• Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00819 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable because the references did not teach its required comparison of desired and interferer signal strengths.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 9. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Here, as in the Director’s example, Petitioner advanced a narrower construction of the dynamic limitations before the district court, which the district court declined to adopt. Pet. 9; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. Instead, the district court adopted a “plain-and-ordinary meaning” construction, which Patent Owner proposed. PO Resp. 38; PO Sur-reply 10 n.2; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed applying the plain and ordinary meaning construction that had already been preliminarily adopted by the district court. Compare Pet. (filed May 1, 2024) with Ex. 2015 (preliminarily adopting plain and ordinary meaning construction on March 25, 2024). Applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR. Thus, we give the dynamic limitation its plain-and-ordinary meaning, which is “adjusting during operation based—at least in part—on information gained during operation.”” slip op. at 13

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In our Institution Decision, we stated that we “will give the term ‘signal path’ its ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ and not limit it only to analog components, as the district court found and the parties agree.” Inst. Dec. 11. Given that the parties continue to agree on this point, we see no need to depart from the construction we adopted in our Institution Decision. Moreover, applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR for the same reasons as discussed above. In this proceeding, the dispute between the parties concerns the application of this and the surrounding claim language (i.e., “in the receiver signal path,” “in the signal path”) to the disclosures in Behbahani. See PO Resp. 43–45. Therefore, we will provide further discussion in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding Behbahani below. However, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language to the extent it requires adjusting an impedance and/or bias current of a circuit while it is in the signal path. See Id. at 50–51.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “Patent Owner’s arguments generally fail to address why Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “plurality of circuits [comprising/including] . . . a filter,” and instead focus on why the low-pass and high-pass filter circuits do not teach the limitation, which is not Petitioner’s position. As stated above, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language – i.e., that it “requires adjusting the bias, in or of a circuit.” See PO Resp. 49. However, Patent Owner’s reading of the claim does not persuasively address why the Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit.” We have reviewed Dr. Larson’s cited testimony and disagree with Patent Owner that he provided “a well-supported opinion . . . as to why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the entire bandpass box to be a single ‘circuit,’ or to reflect variation in ‘an impedance’ or ‘a bias’ in the claims.” Sur-reply 4 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 46–48, 71, 74–83). Dr. Larson testifies that the ’330 patent (which has the same specification as the ’164 patent) “teach[es] these adjustments [that dynamically change operating parameters] as changes effected in a single circuit block.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 46 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 8A, 9A, 8:20–25, 8:36–39, 9:36–59, 10:1–18 (emphasis added)). Dr. Larson does not provide further explanation as to what he means by a “single circuit block,” but relies on Figures 8A and 9A, which show a “function block,” and other disclosures referring to a “function block.” See id. There is no dispute that the recited “circuit” in the receiver signal path is referring to these “function blocks.” See Tr. 22:20–23:4. The ’164 patent states that Figure 8A, which includes function block 820, is “an embodiment of the present invention” 8:28–30. Similarly, Figure 9A, which includes function block 920, “illustrate[s] one of the possible power saving techniques.” Id. at 3:41–42. The ’164 patent describes that “[f]unctional block 820 . . . may be a filter, mixer, amplifier, or other circuit or circuits in a wireless transceiver or other electronic circuits or system.” Id. at 8:30–33 (emphasis added). Based on these disclosures, we are not convinced that Function Block 820 or 920 cannot include multiple filters in a Variable Bandpass Filter Block, or that Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit.” Dr. Larson also relies on Figure 6 of the ’164 patent to conclude that” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 11,564,164 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,564,164
• Visa Inc. v. Cortex MCP, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00489 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–9, 11–18, and 20 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 2, 10, 19, and 21 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would typically have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with at least two years of work involving electronic payment systems, network authentication systems, or related areas.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76–81). Petitioner further states that a person of ordinary skill “could have less education but significant professional experience in one or more of those fields.” Id. In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Patent Owner states that it agrees with the level of ordinary skill set forth in our Institution Decision. PO Resp. 9. Based on the full trial record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’859 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “In our Institution Decision, we preliminarily determined that the term “OVER file” encompasses a virtual representation of one or more credentials, to be used for verification of those credentials. Inst. Dec. 11. We also explained that we did not need to determine for purposes of institution whether the term “OVER file” necessarily includes “tokens” as a general matter, or further elaborate on what additional characteristics might be required to qualify as an “OVER file.” Id. We also determined that Petitioner had made a sufficient showing for purposes of institution that Oborne’s tokens qualify as “OVER files.” Id. at 11, 24–27.