• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• Adobe Inc. v. Jonathan E. JaffeNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01352 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted §103 ground because the references did not teach monitoring the physical coupling between the sensor and memory.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The Institution Decision adopted and applied Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because Petitioner’s “definition generally comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “The parties present various claim construction arguments, disputing the meaning of three limitations recited in claim 1: “a sensor, which is tightly coupled to said memory”; “monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor”; and “based on.” See Pet. 9–14; PO Resp. 5–12; Pet. Reply 4–9; PO Sur-reply 4–11. For purposes of this Decision, we do not need to discuss the construction of “based on.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). As explained below, this Decision turns on whether Glass or Rieger discloses limitation [1c] reciting “monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor.” Ex. 1001, 20:65–66; see infra §§ II.C.2, II.E.1, II.F. That limitation recites an element which overlaps with the earlier-recited limitation “a sensor, which is tightly coupled to said memory.” To reach our decision, we need only provide a limited discussion of two of the parties’ claim construction arguments. Our analysis follows.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “said integrity is compromised, then also providing an indication of said compromised integrity.” Ex. 1001, 20:65–21:2. Although Petitioner points out that the limitation does not expressly recite “‘specifically’ monitoring the tight coupling” (Pet. Reply 8), the structure of the clause suggests that the tight coupling is specifically monitored. At a high level, the limitation is straightforward in its recitation that the integrity being monitored is “of the tight coupling” (Ex. 1001, 20:65–66 (emphasis added)), plainly suggesting that the tight coupling is specifically monitored. More granularly, breaking the relevant clause down to its grammatical parts, the clause recites a gerund (“monitoring”) acting on a direct object (“the integrity”) which is modified by a prepositional phrase (“of the tight coupling”). Notably, the object of the preposition (“of”) is “the tight coupling.” Altogether, this reads that the integrity being monitored is specifically of the tight coupling. Also, the claim recites that “if said integrity is compromised, then also providing an indication of said compromised integrity.” Therefore, from the claim language we know that the “integrity” of the tight coupling is something that may be “compromised,” which is consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed construction of determining whether the physical coupling has been “accessed or disturbed.” Petitioner’s interpretation effectively inserts additional language into the limitation such that the limitation includes monitoring the integrity of a device containing or surrounding the tight coupling, such as a camera (or camera housing), e.g., “monitoring the integrity of a camera that includes the tight coupling.” But, because the plain reading and the structure of the limitation reads that it is specifically the tight coupling’s integrity—not another physical structure, like a camera—which is being monitored, a monitored is not consistent with the language of the claim. See PO Resp. 9 (arguing that “Petitioner’s construction is improper because the claim language explicitly requires monitoring the physical coupling between the memory and the sensor as opposed to some third structure” (emphasis omitted)).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “package 50 does not specifically monitor the integrity of the coupling between Glass’s sensor and the memory and, instead, argues that Glass detects tampering of all “the components and interconnections contained in that packaging,” e.g., control logic 44, cropper 46, compressor 47, MUX 45, code generator 48, and the various interconnections between those components. See Pet. Reply 16; Ex. 1005, 5:13–41. As explained above, we construe “monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor” to mean determining whether the physical 7 Petitioner does not assert that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Glass’s device in any way; Petitioner solely argues that Glass teaches limitation [1c], based on Petitioner’s proposed claim construction. See Pet. 30–32 (“Glass discloses this limitation.”); Pet. Reply 16–17 (“Glass and Rieger disclose the ‘monitoring’ step.”). disturbed, which specifically requires monitoring the physical coupling between the sensor and the memory. See supra § II.C.2. As we agree with Patent Owner that this limitation requires monitoring the physical coupling between the sensor and the memory, monitoring Glass’s tamper resistant package 50 does not teach or disclose “monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor.” Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner fails to show that Glass teaches or suggests [1c] monitoring the integrity of the tight coupling between said memory and said sensor when said at least one internal and unique parameter is generated, and, if said integrity is compromised, then also providing an indication of said compromised integrity, as required by claim 1. Consequently, we determine that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Glass.8” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 6,757,828 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,757,828
• Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,023,203
• Dynaenergetics Europe GmbH / Dynaenergetics US, Inc. v. Qinetiq LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2024 · PGR2023-00003 · APJ William A Capp · PGR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–5 not unpatentable; Petitioner failed to prove its asserted §101, §102, §103, and §112 grounds, including indefiniteness and written-description challenges.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “prevail, Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Serra testifies that he is familiar with the” slip op. at 45

