- PTAB · May 21, 2018 · IPR2018-00049 · APJ George C Best · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Parker’s rehearing request, granted institution on every ground in Laird’s petition under SAS, and denied Laird’s rehearing request as moot.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“(d) Rehearing. A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2018). To be entitled to relief, the party seeking rehearing must demonstrate that the Board abused its discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (2018); see also PNY Techs., Inc. v. Phison Elecs. Corp., No. IPR2013-00472, slip op. at 2 (PTAB April 24, 2014) (Paper 16) (available at https://go.usa.gov/xQUuS). A decision based on an erroneous interpretation of law, a factual finding that is not supported by substantial evidence, or an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors may represent an abuse of discretion. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“of an IPR. Wi-Fi One LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that § 314(a) “grants the Director discretion not to institute even when the threshold is met.”). The Director has delegated this discretion to the PTAB. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The Board has identified a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered in deciding whether or not to refuse to institute an IPR in the context of evaluating follow-on petitions. Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case IPR 2016-01357, slip op. at 16 (PTAB September 6, 2017) (Paper 19) (precedential in relevant part) (available at https://go.usa.gov/xQUvu). For the purpose of this decision, we assume without deciding that at least two of these factors also are relevant to our decision regarding whether or not to institute an IPR that does not involve a follow-on petition—for example, whether to institute an IPR with respect to all 15 grounds of alleged unpatentability set forth in Laird’s Petition even though we have determined that Laird has not established a reasonable likelihood of success with respect to 13 of those 15 grounds. These factors are (6) the finite resources of the Board and (7) the Board’s statutory obligation to issue a final written decision not later than one year after the IPR institution date. See id. (factors 6 and 7).” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“opinion in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018). In that decision, the Supreme Court held that in an instituted IPR, we must issue a final written decision addressing each patent claim challenged by the petitioner. SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1354.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“stability of Nguyen’s soft gel material because Nguyen does not describe the physical properties of this soft gel. Paper 13, 3–4. This argument is not persuasive because Nguyen describes the soft gel material as “a colloid in which the disperse phase has combined with the continuous phase to form a viscous ‘jelly-like’ product.” Ex. 1008, col. 3, ll. 6–8. Nguyen further states that the degree of cross-linking between the amine resin and the rubber composition and/or between the rubber compounds themselves will determine the consistency of the soft gel, which can range from “liquid-like” to “solid-like.” Id. at col. 4, ll. 18–34. In the absence of evidence to the contrary—and Parker has provided none—this is sufficient support for the opinion provided by Laird’s expert that Nguyen describes a form-stable composition.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,208,192 - Micron Technology, Inc. v. MLC Intellectual Property, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Mar 31, 2016 · IPR2015-00504 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing only as to addressing the request’s assertions and otherwise denied rehearing, leaving the denial of institution for claims 1, 9, 10, 12, 30, 42, and 45 over Kitamura in place.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“II. ANALYSIS When rehearing a decision on institution, the Board will review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Dr. Baker goes on to further interpret Kitamura (id. at ¶¶ 75–79), citing additional references (Exs. 1012, 1013), but those additional references do not form part of the obviousness ground, and are not cited in the Petition. We further note Petitioner may rely on expert testimony to interpret patents and printed publications, but may not rely on such testimony as a substitute for a patent or printed publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). We remain persuaded that Dr. Baker does not interpret Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit as requiring the selection of an analog signal, but rather indicates that only as a possible interpretation of Kitamura. As we stated in the Decision, Dr. Baker’s discussion makes clear how the output voltages could be set, but he does not testify that it must employ his discussed methods. Dec. 10.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1003 ¶ 74 (citing Exhibit 1004 at 21:27-31). We were not persuaded that Dr. Baker is testifying as to how the circuit must perform, only how it could perform. 5 Dr. Baker goes on to further interpret Kitamura (id. at ¶¶ 75–79), citing additional references (Exs. 1012, 1013), but those additional references do not form part of the obviousness ground, and are not cited in the Petition. We further note Petitioner may rely on expert testimony to interpret patents and printed publications, but may not rely on such testimony as a substitute for a patent or printed publication. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). We remain persuaded that Dr. Baker does not interpret Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit as requiring the selection of an analog signal, but rather indicates that only as a possible interpretation of Kitamura. As we stated in the Decision, Dr. Baker’s discussion makes clear how the output voltages could be set, but he does not testify that it must employ his discussed methods. Dec. 10. Petitioner also argues that we mischaracterized what aspects Dr. Baker relied upon in making his assessment. Reh’g Req. 8–9. Petitioner continues that Dr. Baker cites to Kitamura’s explicit disclosure, as well as corroborating his explanation with citations to textbook knowledge, but that we failed to credit the same. Id. at 8. We do not agree. We fully reviewed all of Dr. Baker’s testimony and corroborating citations, but we were not persuaded that Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit must function as Dr. Baker suggests it could function. In other words, we do not doubt Dr. Baker’s facts; we are only unpersuaded that Dr. Baker’s testimony states sufficiently that Kitamura’s D/A conversion circuit must select among specific analog reference voltages.” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 5,764,571 - Umicore AG & Co. KG v. BASF CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Dec 7, 2015 · IPR2015-01124 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
Granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request and limited trial to the listed § 103 grounds, excluding claims 17, 18, 21, and 22.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“We agree that we overlooked Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficiently that Maeshima, Breck, and Dedecek disclose or suggest the SAR values recited in claims 17, 18, 21, and 22. Upon further consideration, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not offered adequate evidence demonstrating that the higher SAR values required by claims 17, 18, 21, and 22 would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art over the combination of Maeshima and Breck, or over the combination of Dedecek and Breck. See, e.g., Pet. 13–14, 43; Ex. 1108 ¶¶ 122–129. Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing is granted.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We agree that we overlooked Patent Owner’s arguments that Petitioner failed to demonstrate sufficiently that Maeshima, Breck, and Dedecek disclose or suggest the SAR values recited in claims 17, 18, 21, and 22. Upon further consideration, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not offered adequate evidence demonstrating that the higher SAR values required by claims 17, 18, 21, and 22 would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art over the combination of Maeshima and Breck, or over the combination of Dedecek and Breck. See, e.g., Pet. 13–14, 43; Ex. 1108 ¶¶ 122–129.” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,404,203 - Daicel Corporation v. Celanese International CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Jun 26, 2015 · IPR2015-00171 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted in part, instituting review of claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 for anticipation and claim 57 for obviousness.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because Petitioner has shown Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on an unsupported assumption and the Miura Declaration, we determine Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process, and that claim 42 is anticipated by the ’095 patent. We have also reviewed the Petition’s analysis of dependent claims 43, 44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56, and conclude Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that the additional limitations of these claims are described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 27–35. In sum, at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits in showing claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 are anticipated by the ’095 patent. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted and trial is instituted as to this challenge.” slip op. at 5
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureReference is prior artInherency foundInstituted
“the Petition, and overlooked the fact that Mr. Cooper’s opinion is also based on his own calculations and data in two published articles. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 99. Specifically, Mr. Cooper approximates reactor DME equilibrium concentrations in the ’095 patent examples and explains how these approximations were obtained using readily available data, specifically identifying data in two published articles. Ex. 1003 ¶ 99 (citing Exs. 1029, 1030). Mr. Cooper goes on to explain why, based on the reactor contents and distillation conditions in the ’095 patent examples, DME and acetaldehyde would be present in the overhead distillation streams. Id. ¶¶ 101–102. Because Petitioner has shown Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on an unsupported assumption and the Miura Declaration, we determine Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process, and that claim 42 is anticipated by the ’095 patent. We have also reviewed the Petition’s analysis of dependent claims 43, 44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56, and conclude Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that the additional limitations of these claims are described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 27–35. In sum, at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits in showing claims 42–44, 47–51, 53, 55, and 56 are anticipated by the ’095 patent. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted and trial is instituted as to this challenge.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not found
“terms, and we agree, for purposes of this decision, that claim 42 does not require a specific quantity of DME in the distillation overhead. We do not agree with Petitioner, however, that the Singh and ’507 patent disclosures are identical with respect to the addition of water to distillation column 22. As indicated in our Decision, both Singh and the ’507 patent describe adding small amounts of water to column 22 for the purpose of inhibiting impurity formation. See Dec. 5–6. The ’507 patent, however, includes additional description of adding water to column 22 for the purpose of producing DME in the distillation overhead. See id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 11). This additional description of adding water to produce DME in the distillation overhead does not refer back to the description of adding water as an inhibitor (see Ex. 1002, 10:9–32), or otherwise indicate that the small amounts of water used to inhibit impurity formation in the ’507 patent and Singh processes would produce DME in a distillation overhead. In addition, for the reasons explained in our Decision (Dec. 25–26), Petitioner has not persuaded us that the prosecution history of the ’507 patent includes an admission by Patent Owner that the addition of any amount of water to the distillation step would result in DME in an overhead stream. See Req. Reh’g 10. In sum, Petitioner has not convinced us that our Decision was based on an erroneous claim interpretation or that we overlooked evidence that the addition of any amount of water in the steps common to the Singh and the ’507 patent processes would necessarily result in the presence of DME in a distillation overhead. With respect to Petitioner’s assertions regarding Akinori, we note the Petition relied on Akinori as evidence that DME was necessarily produced in the ’095 patent process. See Pet. 43. Petitioner did not explain how Akinori was relevant to show the presence of DME in the distillation overhead of Singh. For the above reasons, the Request for Rehearing is denied as to the challenge based on Singh in view of the ’095 patent and Akinori.” slip op. at 7