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “After considering the full trial record, we adhere to the construction in our Institution Decision interpreting the claim language at issue “to require that an issuing agency ha[s] verified a virtual representation in an OVER file as being an official representation of the credential.” Inst. Dec. 13. In light of Patent Owner’s statements in its Sur-reply, we further clarify that this construction encompasses (1) considering the OVER file as the credential and verifying the OVER file, or (2) verifying a virtual representation of the credential contained within the OVER file.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “3. Other Terms The parties do not propose constructions for any other claim terms, and we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms for purposes of this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 10,749,859 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,749,859
• Xu Peicheng (Hong Kong) Optoelectronic Technology Co., Limited v. Semisilicon Technology Corp.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00156 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 8 are unpatentable over the stated obviousness grounds; claims 4–6 were not shown unpatentable because Hiroyuki does not teach the claimed terminal pins.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the Schubert Declaration, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related discipline, and 6 years of 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), includes amendments to Section 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the challenged claims issued from an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply pre-AIA law. See Pet. 2; Ex. 1001, codes (22), (30). 2 US 2009/0021955 A1, published January 22, 2009 (Ex. 1004, codes (10), (43)) (“Kuang”). Petitioner contends that Kuang is prior art to the ’546 patent at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2. 3 US 2012/0050606 A1, published March 1, 2012 (Ex. 1005, codes (10), (43)) (“Debevec”). Petitioner asserts that “[b]ecause Debevec was filed prior to the priority date of the ’546 patent, it qualifies as prior art at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).” Pet. 2. 4 US 6,774,584 B2, issued August 10, 2004 (Ex. 1008, codes (10), (45)) (“Lys”). Petitioner contends that Lys is prior art to the ’546 patent at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2–3. 5 JP2006-228529, published August 31, 2006 (Ex. 1006, code (43)) (“Hiroyuki”). We refer herein to the certified English translation filed as Exhibit 1007. Petitioner contends that Hiroyuki is prior art to the ’546 patent at least under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2. practical experience in designing or fabricating LED lighting systems, including controlling and driving LEDs,” or “[a]lternatively . . . would have had a master’s degree and four years of experience, or a Ph.D. degree and two years of experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7–8. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’546 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The parties also dispute the interpretation of the term “synchronous signals” recited in claim 1, with the parties proposing these respective constructions: Petitioner’s Proposed Patent Owner’s Proposed Construction Construction “signals that are sent to the slave “signals related to activities governed by synchronized timing” nodes to control their corresponding LED strings at the same time.”” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The “context” is typically evaluated by reviewing the intrinsic record. See e.g., Regeneron, 130 F.4th at 1380–84. Here, as discussed above, the ’546 patent has multiple disclosures where a curtain lamp has a single light-emitting diode in one light-emitting diode string. See Ex. 1001, 1:33–36, 6:15–20, 6:27–40, 8:25–45. In particular, the ’546 patent similarly discloses a first curtain lamp with one LED in one light string, as well as a second curtain lamp, which provides further support for Petitioner’s proposed interpretation. Id. at 8:25–45. Although Patent Owner argues that Figures 7 and 8 disclose multiple LEDs and light strings in curtain lamps, other embodiments and claims explicitly indicate single components in a “curtain lamp.” “[T]here is a strong presumption against a claim construction that excludes a disclosed embodiment.” See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Given that certain embodiments and claim 8 disclose a curtain lamp with one light string with one LED, we decline to interpret the claim to prohibit Petitioner’s interpretation. Additionally, we do not find that Petitioner’s claim interpretation renders the claim terms nonsensical or illogical. See Becton, 616 F.3d at 1255. Patent Owner asserts otherwise, arguing that Petitioner’s interpretation is based upon a “nonsensical” or “absurd[]” argument, there is no reason to have both a master and slave control unit to operate a single LED, and the interpretation renders most of the components superfluous. See PO Sur-reply 12; PO Resp. Supp. Br. 5. As discussed above, however, although the ’546 patent does not appear to provide any explanation for why there are master and slave control units to operate a single LED, the patent nevertheless discloses that in embodiments. This situation is also distinguishable from Becton, where “unequivocal language” of the claim recited “spring means ‘connected to’ the hinged arm,” such that interpreting the spring means and the hinged arm as the same structure would have rendered the claim nonsensical. Becton, 616 F.3d at 1254–55. Becton further found that interpreting the spring means and hinged arm as the same structure would be inconsistent with descriptions of the elements in the specification. Id. Here, in contrast, the ’546 patent Specification is replete with disclosures of a curtain lamp having one light string with one LED, and claim 8 is directed to the same. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s interpretation of these claim elements.” slip op. at 36

