5 (“Had Petitioner cited to multiple ‘resulting solvent’ valves that each” meet the claim requirements, “Patent Owner would not have raised an issue.”). The general statement that “a” or “an” means “one or more than one,” however, does not support Petitioner’s argument that the limitation broadly covers systems where no single resulting valve meets the three claimed valve positions. The dispute does not turn on whether “a” means “one or more than one”; the dispute, rather, concerns whether the claim allows for multiple valves to meet the three claimed states or whether a single valve must meet those claim requirements.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to establish that Coccia discloses the claimed “resulting solvent valve.” Importantly, Petitioner premises its argument for this limitation on a claim construction that we rejected in our analysis above. Because we determine that the claim requires at least one resulting valve to meet the three claimed states identified in the claim, Petitioner may not rely on a combination of Coccia’s valves 26 and 36 to provide the three claimed states, as Petitioner does throughout its analysis. See Pet. 35–42; Prelim. Reply 4. As to Petitioner’s alternative argument that Anson discloses the claimed resulting solvent valve, we decline to consider the argument because it was not included in the Petition and was made for the first time in Petitioner’s Preliminary Reply. See Pet. 35–42; Prelim. Reply 5. Petitioner relied on Anson in the Petition as an alternative reason to find that it would have been obvious to place Coccia’s valve 36 in the claimed location (downstream of the conduit joint and upstream of the brewing chamber), not to meet all of the limitations associated with the resulting solvent valve. See Pet. 38–39. Moreover, Petitioner’s limited argument and evidence in the Preliminary Reply lacks adequate development and fails to persuade us that Anson’s valve 28 performs all of the “claimed functions” associated with the resulting solvent valve, including the two “active” states that the Petition addresses with reliance on Coccia alone. See Pet. 40–42; Prelim. Reply 5. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner fails to establish that Coccia discloses “a resulting solvent valve” as required by claim 1 and as alleged in the Petition. See Pet. 35–42. 4. Conclusion Based on our review of the current record, Petitioner does not establish a reasonable likelihood of proving that claim 1 would have been obvious based on Coccia and Anson. The remaining challenged claims, claims 2–9, all ultimately depend from claim 1. See Ex. 1001, 18:42–19:48. Petitioner’s obviousness challenges to claims 2–9 build on its analysis for claim 1. See Pet. 10, 43–70, 79–86. Accordingly, for the same reasons we discuss above in the context of claim 1, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood in prevailing on its challenge to any of the dependent claims.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,772,456 - PTAB · Apr 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01483 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–12 would be unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the challenged claims in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of the challenges in the Petition. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had at least the following (or equivalents): a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering with at least five years of experience in product design; or an M.S. degree in mechanical engineering with at least two years of experience in product design.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002, 13). Patent Owner “submits a person of ordinary skill in the art (‘POSITA’) would be a mechanical or materials engineer, or other similar degree, having at least two to three years of personal experience in designing or development of espresso machines.” Prelim. Resp. 8. In the alternative, Patent Owner states that “because Petitioner’s definition is so close to that of Patent Owner’s definition, that no express finding is necessary to find Petitioner has not met its burden to show with particularity that claim 1 is unpatentable.” Id. We find Petitioner’s definition to be consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’524 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). The outcome of this case would remain the same if we applied Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under that standard, we give the words of a claim their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by one skilled in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Id. at 1312–13. Only terms in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The parties propose constructions for several claim terms. For example, Petitioner contends that we should construe “conduit,” “coupled,” “another solvent,” and “dynamically modulate.” See Pet. 13–17. Patent Owner reserves its right to challenge Petitioner’s constructions and proposes its own constructions for “another solvent” and “communicatively coupled.” Prelim. Resp. 9–11. We determine that we need not construe any of these additional terms to determine whether Petitioner met its burden as to any of its challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that any of them disclose an electronic controller coupled to two pumps and a thermal modulator, such as a heater. Petitioner suggests that Lai’s controller controls two “pump(s),” but Lai appears to describe a single pump 138, and Petitioner fails to point to any disclosure or suggestion in Lai that its system employs more than one pump. See Pet. 38–39 (citing Ex. 1002, 41–42); Ex. 1007 ¶ 98, Fig. 60. Petitioner does not directly assert that Santi discloses a controller connected to two pumps, and it too, like Lai, appears to only disclose a single pump. See Pet. 39; Ex. 1005 ¶ 64, Fig. 1. Petitioner correctly notes that Majer discloses controller 9 connected to two pumps, but we agree with Patent Owner that only one of those pumps meets the requirements of the claimed pumps, which are both connected to conduits that eventually lead to the brewing chamber. See Pet. 40; Prelim. Resp. 28; Ex. 1008, 9:11–12 (describing circuit C2 containing pump 4bis as not including any “brewing means”). In addition, Petitioner does not allege, and Majer does not appear to disclose, a controller coupled to Majer’s heating elements. See Pet. 40. Based on the foregoing, none of the prior art Petitioner relies on discloses an electronic controller that controls both claimed pumps and a thermal modulator. Despite these deficiencies, Petitioner summarily concludes that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have recognized that it would be obvious to combine Startz’s machine with the electronic controller of any of Lai, Santi, and/or Majer, and that such electronic controller would be communicatively coupled to both the thermal modulator and the pumps.” Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1002, 43). The Petition provides no additional rationale or argument in support of this conclusion, and the cited declarant testimony provides no further analysis. See id.; Ex. 1002, 43. Given the lack of any teaching of a controller coupled to two pumps and a thermal modulator, it was incumbent upon Petitioner to provide some reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the references in a manner that meets the limitation.14 Because the Petition lacks any such statement or rationale, we find Petitioner’s obviousness argument and evidence lacking in this critical respect.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,576,524 - PTAB · Apr 21, 2025 · PGR2024-00053 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 34–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness over the asserted Mabuchi-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“post-grant review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“likely occur very close in time to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision. . . . the claim construction hearing will occur on April 16, 2025” Prelim. Resp. 63. Neither party identifies a date for trial in the Parallel Litigation. On review of the Pacer record, it appears that the claim construction hearing was continued to April 23, 2025. There is no indication that the trial will be completed prior to a PTAB Final Written Decision, much less a court decision. Accordingly, this factor weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one of claims 34–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 of the ’482 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“[a] person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or a related field, and two-to-three years of experience in the research, design, development, or testing of rotating or reciprocating mechanisms, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 37). Patent Owner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention would have a working knowledge of product development, and would likely have a degree in engineering and/or industrial design, and/or at least three to five years of experience in conceiving, designing, engineering, and/or modifying such products and devices.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,857,482
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.