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “process of claim 1. The first principal decision is the selection of a known liner design from a library that is made at the beginning of the design process. The second principal decision is made at the conclusion of the design process where a “final liner design” emerges after hole shapes produced by modified liners converge toward the desired hole shape. A person of ordinary skill in the art, having read claim 1 in context, would understand that the term “optimized” in the claim refers to the hole shape of the known liner design that is selected from among the known liner designs in the library during the selection step of the claim. A person of ordinary skill in the art would similarly understand that the design that is chosen in the initial selection process is “optimized” with respect to the population of known liner designs in the library as opposed to being “optimized” relative to liner designs produced during the later varying and modelling steps of the design process.” slip op. at 26

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that claims 1–5 of the ’039” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 11,215,039 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Bilski · Phillips · Markman · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,215,039
• Bj’S Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc. v. Walmart Apollo, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 4, 2024 · IPR2022-01496 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because the cited combinations failed to teach required claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “including mobile device applications.” Pet. 8 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Petitioner also contends that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner adds that a POSA could also have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, but otherwise agrees with Petitioner’s definition of a POSA. PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 74–78). We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, but, add that the person of ordinary skill in the art could also have a bachelor’s degree in computer science because that is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’187 patent and the prior art. Our Decision, however, would not be affected if we adopted Petitioner’s level of skill in the art. D. Claims 1–21: Obviousness in View of Poole and Hammad” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We credit Dr. Long’s uncontroverted testimony on the topic of “authentication,” which he supports with citations to objective evidence. Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 26–31 (citing Ex. 2020, 594, 595, 626, 627, 632, 633, 636). He describes the three types of user authentication as being based upon what a user “knows,” “has,” or “is.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 28 (citing Ex. 2020, 627). He testifies that authentication based on what a user “knows” involves entering a user name and password or answering security questions. Id. ¶ 29 (citing Ex. 2020, 632–633). He further explains that the second type of authentication based on a user providing something that they “have,” involves the user providing, for example, “a key to a door” or an “ATM card.” Id. ¶ 30 (citing Ex. 2020, 633). Regarding the last way of authentication, Dr. Long testifies that the third method, providing something that the user “is,” such as a user’s biometric characteristic like a fingerprint or image of a face. Id. ¶ 31 (citing Ex. 2020, 636).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “However, none of the cited material within Poole (¶¶ 32, 48, 88, 94) supports Petitioner’s contention. Poole’s ¶ 32 describes sensors 214 having a “sensor identifier” that “may be used by . . . customer device 220 . . . to identify and/or locate sensor 214,” but wholly fails to describe scanning a machine-readable element to decode location information. Ex. 1006 ¶ 32. Poole’s ¶ 48 explains: information contained in signals transmitted by sensors 214 may include a Bluetooth identifier, Bluetooth profile, sensor identifier, and/or sensor position. The sensor identifier of each sensor 214 may be stored in association with a known position of sensor 214 in memory 306, storage medium 308, and/or database 314. Customer device 220 may retrieve a position or sensor identifier of sensor 214 located near customer device 220 based on the stored information. Id. ¶ 48. This paragraph similarly fails to describe that customer device 220 scans a barcode to decode location information, but instead describes device 220 receiving a wireless signal from sensor 214 used to obtain the position of the sensor from a database. Id. Barcodes are not discussed at all in Poole’s ¶ 48. Id.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,368,187 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,368,187
• Bj’S Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc. v. Walmart Apollo, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 3, 2024 · IPR2022-01509 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable over Poole and Hammad because the combination did not teach the claimed machine-readable element, and Poole did not teach the claimed scanning and decoding.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “priority date would have had a ‘bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering (or equivalent subject) together with one to two years of experience in research, design, development, and/or testing of location-based systems including mobile device applications,’” also noting that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 20). Patent Owner adds that a person of ordinary skill in the art “could also have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, but otherwise agrees with Petitioner’s definition.” PO Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 54–58). We apply Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, but, add that the person of ordinary skill in the art could also have a bachelor’s degree in computer science because that is consistent with the problems addressed in the ’188 patent and the prior art. Our Decision, however, would not be affected if we