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “Although Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s arguments in the Reply on “light strings” and “curtain lamp” as they relate to a single LED are improper, we do not agree. As Patent Owner acknowledges, the Petition and Dr. Schubert’s original declaration stated that a “curtain lamp” is “commonly understood to be one or more light strings.” See PO Sur-reply 12; see also Pet. 8; Ex. 1003 ¶ 37. Patent Owner did not contest Petitioner’s interpretation in its Response. See PO Resp. 15. Patent Owner did, however, argue that Kuang did not teach or suggest “light strings” in any form and therefore did not teach a “curtain lamp” under Petitioner’s definition of the same. PO Resp. 15–17. A petitioner reply may respond to arguments raised in a patent owner’s response under 35 U.S.C. § 42.23(b), and here Petitioner’s argument that a light string may have a single LED is properly presented in its Reply in response to Patent Owner’s arguments. Further, Patent Owner was not only aware that Petitioner had taken the position that a “curtain lamp” could be a single “light string,” but Patent Owner also did not dispute Petitioner’s interpretation.8 Our view, therefore, is that Petitioner’s argument that a curtain lamp may be a single LED is proper because it is corollary to Petitioner’s reply arguments on light strings. That is, Petitioner’s assertion follows from the reply arguments on light strings and the unopposed interpretation of curtain lamp as a single light string. Additionally, to the extent there could be any prejudice to Patent Owner by these light string and curtain lamp arguments, Patent Owner has had opportunities to address them by supplemental briefing.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 8,884,546 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,884,546
• Universal Electronics, Inc. / Gemstar Technology (Qinzhou) Co. Ltd. et al. v. ROKU, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 23, 2023 · IPR2022-00818 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8–10, and 14 are unpatentable over RadioShack; claim 11 was not shown unpatentable over Wouters and Verzulli because the combination did not disclose the claimed combining and installing steps.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touch-stone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ . . . .” Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). A reference is considered “publicly accessible” if it was “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. at 1355–56 (citing In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (CCPA 1981)). Petitioner treats this requirement as having two aspects, namely (1) whether a person of ordinary skill could reasonably have found RemoteCentral.com and (2) whether such a skilled artisan could reasonably have found RadioShack on RemoteCentral.com. Reply 8–13; see also Tr. 33:25–34:8 (Patent Owner asserting that there are two aspects to the analysis on public accessibility: “The first is whether a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have known to arrive at the website containing the prior art reference. The second one is . . . , [a]ssuming the [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have done so, would the [person of ordinary skill in the art], exercising reasonable diligence, have located the prior art reference on the site? And these are separate and distinct requirements, and if you fail one of them, the document is not publicly accessible.”).” slip op. at 27

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “addressed squarely by the principles set forth in Hulu, which addresses the standards at the institution stage and during the trial for evaluating evidence proffered to show asserted art qualifies as a printed publication. Specifically, after a petitioner has presented “evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent,” such that trial is instituted, “some limited opportunities exist for the petitioner to present new evidence later.” Hulu at 13–14. These “limited opportunities” include “in a reply to the patent owner response,” provided that the additional evidence is “responsive to the prior briefing” and provided that the additional evidence does not require “completely reopen[ing] the record, by, for example, changing theories after filing a petition.” Id. at 14–15. Although Patent Owner contends that “[t]his is not an example of permissible rebuttal evidence, but rather a belated attempt to fill a gap in the evidence in the Petition,” we disagree. See Sur-reply 6. Rather, the 7 Patent Owner appears to refer incorrectly to Exhibit 1040 instead of Exhibit 1041 when identifying “articles allegedly referring to RemoteCentral.com.” See Sur-reply 5–6. progression within the instant proceeding comports well with the Hulu framework. During the preliminary proceeding, Petitioner came forth with “evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that [RadioShack] was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent,” just as Hulu demands. Hulu at 13; Inst. Dec. 23 (“[W]e determine that Petitioner’s showing regarding public accessibility of RadioShack is sufficient under the standard we apply at this stage of the proceeding.”). Patent Owner challenges RadioShack’s status as a printed publication in its Response, just as Hulu contemplates. Hulu at 15; PO Resp. 28–41. And Petitioner submits additional evidence that replies to that challenge without changing its theory that RadioShack qualifies as a printed publication by virtue of its accessibility on the RemoteCentral.com web site and in light of date indicia on RadioShack itself.8 See Hulu at 15–16; Reply 7–13. Moreover, in determining that Petitioner’s additional evidence directed at RemoteCentral.com is properly considered, we are further mindful of the Federal Circuit’s endorsement that “the petitioner in an inter partes review proceeding may introduce new evidence after the petition stage if the evidence is a legitimate reply to evidence introduced by the patent owner.” Anacor Pharm., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1830–81 (Fed. 8 In its Reply, Petitioner also relies on evidence of publication of RadioShack on Radio Shack’s own public website and on “a third location,” hifi-remote.com. Reply 14. As we discuss below, we determine that the presence of RadioShack on RemoteCentral.com is sufficient