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,076,507 - Daicel Corporation v. Celanese International CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Jun 26, 2015 · IPR2015-00173 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted in part; IPR was instituted on claims 58–60, 67, 69, 71, and 72 for anticipation by the ’095 patent and claim 73 for obviousness over the ’095 patent and JP ’712.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the Petition, and overlooked the fact that Mr. Cooper’s opinion is also based on his own calculations and data in two published articles. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 97. Specifically, Mr. Cooper approximates reactor DME equilibrium concentrations in the ’095 patent examples and explains how these approximations were obtained using readily available data, specifically identifying data in two published articles. Ex. 1003 ¶ 97 (citing Exs. 1029, 1030). Mr. Cooper goes on to explain why, based on the reactor contents and distillation conditions in the ’095 patent examples, DME and” slip op. at 4
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureReference is prior artInherency foundInstituted
“the Petition, and overlooked the fact that Mr. Cooper’s opinion is also based on his own calculations and data in two published articles. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 97. Specifically, Mr. Cooper approximates reactor DME equilibrium concentrations in the ’095 patent examples and explains how these approximations were obtained using readily available data, specifically identifying data in two published articles. Ex. 1003 ¶ 97 (citing Exs. 1029, 1030). Mr. Cooper goes on to explain why, based on the reactor contents and distillation conditions in the ’095 patent examples, DME and acetaldehyde would be present in the overhead distillation streams. Id. ¶¶ 99–100. Because Petitioner has shown Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on an unsupported assumption and the Miura Declaration, we determine Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process, and that claim 58 is anticipated by the ’095 patent. We have also reviewed the Petition’s analysis of dependent claims 59, 60, 67, 69, 71, and 72, and conclude Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that the additional limitations of these claims are described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 25–30.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“on the combination of the ’095 patent and Akinori, based on our determination in Section 1.A., above, that Petitioner had established a reasonable likelihood it would prevail on the merits in showing claim 58 was anticipated by the ’095 patent alone, and the Petition did not articulate a substantive difference between the two challenges. In the present challenge, the Petition fails to explain how Akinori is relied upon for a teaching of a claim 73 feature not described in the ’095 patent. See Pet. 47–51. The Petition does explain, however, why claim 73 would have been obvious over the combination of the ’095 patent and JP ’712. See id. at 50–51. Based on the record before us, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing claim 73 would have been obvious over the ’095 patent and JP ’712. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted as to claim 73, and trial is instituted based on the combination of the ’095 patent and JP ’712.” slip op. at 11
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,076,507 - Daicel Corporation v. Celanese International CorporationRehearing grantedPTAB · Jun 26, 2015 · IPR2015-00170 · APJ Linda M Gaudette · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted in part and review instituted on claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13 as obvious over Singh, the ’095 patent, and Akinori.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“the Board reviews the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if an unreasonable judgment is made in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“overlooked the discussion on page 26 of the Petition which relies on Mr. Cooper’s declaration testimony. Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on unsupported assumptions and the Miura Declaration, which we determined were not persuasive evidence that DME would be present inherently in the overhead distillation of the ’095 patent Example. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that on the record before us, and for purposes of our decision on whether to institute trial on this challenge, Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process. Further, for purposes of this decision, the Petition identifies sufficiently how Singh discloses features in the dependent claims that are not explicitly described in the ’095 patent. See, e.g., Pet. 56 (claim 2), id. at 57 (claim 8). The Petitioner also provides adequate explanation of reasons for combining the references. See Pet. 50. In sum, upon reconsideration of this challenge in light of the Request for Rehearing, we determine Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation and evidence to support a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on the merits in showing claims 1–4, 6–11, and 13 would have been unpatentable over Singh, the ’095 patent, and Akinori. Therefore, the Request for Rehearing is granted and trial is instituted as to this challenge.