adopted Petitioner’s level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes a specific construction for any claim term. Pet. 8–9; PO Resp. 17. Based on our review of the record, we determine it is not necessary to construe expressly any claim term for the purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on the disclosure of Poole and Hammad, we find that Petitioner’s argument that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have understood that the QR code generated and displayed by Hammad would perform the same function as the barcode taught by Poole” (Pet. 16) is not supported by the evidence of record. Poole does not teach that a user can initiate a purchase transaction by scanning Poole’s barcode. Poole discloses that a bar code on sensor 214 can be scanned to identify the sensor and that a 5 Petitioner states: “[t]o the extent that Poole does not expressly disclose a ‘machine readable element generator . . .’, Hammad does.” Pet. 13. To the extent that this statement can be construed as an argument that Poole alone satisfies limitation 1[d], Petitioner does not direct us to any disclosure that Poole teaches “a machine-readable element generator.” See Pet. 11–13. Petitioner relies on Poole’s disclosure in paragraph 94 of “scanning a bar code.” Id. at 12. Poole’s paragraph 94 does not address how the barcode is generated. Ex. 1006 ¶ 94. Consequently, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden to show that Poole alone teaches “a machine-readable element generator” as recited in limitation 1[d]. bar code on a merchandise item is scanned to identify the merchandise item as part of the store inventory management process. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 94, 97. Petitioner, thus, does not persuade us that Hammad’s use of a QR code to initiate a purchase transaction is functionally equivalent to the use of Poole’s barcode.” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Mr. Williams provides testimony that cites to the same evidence as the Petition and similarly concludes that Hammad’s QR code performs the same function as the barcode taught by Poole. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103–105. Because we find that Poole and Hammad themselves fail to support this conclusion, his testimony is unsupported and thus entitled to little, if any, weight. Additionally, he testifies that Poole’s mobile application scans the bar code. Id. ¶ 118. His testimony that Poole’s mobile application scans the barcode, like the Petition, relies on paragraphs 32 and 94 of Poole. Although Poole describes its customer device 220 wirelessly receiving “a coordinate position” of sensor 214, Poole does not describe its customer device 220 receiving location information by scanning a barcode. Ex. 1006 ¶ 32. When Poole does describe using a barcode to convey sensor identifiers including location information for the sensor, it does so in the context of its description of inventory management, but not in connection with the customer’s use of customer device 220. Id. ¶¶ 94, 95. Consequently, Mr. Williams’s testimony on this point is entitled to little, if any, weight because it is not supported by paragraphs 32 and 94 of Poole.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 10,368,188 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,368,188
• Apple Inc. v. Logantree, LPNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00037 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 8–11, 20, 25, 30–32, 36, 39–42, 45–51, 61–65, 144, and 147 were not shown unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, stating it was “consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art.” Dec. Inst. 8. In proposing a different level of ordinary skill in the art, Patent Owner does not explain why its proposed skill level is more appropriate.12 PO Resp. 16. In addition, the parties’ proposed definitions are materially similar. 12 Petitioner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Reply. definition, although our conclusions with respect to obviousness would be the same if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that we need not expressly construe “movement sensor” to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs, 200 F.3d at 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent the parties raise claim construction issues in addressing the asserted grounds, we address such issues below.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Also, the Petition merely states that “Ono supports instances where the user stops the step-counting mode operation using switch S2 after the processor detects that” the target distance or the target number of steps has been reached and notifies the user by generating an alarm sound. Pet. 53 (emphasis added). In this case, supporting the notion of the user stopping the step-counting mode operation in response to the alarm is not the same as teaching or suggesting the notion to one of ordinary skill in the art. The possibility that a user could stop the step-counting operation in response the alarm is insufficient to render claims 1 and 20 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Facebook, Inc., 743 F. App’x. 998, 1001–02 (Fed Cir. 2018) (deciding that an example in a prior art reference showing that it is possible for image elements to be contiguous is not sufficient to teach a LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”). Petitioner’s reliance on the Hewlett-Packard and Unwired Planet cases (Pet. 56) is unavailing, as the facts in those cases are distinguishable from the facts of the present proceeding. Namely, both of those cases involved prior art references that disclosed operations that satisfied a claimed feature some, but not all, of the time. Hewlett-Packard, 340 F.3d at 1326; Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1002. Here, Ono does not disclose the user stopping the step-counting mode operation in response to the alarm even some of the time. In view of the above, we determine, based on the full record, that the combination of Ono and Hutchings does not disclose limitations [1f] or [20f]. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claims 1 and 20 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono and Hutchings.” slip op. at 28