to qualify RadioShack as a printed publication. We therefore do not reach the issue of whether presence on either the Radio Shack web site or on hifi-remote.com is an improper new theory raised by Petitioner in its Reply. See Tr. 8:13– 9:23 (Petitioner discussing whether reliance on hifi-remote.com presents a different theory than set forth in the Petition). Cir. 2018); see also Vidstream LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 981 F.3d 1060, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board denied VidStream’s Motion to Exclude, holding that it was appropriate to permit Twitter to respond to VidStream’s challenge [to the status of Bradford as a printed publication] by providing additional evidence to establish the Bradford publication date. We conclude that the Board acted appropriately, for the Board permitted both sides to provide evidence concerning the reference date of the Bradford book, in pursuit of the correct answer.”). We accordingly give due weight to Petitioner’s additional evidence of RadioShack’s accessibility on the RemoteCentral.com web site.” slip op. at 25

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “1 Patent Owner objected to Petitioner’s demonstrative slides 45 and 68 as presenting a new argument that was not previously made with respect to challenged claims 2 and 10. Paper 27; see Paper 26 (Petitioner’s demonstratives), 45, 68. At the oral hearing, we reserved ruling on the objections. Tr. 5:23–6:3. Both slides reproduce the same portions of Exhibits 1002 and 1025, with the statement that “A press and hold for an auto-scan or brand-scan is admitted prior art.” Paper 26, 45, 68. As explained below, we do not reach the predicate position upon which the objections are based. See Tr. 5:8–11 (Petitioner stating that “this Board only needs to resolve this objection if it accepts Roku’s claim construction argument that the claims cover a press and hold of a single button, but that they do not cover pressing multiple buttons to present that argument in the alternative. So, if you reject that argument, you don’t even have to resolve the objection.”). We accordingly dismiss the objections as moot.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with this assessment, and the parties do not specifically advocate for one articulation over the other in this proceeding. See Pet. 8 (Petitioner asserting that “[t]he Challenged Claims are unpatentable under both proposed levels”); PO Resp. 5 (Patent Owner stating its “position that the challenged claims are unpatentable under either proposed level of ordinary skill”). We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed statement of the level of ordinary skill as advanced in the related ITC Investigation. But we note that we would reach the same ultimate conclusion that Petitioner shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that all challenged claims are unpatentable were we to adopt Petitioner’s proposal instead.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 8,378,875 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,378,875
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Staton Techiya, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 13, 2023 · IPR2022-00281 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 13, 14, 17–19, and 25–27 are unpatentable as obvious; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience in the design of digital audio systems and associated signal processing.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 22). Petitioner also states that a person of ordinary skill “could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner’s Response applies Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 17. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill, which is consistent with the level reflected in the ’244 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “As a general rule, ‘[u]nless the steps of a method [claim] actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one.’” Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research In Motion Ltd., 764 F.3d 1392, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). “However, a claim ‘requires an ordering of steps when the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, requires that the steps be performed in the order written, or the specification directly or implicitly requires’ an order of steps.” Id. (quoting TALtech Ltd. v. Esquel Apparel, Inc., 279 F. App’x 974, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Our preliminary discussion in the Decision Granting Institution states that “logic dictates that a voice timer must be active before something can happen ‘during a voice timer,’” but the Decision Granting Institution notes that the claims can be read in different ways, e.g.: “(a) changing a mixing gain at some point in time while the voice timer is active, or (b) maintaining an adjusted mix throughout a voice timer ‘pending voice activity.’” Paper 13, 15. On the full record, we determine the latter reading is correct; the claims do not require performing the “activating/activate” step before the “adjusting/adjusts” step, nor that a singular act of “adjusting/adjusts” must occur “during” a voice timer. slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “based on Kvaløy’s additional teachings of a protective earplug that protects a user’s hearing by sealing a user’s outer ear canal while allowing selected sounds to pass through. Pet. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1009 1:39–44, 3:40–46, 3:50–52, 4:22–26, 4:38–41, Fig. 1; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–156). Petitioner also contends a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Rosenberg and Kvaløy because, among other things, the references teach similar devices designed to protect users’ hearing and employing Kvaløy’s sealing section to provide full sound isolation in Rosenberg’s device would have improved Rosenberg’s hearing protection. Pet. 31–32. Patent Owner does not separately address or rebut Petitioner’s contentions for claim 4. We agree with Petitioner that the cited portions of Kvaløy satisfy claim 4, and we determine Petitioner has adequately articulated reasons a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Rosenberg and Kvaløy, including to improve the hearing protection of Rosenberg’s device with the Kvaløy’s teachings of a sealing section. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 4 would have been obvious in view of the combined teachings of Rosenberg and Kvaløy.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot shown unpatentableNon analogous artNot shown unpatentable