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“declaration testimony; rather, we assessed the persuasiveness of Mr. Miura’s testimony in light of other factual evidence in the record. See Dec. 16–20; Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“It is within the discretion of the trier of fact to give each item of evidence such weight as it feels appropriate. . . . In giving more weight to prior publications than to subsequent conclusory statements by experts, the Board acted well within that discretion.”). We did not conclude DME is absent in the distillation overhead in the ’095 patent Example. We found Mr. Miura’s testimony and Experiment 1 were not persuasive evidence that DME would be present inherently in the overhead distillation of the ’095 patent Example given the differences in the ’095 patent Example and Experiment 1 reaction liquids. Thesedifferences were not addressed adequately by Mr. Miura. In this regard, we found Mr. Miura’s dismissal of these differences as “slight,” without further discussion, was not persuasive in light of our actual comparison of the ’095 patent Example and Experiment 1, that revealed “Miura’s Experiment 1 contained more than twice the amount of rhodium and about 34% of the amount of water used in the ’095 patent Example,” Dec. 19, and our review of the ’095 patent and Petitioner’s own patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,683,212 B2 (Ex. 2014), that indicate these differences would affect the reaction product, Dec. 20.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“overlooked the discussion on page 26 of the Petition which relies on Mr. Cooper’s declaration testimony. Mr. Cooper’s testimony is supported by underlying factual evidence, and is not based solely on unsupported assumptions and the Miura Declaration, which we determined were not persuasive evidence that DME would be present inherently in the overhead distillation of the ’095 patent Example. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that on the record before us, and for purposes of our decision on whether to institute trial on this challenge, Mr. Cooper’s testimony provides persuasive support for Petitioner’s contention that DME is inherently present in an overhead distillation stream of the ’095 patent process. Further, for purposes of this decision, the Petition identifies sufficiently how Singh discloses features in the dependent claims that are not explicitly described in the ’095 patent. See, e.g., Pet. 56 (claim 2), id. at 57 (claim 8). The Petitioner also provides adequate explanation of reasons for combining the references. See Pet. 50.” slip op. at 9
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,076,507 - Sure-Fire Electrical Corporation v. Yongjiang Yin And Shenzhen El Lighting Co. Ltd.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Jun 1, 2015 · IPR2014-01448 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Rehearing
Rehearing was granted for claims 1 and 7 under § 103 over He and Korodi, and denied for the He and Currie ground.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“Therefore, we conclude that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute an inter partes review based the combination of He and Currie. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on this ground. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, on rehearing, based on our review of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the combination of He and Korodi. Therefore, we modify our Decision to institute an inter partes review of claims 1 and 7 for obviousness over He and Korodi. We determine, however, that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute review on the asserted ground based on He and Currie, and rehearing is denied as to that ground. At this stage in the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims, including the claim construction.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi. Specifically, we determine, based on the current record, Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings. “‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious simply to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord as taught by Korodi. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102. We additionally are persuaded, on the record before us, that the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. at 417. Indeed, we credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results. Ex. 1008 ¶ 103.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundOther
“Based on the record before us, we are persuaded Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of He and Korodi. Specifically, we determine, based on the current record, Petitioner has articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings. “‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious simply to replace the aluminum core wire in He with a power cord as taught by Korodi. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 99, 102. We additionally are persuaded, on the record before us, that the combination of He and Korodi unites old elements with no change in their respective functions. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16. To be nonobvious, an improvement must be “more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id. at 417. Indeed, we credit Dr. Horenstein’s testimony that replacing the aluminum core wire in He for the power cord in Korodi would have been a merger of familiar elements according to their established functions, known methods, and predictable results. Ex. 1008 ¶ 103. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we are persuaded the combination of He and Korodi is a proper combination.” slip op. at 10
- Burden
“With regard to the asserted ground of unpatentability of claims 1 and 7 for obviousness over He and Currie, Petitioner does not explain adequately the relative strengths or weaknesses of this ground and the grounds on which we have instituted. See Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Constellation Tech. LLC, Case IPR2014-01180, slip op. at 29–30 (PTAB Feb. 8, 2015) (Paper 8). The Currie reference has a filing date of September 24, 2004 and an issuance date of October 17, 2006. Thus, the Currie reference would not be prior art if Patent Owner were successful in establishing a conception date “at least as early as April 2004” and diligence from conception to reduction to practice. See Prelim. Resp. 11. Accordingly, the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing do not apply to the combination of He and Currie. Therefore, we conclude that we did not abuse our discretion in declining to institute an inter partes review based the combination of He and Currie. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on this ground.” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,671,279
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.