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “We have determined incorporated Grounds 1, 2, 3A, 3B, and 4, as well as Ground 5A, deficient for the reasons discussed above. Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner contends that any of these combinations somehow adds something to supplement or strengthen the patentability analysis of the incorporated grounds, we note that neither the Petition nor Dr. Kenny provides sufficient particularity to support such a position. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3))). Accordingly, we are not persuaded on the complete record before us that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) claims 48, 50, and 51 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Amano, Conlan, Kaufman, and Hickman (Ground 5B); (2) claims 1–5, 8–11, 20, 25, 30, 31, 36, 39–42, 45–47, 49, and 61–65 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Amano, and Conlan (Ground 6A); (3) claims 48, 50, and 51 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Amano, Conlan, and Hickman (Ground 6B); (4) claims 1, 3–5, 8–11, 20, 25, 30, 36, 39–42, 61–65, 144, and 147 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Amano, and Kaufman (Ground 7); (5) claims 1–5, 8, 10, 20, 25, 30, 31, 39, 41, 42, 45–47, 49, 61–65, 144, and 147 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Conlan, and Kaufman (Ground 8A); and (6) claims 48, 50, and 51 are unpatentable over the combination of Ono, Hutchings, Conlan, Kaufman, and Hickman (Ground 8B).” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 6,059,576 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,059,576
• Valve Corporation v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2023 · IPR2017-00858 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand

  Claims 18, 19, 21, 26, and 29 were not shown unpatentable as obvious because Valve did not provide a reasoned basis to combine Burns with the design references.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “testimony relating to the combinations of Burns with LaCelle or Knight, it falls short of providing a reasoned basis for modifying Burns. Dr. Rempel merely opines that incorporating the curved shapes of back controls from LaCelle or Knight into Burns would result in a back control that “could have better coupling with the user’s finger than the flat paddles that are otherwise disclosed by Burns.” Ex. 1019 ¶¶ 39–40 (emphasis added). In other words, modifying Burns in view of LaCelle or Knight might improve Burns. Dr. Rempel testified that the modification “could” improve Burns, not that it “would” improve Burns. The possibility of improvement, which also allows that Burns would not be improved, fails to rise to the level of “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Accordingly, we find such testimony to be insufficient to demonstrate that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have modified Burns in view of LaCelle or Knight. After considering the parties’ briefing, we conclude that Valve’s arguments and supporting evidence for combining teachings of Burns with each one of the Design References, excluding the untimely evidence submitted with Valve’s Supplemental Reply, are unpersuasive. Neither the Petition nor the evidence cited in the Petition cogently explains what advantage would be provided by the alternative control geometries of Burns and each of the Design References. A petitioner cannot demonstrate obviousness “by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988). Here, we find that Valve proffers conclusions without sufficient reasoning or objective evidence to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of establishing that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to combine the elements from the prior art to arrive at the claimed controllers.” slip op. at 17