    “First, we determine Petitioner forfeited these arguments by failing to show in the Petition that Olwal qualifies as analogous art. Even if these arguments were timely, Petitioner’s arguments are unpersuasive because Olwal describes a user interface for use with a desktop computer, which is well removed from the relevant field of endeavor, and Petitioner has not adequately established that Olwal’s teachings are reasonably pertinent to the problems with which the inventor of the ’244 patent was involved. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 15 is unpatentable in view of Rosenberg, Park, and Olwal.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 9,270,244 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,270,244
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Staton Techiya, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 10, 2023 · IPR2022-00324 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 9, and 11–16 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 3 was not shown unpatentable over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “reasonable expectation of success in achieving the proposed Le-Kvaløy combination. Our conclusion is supported by Dr. Atlas’s testimony that one of ordinary skill “would have been able to adapt Le’s computer unit 15 to wirelessly communicate with Kvaløy’s ear terminal, as Le itself suggests.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 110. We also credit Dr. Atlas’s testimony that one of ordinary skill would have been able to “pass the signal from the outer microphone [of Kvaløy] (which replaces Le’s environmental microphone in the combination) continually to Le’s computer unit through the digital interface.” Id. ¶ 112; see also id. ¶¶ 113–114. We further agree with and find credible Dr. Atlas’s testimony that one of ordinary skill would have been aware of the potential for feedback, echo, and ringing, and would have been able to implement solutions to address this issue. Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 19–40.” slip op. at 35

  • Skill levelOther

    “C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience in the design of digital audio systems and associated signal processing such as voice or speech processing and/or acoustic pattern recognition.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 18–20). Petitioner further states that a person of 2 Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. ordinary skill in the art “could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means.” Id. Patent Owner “applies the level of ordinary skill in the art that Petitioners propose.” PO Resp. 17. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s undisputed assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is supported by the ’591 patent and the asserted prior art. D. Ground 13: Asserted Obviousness of Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 Based on Le in view of Kvaløy Petitioner contends that claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 would have been” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “3. Motivation to Combine Le and Kvaløy a) The Parties’ Arguments Relying on the testimony of Dr. Atlas, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill “would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Le and Kvaløy, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 93). According to Petitioner, Le emphasizes the desire for the system to be unobtrusive and blend in with the user’s appearance, and discloses that computer unit 15 can be implemented as a cellular telephone with wireless connections for microphones 36 and 38. Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 5, 9, 31, 33, 42). Petitioner also contends that Le is “concerned with properly recognizing voice commands that initiate recording in noisy environments.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 23–24). In view of these disclosures, Petitioner argues, one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to look for ways to implement Le’s system with a wireless connection to the microphones 36 and 38 and an ability to input audio commands in noisy environments, while making the system more unobtrusive. Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 99). Petitioner argues that this motivation would have led one of ordinary skill to Kvaløy. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 99). According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill “would have recognized that Kvaløy’s ear terminal was compatible with and even advanced Le’s disclosed objectives and be as good or superior to Le’s earpiece 30” for the following reasons: 1. Kvaløy’s ear terminal is analogous to Le’s earpiece 30 because both are configured to exchange audio signals with other devices. Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 103). 2. Kvaløy’s ear terminal would be less obtrusive and better blend in with the user’s natural appearance than Le’s wired earpiece 30. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 104). 3. Kvaløy’s inner microphone M2 would provide an equivalent or superior voice signal to Le’s personal microphone 36 for Le’s natural voice commands to computer unit 15 because it is less susceptible to noise. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 105). 4. Kvaløy’s outer microphone M1 for picking up ambient sound so that the user can speak with other people would be as effective as Le’s belt-worn environmental microphone 38 without the obtrusiveness of having to carry around a separate microphone or wear it on a belt. Id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 106). 5. Le’s recording of ambient sound for later recall would have been an obvious use for Kvaløy’s ear terminal microphones. Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 107). Accordingly, in Petitioner’s combined Le-Kvaløy system, “Kvaløy’s ear terminal would replace Le’s earpiece and Le’s environmental microphone such that Kvaløy’s outer microphone would replace Le’s environmental microphone, and Kvaløy’s inner microphone would be used to pick up the user’s speech instead of the personal microphone.” Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 109). Petitioner asserts that “wireless headsets for mobile devices were common in the 2007 timeframe,” and one of ordinary skill “would have been able to adapt Le’s computer unit 15 to wirelessly communicate with Kvaløy’s ear terminal, as Le itself suggests.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 110–111).” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “h) Summary for Claim 1 For the foregoing reasons, and based on the full trial record, Petitioner” slip op. at 54

  Patent outcomesUS 8,254,591 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,254,591
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Staton Techiya, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 14, 2023 · IPR2022-00282 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9–14, and 17–20 are unpatentable; claims 4, 5, 8, 15, and 16 were not shown unpatentable, based on the stated anticipation and obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the ’400 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience in the design of wireless earphones and associated signal processing.” Pet. 17; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18. “Patent Owner accepts the level of ordinary skill in the art that is proposed in the Petition.” PO Resp. 15; Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 9–10. We conclude Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’400 patent and the prior art of record, and it is not disputed by Patent Owner. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s formulation in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “B. Claim Construction We interpret the ’400 patent claims “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). This “includ[es] construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. The Petition asserts “no express constructions of the claims are necessary” in this proceeding, and “the claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 17–18; Ex. 1002 ¶ 74. The Patent Owner Response provides several claim constructions. See PO Resp. 15–19 (construing “sound signal” in claims 1, 14, and 18; “noise signal” in claims 14 and 18; and “envelope” in claims 8, 17 and 20); id. at 19–21 (construing “a background noise level” in claim 1); id. at 33–35 (construing “a background noise signal” in claims 14 and 18); id. at 35–38 (construing “mixing” in claims 4, 15, and 19). We discuss here Patent Owner’s claim constructions as they relate to independent claims 1, 14, and 18. We defer construction of dependent claims to later sections of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “might support construing “a background noise level” in claim 1 to mean a single overall background noise level is the reasoning provided in the Patent Owner Response. However, the CUPP decision states: “We now make precedential the straightforward conclusion we drew in an earlier nonprecedential opinion: ‘[T]he Board is not required to accept a patent owner’s arguments as disclaimer when deciding the merits of those arguments.’” CUPP, 53 F.4th at 1383 (quoting VirnetX, 778 F. App’x at 910). Yet, Patent Owner is in effect asking us to do that here, given the procedural interplay of this proceeding and the District Court Litigation. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the District Court Litigation does not provide a persuasive basis to adopt Patent Owner’s claim construction of “a background noise level” in this proceeding. c) Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we construe “a background noise level” in” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “based on the background noise level, to produce noise-reduced ambient sound signal 78. See Ex. 1005, Fig. 3. In particular, Alves discloses that, in an exemplary noise cancellation algorithm applied by noise reducer 76, “the average power of quasi-stationary background noise is tracked, and then a gain is decided accordingly and applied to the subband signals.” Id. ¶ 43 (emphasis added); accord id. ¶ 31.” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 8,315,400 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,315,400
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Staton Techiya, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 14, 2023 · IPR2022-00234 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 14–15, 17–20, and 24–25 are unpatentable; claims 10–11 are not shown unpatentable, based on the Board’s obviousness ground determinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person having ordinary skill in the art pertaining” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “defined in sufficient detail to establish obviousness, and establishes a sufficient motivation for the combination to avoid hindsight bias. As to sufficient detail, “the amount of explanation needed will vary from case to case, depending on the complexity of the matter and the issues raised in the record.” Personal Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 991–92 & 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2017); InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGo Comms., Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In some cases, a persuasive showing of obviousness requires an explanation of “how the combination of the two references was supposed to work,” as “a prerequisite to adequately explaining and supporting a conclusion that a relevant skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the combination.” Personal Web, 848 F.3d” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,124,982 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,124,982