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “this simple and predictable art, and the results would not have been unexpected.” Id. (citing Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 21, 27, 32). Dr. Rempel cites no objective evidence to support this cited testimony, which largely parrots Valve’s brief. Compare id., with Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 21, 27, 32. Dr. Rempel’s testimony is entitled to less weight because it is not supported by underlying facts or data. See 37 CFR § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 15

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted in part

    “It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify “with particularity” the “evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). “All arguments for the relief requested in a motion must be made in the motion. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding opposition or patent owner response.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We find that: (1) Valve proffered new testimony to fill the gaps that we identified in the Institution Decision and (2) presenting such testimony in the reply constitutes untimely new argument and evidence that must have been presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 9,289,688 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,289,688
• SHDS, Inc. / Galderma Laboratories, L.P. v. Truinject Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 15, 2021 · IPR2020-00937 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 6–16, and 20–26 were not shown unpatentable because the petition did not account for required simulated therapeutic-agent delivery and real-time digital-plunger limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “In light of the parties’ mutually acknowledged agreement of the meaning of the noted-term, and given that we do not see reason on the record before us to deviate from that meaning, we apply the same meaning of “a simulated flow of therapeutic agent delivered from the digital model of the syringe to the digital model of the training apparatus” to the noted claim phrase and consider no further construction to be necessary. 3. Remaining Claim Terms We discern that no other term needs an express construction to resolve the parties’ dispute. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Thus, Patent Owner proposes a construction of the above-noted phrase as “a simulated flow of therapeutic agent delivered from the digital model of the syringe to the digital model of the training apparatus.” Petitioner acknowledges that “the parties agreed to the construction of this term in the Delaware Action. No further construction of the term is required.” Pet. Reply 5. In light of the parties’ mutually acknowledged agreement of the meaning of the noted-term, and given that we do not see reason on the record before us to deviate from that meaning, we apply the same meaning of “a simulated flow of therapeutic agent delivered from the digital model of the syringe to the digital model of the training apparatus” to the noted claim phrase and consider no further construction to be necessary.” slip op. at 9

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “on Lampotang’s paragraph 89, Petitioner attempts to expand its proposed ground, and uses the Petitioner Reply to do so. To that end, Petitioner turns to specific disclosure of Samosky at paragraph 67 as providing an evidentiary basis to conclude that depiction of a simulated delivery of a therapeutic agent “would have been obvious.” Pet. Reply 14. A reply provides an opportunity for a party to respond to arguments made, for instance, in a patent owner response. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). A reply, however, is not an appropriate vehicle to reconfigure a proposed ground based on new or additional evidence that is not reasonably tied to a ground advanced in the Petition, which is what Petitioner seeks to do here. The Petition does not set forth an adequate basis to conclude that Petitioner relied on Samosky’s teachings to account for features of claim 1 of the ’232 patent. As Patent Owner points out (PO Sur-reply 13–14), it is impermissible and untimely for Petitioner to now attempt to do so as a part of the Reply. See, e.g., Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[A]n [inter partes review] petitioner may not raise in reply ‘an entirely new rationale’ for why a claim would have been obvious.”) (citing Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).” slip op. at 21

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Lampotang’s disclosure with reference to Figure 2 focuses on the CVL technique, which involves withdrawing blood from a blood vessel rather than injecting medication into the patient’s body. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 89-90. The CVL technique is not concerned with visualizing a simulated flow of therapeutic agent delivered from a digital model of the syringe to the digital model of the training apparatus. Ex. 2005 ¶ 102; see PO Resp. 41. We credit Dr. Pugh’s testimony on this matter, as we find it consistent with Lampotang’s disclosure as to the content of its Figure 2 and Lampotang’s description of the CVL technique. See, e.g., Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 78, 89–90.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,290,232 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,290,232
• Garmin International, Inc. / Garmin USA, Inc. v. Logantree, LPNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 28, 2019 · IPR2018-00565 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–14, 56–58, 140, 144, and 146 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over the instituted combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties’ respective proposals are substantially similar such that there is no apparent dispute between the parties. Also, based on our review of the record before us, we find that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Thus, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition. We note, however, that our findings in this proceeding would not differ under Patent Owner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The ’576 patent does not include an explicit definition for “interpreting.” See generally Ex. 1001. We note, however, that claims 1 and 13 recite “a “microprocessor capable of . . . interpreting . . . said movement data.” With this language in mind, the ’576 patent discloses that the device “employs a user-programmable microprocessor which receives, interprets, stores and responds to the movement data.” Id. at 2:13–15; see also id. at Abstract (making substantially similar statement). These disclosures indicate that “interpreting” is distinct from receiving, storing, and responding to the data, and are consistent with claims 1 and 13, which recite “interpreting” distinctly from receiving, storing, and responding. Furthermore, the ’576 patent discloses that microprocessor 32 “receives the signals generated by the movement sensor 30 for analysis and subsequent processing” and “analyzes and responds to the movement data signals from the sensor 30.” Id. at 4:52–57 (emphases added). Therefore, in the context of the claims and the Specification of the ’576 patent, we determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of the phrase “interpreting . . . said movement data” is “analyzing the movement data.”” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Decided for petitioner

    “We note, however, that Federal Circuit has recently held that “the retroactive application of IPR proceedings to pre-AIA patents is not an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.” Celgene Corp. v. Peter, No. 2018-1167, 2019 WL 3418549, at *16 (Fed. Cir. July 30, 2019). The Federal Circuit addressed arguments made under both the due process and takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment in so holding. Id. at *11–16. We discern no other argument from Patent Owner in this case other than those expressly rejected by the Federal Circuit. Thus, in view of Celgene, we find Patent Owner’s argument unpersuasive.” slip op. at 13

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “On balance, we are not persuaded on the full record that Stewart discloses that processor 52 controls the comparing function. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of establishing that Stewart’s processor 52 interprets movement data. Regarding the limitation of the microprocessor being capable of “detecting a first user-defined event based on the movement data and at least one of the user-defined operational parameters regarding the movement data,” Petitioner asserts that Stewart discloses a processor detecting an event, such as a spearing movement in football, based on acceleration data and a defined/predetermined threshold. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1004, 5:4–7, 14:6–11). Petitioner also asserts that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Stewart’s system to enable user adjustment of the predetermined threshold to accommodate different users as taught by Rush. Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 59). As an initial point, we note that Petitioner relies on the same disclosures from Stewart (i.e., Ex. 1004, 5:4–7, 14:6–11) for disclosing both interpreting data and detecting an event, but does not provide a sufficient explanation of how these same disclosures teach two different claim limitations. Moreover, we disagree that Stewart expressly discloses that processor 52 detects an event such as spearing. Stewart merely discloses that it may be “possible to determine if a football player is improperly using his helmet (e.g., illegal spearing)” without specifying that such determination is performed by processor 52. See Ex. 1004, 14:4–14). As discussed above, Stewart’s disclosure with respect to the accelerometer responses exceeding a predetermined threshold indicates that this processing is accomplished by a receiver remote from the self-contained helmet system and, thus, is not performed by the processor. See id. at 14:6–9 (disclosing that when correlating accelerometer responses “with desirable punches exceeding a predetermined threshold,” the responses are “processed and scored at a ringside receiver”). For these reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Stewart and Rush teaches or suggests the detecting limitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 6,059,576 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,059,576

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.