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 3, 2022 · IPR2020-01624 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Gauthier, Groen, and Shumarayev, with Huang for certain dependent claims; claim 17 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “speed links, or equivalent academic experience.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). At institution, we applied Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art, with the exception of the open-ended phrase “at least,” which expands the range of experience indefinitely without an upper bound. Inst. Dec. 8. During the trial, Patent Owner stated that it does not object to this level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 7. Based on the parties’ agreement on this issue, we maintain our determination from the Institution Decision and apply that level of ordinary skill in the analysis below.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The parties dispute the scope of “independent.” Petitioner argues that using separate current setting signals for separate devices describes the “independent” aspect of these claims. Pet. 31–35; see also Pet. Reply 3–9 (setting forth claim construction arguments). Patent Owner argues that the ’132 patent does not set forth a special definition for “independent” and, therefore, that the plain meaning applies—“not determined or influenced by someone or something else.” PO Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2005). Thus, Patent Owner argues that “independent of” means “not determined or influenced by.” PO Resp. 8–17; PO Sur-reply 2–7. As discussed below, we conclude that Petitioner has proven obviousness of the subject matter in claims 1–16 and 18 under Patent Owner’s proposed construction, and the deficiencies in Petitioner’s contentions for claim 17 are not related to the definition of “independent.” Thus, we need not resolve this claim construction dispute to issue a final written decision on all claims. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms ... that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached

    “At institution, we preliminarily agreed with Petitioner that these phrases are means-plus-function. Inst. Dec. 13–15. Patent Owner argues that these phrases are not means-plus-function limitations and that “[e]ach claimed ‘current selection module’ is simply a circuit or collection of circuit[r]y that selects current, with additional structural limitations provided by the surrounding claim language.” PO Resp. 17–21. Patent Owner, however, also states that “[t]he Board need not construe the ‘current selection module’ terms because analysis of the prior art does not turn on claim construction.” PO Resp. 18. Patent Owner states it “is not disputing that the prior art discloses ‘current selection modules,’ per se, regardless of which claim construction the Board adopts”; rather, Patent Owner contends “that the current selection modules in the prior art fail to satisfy other claim requirements.” PO Resp. 18. Because there is no dispute between the parties the resolution of which turns on whether the “current selection module” phrases of claims 1 and 12 invoke § 112 ¶ 6, we need not resolve this issue to decide the patentability challenges before us. See Realtime Data, 912 F.3d at 1368.” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “for the combination and that “Petitioner cites no disclosure from any of the references or background materials suggesting that the cited current supplies were known, interchangeable alternatives.” PO Resp. 60–61. We disagree. As discussed above, Shumarayev discloses separate and independent programmable current supplies for the main driver and the pre-emphasis driver. Ex. 1007, 6:10–17, 6:24–27, Fig. 6. This is an alternative to Groen’s disclosure of separately controlled current select modules (DACs 400 and 402) where DAC 402’s input reference current is the current that is output from DAC 400. Ex. 1004, 5:4–8, Fig. 4. Patent Owner also argues that making a control circuit programmable is more complex than making a non-programmable circuit because “a designer would need to add means to store what is programmed, thus involving more than simple PMOS and NMOS transistors” and requiring additional fabrication steps. PO Resp. 62–63 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 70). Both Groen and Shumarayev, however, disclose programmable current sources for pre-emphasis and drive circuitry. Groen’s DAC 400 produces a reference current based on a 5-bit code, and Groen’s DAC 402 produces an emphasis current based on a 3-bit code. Ex. 1004, 4:51–58, Fig. 4. Shumarayev’s driver 44a includes programmable current supplies 56a and 56b, and pre-emphasis driver 44b includes current supplies 58a and 58b that produce an “amount of current that . . . may be controlled by programming how Petitioner’s reliance on Shumarayev’s teachings of separate and independent current sources for main and pre-emphasis drivers introduces any complexity due to the need to make the current sources programmable. Patent Owner also points to Shumarayev’s statement that “there may be consequences of providing too much programmable circuitry” (Ex. 1007, 8:3–4) as suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Shumarayev’s teachings with Groen and Gauthier. PO Resp. 64 (quoting Ex. 1007, 8:3–4). According to Patent Owner, Shumarayev’s statement “suggests that the inventors of the ’132 patent, who were able to build successful circuits with independently programmable primary and pre-emphasis current levels, had to overcome various design challenges.” PO Resp. 64 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 72). We disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. Groen discloses programmability to address “a need in the art for a driver circuit that can select from numerous possible data communication operating modes.” Ex. 1004, 1:32–38. The whole purpose of Groen is to accommodate different driver modes by controlling the drive and emphasis currents. Ex. 1004, 3:50–59 (Table 1), 4:1–13 (Table 2), 5:55–67. Shumarayev, similarly, teaches programmable circuitry to accommodate different “I/O standards such as LVPECL, LVDS, PCML, etc.” Ex. 1007, 6:20–23, 7:57–67. Shumarayev then teaches a simplifying alternative, namely, “replac[ing] some or all of the programmable circuitry in I/O circuits 16 with hardwired circuitry.” Ex. 1007, 8:4–7. Thus, we hardly see why a person of ordinary skill in the art would be discouraged from the combination by the alleged complexities of programmability when both Groen and Shumarayev are expressly directed to such programmability.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 6,975,132 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,975,132
• Analog Devices, Inc. v. Xilinx, Inc. And Xilinx Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 13, 2022 · IPR2020-01596 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8–12, and 15–17 are unpatentable as obvious over OneChip and ORT8850; claims 6, 7, 13, and 14 were not shown unpatentable because QL80FC was excluded.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Dr. Nelson’s opinion that a person skilled in the art would have had at least the education and experience indicated necessarily encompasses persons having the minimum level of education and experience. It is axiomatic that something that was known or would have been obvious to a person having a minimum level of education and experience would necessarily have been known or obvious to a person having the same or a higher level of education or experience. As we indicated in our Institution Decision, “the level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior art and the claimed invention.” Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In our analysis below, we consider all evidence as if viewed by a person having the minimum level of education and experience identified by Dr. Nelson, i.e., having “the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or related field and 3-5 years of professional experience in computer systems design, circuit design, or equivalent academic experience.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 6.” slip op. at 24

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedGranted in part

    “the parties, we find Petitioner has failed to authenticate Exhibit 1008, and that the dates printed on the faces of Exhibit 1008 and Exhibit A of the Rosenberg declaration are hearsay. Exhibit A of the Rosenberg declaration contains two archived versions, dated September 3, 2000 and October 23, 2000, of the webpage www.quicklogic.com/devices/QuickFC/Default.html. Ex. 1019, Ex. A. The “second page” of the archived webpage contains a link entitled “QuickFC Device DataSheet.” Id. However, as Patent Owner correctly argues, “the Rosenberg Affidavit only purports to ‘attest[] to the authenticity of the archived and dated QuickFC webpages’—not the purportedly linked to [QL80FC] exhibits” and “[t]he Rosenberg Affidavit neither references QL80FC nor makes any assertion of a connection between QL80FC and the webpages shown in the printouts.” PO Resp. 53–54. Petitioner offers no testimony from a custodian of records for the QL80FC product, as they did for the ORT8850 product, to support a finding that Exhibit 1008 is what Petitioner purports it to be. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). Moreover, we disagree with Petitioner’s contentions that FREs 703, 901(b)(4) or 902(7) authenticate or provide a basis to forego excluding Exhibit 1008. FRE 703 allows an expert to base his or her opinion on facts or data an expert in the field would reasonably rely on, even if they are not themselves admissible. Id. 703. They do not prohibit the exclusion of inadmissible evidence or allow for the admission of otherwise excludable evidence. Although FRE 901(b)(4) does allow evidence to be admitted based on its “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,” Petitioner has not shown that Exhibit 1008 contains sufficient distinctive characteristics to authenticate it. The only characteristic of Exhibit 1008 that tends to show that it is a QuickLogic datasheet for the QL80FC product is the appearance of QuickLogic’s name and logo on the datasheet. See Ex, 1008. But Petitioner fails to present authenticated versions of other QuickLogic data sheets to demonstrate how the structure, format, and appearance of QL80FC is consistent with their structure, format, and appearance. See Pet. Reply 22–23; Opp. 14–15. Finally, FRE 902(7) does not authenticate Exhibit 1008, it only authenticates any “inscription[s], sign[s], tag[s], or label[s]” affixed to Exhibit 1008. See Fed.R.Evid. 902(7). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we find Petitioner has failed to authenticate Exhibit 1008, and we exclude Exhibit 1008 from this proceeding.” slip op. at 22

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “1. Programmable Fabric / Programmable Fabric Circuitry Petitioner contends these terms “refer to user programmable circuitry capable of being programmed to implement arbitrary, as opposed to specific, logic functions.” Pet. 10. In our Institution Decision, we determined the precise meanings of these terms were not in dispute and, therefore, declined to expressly construe them. See Dec. Inst. 19–20 (citing Nidec Motor, 868 F.3d at 1017). Neither party disputes that finding, which we maintain here. See PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 3–30.” slip op. at 26

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “maintain our preliminary construction that the plain and ordinary meaning of the transceiver component limitation requires the LOS detector to be “a transceiver component having selectable values that is configured by the plurality of configuration memory cells.” The limitation requires “a plurality of transceivers containing respective components having selectable values,” wherein “said components [are] configured by . . . memory cells,” and wherein “one of said components is a loss of synchronization detector.” Ex. 1001, 6:32–36 (emphases added). Thus, the LOS detector is one of the transceiver components referred to earlier, i.e., one of “said components” “having selectable values” that is “configured by . . . memory cells.” Id. The Specification is consistent with this interpretation. It discloses a transceiver whose receiver side includes deserializer/comma detector 174, decoder 178, elastic buffer 182, CRC 186, and LOS 188.10 Id., Fig. 3. Each of these components is described as being configurable and having selectable values. Id. at 4:54–6:7. Moreover, our interpretation does not render superfluous the use of the term “configurable” in other limitations. To the contrary, the transceiver components limitation only requires transceiver components identified as “one of said components,” i.e., as one of the “respective components having selectable values” to be configurable. It does not require every transceiver component to be configurable because not every transceiver component has to be identified as “one of said components.” Thus, because the serializer and deserializer are not identified as “one of said components” in the “transceiver components” limitation, that limitation does not require that they be configurable. As a result, the claim’s later requirement of “a configurable serializer” and “a configurable deserializer” is not superfluous.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,187,709 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,187,709

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.